ISIS

ALL THE PRESIDENT’S WARS: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE WAR ON TERROR by Peter Bergen

szfreiberger Afghanistan, American Diplomatic History, Iraq, ISIS, Middle Eastern History, War in Iraq, War on Terror Leave a comment
File photo of the second tower of the World Trade Center bursting into flames after being hit by an airplane in New York

The title of Peter Bergen’s latest book ALL THE PRESIDENT’S WARS: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE WAR ON TERROR is a misnomer.  The War on Terror did not begin on 9/11 as attacks against American interests took place long before planes flew into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996; or the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 all come to mind.  It seems that the United States has been involved in preventing terrorist attacks for decades before 9/11 and will continue to be involved in counter-terrorism for years to come.  This being the case Peter Bergen’s book is important as it lays the foundation of what took place in the recent past, errors and successes, and what we can learn to be more effective in counteracting terrorism today as recently as last week when a possible attack against a military base in England that housed American bombers was thwarted, in addition to dealing with asymmetric warfare, an outgrowth of President Trump’s invasion of Iran.

In reviewing that past four administration’s policies toward Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran Bergen immediately cuts to the crux of the problem – decision makers needed to frame, “what kind of war are we embarking on” in response to the attacks on 9/11.  Each administration would answer the question quite differently with varying degrees of success.  The Bush administration would come up with the vague term, “the War on Terror,” and it came to mean that the war would be fought globally and for decades into the future.  This created a series of consequences that we are still dealing with today.

FILE PHOTO OF WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF CARD TELLING BUSH ABOUT SECOND PLANE AT TRADE CENTER.

(President George W. Bush listens as White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card informs him of a second plane hitting the World Trade Center while Bush was conducting a reading seminar at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida)

The War on Terror precipitated great change in the Middle East, the sharp increase in sectarian violence between Shia and Sunnis and the rise of Iran as a critical player in the region.  Bergen is correct in arguing that by overthrowing Saddam Hussein after the invasion of Iraq Washington inverted the power structure in Iraq allowing the Shia to come  to power fostering a civil war that included the rise of ISIS and killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.  Further, the true winners of the war were the Shia and their Iranian ally who would emerge as the dominant force in the region in part because of Bush’s invasion of Iraq and currently because of Trump’s invasion of Iran. 

There have been some successes along the way, a surge of troops and a new counter-insurgency strategy after the invasion of Iraq fell apart, but in the end the Shia came to power.  Another short term success was the capture of Osama Bin-Laden and his death resulting in a weakening of Al-Qaeda, however, eventually it reconstituted itself though it did not form a strong alliance with ISIS.  Once Bin Laden was out of the picture President Obama shifted his focus away from Iraq to Afghanistan reinforcing his belief that the US should withdraw from that country as soon as possible.  This led to a number of decisions that would eventually lead to Trump’s signing a withdrawal agreement with the Taliban.

Bergen, a well-respected national security journalist and one of the leading authorities on his subject, has written a sobering, meticulously researched postmortem of U.S. foreign policy encompassing the 2001-2026 time frame.  It is clear that American administrations had policy choices over the last two and a half decades and Bergen, not surprisingly focuses more on the poor decisions as opposed to the positive ones.   He eviscerates the Bush administration, delving into the consequences for poor decisions leading up to the invasion of Iraq and its “occupation” of that country and setting the stage for the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The dilly dallying of the Obama administration decision making, and Trump’s negotiations with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan, and his invasion of Iran are all discussed.  These examples reflect the growing belief in foreign capitals that the United States had little idea as to what it wanted to accomplish or how to achieve it.  This would lead to a change in the global order as the United States has gone from the upholder of a rule based system, to being seen as a destabilizing force as it pursued what Richard Haass describes in his excellent work, WAR OF NECESSITY, WAR OF CHOICE.

Bergen provides many insightful observations throughout the monograph.  First, he points out that Al-Qaeda assassinated Ahmed Shah Masood, the leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, a mortal enemy of the Taliban, and a leader the United States was working with two days before 9/11.  Bin Ladin did so to to mollify the Taliban as he realized that the United States would soon retaliate against the theocratic organization very harshly.  In discussing the Arab Spring of 2011 Bergen interestingly describes it as “the Arab spring would soon turn into the Arab winter.”  Bergen supports this assessment by exploring the overthrow of Muhammar Gahdaffi and the resulting civil war; the rise of ISIS and its expansion to control 33% of Syrian and 40% of Iraq before its “Caliphate” was defeated;

Saddam statue fall of baghdad

(A US Marine watches a statue of Saddam Hussein being toppled in Firdaus Square in downtown Baghdad on April 9, 2003)

Bergen reviews many important events and personalities of the period under discussion that have been dealt with elsewhere from his previous books and the works of Steven Coll, Craig  Whitlock, Lawrence Wright, and the most recent monograph by Carter Malkasian, THE AMERICAN WAR IN AFGHANISTAN.  The run up to the invasion of Iraq and Donald Rumsfeld’s approach to war and his refusal to provide the necessary assets to capture Bin Laden at Tora Bora, the incompetence of Peter Bremer’s de-Bathization and disbanding the Iraqi army that allowed the Shia to come to power after Saddam Hussein was captured and killed reflecting the self-righteousness of the Bush administration.  The author examines the different approaches on fighting the war in Afghanistan focusing on the ideas of General Stanley McCrystal and Colonel H.R. McMaster and disagreements with President Obama in an excellent chapter entitled “We are out of Schlitz.”  The role of Pakistan in harboring the Taliban fearing US withdrawal from Afghanistan and whether they hid Osama Bin Laden (Bergen argues decisively they were not aware of his presence in Abbottabad) are examined as is the lack of competence in the Afghani and Iraqi militaries after years of American training cutting and running from the Taliban and ISIS.  Lastly,  Ahmid Karzai’s relationship with American diplomats and US distrust of the Afghan president.

The Obama administration does not fare very well in Bergen’s analysis.  He argues that Obama was obsessed with not getting into any more “stupid” wars.  However, his inability to make up his mind about how many troops to commit in Afghanistan, whether to go along with a surge, his refusal to enforce his own “red line” pertaining to Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria, his administrations framing the Afghan War as a Taliban insurgency that was supported by Pakistan when in reality it was a three tiered conflict: inter-tribal, inter-ethnic, and inter-state, and for not taking ISIS seriously enough referring to them as the “B” team of terrorists and moving too slowly in confronting the terrorist threat many American felt they presented.   Obama’s Vice-President Joe Biden is also criticized a great deal as he argued to withdraw US troops from Iraq even as the civil war exploded, he was a sceptic who believed little could be done to assist Afghanistan and opposed any surge and wanted to focus on Al-Qaeda, not the Taliban, and even went so far as claiming he supported the attack on Bin Laden’s compound resulting in his capture when in fact he argued against it.  Later  he would claim that the Pentagon did not counsel him to leave 2500 troops in Afghanistan as a means of blocking the Taliban and maintaining security as American troops withdrew.  Generals have argued that Biden was not telling the truth especially when the evacuation turned into a disaster.  All in all, it appears as if the administration was at times in disarray. 

Saddam Hussein capture

(A photo dated December 13, 2003 shows Hussein in what appear to be Flexi-cuffs after his arrest)

One policy that reflects Obama’s willingness to adapt to the new asymmetric warfare was his adoption of the use of drone warfare as a vehicle to avoid committing further US troops as he wanted to pivot American foreign policy toward Asia.  American drone attacks increased substantially under Obama particularly in the tribal regions of Pakistan where the Taliban had sanctuary and Yemen where Muslim extremists were protected.  The Obama administration even went after an American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki who was the brains behind the failed “underwear bomber” attack on a Northwest flight on Christmas day 2009.

Bergen is correct when he points out despite Donald Trump’s bragging about how he would defeat ISIS and disparaged Obama’s approach, he pursued a policy that was developed over a two year period before he became president.  Trump may have speeded up the process but they both deployed a relatively small number of American troops on the ground in Syria and Iraq who operated through local allies.  In Iraq the Counter Terrorism Service, and in Syria with Kurdish fighters.  The ultimate victory over ISIS was fostered by Iraqi and Kurdish troops.  Trump’s Afghan policy was rather disjointed, represented by negotiations to withdraw American troops before the 2020 election.  Bergen dissects negotiations to end the war and it is clear that all that Trump wanted was to get out and did not care about the carnage that would take place once the Americans left.  This would take place under Biden who similarly wanted out of Afghanistan leaving many locals to be victims of Taliban retribution despite their services to America over the years.

If one were to sum up American foreign policy toward the Middle East since 9/11it would center around the fact that Washington creates a plan to get involved be it the invasion of Iraq, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the overthrow of Muhammar Gahdafi, or the invasion of Iran.  All of these actions created unaccounted for consequences because the United States never seems to have a plan for “the day after.”  Today, we are dealing with the fallout from Trump’s invasion of Iran with higher gas and diesel prices causing an increase in inflation that has resulted in  incalculable damage for the American people.

People approach a wall surrounding a compound.

(Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, is shown here, May 4, 2011, two days after he was killed)

As Scott Anderson points out in his September 6, 2026, New York Times review entitled, “Why the War on terror is Still Haunting Us,”  “Quite early in “All the Presidents’ Wars,” the journalist Peter Bergen’s chronicle of the “war on terror,” the reader is likely to conclude that the groups of American officials who have presided over the past two and a half decades of conflict in the Middle East consist of idiots, fools or knaves. The further one progresses into this damning and meticulously researched book, the more this assessment seems confirmed.

In fairness, the war on terror hasn’t been an unmitigated catastrophe. The development of advanced weaponized drones facilitated the killing of Qaeda leaders at long range and with little risk. American military commanders also eventually adopted counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq that proved very effective, even if they failed to change the ultimate outcome of that conflict. And while it is difficult to get all hopped up over something that didn’t happen, the fact is that there hasn’t been a large-scale terrorist attack on American soil since Sept. 11.”

Still, at the cost of trillions of dollars, the lives of some 7,000 U.S. servicemen and women, as well as hundreds of thousands of Iraqi and Afghan civilians, and two failed war efforts — with a third in progress — one would hope for some more bright spots.

Military helicopters hover over a vessel, with the horizon in the background.

(U.S. forces carried out a maritime interdiction and right-of-visit boarding of the Davina, a sanctioned stateless oil tanker, in the Indian Ocean within the Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility, June 4, 2026. The U.S. continues global maritime enforcement to disrupt illicit networks and interdict vessels providing material support to Iran, wherever they operate.)

Anderson goes on to write; “One might wish that “All the Presidents’ Wars” was coming out a few months from now, in time for the full magnitude of the stupidity attending Trump’s war of choice against Iran to be realized. As it is, Bergen’s last words were penned in mid-March 2026, just a few weeks into this latest American misadventure.

As has been the case so many times over the past 25 years, this folly, too, was peddled as part of the war on terror, but undertaken with even less forethought than its predecessors. Incredibly, Trump seemed to take no notice of how the weaponized drone has enabled Ukraine to keep the vastly larger Russian Army at bay for over four years. Nor did he seem to consider how this innovation might factor into a conflict with Iran, one of the world’s pioneers in the manufacturing of cheap and sophisticated drones..

A major theme of Bergen’s book is the repeated failure of American leaders to plan for “the day after” a military action is taken, but in Iran, he makes clear, Trump didn’t even plan for “the day of.” As a result, it is now all but certain that the United States is headed for another major defeat in its war on terror. For the gory details on that, though, one will have to wait for Bergen’s next book.”

YEAREND PICTURES 2001.
szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, ISIS, Middle Eastern History Leave a comment

(Abu Mu’sab al-Zarqawi, the man who laid the foundation for ISIS)

If one were to read one book to gain an understanding of how the Islamic State (ISIS) was able to conquer a land mass that is as big as Israel and Lebanon, it should be Joby Warrick’s new monograph, BLACK FLAGS: THE RISE OF ISIS.  Warrick, a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter for the Washington Post writes in a clear style that allows the reader to gain insight and understanding of the many important points he makes.  What separates Warrick’s effort from the myriad of works on ISIS that have appeared in the last year is the perspective he brings.  A major part of the book presents the rise of ISIS from the Jordanian point of view.  Concentrating on King Abdullah II of Jordan, the reader is exposed to the inner workings of the Hashemite Kingdom as they try to cope with what is occurring on two sides of their border.  The book opens with attempts to negotiate the release of the downed Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasabeh with ISIS, and the plight of Sajida Rishawi, a convicted ISIS terrorist who is facing execution for trying to unleash a horrendous attack in Amman.  In the end al-Kasabeh is burned alive, creating revulsion throughout the Muslim world, and Rishawi is executed.

In addition to being led inside the Jordanian national security bureaucracy through the work of Abu Haytham, a senior officer in the Jordanian counterterrorism division; the author concentrates on the role of American Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford; and Mouazi Moustafa, a Syrian immigrant who became a veteran Capitol Hill staffer who lobbied hard to assist the Syrian people and arm moderate elements who were opposed to Syrian president, Bashir el-Assad in explaining events and policies that evolved before and after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Apart from discussing policy decisions as ISIS develops, Warrick spends the first two-thirds of the book presenting a biography of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi who is credited with creating the foundation of the Islamic State.  We meet an uneducated street thug who fought in Afghanistan and was eventually imprisoned in Jordan.  Warrick and others point to Zarqawi’s imprisonment as attending “Jihadi University” as many like-minded individuals came together and became radicalized.  Further, after the United States invaded Iraq it set up Camp Bucca which will become another branch of the “Jihadi University” as over 26,000 prisoners lived in communal tents according to their own sectarian identification.  The result is that the camp created the nucleus of the ISIS leadership as men like the future self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was also in residence.

(King Abdullah II of Jordan who personally led air stikes against ISIS)

The author explores the developing story that culminated in Vice President Dick Cheney’s charge that Zarqawi met with Saddam Hussein to discuss access to chemical weapons which was false, but was used as one of the excuses to invade Iraq.  Further, Warrick does an excellent job synthesizing the information that reflects the “head in the sand” approach taken by the Bush administration in dealing with post-invasion Iraq.  After declaring victory on the USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush faced a developing insurgency by the end of August, 2003 that his administration refused to face up to.  This lack of accepting the reality of events in Iraq left a vacuum that allowed Zarqawi to take advantage of and fill.  Warrick describes Zarqawi’s approach to the insurgency and his disagreements with Osama Bin-Ladin nicely, and what emerges is a ruthless individual who justifies his murderous action with the cover of his own Koranic interpretation.

(President Bush places a medal around the neck of Paul Bremer III….it could not have been for his actions taken in Iraq!)

Another important perspective that Warrick presents is the analysis offered by Nada Bakos, a CIA operative who became the agencies “targeter” whose function was to concentrate on Zarqawi until the United States killed him.  Bakos takes us inside the CIA as they try to develop a coherent strategy to deal with the “Sheik of Slaughterers” as he referred to himself.  Warrick also exposes one of the most disturbing aspects of American actions in Iraq.  Warrick describes the arrogance and incompetence of Paul Bremer III, the Bush appointed head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2004.  King Abdullah II had warned the U.S. repeatedly against the invasion of Iraq as well as deBathification of the army, intelligence, and government agencies which were in charge of the country’s infrastructure once the invasion took place.  After detailing Zarqawi’s massive plot to set off what would have been a “dirty bomb” in Amman in March, 2004, Abdullah II met with Bremer as Warrick reports, to appeal once again not to deBathize Iraq.  Bremer’s reply was brusque, “I know what I am doing.  There’s going to be some sort of compensation.”  I’ve got it all in hand, thank you very much.” (148)

 (US Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford)

The last third of the book is devoted to the disintegration of Syria and the opportunity those events presented for ISIS.  Warrick dissects Assad’s reaction to the Arab Spring of 2011 and how he hoped to manipulate the rebellion against him by releasing jihadis from Syrian prisons to enhance the revolution against him.  This was done to show the west that he was fighting an Islamic insurgency, rather than a civil war.  Warrick examines the approach taken by the Obama administration in dealing with Syria and the rise of ISIS.  His analysis is not very complementary as he discusses the schisms within the administration as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and CIA head David Petraeus tried to convince the president to provide more than humanitarian aid to moderate elements opposing Assad. Finally, when Assad employs chemical weapons against the rebels, Obama launches an air campaign that is ongoing.  The effectiveness of this campaign has been hotly debated and with the Russian entrance into the war to prop up its ally with cruise missiles and bombing runs the situation is growing more precarious each day.  Warrick does explain Obama’s thinking throughout the period as he is sorely limited in terms of options with Iran and Russia providing money and weapons to Assad, and the United Nations not an option because of Moscow’s opposition.

Warrick has written an important work as he synthesizes much of the material dealing with Zarqawi and how the Islamic State declared itself a Caliphate in July, 2014.  It is clearly written for the lay person and should enhance any reader’s understanding of what is probably the most dangerous situation American foreign policy has faced in decades.  After reading this book the reader will wonder what the United States could have done differently based on events, not the partisan harangues that emanate from Congress.  It is important for all to pay attention to what is occurring as people in the region wait for the next shoe to drop.  One can only feel trepidation for King Abdullah of Jordan as he tries to maneuver his way in a region that is a tinderbox.

(Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi)

szfreiberger ISIS, Middle Eastern History Leave a comment

(Caliph Ibrahim, or Abu Umar al-Bahgdadi, the leader of the Islamic State)

Since 2014 a number of interesting works have appeared that try to explain the background history of the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and why it has been successful to date.  William McCants, the Director of the Project on U.S. relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution has added his new book, THE ISIS APOCALYPSE: THE HISTORY, STRATEGY AND DOOMSDAY VISION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE to that genre.  What separates McCants monograph from the others is his emphasis on the role of Islamic messianism in the policies pursued by the Islamic State, and the differences between the Islamic State and Osama Bin-Laden’s al-Qaeda’s view of jihadism, and how and when to establish an Islamic caliphate.

In his introduction McCants presents himself with a challenge as he takes the reader on a tour of the Islamic State.  He tells the reader that they will be exposed to explanations concerning obscure allusions to Islamic history and theology, in addition the reader will be able “to appreciate how the Islamic State thinks of itself, and how its self-understanding has affected its political fortunes, and what will happen if those fortunes change again.” (2)  Having completed McCants’ tour, as a reader I believe he has accomplished his goals.  At the outset he does a nice job explaining the origins of ISIS by exploring the relationship and differences that existed between Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawri and Osama bin-Laden, and the creation and failure of ISIS by 2008.  McCants discusses the different historical figures and events that influenced ISIS as well as the current leadership in the different jihadi movements.

(An english speaking ISIS member leads a mass execution)

The most important aspect of the book is how McCants delves into the role of messianism in Islam and how it affected the rise of ISIS and the policies it pursues.  The prophecies of Islam play a major role for ISIS.  The concept of the Mahdi, “the rightly guided one,” is important because according to Islamic prophecy he would appear at the end of time to lead the final battle against the infidels.  The similarities between the Abbasid Dynasty and ISIS is treated carefully and presents an interesting dichotomy for the reader.  The popularity of the Dabiq prophecy attracted foreign fighters as the prophecy called for the conquering and cleansing of this small town near the Syrian-Turkish border before a caliphate flag could be raised.  Aspects of Islamic prophecy hold today that before the final apocalypse, sectarian conflict must precede it, as it took place following the death of Mohammad.  Each sect is trying to complete the task of killing the infidel, but first they must destroy each other to achieve the honor of doing so.  The apocalyptic message that ISIS employed along with the restoration of the caliphate that ended after World War I, and revolution are the core of its principles.  However, Osama Bin-Laden refused to accept this.  The al-Qaeda leader believed that the needs of the people must be taken care of first and the United States had to leave Iraq and Afghanistan before a caliphate could be declared, something he believed would not take place in his lifetime.

McCants is accurate in his explanation as to why ISIS was able to expand so easily and acquire the territory that would provide legitimacy to its restoration of the caliphate.  Bashir al-Assad’s policies in Syria facilitated ISIS’ task by funneling hundreds of jihadists into Iraq to fight the U.S., and releasing numerous prisoners to foster the chaos that allowed him to crack down on opposition to his rule.  Assad chose not to fight ISIS but concentrate on domestic opposition thus allowing ISIS to expand into eastern Syria, and with the issues attendant to Iraq they could easily capture western Iraq giving them a stronghold that encompassed Mosul to Aleppo.  McCants is also on firm ground as he detailed the rise of Abu Umar al-Bahgdadi within ISIS and the announcement of the restoration of the “caliphate in accordance with the prophetic method,” in addition to declaring himself caliph.  McCants explores the opposition by al-Qaeda and others to this move explaining that the trappings of a caliphate do not make it a caliphate.

(ISIS takes villagers hostage in Syria)

The book is a slim volume, but McCants certainly maximizes the space.  He explores events in Yemen and the rise of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as well as other al-Qaeda affiliates in North Africa and the Horn of Africa.  He points to their differences with ISIS, but also areas of support.  The influence of the Arab Spring is discussed in relation to ISIS ideology and its role in the apocalyptic narrative that ISIS spins.

Everyone seems to want to know why ISIS was so successful between 2013 and 2014 – it is a simple answer – they were pretty much left alone.  When Sunni rebels try to overthrow Assad, ISIS concentrated on setting up a state in the Syrian hinterland.  It filled its leadership with ex-Ba’athists from Saddam Hussein’s military and intelligence branches and attracted thousands of foreign fighters “by using a propaganda mix of apocalypticism, puritanism, sectarianism, ultraviolence, and promises of a caliphate.” (153)  all of these aspects of ISIS are fully explored by the author in creating an important addition in trying to understand the success of ISIS and where we go in the future.