HITLER’S AMERICAN GAMBLE: PEARL HARBOR AND GERMANY’S MARCH TO WAR by Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman

January 18, 2022szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, English History, Modern European History, Nazi Germany, World War II Leave a comment

The dates December 5 through the 7^th, 1941 mark the parameters of the most consequential week of the 20^th century or perhaps any other time in history. It was during that week that the Soviet Union began a major counter offensive against the Nazis who were threatening Moscow, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, and Hitler declared war on the United States. It was a perilous time for the British who had endured Dunkirk, the Luftwaffe’s blitz over London and other cities, fears of Japanese attacks against British held territories in Asia, and Churchill’s fear that the only thing that could save his island empire – the entrance of the United States into the war against Germany would not occur as Washington would now focus on Japan after Pearl Harbor. The event that saved the British was the Nazi dictator’s declaration of war against the United States, an act that should be difficult to understand since Germany was already fighting a devastating two front war.

Historians have questioned for decades why Hitler would take on the United States when Germany faced so many obstacles. The German alliance with Japan was defensive predicated on an attack on Japan which the events of December 7^th made obsolete. In analyzing Hitler’s decision making historians fall into two camps. The first, Hitler was a nihilist who was driven by an egoistic personality in making numerous irrational decisions. The second school of thought has ferreted out a semblance of strategic calculations in his decision making. In his latest book, British historian Brendan Simms and his co-author Charlie Laderman entitled, HITLER’S AMERICAN GAMBLE: PEARL HARBOR AND GERMANY’S MARCH TO WAR support the latter analysis which is consistent with Simms’s 2019 biography of Hitler when he argued that Hitler was well aware of American power and war with the United States was inevitable therefore his decision was pre-emptive.

Whichever argument one accepts it is clear that Simms and Laderman have made a compelling case in analyzing Hitler’s thought process the first part of December 1941 which led him to declare war on America. Along with this analysis, the authors dig deeply into the state of the war as of early December, the realpolitik practiced by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, and the key role played by the Japanese government.

The authors have written a detailed description of the uncertainty that existed between December 5-12, 1941. It seems as if the reader is present as decisions are made by the main participants hour by hour. The blow by blow account is incisive and the results of Hitler’s decision to declare war on the United states would launch a global war. The authors make a compelling case that before the onset of war the Japanese government did not trust Hitler as they feared the Nazi dictator would seize Vichy French colonies in Southeast Asia. Simms and Laderman provide an accurate appraisal of the background history leading to December 7^th. They raise interesting points, many of which have been written about by previous historians.

Lend Lease plays a significant role in the thinking of all the participants leading up to and after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The authors are clear and correct when they argue that the American aid policy infuriated Hitler. For the Fuhrer it reinforced the connection in his mind that capitalism, Jews, and American policy were all part of a conspiracy against Germany. From Hitler’s perspective American actions were driving Germany towards war against the United States. For example, in March 1941 the American navy began to protect British convoys across the Atlantic. In addition, the U.S. would expand its defensive zone all the way to Greenland and reinforce its Atlantic Fleet. Lend Lease also played a key role in Hitler’s thinking even after December 7^th. The authors spend a great deal of time discussing how Churchill and Roosevelt believed that the Nazis pressured the Japanese to attack developing the hope that the Japanese attack would force an American declaration of war against Tokyo and forcing Washington to reduce its aid to England and the Soviet Union because of its own needs in the Pacific. Hitler was under no illusion concerning US military production, but he would come to believe that the Nazis should strike before the American military-industrial complex could reach maximum production.

As Hitler contemplated declaring war against the United States, Churchill and the British government desperate for continued Lend Lease worried that the aid would be reduced because of US needs in East Asia. Churchill was especially concerned because of the ongoing fighting in North Africa and the threat to the Suez Canal. In fact, the authors point out that aid was stopped for a brief period as disagreement arose between Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Lend Lease administrator Edward Stettinius.

From the Japanese perspective they were unsure if they could rely on a German declaration of war. The authors mine the commentary of Japanese leaders particularly Foreign Minister Shigenari Togo who did not trust that Germany would join the war against the United States.

Roosevelt was concerned about America Firsters and isolationists in Congress. Both groups were willing to fight the Japanese but were against involvement in Europe as they refused to fight for what they perceived to be British colonial interests. FDR walked a fine line and refused to meet with Churchill after December 7^th as to not exacerbate domestic opposition. Hitler’s declaration made it easier for Roosevelt to declare war on Germany and overcome isolationist opposition.

The Repulse and Prince of Wales Battleships: How They Sunk

(The sinking of the British battleships Repulse and The Prince of Wales December 10, 1941)

The coming Holocaust against European Jewry played a role in Hitler’s strategy. The Nazi dictator saw the Jews of Europe as hostages to keep FDR from taking further action against Germany. It did not stop the murderous horror taking place in eastern Europe but as long as the US did not enter the war the fate of western European Jewry would be postponed. However, the authors argue effectively argue that once Hitler declared war against the United States, in his mind they were no longer a bargaining chip in dealing with Washington. He was now free to conduct his Final Solution against western and central European Jews.

Churchill & Roosevelt. /Nprime Minister Winston Churchill And President Franklin D. Roosevelt Photographed During A Press Conference In — (Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt)

The authors astutely point out the role of racism in the war. John W. Dower’s amazing study, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR is the best study of the issue arguing that war in the Pacific was a racial war. For Simms and Laderman the decision making process on the part of Anglo-American military planners was greatly influenced by their low opinion of Japanese military capability. Leadership on both sides of the Atlantic could not fathom the idea that the Japanese had the ability to launch intricate attacks such as the attack on Pearl Harbor, Malaya, the Philippines, Guam, Singapore, Southeast Asia at the same time. This type of thinking also resulted in disaster for the Royal Navy as Japanese bombers destroyed Force Z that included the sinking of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales.

Simms and Laderman do an excellent job delving into the calculations of the major participants in the coming war. The significant issues apart from Hitler’s decision as to whether he should declare war on the United States included whether Stalin should declare war on Japan? How would England and the Soviet Union make up for the shortfall of Lend Lease aid in the immediate future? How would FDR overcome domestic opposition to US participation in the European War and so on?

(Japanese envoys in Washington, DC December 1941)

The authors also do an admirable job integrating the opinions of people across the globe concerning the implications for Japanese actions in the Pacific. People as diverse as the former mayor of Cologne Konrad Adenauer (and future German leader after WWII) to everyday citizens on the streets of Berlin, London, Leningrad, intellectuals in Poland tosoldiers on the eastern front. For all the key was what would Hitler do – would he declare war on the United States and unleash a global war as Mussolini had warned or would he allow Japan to take on the American colossus themselves.

Overall, Simms and Laderman have written a thought provoking book that breaks down the December 5-12^th 1941 period for three-fourths of their narrative that includes an important introduction that sets the scene for Hitler’s decisions and the implications that the decisions would have for the future of the war which would not end until August 1945.

MARY QUEEN OF SCOTS by Stefan Zweig

January 11, 2019January 11, 2019szfreiberger Biography, English History, European History Leave a comment

(Mary Queen of Scots)

The other day I went to see the film, Mary Queen of Scots and as I do with most historical films, I wondered how historically accurate it was. I vaguely recalled the biography of the Scottish Queen written over forty years ago by Antonia Fraser and it seemed there was a great deal of artistic license employed. Since the most recent biography of Mary was written by John Guy it seemed like the best choice to read, however the film was based on that monograph. I decided to read an older classic account of the Queen written by Stefan Zweig in 1935 which has withstood the test of time.

Zweig, a prolific short story writer has written several biographies of major historical and literary figures that made him one of the most popular European writers in the 1920s and 30s. Zweig delivers a solid biography that encompasses her life begun during the time of Henry VIII who tried to pressure Mary’s father, James V to reject Catholicism and accept Protestantism. James V would die six days after Mary’s birth (though Zweig seems to say they died on the same day), resulting in the ascension of Mary to the Scottish throne at birth.

(Lord Henry Darnley)

What is clear about Scottish history is that it was very difficult for any monarch to rule Scotland effectively due to the marauding and jealous clans, led by lords who had difficulty projecting fealty to any monarch. These lords were arrogant and greedy and were part of a somewhat narcissistic nobility. Any wealth the monarchy might posses apart from sheep herds were gifts and grants from the French king or the Pope. Historically Scotland was a pawn in the battle between France and England, and when war would break out, the English would land at Normandy, and the French would foment problems with their Scottish allies in the rear.

Zweig writes in a pleasant literary style that most historians can not match. He writes with a scent of sarcasm whether discussing dynastic politics or diplomacy, and his monograph reads like a novel. A prime example are the negotiations between Henry VIII and the Scots to marry his son Edward to the six-year-old Mary. However, even after the negotiations are successful, she is spirited away by the French King Henry II to marry his son Francis.

(Elizabeth I)

The basic problem is that Mary had a legitimate claim to the English throne once Henry VIII died and his heirs Edward and Mary died. The Scottish Mary was the great grand daughter of Henry VII of England, and Elizabeth, the daughter of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn was deemed a bastard. Henry II would paint the English coat of arms on Francis and Mary’s blazon in 1559 thus fostering the enmity and creating a rival for Elizabeth I. For the remainder of her life, Mary was seen by Elizabeth as a threat to her throne and eventually it would not end well for Mary.

Zweig will lay out the history of Mary’s short marriage to the sickly Francis and describe in detail her unwanted departure from France and return to Scotland. Zweig effectively relates Mary’s emotional state as she departs France. Zweig integrates Mary’s state of mind throughout the book and incorporates Mary’s own writings and words into the narrative. When Mary departs for Scotland on August 14, 1561, she is traveling to a country that is totally strange and foreign to her. She faces several obstacles before she arrives that will dog her for her entire reign. She is to rule over a poverty-stricken country, she must deal with a corrupt nobility that seems to make war at the slightest provocation, she must confront a clergy that is equally divided between Catholicism and Protestantism, and must deal with foreign neighbors who are waiting to benefit from the fratricidal disputes that seem to occur regularly.

(Lord Bothwell)

Zweig lays out the barriers that Mary must face when she assumes the throne. She is poor as her mother; Mary of Guise left no inheritance. Further, she must deal with wars of religion where the towns support Protestantism, and the countryside Catholicism. In addition, she must deal with fanatical priests and foreign powers, and lastly nobles who convert to Calvinism as a means of seizing Church wealth. Mary learned fast and decided that perpetual warfare was the way to preserve her Stuart heritage. The question that dominants is how does one rule when more than half of your kingdom believes in a different religion.

Several important figures emerge that influence the course of Mary’s reign. Her half-brother James Stuart, the bastard son of James V was her Prime Minister, and a Protestant. A patient practitioner of the Machiavellian arts, he would have made the perfect king of Scotland. James was wealthy in his own right and was always willing to accept subsidies to carry out the desires of Elizabeth I. Another major figure was John Knox, the fanatical Calvinist preacher who refused to accept Mary as the legitimate ruler of Scotland. His merciless antagonism and demagogic speeches designed to spread his dictatorial religious beliefs was a threat to Mary her entire reign. When they finally meet for the first time, Zweig presents a wonderful description of their debate that demeaned Mary, who stood up to Knox but realized the difficulty that he presented.

Throughout Zweig allows the reader to experience Renaissance culture through the poets and their poetry of the period. Mary who grew up during the French Renaissance was a cultured individual who did not fit in Scotland. Zweig shifts his narrative to the social and cultural mores and norms whenever the situation warrants, and it is a pleasant change from the constant lack of decency and back stabbing that dominates Mary’s reign.

Any biography of Mary must concentrate on her relationship with Elizabeth I. Zweig

does an exceptional job and his narrative is based on facts presented or debated with a scholar’s enthusiasm. There is a psychological dimension to the relationship between the two Queens and Zweig does his best to explore it and reach his own psychohistorical conclusions. He possesses a deep admiration for Mary and her refusal to give into a destiny that she should have been able to predict. Reading this monograph at a time of the “me-too” movement one must not take out any sexist frustrations one might feel in regard to Zweig’s comments, i.e.; “In spite of their superlative traits these two women remained women throughout and were unable to overcome the weaknesses inherent in their sex.” The narrative concerning the monarchial cousins centered on their differences that led to the ruin of Mary and victory for Elizabeth.

Zweig correctly points out that the Treaty of Edinburgh was at the center of their inability to reach a rapprochement despite the flowery letters between the two. Mary would not sign the treaty recognizing Elizabeth’s reign until Elizabeth had accorded the succession to Mary – but to Elizabeth that would be signing her death warrant. Zweig points out the strengths and weaknesses of the cousins as well as their similarities and differences. Mary possessed a madly heroic self-confidence that led to her doom. Elizabeth suffered from a lack of decision making, but she would still be victorious. Mary was the champion of the old Catholic faith and was a character out of the Middle Ages believing in chivalry which was dying out. Elizabeth was the more modern monarch who was defending the reformation. The approach to their individual kingdoms also sets them apart. Mary’s kingdom belonged to her on a personal level and she was interested in territorial expansion of her realm, only if it would benefit her personally. For Elizabeth everything she did was to expand her kingdom and add to the glory of England, not her personal possessions. The resulting engagement in wars, colonial expansion, and spreading England’s influence around the world was the result.

Perhaps Zweig’s most fascinating chapters deal with marriage diplomacy between the two Queens. The narrative is priceless as negotiations between the two go back and forth and characters like Lord Henry Darnley and Robert Dudley become pawns between the two women. Zweig’s presentation is almost like a comedic sketch resulting in the secret marriage of Darnley to Mary that has grave repercussions as Elizabeth and James Stuart are shunned to the side and the result is war that at first Mary is victorious, but in the end creates tensions that could only result in her defeat.

Zweig constantly offers a lens into the human condition throughout the narrative. He delves into the psychological imperative that drives Mary and provides a wonderful soliloquy encompassing her infatuation for Lord Bothwell and the repercussions of the murder plot to kill her husband and her almost immediate marriage to her husband’s murderer. Zweig’s analysis is deep and carefully thought out and certain historical scenes are presented as if from a Shakespearean play as there are constant comparisons to the Bard’s characters. The result is that Mary’s psyche has deteriorated to the point that she is unable to face what she has done and how dark were her deeds. A major component of the book is the decline in Mary’s psychological well being as her behavior is detrimental to her political position and her own happiness resulting in her self-inflicted downfall.

(The execution of Mary Queen of Scots)

This decline is readily apparent as Zweig describes the negotiations between the cousins once she leaves Scotland and is “detained” in England in 1567. Elizabeth wanted Mary to renounce her rights to the English throne and retire quietly. Further, she wanted Mary to be cleared of involvement in the regicidal plot involving Bothwell and the death of her husband, Lord Darnley. Zweig reproduces a great deal of documentation of the Westminster Conference which investigated the murder. As in several cases dealing with Mary the results were not clear, but no matter the result Mary once again let her pride stand in the way of her safety as she lamented her situation and refused to give into Elizabeth’s demands. The situation could easily have been resolved had Elizabeth, who at times had difficulty making major decisions just had Mary found guilty and executed in 1568 and not let the situation drag on for years with the same results.

As an aside, if one compares the film, Mary Queen of Scots to Zweig’s or other historical monographs it becomes clear there are several inaccuracies. First, Mary and Elizabeth never met face to face as takes place toward the end of the film. Second, the brutal murder of David Rizzio, Mary’s confidante does not take place in front of the Queen as is shown in the film as he was dragged into another stateroom for the deed to transpire. Third, it is debatable to assert that Darnley and Rizzio were lovers as is reflected in the film. Fourth, Mary did not have a Scottish accent as reflected in the film as she was raised in France, and lastly Lord Darnley probably raped Mary the first time they had sex. The film overall is well done with a diverse cast, which of course did not exist in the 16^th century, but the gist of historical accuracy does come across and one must remember a film is made to make money – not bring true history to the screen.

(Mary Queen of Scots and Elizabeth I as portrayed in the film)

Zweig has written a somewhat entertaining and literary biography of Mary Queen of Scots. In reading the book one must realize the time period in which it was written and Zweig’s background as a writer. It may not meet the criteria that today’s historians might call for, i.e.; a full bibliography and endnotes, but it is a legitimate work of history and I would recommend it for those who seek clarification, those who have seen the film, or those who are just curious about one of the most enigmatic figures in history.

(Mary Queen of Scots as portrayed in the film)

GRAND IMPROVISATION: AMERICA CONFRONTS THE BRITISH SUPER POWER, 1945-1957 by Derek Leebaert

January 6, 2019szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Cold War, English History, Modern European History, Uncategorized 2 Comments

“Americans don’t do grand strategy.”

(Oliver Franks, British Ambassador to the United States, 1953)

From the outset of his new work, GRAND IMPROVISATION: AMERICA CONFRONTS THE BRITISH SUPER POWER, 1945-1957 Derek Leebaert puts forth the premise that the idea that the British were about to liquidate their empire because of financial and military weakness after World War II was fallacious. Further, that the United States was fully prepared to assume the leadership of the west and would do so while creating an American led international order that we’ve lived with ever since was equally false. Leebaert’s conclusions are boldly stated as he reevaluates the historical community that for the most part has disagreed with his assumptions over the years. The author rests his case on assiduous research (just check the endnotes) and uncovering documents that have not been available or used previously. Leebaert argues his case very carefully that American foreign policy in the post war era was very improvisational as it tried to develop a consistent policy to confront what it perceived be a world-wide communist surge. Leebaert argues that it took at least until 1957 at the conclusion of the Suez Crisis for London to finally let go of their position as a first-rate power with a dominant empire, allowing the United States to fill the vacuum that it created. No matter how strong Leebaert believes his argument to be I would point out that events in India, Pakistan, Palestine, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the creation of NATO, and the American loan of $3.75 billion all of which occurred before 1948 should raise a few questions concerning his conclusions.

(British Prime Minister Winston Churchill)

Despite the assuredness with which Leebaert presents his case there are merits to his argument and the standard interpretation that has long been gospel deserves a rethinking. His thesis rests on a series of documents that he has uncovered. The most important of which is National Security Document 75 that was presented to President Truman on July 15, 1950. Leebaert contends that this 40-page analysis has never been seen by historians and its conclusions are extremely important. NSC 75’s purpose was to conduct an audit of the far-flung British Empire concentrating on its ability to meet its military commitments and determine how strong the United Kingdom really was, as men including John J. McCloy, Paul Nitze, David K. Bruce, and Lewis Douglas feared what would happen if the British Empire collapsed. All important agencies in the American government took part in this analysis; the CIA, the Pentagon, the Treasury and State Departments and reached some very interesting judgments. The document concluded that “the British Empire and Commonwealth” still had the capacity to meet its military obligations with an army of close to a million men. Leebaert argues that “there had been no retreat that anyone could categorize, in contrast to adjustment, and no need was expected for replacement. Nor could American energy and goodwill substitute for the British Empire’s experienced global presence. As for the need to vastly expand US forces overseas, that wasn’t necessary. Instead the United States should support its formidable ally, which included backing its reserve currency.” (234) For Leebaert this document alone changes years of Cold War historiography.

(President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State George C. Marshall)

Harold Evans points out in his October 18, New York Times review that Leebaert offers other persuasive points that mitigate any American take over from the British due to their perceived weakness. First, British military and related industries produced higher proportions of wartime output than the United States well into the 1950s. Second, Britain was ahead in life sciences, civil nuclear energy, and jet aviation than America. Third, England maintained the largest military presence on the Rhine once the United States withdrew its forces at the end of the war. Fourth, British intelligence outshone “American amateurs.” This being the case Leebaert’s thesis has considerable merit, but there are areas that his thesis does not hold water, particularly that of the condition of the English economy, dollar reserves, and how British trade was affected by the weakness of the pound sterling.

(British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin)

Leebaert’s revisionist approach centers on a few historical figures; some he tries to resurrect their reputations, others to bring them to the fore having been seemingly ignored previously. The author’s portrayal of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin is a key to his presentation. As the leader of the Labour Party, Bevin held leftist anti-colonial beliefs, but once in power the realities of empire, economics, and politics brought about a marked change particularly as it involved the Middle East, London’s role in any attempt at a European federation, the devaluation of the pound sterling, the need to create an Anglo-American bond, and numerous other areas. Leebaert goes out of his way to defend Bevin in several areas, especially charges that he was anti-Semitic in dealing with the situation in Palestine. Other individuals discussed include John Wesley Snyder who had strong relationships with President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall, who as Secretary of the Treasury oversaw the transition of the US economy to peacetime and was the driving force behind the Marshall Plan. The American Ambassador to Great Britain, Lewis Douglas also fits this category as does Commissioner General Malcom MacDonald, who oversaw British policy in the Pacific from his position in Singapore, the hub of British Pacific power.

Leebaert’s narrative includes the history of the major Cold War events of the 1945-1950. His discussion of the situation in Greece and Turkey including Bevin and US Admiral Leahy’s bluffs in negotiations that resulted in the Truman Doctrine and $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey. The Berlin Crisis, the Soviet murder of Jan Masaryk, Mao’s victory in China and what it meant for Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the Korean War are all presented in detail.

(George of Kennan, Ambassador to Russia; Head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff)

Perhaps Leebaert’s favorite character in supporting his thesis is Walter Lippmann, the American journalist who had difficulty deciding whether the British were using the United States as a foil against the Soviet Union, or as a vehicle to fill any vacuums that might avail themselves should England retrench. But eventually Lippmann concluded that Washington believed that the British Empire would contain the Soviet Union all by itself, not the actions of an empire that was about to fold and pass the torch to the United States.

Leebaert is not shy about putting certain historical figures on the carpet and shattering their reputations. Chief among these people is George F. Kennan, who was Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Head of the State Department Policy Planning staff among his many diplomatic positions. For Leebaert the idea that Kennan was a “giant of diplomacy” as he was described by Henry Kissinger is a misnomer to say the least. He finds Kennan to be emotional, careless, impulsive, and “frequently amateurish.” Further, he believes Kennan was often ignorant about certain areas, particularly the Middle East and Japan, and lacked a rudimentary knowledge of economics. But for Leebaert this did not stop Kennan from offering his opinions and interfering in areas that he lacked any type of expertise.

(British Commissioner General Malcom MacDonald)

The situation in Southeast Asia was crucial for the British as seen through the eyes of Malcom MacDonald. He firmly believed that if Indochina fell Thailand would follow as would the British stronghold of Malaya. British trade and investment would be cut and wouldn’t be able to strengthen their recovering European allies, thus ending any American hope of a self-reliant North-Atlantic partnership. According to Leebaert, it was imperative to get Washington to support Bao Dai as leader of Vietnam and MacDonald made the case to the Americans better than the French. If nothing was done the entire area would be lost to the communists. Leebaert interestingly points out that in the 1930s when it appeared, he might become Prime Minister some day he backed Neville Chamberlain at Munich, now in the early 1950s he did not want to be seen as an appeaser once again.

At the same time disaster was unfolding on the Korean peninsula and Washington kept calling for British troops to assist MacArthur’s forces at Pusan. The Atlee government did not respond quickly, and with British recognition of Mao’s regime and continued trade with Beijing, along with its attitude toward Taiwan, resulting in fissures between the British and the United States. With Bevin ill, Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State argued that London could not be spread too thin because they could not leave Iran, Suez, Malaya, or Hong Kong unguarded. Interestingly, Leebaert points out at the time the only real Soviet military plan was geared against Tito’s Yugoslavia. The difference between Washington and London was clear – the British had global concerns, the Americans were obsessed with Korea. Finally, by the end of August 1950 London dispatched 1500 soldiers, a year later 20,000 Commonwealth soldiers would be involved in combat operations.

(President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles)

Leebaert’s premise that the British would not forgo empire until the results of the Suez Crisis was a few years off. By 1951 strong signals emerged that the empire was about to experience further decline with events in Iran and Egypt taking precedence. If Islamists focused on anti-communism in these areas the British were safe, but when they began to turn their focus to nationalism London would be in trouble. Domestically, Britain was also in difficulty as financial news was very dispiriting. Due to the Korean War and the US demand for industrial goods the total cost for imports shot up markedly. This caused a balance of payments problem and the pound sterling plummeted once again. The cold winter exacerbated the economy even further as another coal shortage took place. It seemed that the British people had to deal with the rationing of certain items, but the defeated Germany did not. Further, by 1952 Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya began to take their toll causing London to face another external challenge.

The British strategy toward the United States was to stress the anti-communism fear in dealing with Egypt and Iran. In Egypt, King Farouk was a disaster and the British feared for the Suez Canal. In Iran, the English fear centered around the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which had been ripping off Teheran for decades. An attempt to ameliorate the situation came to naught as the company was nationalized and eventually in 1953 the British and American staged a coup that overthrew the elected Prime Minister, Mohamed Mossadegh. In Egypt nationalism would also become a major force that London could not contain resulting in the 1952 Free Officers Movement that brought to power Gamel Abdul Nasser. In each instance Washington took on an even more important role, and some have argued that the CIA was complicit in fostering a change in the Egyptian government. In addition, Dwight Eisenhower became president and John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State. Despite newly elected Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s hope that the World War II relationship could be rekindled, Eisenhower saw the British as colonialists who were hindering US foreign policy, in addition the relationship between Dulles and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden was at rock bottom. It became increasingly clear that the Eisenhower administration wanted to avoid being perceived as acting in concert with Britain in dealing with colonial issues, except in the case of Iran which the United States is still paying for because of its actions.

(British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden)

Regarding Indochina, the United States and England could not reach any demarche as regards the plight of the French visa vie the Vietminh, particularly as the battle of Dienbienphu played out. Leebaert does an excellent job recounting the play by play between Dulles and Eden, Eisenhower and Churchill as the US and England saw their relations splintering as negotiations and the resulting recriminations proved fruitless. This inability to come together over Southeast Asia would have grave implications in other areas.

(British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill)

In another region, the Eisenhower administration would embark on a strategy to create some sort of Middle East Defense Organization to hinder Soviet penetration. This strategy, whether called a “Northern Tier” or the “Baghdad Pact” of Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran or other nomenclatures created difficulties with Britain who sought to use such an alliance as a vehicle to maintain their influence in the region, particularly in Jordan and Iraq. British machinations would irritate Washington as Eden and company resented American pressure to withdraw from the Suez Canal Base and other issues. The result would be an alliance between England, France, and Israel to topple Nasser in Egypt. The alliance was misconceived and would evolve into a break between the United States and its Atlantic allies even to the effect of the Eisenhower administration working behind the scenes to topple the Eden government and bring about the Eisenhower Doctrine signaling that the British had lost its leadership position and was no longer considered a “major power.”

(Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser)

I must point out that I have written my own monograph that deals with major aspects of Leebaert’s thesis, DAWN OVER SUEZ: THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1953-1957. My own research concludes that the United States actively worked to replace Britain as the dominant force in the Middle East as early as May 1953 when John F. Dulles visited the region and came back appalled by British colonialism. Leebaert leaves out a great deal in discussing the period; the role of the US in forcing Churchill into agreeing to the Heads of Agreement to withdraw from the Suez Canal Base; the failure of secret project Alpha and the Anderson Mission to bring about a rapprochement between Israel and Egypt and its implications for US policy; the disdain that the Americans viewed Eden, the extent of American ire at the British for undercutting their attempts at a Middle East Defense Organization by their actions in Iraq and Jordan; the role of US anger over the Suez invasion because it ruined a coup set to take place in Syria; and the Eisenhower administrations machinations behind the scenes to remove Eden as Prime Minister to be replaced by Harold Macmillan. In addition, the author makes a series of statements that are not supported by any citations; i.e.; Eisenhower’s support for finding a way to fund the Aswan Dam after Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal; attempts to poison Nasser etc.

Overall however, Leebaert has written a monograph that should raise many eyebrows for those who have accepted the Cold War narrative of the last six decades. There are many instances where he raises questions, provides answers that force the reader to conclude that these issues should be reexamined considering his work. At a time when the United States is struggling to implement a consistent worldview in the realm of foreign policy it is important for policy makers to consider the plight of the British Empire following World War II and how Washington’s inability to confront world issues in a reasoned and measured way and develop a long term strategy fostered a pattern that has created many difficulties that continue to dog us today.

LAST HOPE ISLAND: BRITAIN, OCCUPIED EUROPE AND THE BROTHERHOOD THAT HELPED TURN THE TIDE OF WAR by Lynne Olson

September 13, 2017szfreiberger English History, Modern European History, World War II Leave a comment

(Queen Wilhelmina of Holland broadcasting over the BBC from London to her country during WWII)

England has had a long and tortured history as she related to the European continent – always asking the question: should we become involved or not? We can see it after World War II and the developing Common Market, and of course with the recent Brexit vote. The dark days during the spring of 1940 when the Nazis rolled over France and the Low countries presented the problem anew, but this time after sitting back in the late 1930s allowing Hitler carte blanche it decided to support a “community of nations” as London was made available as a sanctuary for governments overrun by the Nazis. London would become the home for the exiled governments of Poland, Norway, France, Belgium, Holland, and Czechoslovakia. These governments would band together with England to defeat Nazism and lay the basis for European cooperation after the war. One of Olson’s major themes rests with the exile communities. She affirms without the exiles work as pilots, mathematicians, intelligence operators, scientists, physicists, and soldiers who knows how the war might have turned out. Today, with the European Union under attack on the continent by certain right wing parties it is useful to explore Lynne Olson’s latest work dealing with World War II entitled, LAST HOPE ISLAND: BRITAIN, OCCUPIED EUROPE AND THE BROTHERHOOD THAT HELPED TURN THE TIDE OF WAR.

(Charles de Gaulle, leader of Free French forces during WWII)

Olson covers a great deal of material in her book, much is new, but some of it has appeared in past books. For example, the chapter dealing with the Battle of Britain and the London Blitz has a similar narrative that appears in A QUESTION OF HONOR: THE KOSCIUSZKO SQUADRON: THE FORGOTTEN HEROES OF WORLD WAR II as she writes about Squadron 303 made up of Polish airmen who accomplished remarkable things at a time of England’s greatest need. Other examples can be found in TROUBLESOME YOUNG MEN: THE REBELS WHO BROUGHT CHURCHILL TO POWER AND HELPED SAVE ENGLAND and CITIZENS OF LONDON: THE AMERICANS WHO STOOD WITH BRITAIN IN ITS DARKEST, FINEST HOUR. The integration of past research enhances her current effort particularly when she writes about the early part of the war. To her credit she has an amazing knowledge of the leading secondary works and historians dealing with her topic which just enhances the narrative.

Olson employs a wonderful wit as part of her approach to writing. For example she quotes the novelist and former MI6 member, John le Carre as he noted how devoted MI6 had been to “the conspiracies of self-protection, of using the skirts of official secrecy in order to protect incompetence, of gross class privilege, of amazing credulity,” then remarks that “the years immediately preceding the war MI6, as it happened, had a considerable amount of incompetence to protect.”

(British Prime Minister Winston Churchill)

The author breaks the narrative into two separate parts. The first being the prewar period through the end of 1941 as the Germans rolled through France and the Low countries and we find a number of governments in exile stationed in London. In that section of the book Olson successfully narrates the relationship of these governments in exile first with the Chamberlain government, then that of Churchill. She explores the important personalities that include King Haakon of Norway, Queen Wilhelmina of Holland, Charles de Gaulle of the Free French, and Edvard Benes of Czechoslovakia. The problems of each are explained as well as how the British responded to their needs. Olson accurately points out the humiliation and frustration experienced by Benes who was forced not to fight during the Munich conference, then was pilloried for not fighting when Hitler seized Czechoslovakia in March, 1939. Further she explores the difficult relationship between the British and the French particularly during the evacuation from Dunkirk, as well as with de Gaulle once France fell. For the British de Gaulle could be described as the self-appointed French leader who exhibited “extreme weakness that required extreme intransigence.” King Haakon and Queen Wilhelmina got along much better with the British as each had merchant marine fleets that English needed, as well as natural resources. Olson points out the complexity of the relationship with the Polish government in exile. Of all these governments it was the Poles who fought, wanted to continue to fight, and developed the Home Army to do so. They made tremendous contributions as pilots, intelligence sources, and creating a resistance against Nazi Germany.

(Exiled Polish pilots from Squadron 303 who assisted England during the Battle of Britain)

Olson does a commendable job explaining the incompetence of the British and French military leadership who instead of accepting responsibility for events that led to Dunkirk used Belgium as their scapegoat for their own failures and defeat. Showering King Leopold as a “Quisling” was blasphemy for the king whose army fought as well as possible based on the resources at his command, and further, refused to surrender to the Germans. Olson also argues that the myth that the French just gave up was unfair based on the lack of support the British provided as the Germans goose-stepped into Paris.

The importance of the BBC is given its own chapter which is important because the radio broadcasts had an important role to play. First, it allowed exiled leaders the opportunity to broadcast their own message to their people. Second, it provided the various resistance movements accurate information as to the course of the war. Third, they broadcasted in over forty languages. Lastly, it gave hope to demoralized population, particularly in France as they told the truth.

(King Haakon VII of Norway)

By December 1941 the governments in exile came to the realization that with the entrance of the United States and the Soviet Union the entire diplomatic formula was dramatically altered. With the Americans and Russians now in the war, their early closeness with Great Britain was about to give way to power politics, and perhaps a European Union might be in the offering. From this point on Olson’s focus begins to change.

Olson spends a great deal of time taking apart the reputations of British MI6 and their Special Operations Executive. She delves into the lack of competence exhibited by MI6 head Stewart Menzies and his battle with SOE leadership whose task was to foment sabotage, subversion and resistance in Europe. In chapters dealing with Holland and France, Olson points out the errors that SOE leaders engaged in including a lack of security and simplistic coding, and foolish field decisions involving their agents. London’s poor decision making would prove disastrous for Dutch agents who were easily rounded up by the Germans as they parachuted into Holland. Olson is meticulous as she undermines the myth of the excellence of British secret services and the negative impact on events in Holland and France. Two men stand out in her narrative, Leo Marks and Frances Cammaerts who were “passionate, skeptical, and [possessed] fiercely independent traits unappreciated by the SOE brass.” The problem was this weak intelligence infrastructure created issues for the French resistance that was to play a major role in D Day planning and the early stages of the invasion as many suffered horrendous death at the hands of the SS. Further complicating things was the split between the French resistance and de Gaulle, and the British and de Gaulle. In both cases endangering the overall invasion.

(Czechoslovakia’s leader Edvard Benes)

Olson is at her best when she integrates stories about certain figures who seem to be on the periphery of the main narrative, but are involved in important actions. For example Andree de Vongh, an independent woman who decided to ignore SOE objections and developed the “Comet Line” an escape route for British airmen and paratroopers that began in Brussels, snaked its way through France, and crossed the Pyrenees into Spain. She organized safe houses along the route and when MI9 refused to give her funds she raised them on her own. She personally escorted 118 servicemen to freedom out of 7000 total for all networks during the war. If reading about de Vongh is not interesting enough, Audrey Kathleen Ruston, a thirteen year old aspiring dancer and Dutch resistance member emerges, a.k.a Audrey Hepburn.

One of the major debates that historians seem to engage in is how valuable were resistance movements in winning the war. Though some argue not as much as one might think, Olson makes the case throughout that they were very consequential. The Poles in particular who contributed to breaking the Enigma code and intelligence collected by their spies throughout Europe were of great importance to the Allied victory. The Poles who seemed to have given so much received very little as the war wound to a close, and in the postwar world. It was unfortunate that they became pawns between Stalin’s strategic view of Soviet national security in Eastern Europe, and Roosevelt’s desire not to upset the Russian dictator whose army suffered an inordinate number of casualties compared to England and the United States. When Polish exile leaders appealed to Churchill, no matter what the English Prime Minister believed, he could do little to convince his allies to assist the Poles as the Nazis were about to destroy what remained of Warsaw in May, 1944. As far as the French are concerned General Eisenhower argues that the resistance was “of inestimable value…without their great assistance, the liberation of France would have consumed a much longer time and meant greater losses to ourselves.” Olson summarizes her view nicely as she quotes historian Julian Jackson, “there was indeed a Resistance myth which needed to be punctured, but that does not mean that the Resistance was a myth.”

(British General Bernard Montgomery, 1943)

When evaluating the Dutch contribution Olson correctly takes General Bernard Montgomery to task. Montgomery had a large sense of self, arrogant and stubborn as he refused to take into account Dutch intelligence concerning the retaking of the port of Antwerp. Rather than securing the Scheldt River estuary before moving on to Operation Market Basket, Montgomery had his eye on racing to Berlin before the Americans or Russians arrived. As a result the Germans lay in wait, and Arnhem would become a trap leading to a fiasco which Montgomery’s over-sized ego caused.. “As a result, many more people would die, soldiers, and civilians alike. For the Netherlands, the consequences would be dire” as the Allies controlled southern Holland, but the Nazis the northern cities and they took out their retribution on the populations of Rotterdam, Amsterdam, the Hague, Utrecht, and others.

The latter part of the book evolves into a narrative of the last year of the war. Olson covers the salient facts and personalities as she tries to maintain to her “exile” theme. If one were to pick which character she was most impressed with it would be Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch people. Olson points out the errors that politicians made and how their decisions impacted the post war world particularly Czechoslovakia as Patton’s Third Army stood outside Prague and waited to allow the Soviet army march in. This along with Poland plight reflects Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower’s desire not to allow political implications affect how they decided to deploy American soldiers. Olson’s new book is an excellent read, a combination of straight narrative, interpretive, and empathetic history that all can enjoy.

(Holland’s Queen Wilhelmina returning to her country after WWII)

THE MIRACLE OF DUNKIRK by Walter Lord

August 21, 2017szfreiberger English History, World War II Leave a comment

(the evacuation from Dunkirk)

A few days ago I saw the film “Dunkirk” which attempted to convey the importance of the rescue of 338,000 men off the coast of France across the English Channel in late May and early June, 1940. The film does an excellent job presenting the plight of British and French troops as they lined up on the beaches to be extracted from the threat of German tanks, artillery, soldiers and bombers. What the historian, Walter Lord refers to in his classic study, THE MIRACLE OF DUNKIRK is a series of crises that allowed many components of British society to take part in the rescue of these men. Though originally published in 1982, Lord’s book has lost none of its punch and command of events that led to the evacuation, the evacuation itself, and its implication for the overall war effort. When reading Lord’s work today it still reflects a historian who had mastered the craft of narrative history and allowed the reader to take part in the action being described.

The approach taken in the film is reflected in Lord’s work. It presents three important elements of the rescue; the outnumbered brave British pilots who met and tried to neutralize German Stukas, the employment of anything that would float represented by a family fishing boat, and the men stuck on the French beaches trying to survive German bombing. All aspects help capture the bravery, spirit, audacity of the British people that allowed them to save their army – an achievement that would go a long way in finally defeating the Nazis five years later.

Having seen the film I decided to read Lord’s highly readable study of what occurred. Events in France shocked many, particularly Prime Minister Winston Churchill who was informed early on the morning of May 15, 1940 by French Premier Paul Reynaud that the French had been defeated after the Germans surprised them by attacking through the supposedly impenetrable Ardennes Forest. German Panzer Divisions poured through the French countryside trapping the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), two French armies, and all Belgium soldiers, nearly one million men pinned against the sea at Flanders.

Lord does a superb job describing British resiliency as they tried to block the German advance at the same time they instituted a massive withdrawal to save the BEF. Lord points out French arrogance in dealing with the British, how quickly their troops and leadership became demoralized, and how the British were confronted with French “invisibleness” as they tried to cope with the German advance. British policy seemed to always have to take in to account the French state of mind. Once the French had given up, the BEF command had to prod them to hold certain areas so an escape route could be protected. Further, the French felt they were not being treated equally once the evacuation began to gather steam. They wanted the use of British ships and equal extraction of soldiers. Churchill was very cognizant of French sensitivities as he was afraid of losing an ally at a time when things were becoming desperate.

Once the Germans realized what was occurring as the BEF and its allies began retreating north they worked to close off any access to French ports, be it Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. The Germans were spreads very thin and were stunned the allies did not attack their flanks as they raced for the beaches. Luftwaffe head, Herman Goring grew jealous of Heinz Guderian’s Panzer unit and pleaded with Hitler to halt the German advance and allow his air force to complete the job of wiping out the BEF. Hitler was concerned about his armor and viewed Paris as his main target so he went along with Goring. This decision was very telling as it gave the BEF three days to organize its retreat before Hitler changed his mind – probably creating the opportunity for the “miracle” at Dunkirk.

Perhaps Lord’s best chapter, “Operation Dynamo” deals with how the Admiralty bureaucracy organized the diversified types of ships and crafts that would take part in the rescue of the BEF. On May 14, 1940 the BBC called for “all owners of self-propelled pleasure craft between 30 and 100 feet in length to send all their particulars to the Admiralty within fourteen days.” Lord provides intricate details how this miracle at sea was organized under the leadership of Vice Admiral Betrum Ramsay who was located deep in the White Cliffs of Dover. The result was a “strange fleet of ferries, hoppers, dredges, barges, coasters, and skoots.” Once Boulogne and Calais fell, Dunkirk was the only option.

What sets Lord’s work a part from others is how he integrates the private stories and individual experiences of the soldiers and civilians who came to their rescue during the evacuation. The harrowing trip across the channel and back avoiding German mines and bombers, placing the reader with the heroic individuals Lord describes. Lord presents a number of important personages in his narrative that include King Leopold III of Belgium who quickly surrendered to the Germans, General Bernard Montgomery who organized his troops to fill the gap in the BEF escape route, and General Gort (Viscount Lord) who was in charge of BEF at Dunkirk, among others. In addition, Lord has interviewed numerous survivors, civilians, and officers whose personal experiences helped create a fascinating narrative that began with a disorganized movement of troops onto the beaches, the need to create a pier to allow ships to pick the men up, and organizing the men into small units that would make for an efficient extraction. What resulted at times was “bewildered waiting” and trying to avoid being hit by German bombers.

The British command also had to make important choices as a number of destroyers dispatched to evacuate men began to be sunk. Churchill and company were concerned that the losses were too much in light of what they thought would be a long war. At one point a number of destroyers were withdrawn. What facilitated the evacuation was low cloud cover and smoke for a good part of the end of May, 1940. As the Admiralty withdrew the destroyers the void was filled by car ferry’s, fishing boats, open motor launches, barges, cabin cruisers, trawlers, and rusted scows – ships/boats of every conceivable type. By the end of May, it became a deluge of “little ships.” These craft were mostly unarmed and many were piloted by everyday civilians, a number of which were on their maiden voyage with little knowledge of nautical equipment. The ingenuity of the British was seen as troops cannibalized materials from wherever they could, be it partially sunken destroyers, damaged buildings etc. all to create a temporary pier or mole so rescue boats could come astride and extract as many men as possible.

By the end of the evacuation 224,686 of the BEF and 123,095 French soldiers were evacuated. This would be a problem for Churchill for the remainder of the war as the French believed that the British did not do their utmost to save French soldiers. Lord also does a marvelous job detailing the intricate and frosty relationship between England and France, especially as the Germans began to turn their attention away from Dunkirk and moved their panzer divisions to conquer Paris.

The significance of the evacuation lay in the large number of British troops that were saved. Guns and vehicles could be replaced, but not the only trained troops that Britain had left. It would form a nucleus of the great allied army that would win back the continent. Further, leaders such as Lt. General Alan Brook, Major-General Harold Alexander, and Major-General Bernard Montgomery “all cut their teeth at Dunkirk.” In addition, the evacuation electrified the British people and gave them a sense of purpose that the war previously lacked. It was an opportunity for ordinary citizens to feel they had made a direct contribution to the war effort.

Lord has written a highly readable account of the rescue of allied forces from Dunkirk. An accomplishment many historians credit for saving Britain from being forced out of the war with Germany. Though written and researched over thirty five years ago it still stands as the best narrative of the rescue and provides numerous insights into the mindset of the hundreds of thousands who survived the Nazi onslaught in the late spring of 1940.

(the evacuation from Dunkirk)

VICTORIA: THE QUEEN by Julia Baird

February 1, 2017szfreiberger Biography, English History Leave a comment

(Queen Victoria)

The current airing of PBS’ Masterpiece Theater of VICTORIA and its popularity has created great interest in the British monarch who ruled her kingdom and the world’s largest empire between her accession to the throne in 1837 and her death in 1901. The program is written by Daisy Goodwin who has recently published her novel VICTORIA a fictional account of the early years of Victoria’s reign. For a full and intimate biography Julia Baird has filled that void with VICTORIA: THE QUEEN which is an in depth study of the queen focusing on what it was like to be a female monarch in a world dominated by men. Baird takes a somewhat feminist approach to her subject and based on years of research and mastery of primary and secondary material, the reader will learn what it was like for the teenage girl to suddenly assume the throne in 1837, her views on Parliament, Prime Ministers, attitudes toward the poor, foreign policy ranging from the Crimean War to the Boer War, but also the effect of her reign on society and women in particular. The approach Baird takes is informative, well thought out, provides impeccable analysis, but at times she takes her intimate approach a bit too far. I understand the importance of Victoria’s multiple pregnancies that produced nine children, but I do not need to know the details of her menstrual cycle and her reproductive anatomy. Details about her life with Prince Alfred are fascinating, but at times, here too, she goes overboard. However, despite some flaws the book is beautifully written and an important contribution to the historiography of the Queen.

During her reign Victoria steered her people through the social and economic changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution, and oversaw her kingdom as the European balance of power was radically altered through nationalism and imperialism. The Queen’s reign was the longest in British history until it was recently surpassed in 2015 by Queen Elizabeth II. Baird points to the many myths associated with Victoria relating to her marriage to Prince Albert, her use of power as queen, her treatment of her subjects, and her personality traits. Baird accurately concludes that “Victoria is the women under whose auspices the modern world was made.” Further, Baird does an exceptional job analyzing her subject in the context of mid to late 19^th century socio-economic change and her impact on European society and the larger world especially for the role of women. In a sense Baird has created an ode to the development of the women’s movement with Victoria’s situation seen as a primary motivator behind it. Baird correctly argues that Victoria fought for her independence, prestige, and respect for her reign from the time she was a teenager, and did so mostly on her own. For the author, she “worked until her eyes wore out, that she advised, and argued with, ten prime ministers, populated the royal courts of Europe, and kept the British monarchy stable during the political upheavals that shook Europe in the nineteenth century.”

(William Lamb, Lord Melbourne)

Baird gives Victoria a great deal of credit but then she backtracks as she discusses the queen’s relationship with Lord Melbourne, who she leaned on for support in dealing with her mother, John Conroy, certain members of her family, Parliament, and policy decisions. Baird describes a young woman infatuated with an older man, who thankfully does not seem to take advantage of his positon. According to Baird, Victoria will eventually concede powers to Prince Albert in most major social, political, and foreign policy areas. Granted, Victoria was pregnant a great deal of the time during her marriage to Albert, and suffered from postpartum depression and other ills that made her involvement in decision making less of an issue, but Baird herself points out the differences in approach between Victoria and Albert. The Prince was more of an intellectual than his spouse and was greatly interested in the problems of the poor and working classes. Albert was a cultured and well educated person who did not want to crush public dissent like Victoria and it appeared he wanted to bring about reform in order to lessen that dissent. According to Baird, “the role of the monarchy under Albert’s leadership, then, was a forceful influence, which urged the government to exercise restraint in foreign policy and democratization, to erode the authority of the aristocracy and exert influence through a web of royal connections that spanned Europe in a network of carefully planned and delicate backdoor diplomacy.” Victoria on the other hand was not as empathetic toward her subjects. A case in point is her approach to the Irish famine where she started out criticizing tyrannical landlords, but once a few landlords that she knew were murdered, her sympathy for Irish tenant farmers waned. Baird argues that it was a stretch to blame Victoria for the famine, but there was a great deal she could have done to mitigate their effects. It is clear that from the time of her marriage to Prince Albert in 1839 until his death in 1861 England may have gone through an Albertine Age as Baird suggests, and it took until the Prince died for Victoria to seize the reigns and create the Victorian Age.

(Queen Victoria and Prince Albert)

For Victoria until Albert’s passing life was a balancing act; how to be a good mother, wife, and reign over her kingdom. Baird does her best to show the Queen as a loving and doting mother, but then in the next sentence she will point out that she was rarely involved in certain aspects of her children’s care. Victoria possessed a quiet stubbornness that forced many who opposed her wishes to underestimate her, particularly when she ruled by herself. Lord Melbourne did school her well on how to be an effective Queen, and she learned from Albert certain sensibilities that a monarch needed to possess.

Baird does an effective job dealing with Victoria’s views and impact on events. Her role in the Crimean War debate is discussed in full, her fears of revolution in 1848 and why the social upheaval throughout Europe did not cross the English Channel, her distaste for the Russians in the Eastern crisis that led to war and the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, and her opposition to Home Rule for the Irish. Further, Baird’s discussion and analysis of Victoria relationship with her Prime Ministers is top drawer particularly her negative relationship with Lord Palmerston when he was Foreign and Prime Minister, and her up and down relationships with certain Prime Ministers, particularly William Gladstone, Lord Derby and Lord Russell. Her relationship with Lord Salisbury was excellent but nothing compared to her relationship with Benjamin Disraeli as he was the only Prime Minister to realize that the lonely queen wanted to be “fettered, flattered, and adored.” As Victoria aged she moved on from her Whiggish liberalism under the influence of Melbourne to outright conservativism due to her close relationship with the Tory, Disraeli. The last twenty years of her reign Victoria, who never acted as an impartial monarch, became greatly involved in politics, especially when the man she loathed, William Gladstone had defeated Disraeli in parliamentary elections in 1881.

(Prime Minister William Gladstone)

It can be argued that 1861 was a watershed year for Europe and the world because of its impact on the United States and across Europe. It witnessed the outbreak of the Civil War in the United States, the supposed emancipation of serfs in Russia, and the death of Prince Albert. Her husband’s death became the greatest test for Victoria’s reign. She seemed to succumb to an extreme depression and many wondered if mental illness would overtake her as it did George III. Her depression would last for a number of years where she had doubts about how to proceed with policies and felt extremely alone. During that time a number of major events in Europe would draw the attention of the British Foreign Office. The Polish Revolt against Russia and the controversy over Schleswig-Holstein would lead to the Danish War between Denmark and Prussia. English influence in this 1863 crisis was marked and if Albert had been alive he might have influenced events more than his mourning widow. By the late 1860s it appeared that Victoria was emerging from her depressive state, and as she overcame her loss she would go on to be a strong monarch in her own right making a deep impact on her kingdom as well as Europe.

The key individual in Victoria’s emergence from her widowed state was John Brown, a Scottish Highlander who had been Albert’s outdoor attendant at Balmoral who became her most intimate friend. Her children despised him and nicknamed him the “Queen’s Stallion.” There are many rumors and myths about their relationship that Baird addresses, whether they were lovers and what impact he may have had on policies, as one writer referred to him as “Rasputin with a kilt.” No matter what the truth may be, one thing is certain is that the Queen came to rely on him and he helped fill the void created by Albert’s death. In fact, Victoria would spend eighteen years in his company, almost as long as she spent with her beloved Albert.

(Wilhelm II of Germany, Victoria’s grandson)

Baird spends a great deal of time discussing royal genealogy and its impact on Victoria’s life and policy decisions. Using the marriage of her children for diplomatic need had been a tradition of European and English monarchies for centuries, but in her case the result can be considered quite disastrous as her lineage connects her to Wilhelm II of Germany, and Nicholas II of Russia who both bear a great deal of the blame for the outbreak of World War I and the carnage that followed. Her children were placed throughout Europe as a means of extending English influence, but in reality that goal was rarely met.

There is no doubt that no one person dominated her kingdom the way Victoria had, particularly from the 1870s onward as she applied the political lessons learned over the decades, especially working in the shadows to achieve her goals while her subjects thought she was romping in Scotland as any monarch would do. Baird creates an absorbing picture of a fascinating life. Despite a few flaws Baird should be commended for producing the most comprehensive analysis of Victoria and her importance in history, and it should remain the most important secondary source on Victoria’s life for years to come.

(Queen Victoria)

1956: THE WORLD IN REVOLT by Simon Hall

November 26, 2016szfreiberger African History, Cold War, English History, Middle Eastern History, Russian History, United States Foreign Policy Leave a comment

(Montgomery, Alabama bus segregation, 1956)

During my forty two year teaching career my students repeatedly complained when I used the term “watershed date” in class. There are certain dates in history that deserve that characterization, i.e.; 1648 the dividing line between the Medieval and the modern, 1789 the year of revolution and of course 1989 the collapse of the Soviet Union, among many others. Often historians seem to come up with new dates, arguing its historical significance, and in Simon Hall’s new book 1956: THE WORLD IN REVOLT, the author chooses a year that probably qualifies as a “watershed date.” The year 1956 witnessed a number of important events that include the Suez War, the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the Montgomery bus boycott in Alabama, the Polish uprising, the Algerian Civil War, Nikita Khrushchev’s destalinization speech, the independence of Ghana, and important events in South Africa, Cuba among many others. Trying to write a complete history of all of these events is a daunting task that for Hall, falls a little bit short. The author makes a valiant attempt by introducing the main characters through biographical sketches and goes on to explain what has occurred and why it is important. The problem for Hall is carrying out his theme of anti-colonialism and the rise of independence movements, while trying to effectively link them all together globally, a truly difficult task.

(Algerian Civil War independence movement)

Today we acknowledge the sixtieth anniversary of the Suez War and the Hungarian Revolution with a number of new books appearing particularly monographs by Michael Doran and Alex von Tunzelmann, which are narrower in focus than Hall’s work. The author teaches at the University of Leeds and has published a number of works on civil rights and the protest movements of 1960s. Hall sees 1956 through a much wider lens in which the European powers refused to fully relinquish their imperial ambitions, the so called “people’s democracies” of eastern Europe were confronted by further Soviet oppression, and in the United States and South Africa white supremacists tried their best to retain racial control. The book is broken down into a series of chapters that seem to jump from one topic to another with a closing paragraph that tries to create continuity with the next chapter. This technique is very informative from a narrative perspective, but linking the history of Rock n’ Roll to civil rights and independence movements is a bit of a stretch. At times this technique does work as the Algerian Civil War impacted other colonial struggles in Cyprus, Ghana and other areas.

Hall devotes a great deal of time to the Suez Crisis that resulted in war at the end of October into November 1956. His narrative is spot on but he does not add anything new to historical analysis. His discussion of Gamal Abdul Nasser, Guy Mollet, Anthony Eden, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and David Ben-Gurion are accurate and provide insights into how the drama unfolded and was settled. Hall relates Suez to events in Poland and Hungary as the war provided cover for the Soviets to crush descent in its satellites. It was able to avert a military incursion of Poland through threats, and in Hungary the Soviet army crushed the revolution with tanks and infantry. Hall introduces Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Wladislaw Gomulka, Imre Nagy, and the workers and intellectuals who stood up for their principles as best they could. These events were fostered by Khrushchev’s February 20, 1956 Speech to the Soviet Party Congress where he denounced Stalin and his “cult of personality” and argued that countries could take a different path to socialism. The Soviets let the genie of freedom out of the bottle and throughout the Soviet bloc people began to call for greater rights. As events in Hungary showed the forces of freedom went too far for Soviet tastes. As Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawn stated “the October Revolution created a world communist movement, the Twentieth Congress destroyed it.” (381)

(Hungarian people demonstrating against Soviet oppression knock down statue of Joseph Stalin in Budapest)

Hall makes many astute comments in the narrative. His discussion of the strategy employed behind the scenes during the Montgomery bus boycott and the leadership of Martin Luther King and how he relates the strategy of non-violence pursued by civil rights leaders in America and its impact on events in Africa and Asia are important. The strategies and ideology of the white supremacists blaming calls of integration and greater civil rights for all citizens as a communist plot, just played into the hands of Soviet propaganda as it was crushing the citizens of Budapest with tanks. Hall is perhaps at his best when discussing the origin and the course of the Algerian Civil War. His explanation of how one million European settlers living in Algeria dominated a Muslim population of over nine million reflects the basic problem. Of these one million Europeans, about 12,000 owned most of the industry, media and fertile land in Algeria. Hall explains the creation of the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) and describes its leadership and strategy as the bloody civil war that Alistair Horne calls the “A Savage War of Peace” in his excellent study of the conflict progresses from its origin in November 1954 and would not end until 1962.

(Nelson Mandela, imprisoned in South Africa, 1956)

Hall’s final chapter is very timely as he describes the rise of Fidel Castro and his 26 July movement. It is especially relevant today as this morning we learned that Fidel passed away at the age of ninety. Hall explores Fidel’s rise and how he created his movement with his brother Raul, Che Guevara and eighty Marxist guerillas, and why it was so successful, in addition to its impact in the western hemisphere and Africa.

Overall, the book is extremely well written, though it relies too often on secondary sources. If you are looking for a general history of world events with a global perspective that seems to come together in the mid-1950s that impacts Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas for decades, then Hall’s effort might prove a satisfactory read.

(Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott, 1956)

HERO OF THE EMPIRE:THE BOER WAR, A DARING ESCAPE AND THE MAKING OF WINSTON CHURCHILL by Candice Millard

September 27, 2016szfreiberger Biography, English History Leave a comment

(Winston Churchill as a war correspondent)

Author Candice Millard’s recent successes include RIVER OF DOUBT: THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S DARKEST JOURNEY which chronicles the former president’s exploration of the Amazon River, and DESTINY OF THE REPUBLIC: A TALE OF MADNESS, MEDICINE AND THE MURDER OF A PRESIDENT that categorizes the life and assassination of President James A. Garfield. She has followed these works with her latest book, HERO OF THE EMPIRE: THE BOER WAR, A DARING ESCAPE AND THE MAKING OF WINSTON CHURCHILL that introduces the reader to Churchill’s early career exploits during the Boer War, a war which brought Churchill to the attention of a British public that was shocked by the difficulties that Her Majesty’s soldiers experienced in fighting the Boers. Churchill found himself in South Africa hoping to achieve the military fame that had eluded him previously in Cuba, India, and the Sudan. He was driven by an insecure ego that hoped to make a name for himself so he would not only be known as the scion of a rich of an aristocratic family. Early on, Churchill would inform others that soon he would soon earn a seat in Parliament, and eventually would become Prime Minister. In England at the time he was considered a “self-promoter par excellence.”

Churchill’s sense of his own destiny is well known and was reinforced by his experiences in witnessing British troops fighting the Pashtuns in what today is Pakistan, and Madhists in the Sudan. Churchill used family connections to be placed in whatever colonial war England was engaged in at the time, and was able to build a resume as an important figure in British politics as he felt the weight of his ancestor, John Churchill, the First Duke of Marlborough who throughout the last 17^th and early 18^th century never left a battlefield unless he was victorious. After being defeated in his run for a seat in Parliament at the age of twenty-five, Churchill realized he needed a “good war” to propel his career and events in South Africa presented a unique opportunity with its reserves of gold and diamonds. Storm clouds in the region gathered throughout the second half of the 19^th century and by October, 1899 the Boer (a combination of Dutch, German, and British people who had migrated to the area since the 17^th century) had enough of London’s encroachment into what they deemed to be their “republics” and war became official on October, 11, 1899.

Millard is a wonderful stylist who provides enough detail that the reader gains a true understanding of the makeup of Boer society and politics, along with an accurate portrayal of local topography, Boer villages, and culture. The author captures British military arrogance from the outset of the first Boer attack in Dundee, an attack that was designed by Boer commander, Louis Botha to shake British confidence. For the British the goal of defeating the Boer by Christmas was no longer a forgone conclusion. Millard’s comparison of Boer and British fighters is priceless as she described the British as moving at a “glacial pace,” and the Boer being “astonishingly mobile.”

Millard explains the background history of the region before Churchill’s arrival from the Dutch extermination and removal of local tribes, the British settlement of the Cape Colony, and the Boer “trek” to the Transvaal, and wars against the Xhosa and Zulu. The importance of the war against the Zulu cannot be underestimated because it provided the Boer with military lessons and strategy which allowed them to fight like no Europeans had previously and gave the British such difficulties. Once Churchill zeroed in on South Africa he had to use family connections to gain an appointment as a journalist to enter the war zone since he was no longer a member of the military. It is interesting that the future First Lord of the Admiralty hated to travel by sea which was how he reached Cape Town!

The author provides a number of mini-biographies of the major players in her narrative. Aside from Churchill and his coterie of friends like Adam Brockie and Aylmer Haldane, she explores the lives of important Boer figures like Louis Botha, the Boer commander, and Boer President Paul Kruger. Her discussion of Boer leadership is especially important because her discussion of their leadership and strategic skills takes the reader inside their movement and when she compares it to the British approach it explains the poor showing of Her Majesty’s forces. Further, if one projects into future Boer methodology, it is useful to imagine the decline of the “Empire” beginning between 1899 and 1902 in South Africa.

(Two Boer soldiers)

The narrative recounts Churchill’s experiences and exploits during the Boer War and its implications for Churchill’s future career and the effect on Britain’s political and military history. Millard explores Churchill’s captivity and treatment and how he was able to acquire the many amenities that he had been used to as a member of the aristocracy. Churchill’s argument with the Boers rested on his “status” as a journalist for the Morning Mail, demanding that he be released immediately. When the Boers realized the type of prisoner they possessed there was no way they would restore his freedom. The Boer reaction to his escape was one of obsession and the need to recapture him, and humiliate him to the point that for a period his recapture was more important than the war itself. We witness the planning that went into his escape, his life as a fugitive, and his final arrival in Portuguese East Africa, a trek of over 300 miles to freedom.

(Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener)

Millard lists the advantages that Boers had at the outset of combat and the desperate measures the British employed, (i.e.; concentration camps that resulted in the death of 22,000 women and children out of a total of 26,000 total death) to finally bring about an end to the war in 1902. The Boers had felt no shame in conducting a war based on staying hidden, not pursuing personal glory, fighting to the death, applying superior knowledge of the veld, and their ability as sharpshooters. For the British, war was about romance and gallantry as they viewed guerilla tactics as cowardly, and believed they were engaging in an adventure until they realized their approach was a failure. Their arrogance had been self-defeating and proved very detrimental to their cause until Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener introduced an unprecedented level of savagery to the conflict.

In the end Churchill achieved the level of heroism he sought and gained election to Parliament soon after the war. A war that taught him many important lessons that he would employ during his marvelous career that followed. Millard has written a stirring narrative that should interest the general reader and students of Winston Churchill equally. This is her third straight successful literary venture, and I look forward to the fourth no matter what subject she chooses to tackle.

(Winston Churchill as a war correspondent)

WHEN LIONS ROAR: THE CHURCHILLS AND THE KENNEDYS by Thomas Maier

March 2, 2016szfreiberger Biography, English History, World War II Leave a comment

(US Ambassador to England, Joseph P. Kennedy, and English Prime Minister, Winston Churchill)

The 20^th century was greatly affected by a number of prominent families, but aside from the Roosevelts, few stand out more than the Churchills and the Kennedys, and their relationship with each other. The interactions between these two families forms the core of Thomas Maier’s recent book, WHEN LIONS ROAR: THE CHURCHILLS AND THE KENNEDYS. The book explores the different dynamics that existed between the two families and the world around them, be it political, financial, personal, and too often, sexual. The result is a historical work that at times seems peppered with a bit too much gossip.

As I examined the book I wondered if the author had unearthed anything of substance. Tackling a topic that has been mined by many excellent historians, it seemed to be a difficult task. Concentrating on the relationship between fathers and sons; Winston Churchill and his son Randolph, and Joseph P. Kennedy and his sons Joe Jr. and John, the author provides a glimpse into both families and the intensity of their relationships. The most interesting facet of the book involves how both fathers had such grandiose hopes for their sons, but in both cases, the fathers were to be disappointed. Randolph spent much of his life trying to emerge from the shadow of his famous father, while remaining loyal to him. At times father and son would grow to resent each other, Winston disappointed by his somewhat alcoholic and womanizing son who would never reach the heights that were expected of him. Joseph Kennedy’s disappointment revolved around the agony of losing his eldest son Joe Jr., whose naval bomber was shot down over England. Unlike Winston, the senior Kennedy, would be rewarded when his second youngest son, John Fitzgerald would become a war hero, and successful politician who would be elected president in 1960.

(The Kennedy Patriarch and his family)

Maier provides the background story of each family that has been told many times before. His biographical sketches of Winston and Joseph Sr. present nothing substantially new, but it should prove helpful for the general reader. The most important component is how the two families become dependent on each other. Maier begins in 1933 with the first meeting of Winston and Joseph Sr., as both men were allies when it came to prohibition. The senior Kennedy hoped to procure a deal to acquire the distribution rights for English gin and other liquors in the United States as prohibition was coming to an end. Kennedy would use his close relationship with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s son, James as a conduit to his father and a budding relationship with Churchill to achieve his goals. Kennedy achieved an economic coup as he set up a company called Somerset importers and landed the contract to distribute Dewar’s scotch, Gordon’s gin and other important liquors. Maier reviews the instability of Churchill’s income in comparison to Kennedy, particularly when he was out of power. Churchill had to rely on his writing and the “gifts” of rich friends to survive a lifestyle he could not afford. One wonders if the future Prime Minister benefited in any way from the future Ambassador to the United Kingdom. For a wonderful discussion of Churchill’s finances see the new book NO MORE CHAMPAGNE: CHURCHILL AND HIS MONEY by David Lough.

(John F. Kennedy, Joseph P. Kennedy, and Joseph Kennedy, Jr.)

Maier examines the different responses taken by both families to the rise of Adolph Hitler to power in Germany. Both Churchill and Kennedy offspring follow the leads of their fathers. Randolph would mimic his father’s preparedness views and the fear that war with the Nazis was inevitable. Joseph Jr., then a student at the London School of Economics conformed to his father’s views about the Nazis, even expressing a certain amount of anti-Semitism. John F. didn’t toe the line as much as his elder brother and more and more he came around to Churchill’s viewpoint. A tendentious problem developed between the fathers as how to approach the militarization and expansion of Nazi Germany. Once the war broke out and both men were in positions of power, the diplomatic rift between the two was exposed as Kennedy seemed to rely on Charles Lindbergh’s opinion of the Nazis, and his own fears of war and how it could affect his son’s futures. Kennedy’s overt support for appeasement throughout his stay in London created a great deal of tension between the two men. Churchill was careful of not pushing Kennedy too far because he realized how dependent he was on the creation of a “special relationship” with the United States, especially after the Nazi seizure of Holland, Belgium, and France in 1940. Behind the scenes we are told the story of how FDR manipulated both men and how the president could no longer tolerate an ambassador who was undermining his foreign policy, a story that Michael Bechloss has told very effectively in his book, KENNEDY AND ROOSEVELT.

(Randolph Churchill, Winston Churchill, and his grandson Winston)

The one major criticism of the book I would raise is the amount of racy information Maier either states or suggests. The reader is presented with a series of love triangles, affairs, and the sexual needs of the different characters that appear in the narrative. Randolph Churchill’s wife Pamela is involved with FDR’s personal liaison to Churchill and later Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman, Edward R. Morrow of CBS news, among a number of prominent historical figures. The affairs of Clare Booth, writer, politician and future husband of Time magazine magnate, Henry Luce, with Joseph P. Kennedy, Randolph Churchill, the American financier Bernard Baruch and numerous others is over the top. In addition, Sarah Churchill’s relationship with Joseph Kennedy’s replacement as ambassador to the United Kingdom, John G. Winant, and of course Maier cannot leave out the dalliances of John F. Kennedy and after a while, I wondered what purpose this information plays, if not just to spice up a historical narrative that should stand on its own merits.

To his credit Maier distills a number of situations that have remained obscure over the years. Perhaps the most interesting is that of Tyler Kent, a code clerk in the American Embassy in London under Kennedy’s ambassadorship. Kent was stealing documents and funneling them to a right wing group in England, conservative pro-Nazi politicians, and the Nazi government. Documents included sensitive communications between Churchill and Roosevelt among others. Scotland Yard and MI5 surveilled Kent and Kennedy for over seven months. Once Kent was arrested, Maier, quite accurately describes Kennedy as an inept administrator who worried more about how things affected the “Kennedy Brand” as opposed to the damage the fiasco caused the war effort. Kennedy would emerge totally discredited, which reinforced FDR’s negative view of him. Another tidbit that Maier explores is that of Churchill’s health that resulted in two heart attacks and the belief that his son Randolph who surprisingly exhibited tremendous courage despite his reputation needed to be kept in a safe area as not to overly stress his father, since the Prime Minister was a key to holding out against the Nazis until victory.

(Winston Churchill and his daughter Mary, Lady Soames)

Maier does a competent job tracing the rise of Jack Kennedy from his election to Congress in 1946 to the presidency fueled by the wealth of his father. Kennedy Sr. lived vicariously through his second son as he wanted him to gain the respect and success he could never attain. Though there is nothing new in his discussion of Jack Kennedy’s rise to power, Maier does bring to the fore Churchill’s adamant position visa vie the Soviet Union following the war. After giving his “Iron Curtain Speech” in Fulton, MO delineating the Soviet threat he would follow up by advocating the use of the atomic bomb against the Russians, taking advantage of the nuclear option before the Soviets developed their own which he was convinced they would employ. Using little known FBI records, Churchill urged Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, “that if and atomic bomb could be dropped on the Kremlin wiping it out, it would be an easy problem to handle the balance of Russia, which would be without direction.” (433)

(Randolph and Pamela Churchill)

Maier provides the reader with interesting portraits of a number of important historical figures. Chief among them was Max Aiken, or Lord Beaverbrook, a close friend and companion of Churchill, and the senior Kennedy, who at times professed his own agenda. Other portraits include; Clementine Churchill, the spouse of the Prime Minister, as well as Rose Kennedy. The English writer Evelyn Waugh, the financier and FDR confidant, Bernard Baruch, Clare Booth Luce, Kay Halle, a beautiful Cleveland journalist who worked with William Donovan at the OSS and at one time was the paramour of Randolph Churchill, George Gershwin, Averell Harriman, the columnist, Walter Lipmann, and Robert F. Kennedy, among others. FDR and his advisors, particularly Harry Hopkins are portrayed fairly, as are certain important members of the British parliament. Overall, Maier’s portrayals captures numerous individuals, and the author is even handed in his approach as he presents his breezy narrative.

Maier’s writing is easy to follow and each component of his story seems to flow into the next in a pattern that maintains the reader’s interest. His story is carried into the 21^st century following the death of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, as Maier repeatedly seems to conjecture as to what might have been. Whatever the case, Maier’s work is quite appealing and should interest those who have questions about two remarkable political dynasties.

(Joseph P. Kennedy and Winston Churchill outside 10 Downing Street)

THE CHURCHILL FACTOR: HOW ONE MAN MADE HISTORY by Boris Johnson

January 1, 2016szfreiberger Biography, Cold War, English History, Uncategorized, World War II Leave a comment

(English Prime Minister Winston Churchill, August 27, 1941)

If you are looking for a personal, breezy hagiography of Winston Churchill then Boris Johnson’s THE CHURCHILL FACTOR: HOW ONE MAN MADE HISTORY will be of interest. Johnson’s effort is not a traditional biography of the former occupant of 10 Downing Street, but a manifesto imploring the reader to consider the genius and greatness of Churchill. Johnson is concerned that as time has passed fewer and fewer of the non-World War II generation have forgotten or are not aware of Churchill’s accomplishments as he states at the outset “we are losing those who can remember the sound of his voice, and I worry that we are in danger….of forgetting the scale of what he did.” For the author, World War II would have been lost, if not for Churchill, and he further argues that the resident of Chartwell House and Blenheim Palace saved civilization and proved that one man can change history.

Johnson’s writing is very entertaining. His phrasing is both humorous and poignant, i.e., “the French were possessed of an origami army! They just keep folding with almost magical speed.” In his description of Churchill, he looked “like some burley and hung over butler from the set of Downton Abbey. However, aside from the humor presented, Johnson has a serious purpose as he seems to want to align himself with Churchill as a means of furthering his own political career. The question is what do we make of Johnson’s THE CHURCHILL FACTOR? Many who are familiar with Johnson’s career can foresee this Member of Parliament, mayor of London, former editor of The Spectator, and columnist for the Daily Telegraph pursuing the leadership of the Conservative Party, and at some point attaining the position of Prime Minister. By manipulating Churchill’s legacy as a comparison to certain aspects of his own life, Johnson may have hit upon a vehicle for his own political ascendency. Johnson suggests certain similarities with his hero, but then upon reflection he negates them, but for those who are familiar with the British political system, Johnson’s ambitions are clear.

Johnson’s thesis rests on rehabilitating the less savory aspects of Churchill’s personality and politics, at the same time presenting him as the genius who saved the world from Nazism. Johnson strongly suggests when reviewing the political choices that existed in England as the Dunkirk rescue was ongoing in May, 1940 there was no alternative to Churchill. Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax were both appeasers and wanted to make a separate peace with Germany. Johnson reviews Churchill’s career as a journalist, soldier, and social reformer to reflect on his preparation for taking on Hitler, and does not find him wanting in any area. The author tackles the opposition to Churchill within the Conservative party and why he was a lightning rod for his opponents. Johnson explains why he was so despised by many head on. He argues that Churchill, like his father Randolph, suffered from a lack of party loyalty and we see that both followed their own path when it came to shifting parties and then returning to the conservative fold. In addition, Churchill helped bring on ill will by always being a self-promoter and political opportunist. Churchill made a number of errors during World War I and later, in his career. The following come to mind: the fiasco at Antwerp in October, 1914, and Gallipoli in September, 1915 that forced many to question his ability as a military strategist when he was First Lord of their Admiralty. Further, Churchill’s ill-fated plan to block the Bolshevik victory in Russia after World War I, as well as fighting to prevent Indian self-government where not well thought out. Lastly, Churchill’s support for Edward VIII’s desire for a divorce and forfeiture of his throne angered many conservative back benchers.

(Churchill’s March 5, 1946 “Iron Curtain Speech” at Westminster College, Fulton, MO)

Johnson presents Churchill’s bonifedes as a military leader by spending a good amount of time reflecting on Churchill’s bravery. He discusses Churchill’s love of planes and desire to develop an air force. He reviews his combat experience in the Sudan, the Boer War, India and the trenches of World War I. He concludes that Churchill’s own personal bravery allowed him to ask whether other candidates in 1940 had the experience and demeanor to lead England against the Nazis. Johnson also tackles some of the negative charges against Churchill. For Johnson, Churchill is a social reformer in the context of being a capitalist and a free trader. He argues that next to his mentor, Lloyd George, Churchill had great concern for workers and the lower classes. For Churchill, workers were the bedrock of the British Empire and without them the empire would collapse. Johnson points to Churchill’s championing of Labour exchanges, a Trade Board Bill to enforce minimum wages for certain jobs, unemployment insurance with worker, government and employer contributions, a 20% tax on land sales in order to fund progressive programs and redistribute wealth. Churchill was concerned that if the needs of the workers were not met, unrest could “scuttle” British power overseas. One might argue that Churchill was somewhat of a hypocrite based on some of his racist and imperialist goals, Johnson would say that he was nothing more than being politically pragmatic. Perhaps Churchill’s “compassionate conservatism” was years ahead of George W. Bush.

The author rests much of his argument on Churchill’s amazing work ethic and the motor of his exceptional brain. Johnson offers a great deal of evidence to support his claim, i.e., Churchill’s prodigious writing that earned him a Nobel Peace Prize for Literature at the age of seventy-five. Churchill’s work developing tank technology during World War I, his role in creating the boundaries for the Middle East, the partition of Ireland, and diplomacy during World War II to save England from the Nazis and rallying his own people. Lastly, the use of his personal charm to “drag” the United States into World War II. Once out of power Churchill sought to warn the west about Stalinist expansionism. His “Iron Curtain” speech in 1946 made public his concerns, but Churchill had internally warned his cabinet and FDR at least a year earlier. As in the 1930s when he warned about Nazism, as World War II came to a close he was seen as a war mongerer by many. Despite the fact that he was correct in both cases, this did not help him politically at home or in his relationship with President Truman, as he was soon out of office. Once he returned to power in 1951, and with the death of Stalin in 1953, Churchill worked for a summit of the great powers as he was deathly afraid of a thermonuclear war. Though he did not achieve his goal, after he left office for good in 1955, a four power summit did take place. For Johnson, in the end, Churchill’s ideas prevailed, from his speech in Fulton, MO in 1946 to the final collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Churchill had called for rapprochement between France and Germany, and a united Europe all of which was eventually achieved.

(Cairo Conference, 1921, Churchill is on the left, Gertrude Bell in the center, and T.E. Lawrence on the right)

One of the major blemishes that exists in dealing with Churchill’s career lies in the sands of the Middle East. As Colonial Secretary he had to undue the negative results of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration all issued during World War I making very contradictory promises that Johnson describes as “Britain sold the same camel three times.” The story of the Cairo Conference and Churchill’s influence on the creation of Iraq, Transjordan, Syria, and Palestine has been told many times, but even Johnson must acknowledge that what Churchill had created, though it lasted for decades was bound to come a cropper. Further Churchill’s optimism concerning Jewish-Palestinian relations was ill-conceived. Johnson, as his want, does not blame Churchill, but the selfishness of both sides, particularly the lack of Arab leadership, a rationalization to deflect away from Churchill anything the author finds unacceptable. Despite his errors the author proposes that Churchill, even in old age, was a man ahead of his times, and based on his amazing career who is to say that Johnson was wrong.

(Potsdam Conference, July, 1945, Churchill, Truman, and Stalin)

Perhaps the major criticism one can offer is how the author presents his material. I for one enjoy objective biography, not subjective hero worship, particularly when there are so many instances of a lack of source material to support the author’s conclusions. However, if one is interested in a fast read encompassing Churchill’s entire career, Johnson’s effort could prove to be intellectually challenging, and entertaining.

Doc's Books

A window into Doc Freiberger's library

English History