(President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vice President elect Harry S. Truman, Vice President Henry Wallace)

During my forty-four year teaching career on the secondary and university level I was often asked; “Who is your favorite President?”  The answer came very easily, Harry S. Truman.  My response was based on his personality, moral code, and his actions during his lifetime culminating in the presidency.  My opinion is not based on hagiography, but on a clear view of his important successes, and the mistakes that he made.  There have been a number of important biographies written about Truman, perhaps the best are the works of Alonzo Hamby and David McCullough.  Both are balanced and quite readable.  The latest effort to unmask the thirty-third president is Jeffrey Frank’s THE TRIALS OF HARRY S. TRUMAN: THE EXTRAORDINARY PRESIDENCY OF AN ORDINARY MAN, 1945-1953 which focuses on the major decisions made during his administration, and whether they were the correct ones that resulted in success, and those that ended in failure.  Truman, like most people, is a complex person who assumed the presidency at a time when the world was still in crisis and Frank delves deeply into how he managed those calamities and whether his approach was correct or flawed.

Upon entering the White House with the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman was unprepared as the deceased president had kept him in the dark about virtually everything before dying three months into his fourth term.  Truman’s position was untenable due to a myriad of crises he was forced to confront, making decisions, whose impact still reverberates in today’s world.  Frank’s goal is to reevaluate Truman’s presidency and his decision making, puncturing the myth of his “Give Him Hell Harry” persona while concentrating on foreign policy issues, and less so on the Fair Deal, Truman’s domestic agenda.  According to historian James Taub in his April 10, 2022,  New York Times book review; “biographies have a built in bias toward giving their subjects too much credit for anything within reach; Frank leans almost in the opposite direction,” focusing more on Truman’s imperfections.  In Frank’s case he leans almost totally in the opposite direction in presenting an important contribution to the Truman literature analyzing many of the important achievements and disappointments during his administration.                             

(President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur at Wake Island, October 14, 1950)

Frank immediately offers an astute analysis of Truman’s personality and decision making that would impact American foreign policy for generations.  He considered indecisiveness to be a character flaw which allowed him to decide questions quickly and intuitively – “making what he called ‘jump decisions’ with all the risks of undue haste.”  This trait was evident throughout his presidency.  Truman was an insecure man based on his background and earlier career possessing an imperfect knowledge of the people around him, some of whom like Secretary of State James Byrne and Vice President Henry Wallace believed that they should have been president.  The problem was that he met many of his cabinet members and administration officials for the first time on assuming office.  Further he was too deferential to military leaders, especially George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Douglas MacArthur.  One individual he relied on a great deal was his fourth Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, whose stubbornness concerning the Cold War would lead Truman into many dangerous policy decisions.  To better understand Truman, it helps to understand how he was guided and affected by these men and others, i.e., political enemies in Congress, a generation of powerful newspaper columnists who disliked Truman, assorted scientists and engineers, and “hangers-on from Missouri,”  who cast doubt concerning his integrity.  Frank continues arguing that Truman liked the reputation of honesty and directness, but he could fudge, and lie, when he felt concerned or embarrassed.  He had a temper and like most presidents held grudges especially if it involved his family.  This is an astute analysis that captures Truman’s true nature and how it impacted the impactful decisions he was forced to make. 

The decision making process is evident throughout the narrative.  In a book that was dominated by the decision making that led to the Korean War and the resulting “police action” and its results, and policies surrounding the use of and the possibility of sharing atomic secrets which led to the hydrogen bomb and the nuclear arms race, the author does not provide enough depth in his discussions of other important policies.   The process that  created the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Crisis, and the creation of NATO needed greater discussion as it would have been beneficial for the reader to have been exposed to a more in depth analysis of these measures.      

From the outset Truman viewed the Soviet Union as a country inhabited by “semi-primitives, incapable of advanced thought, a people that somehow had managed to explode a nuclear something.”  He regarded Stalin as “Uncle Joe,” similar to politicians in Jackson, Mo. and held to the idea that the Soviet Politburo, not Stalin, made the major decisions and was to blame for Soviet duplicity.  This attitude is evident  after the Potsdam Conference, the Berlin Crisis, and the Russian decision to support Kim Il-Sung’s invasion of South Korea.  This view was reinforced by his last Secretary of State Dean Acheson who probably had the greatest influence on Truman than any other official and greatly affected the conclusions he reached.

Within the Truman administration there were numerous personality conflicts that needed to be managed.  First, the inability of Acheson to get along with Defense Secretary Louis Johnson.  Second, Truman’s inability to work with Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace due to his left leaning policies; Secretary of State and Defense Secretary George C. Marshall’s dislike of Douglas MacArthur because of his imperious nature; both Acheson and Truman found it difficult to work with then Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who Truman saw as pursuing appeasement toward the Soviet Union; and the plight of Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal’s mental condition fostered difficulties with most individuals that he came in contact with.   These are just a few of the personality conflicts that existed among administration officials.  Throughout these discussions Frank provides an exceptional window into Truman’s personality and thought process.  Further the author provides wonderful descriptions of the many characters that dominated the American domestic and foreign policy scene throughout Truman’s presidency.  His description of George Kennen is a case in point as he describes him as “an enormously perceptive and spookily prescient, qualities that eluded Bynes, whose missteps on Russia were nothing compared to his missteps with Truman.”

(Joseph Stalin, Harry Truman, and Winston Churchill at the Potsdam Conference, July, 1945)

Frank is correct in stressing that the watershed moment for Truman and the coming Cold War was England’s decision to effectively end military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. This would lead to the United States filling the power vacuum in the Middle East and elsewhere as it would culminate in American aid to those countries and ultimately the Marshall Plan which would provide aid to European countries.  Frank could have developed this further as the Marshall Plan was designed as a program to help Europe recover economically so they could serve as markets for American products and enhance the American economy.  This is indicative of Frank’s approach to the many topics in his monograph.  While he does delve into the creation of the European Recovery Act, another name for the Marshall Plan, he gives short shrift to other areas.

Another watershed event that Frank is correctly addresses his discussion of the 1948 election where an underdog Truman shocks the political world by defeating New York governor Thomas Dewey.  For nearly four years the Truman presidency experienced a great deal of success in the foreign policy realm, though less so domestically.  However, in the ensuing four years Truman would not be as successful and was prone to make poor decisions.

A further turning point was the implementation of NSC 68 as it should be seen as a lesson in how American foreign policy was being developed – shaped by the expanding role of the nation’s defense and intelligence agencies.  The document called for a massive increase in defense spending in the hazardous post-war world which would allow the United States to confront and contain Soviet expansion.  It is clear that the document was impacted by the “who lost China?” debate and the rise of Joseph McCarthy, two issues that Frank should have discussed in greater detail.

Frank takes his deepest dives when discussing the implications of decisions relating to the development of the Atomic bomb and its use, and events surrounding the Korean war.  A number of scientists involved in the A bomb project favored sharing the technology and the creation of an international regulating body as a means of preventing a nuclear arms race.  Truman was adamant in his opposition concerning the sharing of nuclear knowledge, but did support a role for the international community to regulate peaceful ways to use that information.  Further, Truman had no qualms about dropping the two atomic devices, and if Japan had not surrendered he would have approved dropping a third bomb because his advisors inflated the Soviet menace, and the US needed to project unflinching firmness which would send a message to Stalin.  In the end, because of Acheson’s influence the International Atomic Energy Commission was created as well as the Atomic Energy Committee domestically.

(Korean War, June–August 1950 Map showing North Korean advances in the Korean War in June–August 1950)

The Korean War proved to be Truman’s Rubicon as he committed US troops to beat back the North Korean invasion and allowed MacArthur to cross the Yalu River with American troops provoking Chinese entry into the conflict.  Truman and Acheson believed that the Soviet Union was behind the North Korean invasion as Stalin was influenced by Acheson’s “defense perimeter speech” on January 12, 1950, which omitted South Korea.  Truman’s belief in what would become the “domino theory” at a time when the Sino-Soviet split was in its early stages is a total misreading of the struggle between Mao Zedong and Stalin for leadership in the Communist world which would impact US foreign policy for two decades.

The role of General Douglas MacArthur is especially important because Truman did not rein him in and almost gave him card blanche to conduct the war anyway he saw fit.  This would lead to China’s entrance into the war which would prolong the “bloody” police action for almost three years.  Further, the Wake Island conference between Truman and MacArthur reflected the general’s disrespect for the president as he treated Truman as his equal and provided false information concerning Chinese intentions as Truman did not stand up to military figures until in this case it was too late.  The summary notes of the meeting reflect “a chronicle of extraordinary disrespect by a general toward his commander-in-chief.  Out of pride, or unwilling suspension of disbelief, Truman was unable to recognize the impertinence before his eyes.”

(Margaret, Harry, and Bess Truman)

According to Frank, Truman “saw the North Korean invasion not only as a test of national will, but of his personal backbone.  Truman was in a quandary, partly of his own making.  To do nothing meant ignoring the administration’s policy blueprint, NSC-68;  risking American prestige; and possibly surrendering Korea and Formosa.”  However, if he chose the military option, with available manpower, there was no way to predict, or control what might happen next as Eisenhower warned him.  Interestingly, in the midst of the crisis when Chinese troops crossed the Yalu in late November 1950 Truman committed a major faux pas when asked at a press conference if he would deploy Atomic weapons, Truman responded, “There has always been active consideration of its use…it includes every weapon we have.”  This would send allies into an uproar and allowed MacArthur to begin  choosing the North Korean sites he would use atomic weapons to destroy.

Despite Truman’s limitations, according to Henry Dykstal:  “it is remarkable how much he accomplished despite this. Truman set the terms for the post–World War II alliances and determined how the Cold War would be fought for decades. He began the government’s response to the Civil Rights movement by desegregating the armed forces. And when Medicare passed in 1965, Truman was given the first card in recognition of his pioneering efforts in creating a health-care safety net.

(Secretary of State Dean Acheson)

He was a private, ordinary man: the last president not to have gone to college, a man who was chosen to be vice president for lack of a better option. He took hell from all sides and left, if not popular, with some everyday dignity. He and Bess departed Washington by themselves in their own ’53 Chrysler, staying in modest motor courts and unaccompanied by security on the way home to Missouri. Frank has made a case for a man who, when given the responsibility of the entire country, was able to thread many needles, based on personal confidence, trust in the right people, and healthy relationships with family and friends.”*  But one must remember in the end Truman held an unrealistic view of American power.  As Frank argues “he held fast to the confident, and ruinous, idea that, from a great distance-and with no easily understood national interest at stake-the United States could successfully wage a war and administer a lasting peace.”  As Walter Lippman wrote, the Truman Doctrine was “inflated globalism” which led to “misinformation, miscalculation, and misjudgment at the highest levels of decision and command” which would, and did not end well.

*Henry Dykstal. “A Private Gentleman: On The Trials of Harry Truman,” Los Angeles Review of Books, March 1, 2022.

(Harry S. Truman being sworn in as President, April 12, 1945)