ONCE WE WERE BROTHERS by Ronald H. Batson

October 25, 2019szfreiberger Historical Fiction, Holocaust Leave a comment

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(Zamosc, Poland as a ghetto during WWII)

In 2004, the night of charitable gala for the Lyric Opera of Chicago, Ben Solomon, a survivor of the Nazi death camps walks over to a guest and points a German Lugar P08 at his forehead. The guest, Elliot Rosenzweig, a major Chicago philanthropist and supporter of the opera is supposedly a Holocaust survivor. Solomon is tackled and arrested. His motivation rests on his claim that Rosenzweig is a former SS officer named Otto Piatik who murdered Jews during the war. Rosenzweig is incredulous but refuses to prosecute. Solomon not satisfied decides to initiate a lawsuit against Rosenzweig in civil court to prove he was a mass murderer and stole money, jewels, and other property from his family.

Thus, begins Ronald H. Batson’s successful first novel, ONCE WE WERE BROTHERS, the first in a series that focuses on two characters, Liam Taggert, an investigative reporter, and Catherine Lockhart, a lawyer. Almost immediately Batson draws the reader’s interest as Rosenzweig vehemently denies the past that Solomon swears by. A past that saw both men grow up in a small Polish village of Zamosc with Piatik abandoned as a child by his parents and raised by Solomon’s parents. Solomon approaches Taggert and Lockhart to take his case and after an initial reluctance to do so because of Rosenzweig’s reputation and the fact that the events Solomon describes was over 70 years ago they are drawn into Solomon’s narrative and work to prove his accusation. Whether Solomon is right or not, Batson has created two wonderful characters, who have their own personal baggage as ONCE WE WERE BROTHERS is the first of five installments that focus on the work of Taggert and Lockhart.

From the outset Batson transports the reader to Zamosc, Poland following Hitler’s assumption of power in 1933. The author relates the plight of Jews in Germany and the rise of anti-Semitism in Poland throughout the 1930s and how it impacted the Solomon family and the Jews of their village. He follows the historical timeline throughout the war as the Solomon family is separated. As far as Batson’s command of history it is usually accurate, but there is a major glitch in his timeline. He puts forth the character of Ilse Piatik, Otto’s mother as the secretary to Reinhard Heydrich, a major figure in the creation of the Final Solution, but he dates its origin to 1935 when he states, “she knew about the plans for the Final Solution.” Most historians of the Holocaust argue that the Final Solution was not decided upon and implemented so early and that it took until the invasion of the Soviet Union when the Nazis were confronted with millions of Jews in Russia that extermination plans began to crystalize. Batson use of historical characters is accurate, particularly Hans Frank, the Governor-General of the Polish occupied territories during World War II and Reinhard Heydrich, one of the driving forces behind the Holocaust until his assassination by Czech fighters on June 4, 1942. Further, Batson’s exploration of the role of the Judenrat is important, particularly when seen in the context of the ethical and personal dilemma’s it presented for Ben’s father.

Batson provides the Solomon family background through the life of Ben Solomon as he traces his childhood and adolescence in Zamosc throughout the 1930s. Solomon’s relationship with Piatik is carefully explored in full as the Nazi threat begins to unfold. As the story is recounted something darker seems to be hidden and Batson does a nice job drawing it out just enough to keep the reader on the edge of their seat. If there is an aspect of the novel that is very disconcerting as a former educator it is Lockhart’s seeming ignorance when it comes to the Holocaust, i.e.; she did not know what a Jewish ghetto was and other information. I realize that many claim to be ignorant of the Holocaust, but she is presented as an educated person.

(Hans Frank, the butcher of occupied Poland)

The politics and pressures of working in a major law firm are on full display and the role of local politics is ever present as Rosenzweig puts pressure on Lockhart to end her investigation, while conducting his own investigation. The Rosenzweig character is an interesting one as Taggert delves into his background and the case that he might be Piatik unfolds. There are a number of twists and turns as the story plays out and the reader wonders whether Rosenzweig is actually a Nazi murderer and overall the story is quite believable and makes for good historical fiction.

Batson, an attorney, originally self-published his novel. It was later picked up by a major publishing house which has greatly benefited his readership. The book adds to the myriad of novels that regularly appear concerning the Holocaust, but this one has a new twist and it is worth looking at an old story. The Taggert-Lockhart relationship emerges, and it will form the basis of four other historical novels that I look forward to reading.

(Zamosc, Poland as a Nazi Ghetto during WWII)

A STATE AT ANY COST: THE LIFE OF DAVID BEN-GURION by Tom Segev

October 22, 2019szfreiberger Arab-Israeli Conflict, Biography, Middle Eastern History Leave a comment

(David Ben-Gurion)

A STATE AT ANY COST: THE LIFE OF DAVID BEN-GURION is an apt title for Israeli journalist and historian Tom Segev’s new biography of Israel’s first Prime Minister. Segev is a prolific writer who is the author of seven books ranging from a biography of Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal; THE SEVENTH MILLION; 1967: ISRAEL, THE WAR AND THE YEAR THAT TRANSFORMED THE MIDDLE EAST; and ONE PALESTINE, COMPLETE. Segev’s books reflect impeccable research that includes archival work, interviews, and a strong command of secondary materials in addition to examining previously unavailable materials. This approach dominates all of his previous books as well as his newest effort. For those familiar with Ben-Gurion’s life and decision making it is clear that the creation of an Israeli state was paramount, even to the point of sacrificing refugees from Europe during and after the Holocaust or turning against other leaders and organizations who would not accept his leadership. He was a man who did not change and from the outset Segev points out he “exhibited ideological devotion that awed those around him. The Zionist dream was the quintessence of his identity and the core of his personality, and its fulfillment his greatest desire.”

(the “young” David Ben-Gurion)

Ben-Gurion wanted to be a leader and aspired to a specific place in history – the man who facilitated the creation of a Jewish state. He often referred to the Bible and Jewish destiny but realized that achieving his dream required “exhausting labor, and tiny, often exasperating steps forward.” Segev is correct that many shared his vision, but few of his contemporaries were as obsessed with politics. Few of his colleagues were as diligent and addicted to detail and these characteristics made him “an indispensable leader, though not an omnipotent one.” If he had to use people, lie about them, manipulate situations for his benefit he had no compunction that it might be wrong, as long as it contributed to his overall goals.

(Albert Einstein and David Ben-Gurion)

Segev does a very good job explaining the different organizations associated with Palestine. Be it Zionist groups in Poland before World War II, groups in America or London, groups in Russia, or those in Palestine, Segev dissects their ideologies as well as the important personalities involved. For supporters of Zionism they were required to reconsider their traditional identities and position themselves between the values of Jewish tradition and a new Jewish nationalism. Most Jewish immigrants who came to Palestine before World War I arrived with the belief that they came to a land that belonged to them, land that God had promised Abraham. For Ben-Gurion taking control of the labor market which, these immigrants reinforced was the key in turning Jews who had run from pogroms back into normal people.

(Ben-Gurion and Israeli Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister Golda Meir)

Segev’s biography puts forth a number of important themes. First, his subject is a deeply flawed individual who suffered from bouts of anxiety, depression, and at times manic behavior. Segev is at his best when probing the human side of this complex leader. His integration of excerpts from his diaries and letters show a lonely man despite his iron will and outwardly self-assured manner. His personality at times touched levels of megalomania that fostered a series of internal and external conflicts. But one must realize that the price of creating a Jewish state was steep and it took a personal toll on Ben-Gurion as thousands would die and he had to cope with that fact and so many other details.

These characteristics are present in Segev’s second theme as Ben-Gurion worked his way up the Zionist leadership ladder, he would also engage in nonstop, often rivalrous and sometimes divisive power struggles with just about everyone. Among those he competed with include the likes of Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the founder of an uncompromising Revisionist Zionist Movement, Menachem Begin, the leader of the Irgun and future Prime Minister of Israel, and fellow Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann whom he argued with over strategy and who would be the dominant voice in Zionist leadership. Despite his strident behavior and beliefs Ben-Gurion did have the ability to compromise if he perceived that he could adopt a position that would further the goal of a Jewish state. This strategy manifested itself with his attitude toward Holocaust survivors, compromises with the British during World War II, and support for partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs. Ben-Gurion could be pragmatic when necessary particularly when it came to partition. For example, the 1936 Peel Commission allotted Jews a small territory which elated Ben-Gurion as he argued the fact that having a state was more important than borders; besides, “borders are not forever.” In every instance Ben-Gurion always believed in the righteousness of his approach.

A third theme that drives the entire narrative focuses on Ben-Gurion’s ideology and belief system which he used to try and encourage people to immigrate to Palestine and win over political allies as he traveled to the United States, London, and throughout Europe rarely staying at home for more than a few months at a time. Ben Gurion’s world view contributed to the factionalism that existed within the Zionist and non-Zionist movements be it the Zionist Congress, Hapo’el Hatzair, Ahdut Ha’avodah and others. This factionalism is evident as Segev does a marvelous job describing the rhetorical and personal hatred that existed between Ben-Gurion and Jabotinsky; Ben-Gurion and Weizmann; the creation of a Jewish army; disagreements with the likes of Israel Galili, the Chief of the National Command a few weeks before the Arab attack in May 1948; and the final creation of the Mapai party among many examples.

A fourth theme encompasses Ben-Gurion’s personal life as he chose power politics over family. His marriage to Pauline Moonweis seemed at times cold, but at times loving. Ben-Gurion’s travel presented many opportunities for at least four mistresses and other affairs which he engaged in repeatedly despite his wife’s knowledge of them. Ben-Gurion had three children, but he was a poor father at best and his relationship with his son and daughters was quite distant.

Segev points out a number of interesting aspects of Ben-Gurion’s political development. He would visit Moscow in 1923 and stay for four months and he came to admire Lenin’s ability to reshape his people’s destiny apart from his ideology. He would learn the structure of authoritarian leadership and use it systematically to achieve his life’s goals. According to Segev “Ben-Gurion intended to be a Zionist Lenin.” This approach to leadership was exhibited in his reaction to Arab Revolts of 1921 and 1936, the issuance of British White Papers throughout the 1930s, and the rise of Nazi Germany. Ben-Gurion’s principle occupation as a leader was to respond to events, he had no control over and do the best he could in manipulating them for his future goals.

Segev is very clear in his view of Ben-Gurion’s callousness in response to the Holocaust. The European Jews who escaped extermination were those who immigrated to the United States or elsewhere before the killings began. Ben-Gurion blamed the Holocaust on those Jews who remained. Segev points out that “Zionist ideological negation of the Exile presented the Jews of the Diaspora as passive and weak and thus contemptible. It was a common claim—instead of coming to Palestine, the Jews of Europe let the Nazis murder them, and thus undermined the Zionist project.” Ben-Gurion stated, “they refused to listen to us.” This attitude contributed to Ben-Gurion’s approach toward the Holocaust as he realized that was little that could be done. Segev speculates that Ben-Gurion’s guilt over his inability to help Holocaust victims was responsible for distancing himself from their suffering when he visited them in Displaced Persons camps in Germany after the war. For Ben-Gurion, any plan or strategy should focus on bringing “able” survivors of the Nazi death camps to Palestine after the war as labor would be crucial to achieving the Zionist state. The only way Ben-Gurion could deal with his helplessness during the Holocaust was to place it behind him emotionally and focus on the future. Ben-Gurion’s fear was that the annihilation of European Jewry would obliterate Zionism, it was a crime against the future State of Israel as he feared there would be no one left to build the country.

(Ben-Gurion finally meets Winston Churchill who is 87 years old!)

According to Segev, who has often been associated with revisionist historians who have challenged Israel’s founding narrative, one of the most controversial aspects of Ben-Gurion’s role in Israel’s founding was Plan Dalet. A formal written order seems to have been written in May 1948 expelling Arabs from entire villages solving the problem of depopulating areas of Arabs and supposedly clogging the roads with Arab refugees hindering the progress of Arab armies. A further goal was to prevent Arab settlements from being used as bases for enemy forces resulting in the destruction of entire villages and forcing the Arabs to flee. Other plans were employed using propaganda, “whispering campaigns,” shutting off water and electricity to encourage people to leave their homes. In the end according to historian Ilan Pappe in his ETHNIC CLEANSING OF PALESTINE at least four to six hundred thousand Arabs if not more fled or were uprooted. Ben-Gurion’s role according to other historians like Benny Morris in THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949, is that the Israeli leader was present on May 10, 1948 at a meeting in Tel Aviv where the decision to depopulate certain Arab population centers and the forcible depopulation and destruction of villages was made.

(Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan)

Segev spends a great deal of time on the development of the United Nations Partition Plan once the British decide to leave Palestine as the cost of keeping the peace and dealing with terrorism and the bankruptcy of their empire was too much. The reparations negotiations with West Germany receive fair coverage as does the 1956 Suez War, which provides a great deal of new information about the Israeli security mindset leading up to the war. All in all, Segev’s comprehensive monograph will probably leave Ben-Gurion admirers and critics equally unhappy but it cannot be in doubt that Israel’s first Prime Minister was the most important figure in Israel’s founding and eventual survival.

THE EDUCATION OF AN IDEALIST by Samantha Power

October 13, 2019October 13, 2019szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, Memoir Leave a comment

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(Samantha Power at the United Nations)

Toward the end of my teaching career I had the opportunity of meeting Samantha Power and she proved to be a warm individual with a sardonic sense of humor. The occasion was a Model Congress trip to Washington with over thirty teenagers who were role playing our legislative branch of government with over 1000 other students from all over the United States. During our Saturday afternoon break we walked over to the White House and met with Ambassador Power in her office where she proceeded to spend a few hours with us reviewing the national security process in the Obama administration and engaged my students with the myriad of foreign policy issues then facing the United States. The afternoon session is something that my students have still not forgotten and neither have I as Power took the time to try and educate a group of teenagers and make them aware of the importance of protecting American national security and the importance of promoting human rights worldwide. Up until that time my familiarity with Power was as an academic having used her Pulitzer Prize winning book “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF GENOCIDE as a class text, and CHASING THE FLAME: ONE MAN’S FIGHT TO SAVE THE WORLD, the poignant story of Sergio de Mello who worked for the United Nations to try and bring peace to Iraq, Bosnia, Cambodia among others before he was killed in Iraq. Her latest effort is a personal memoir, THE EDUCATION OF AN IDEALIST where Power describes her life’s journey from immigrating from Ireland as a child, war correspondent, to presidential Cabinet official in a deeply personal way, but also providing incisive analysis of the issues she has dealt with during her career.

Power was raised in a loving but dysfunctional family. Her mother was a doctor and father a dentist. She received support from both parents, but her father’s alcoholism would ruin the marriage and form a cloud that hovered over Samantha’s childhood. Despite her father’s addiction he was an attentive father who took her to Hartigan’s Pub on a regular basis where he spent time with her, but mostly she read her books. Once her mother had enough, she emigrated to the United States when Samantha was nine leaving her father behind. The situation created deep emotional issues for Power throughout her remaining childhood and adulthood which she explores in a deeply personal and at times sad manner that would impact her relationships with men until she met Cass Sunstein. Power uses her memoir as sort of a catharsis as she explores her unresolved issues with “abandoning her father” who would later die from his disease at a young age. Power deeply ponders if she had remained or at least had a closer relationship with her father might he have survived. The guilt involved plagued her for years.

(Power with President Obama)

The memoir explores many personal issues that makes the telling of her life story more human than most. She engages the reader through her relationship issues with men and how her courtship with Cass Sunstein evolved and what finally achieving a secure family meant to her. Her discussion of her pregnancy and the birth of her son Declan is a mirror to the type of mother she will become. Her vignettes about breast feeding in the “old boys network” of the State Department is priceless as is her discussion of the “support group” that was developed by woman who served on the National Security Council is entertaining, but projects the reality of women whose career paths took them into a male stronghold.

Power’s future political views can be seen developing early on as she dealt with her school’s racial integration in Dekalb County, Georgia while in Middle School. Her education would bring her to Yale and travels to Eastern Europe where she saw the effects of the rise of liberal democracy in Czechoslovakia and Poland, but not in Yugoslavia. She would intern at the National Security Archive, a liberal NGO involved with Freedom of Information requests. With the guidance of Mort Abramowitz, a former Ambassador to Thailand and Turkey, as well as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and Fred Cluny, a human rights activist, Power became a journalist where she witnessed the horrors of the Bosnian Civil War in 1993. She encountered the siege of Sarajevo, the massacre at Srebrenica from her base in Zagreb, Croatia which greatly impacted her views on human rights and what could be done to prevent this type of ethnic cleansing from breaking out elsewhere.

(Cass Sunstein and Samantha Power)

Her book “A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE altered her career trajectory and her life’s path. She raised questions about the nature of individual responsibility in the face of injustice, as she calls “upstanders v. bystanders.” Power interestingly points out that many critics have argued her monograph was a justification for the invasion of Iraq. In reality she condemns the United States for doing nothing about the different genocides she has researched particularly when there were options that Washington could have chosen to lessen the impact of events that resulted in so many deaths.

(Power with her son Declan and daughter Rian)

Power describes in detail her relationship with Barack Obama for whom she became a foreign policy fellow on his Senate staff in 2005. She explores Obama’s rise to the presidency and her role as a staffer during the campaign and the pitfalls that resulted, i.e.; calling Hillary Clinton a “monster” which caused her temporary exile from the Obama team. During the Obama administration she would become the Human Rights expert on the National Security Council, worked closely with Ambassador Susan Rice at the United Nations, developed an office in charge of aiding Iraqi Refugees, and eventually replaced Rice at the United Nations. In discussing all of her positions she delves into her frustrations of policies she was not able to impact, the National Security process within the Obama administration, and her successes and failures.

Important issues are dissected throughout parts of her book that deal with the Obama administration. Power does a nice job providing the historical context of each crisis that the Obama administration was presented with. Be it Libya, “genocide” controversy with Turkey, Assad’s use of Sarin gas during the Syrian Civil War, or Putin’s invasion of eastern Ukraine and seizure of Crimea she is able to place contemporary crisis’ within a larger historical narrative. The issue of Libya is front and center as Colonel Muammar Qaddafi is overthrown and the ensuing violence would result in the death of US Ambassador Christopher Hill at Benghazi which created a firestorm set by Republicans. Power lays out Obama’s thinking and belief that the US had led the movement that stopped the massacre of Libyan civilians and it was now Europe’s turn to carry the load. He did not want to commit US troops and Power concludes there was probably little Washington could have done to prevent events that transpired following Qaddafi’s death. Of all the sections in the book it seems that the death at Benghazi are given short shrift. I would have expected Power to offer further insights to what transpired and how the issue would dominate politics up until and throughout the 2016 presidential campaign.

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(an image from the Syrian Civil War)

The Syrian Civil War probably did the most to damage the Obama administration’s reputation in the world and at home. First, when learning of Assad’s use of chemical weapons Obama put forth his “Red Line” that if crossed would result in a military response by the United States. Obama with reasons explained by Powers would backtrack and pursue Congressional approval for US air strikes which was not forthcoming. In the end Vladimir Putin for his own reasons would agree to a UN Resolution to destroy a significant amount of Assad’s stockpile of chemical weapons, but the damage was done, and Obama’s foreign policy became a further target for Republicans. Power supports Obama’s rationale, but in retrospect she argues that the United States should have followed through and bombed Syrian targets designated by the Pentagon, and at least attempted to mobilize a group of countries to oversee a “no-fly zone.” This would have provided some security for Syrian civilians, but with the numerous factions, the role of Russia, and the vagaries of war anything that might have been tried would not have ended the civil war.

Among other frustrations that Power had to work through professionally was the issue of the Armenian genocide that dates back to World War I. As I write Turkish planes and troops are killing hundreds of Syrian Kurds and fostering a migration of thousands. This is a pattern in Turkish history, and when the issue of the April 24, 2009 anniversary of the 1915 genocide of Armenians arose Power worked to include the word “genocide” as part of the American government’s characterization of the event. Power describes how difficult it was to change American policy, from which she failed. But at least there was a decision-making process, unlike the current administration when it decided to give Istanbul free rein to kill Armenians once again.

(Power condemning the Russian incursion into Eastern Ukraine at the UN Security Council)

Perhaps the most egregious issue that Power dealt with was Ukraine. In 2014 Putin’s Russia invaded Eastern Ukraine and seized the Crimea. Power reviews the machinations behind the scenes at the United Nations and inside Obama’s National Security apparatus nicely but what is most fascinating is how she evokes some sympathy for Vitaly Churkin, the Russian Ambassador to the United Nations. She explores how the ambassador tried to defend positions that he knew were totally indefensible. At times she would surreptitiously meet with Churkin and try to reach an accommodation dealing with eastern Ukraine. Churkin’s usual defense was that Putin was monitoring negotiations and his view was clear; if the western countries embraced a particular cause, then as if by reflex Moscow would pursue the opposite position. An excellent example came with the 20^th anniversary of the Srebrenican genocide which Putin refused to label “genocide” in the Security Council. Power would gain a measure of revenge when she worked to block Russia from occupying a seat on the Human Rights Council by one vote!

Overall, Power has delivered an exceptional memoir that reflects her humanity and honesty. She puts forth her feelings for the reader to engage and comes across as a warm-hearted person who has overcome emotional baggage that she carried around for years. This book is not your typical memoir and I commend it for its depth of analysis, insights into the human condition, and exploration of how difficult it is for America to lead in a world dealing with problems that Trumpist isolationism exacerbates resulting in a vacuum that Iran, Russia, and China are already beginning to fill. Power’s work at the United Nations should be a model for an American Ambassador to the United Nations, for evidence review her work in dealing with the Ebola crisis in Africa. It is not about being liberal or conservative it is about what is best for the United States and humanity in general, not a platform for racism and demeaning allies.

Thomas Friedman sums it up best in describing Power’s book,

It’s an unusual combination of autobiography, diplomatic history, moral argument and manual on how to breast-feed a child with one hand while talking to Secretary of State John Kerry on a cellphone with the other. The interweaving of Power’s personal story, family story, diplomatic history and moral arguments is executed seamlessly — and with unblinking honesty.

and,

When it comes to striking that right balance between idealism and realism, this book is basically a dialogue between the young, uncompromising, super idealistic Power — who cold-calls senior American officials at night at home to berate them for not doing more to stop the killing in Bosnia — and the more sober policymaker Power, who struggles to balance her idealism with realism, and who frets that she’s become one of those officials she despised.*

Thomas Friedman, “What Samantha Power Learned on the Job,” New York Times, September 10, 2019.

APPEASEMENT: CHAMBERLAIN, HITLER, CHURCHILL, AND THE ROAD TO WAR by Tim Bouverie

October 5, 2019October 5, 2019szfreiberger British History, Nazi Germany, World War II 2 Comments

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(Neville Chamberlain after returning from the Munich Conference)

In 1961 the controversial British historian, A.J.P. Taylor published THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR arguing that the war was caused by the appeasement policies pursued by England and France toward Nazi Germany. He further purported that Adolf Hitler was more of a traditional European statesman who easily could have been stopped in March 1936 at the Rhineland bridges had England and France had the will to do so. This book created a firestorm in academic circles and over the years numerous historians have challenged Taylor’s conclusions. Among the first was J.W. Wheeler-Bennett’s MUNICH: PROLOGUE TO TRAGEDY followed later by Telford Taylor’s MUNICH: THE PRICE OF PEACE, Lynne Olson’s TROUBLESOME YOUNG MEN: THE REBELS WHO HELPED SAVE ENGLAND, David Faber’s MUNICH THE 1938 APPEASEMENT CRISIS, and last year a fictional account was written by Robert Harris. These books among many others lay out the counter argument to Taylor that even though Anglo-Franco appeasement was responsible for the war, Hitler would have stopped at nothing to achieve at a minimum domination of Europe.

(Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain)

The latest entry into this debate is Tim Bouverie’s APPEASEMENT: CHAMBERLAIN, HITLER, CHURCHILL, AND THE ROAD TO WAR. Bouverie, a former British journalist offers a fresh approach in analyzing London’s foreign policy throughout the 1930s leading to the Second World War. The author excoriates British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his apologists who argue that he had little choice because of England’s lack of military preparation and fear of inflicting further damage to an already depressed economy. Bouverie concludes that Chamberlain had decided even before he became Prime Minister that an accommodation with Hitler needed to be made in order to prevent revisiting the carnage of World War I. With England’s position growing untenable in the Pacific due Japanese expansionism a rapprochement with Germany was a necessity. Chamberlain would proceed to try to make deals with Benito Mussolini to pressure the Fuhrer, but in reality as his own writings and correspondence reflect he was bent on giving in to Hitler as shown in his reaction to the Anschluss with Austria, the drum beat by Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia for autonomy, the dismemberment of the only democracy in central Europe at the Munich Conference and thereafter, and finally over Danzig. It was clear that the policies of Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, who Bouverie calls the “evangelicals of appeasement” would give away almost anything to achieve an Anglo-German Pact.

Bouverie does an excellent job developing the pacifist movement in England and the attitude of British elites toward Germany. To the author’s credit he not only focuses on the major players in English politics during the period but others like Baron Lord Rothermere, his brother Lord Northcliffe, and Geoffrey Dawson who greatly impacted British public opinion through their newspaper empires. In addition, Sir Robert Cecil, an ardent advocate of the League of Nations and the Peace Ballot in favor of collective security, Ernest Jenner, a banker, the historian Arnold Toynbee, former Labor leader George Lansbury, all whom received audiences with Hitler among others that the author discusses. These individuals were able to mold public opinion and create further pressure on Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin who was replaced by Chamberlain.

(Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler at the Munich Conference)

Bouverie’s narrative is grounded in social and political history and makes exhaustive use personal papers, documentary collections, and the press. He explains that England’s response to Hitler derives from a number of critical works such as John Maynard Keynes’ THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE written in 1919 which pointed out the deficiencies in the Versailles Treaty. Many in power in England saw the rise of Hitler as a manifestation of legitimate German grievances concerning the treaty, thus ameliorating Hitler’s “Diktat of Versailles” became a rallying cry for appeasers. Those individuals include the British Ambassador to Germany, Neville Henderson; Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, and Sir Horace Wilson, the government’s Chief Industrial Advisor and Chamberlain’s alter ego. Bouverie presents an incisive narrative concerning the raucous debate in British politics centering around rearmament, especially since Hitler was rearming Germany right under the nose of France and England undoing that clause of the treaty. England would face reality and in 1934 agreed to a naval treaty with Germany allowing the Nazis a navy 35% of that of Great Britain (though at the time the treaty was signed Germany had already passed that threshold).

The author takes the reader through each major crisis that predated World War II. Beginning with attempts at an Anglo-German Treaty recognizing Germany’s eastern borders and League membership; the German occupation of the Rhineland in March, 1936; the Anschluss with Austria in March, 1938; machinations against Czechoslovakia leading to the Munich Conference in September, 1938; the seizure of all of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the final crisis in Danzig that resulted in the invasion of Poland and the “Phony War” that followed. In each instance Bouverie provides insights into the thought patterns of English politicians and why they did little or nothing to stop Hitler. The author also explores the opposition to the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments, in particular Winston Churchill who found the warnings he had offered about Hitler since 1933 coming home to roost. But it is clear that the “evangelical appeasers” faced no serious opposition or obstacles in Parliament.

(London, 1940)

One of Bouverie’s best chapters deals with “Hitler’s Wonderland” reflecting British attitudes toward Germany in light of the Nuremburg Party rallies and the 1936 Olympics that took place in Berlin. British elites like King Edward VIII, Charles Vane Tempest-Stewart, and the 7^th Marquis of Londonderry all visited Germany a number of times and became the United Kingdom’s leading Hitler apologists.

Bouverie provides fascinating portraits of the periods leading characters. His most important was his analysis of Chamberlain describing his intellectual self-assurance, a trait that would not allow him to consider the opinions and findings of others. His arrogance would alienate Laborite’s as well as people in his own party. This would prove a disaster as he tried to form governmental coalitions in 1939 and 1940. In his defense Bouverie points out that Chamberlain had been a social reformer, but events did not allow him to pursue that interest. As the former Chancellor of the Exchequer he realized England could not afford an arms race, so he tried to engage his countries enemies. Chamberlain realized he could not rely on the United States, in large part because of his low opinion of Washington, believed that “careful diplomacy” would in the end be successful. Bouverie is careful to point out that Chamberlain did not invent appeasement as British governments had been practicing it since the early 1920s, but it is Chamberlain who seems to have earned the mantle of the “great appeaser” because of Munich and beyond due to his innate stubbornness in dealing with those who disagreed with him.

(Winston Churchill and Edward Wood, Lord Halifax)

Bouverie’s narrative allows the reader to eavesdrop on many interesting conversations and events. Particularly fascinating was a lunch thrown by German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop at the German Embassy on March 11, 1938 with British politicians in attendance at the same time that Hitler demanded the resignation of Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg or suffer an invasion. Also interesting is the verbal give and take between Chamberlain’s Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, a pro-German appeaser and his predecessor Anthony Eden who resigned over English recognition of Mussolini’s seizure of Abyssinia. The give and take in the English cabinet after the Anschluss fearing Hitler’s next move is important as the evidence that Bouverie presents makes it clear that no one in Chamberlain’s government wanted to risk war over Czechoslovakia a country they believed had little to do with British national security. Lastly, Bouverie’s discussion of conversations between Henderson and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop as negotiations proceeded in August 1939 is priceless.

When war finally came, Bouverie notes that following the conquest of Poland, England and France declared war on Germany, but this was a rare case when war was declared but it was not fought until Hitler’s blitzkrieg entered France and the low countries in May 1940. Finally, Tory anti-appeasement rebels will begin an all-out effort to get rid of Chamberlain in and Bouverie’s coverage of probably the most important parliamentary debate in English history is exemplary as it finally brought Winston Churchill to power.

Bouverie’s effort is very timely as Lynne Olson points out in her New York Times article, “Failure to Lead” (July 21, 2019). Olson commends Bouverie for providing historical evidence as what will occur when a politician who has no knowledge of foreign policy, like Chamberlain imagines himself to be an expert and bypasses other branches of government to further his aims. In addition, when one focuses only on negotiations with dictators and leaves their allies in the lurch……sound familiar?