Middle Eastern History

AMERICA AND IRAN: A HISTORY 1720 TO THE PRESENT by John Ghazvinian

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Middle Eastern History Leave a comment
The_Shah_of_Iran_and_President_Nixon_-_NARA_-_194301
(Reza Pahlavi Shah and Richard M. Nixon)

In a world where the war in Ukraine and economic sanctions dominate foreign policy discussions relations with Iran could have been pushed to the back burner instead they are now coming to the fore.  As the Russian army continues its bloody war against Ukrainian civilians, the need to sanction Moscow’s energy industry which finances its genocide is paramount.  The Biden administration is focusing on increasing the world’s supply of energy and to this end has reengaged with Iran after the Trump administration abrogated the Iran nuclear deal negotiated during the Obama administration. The odds of coming to a quick agreement with Iran is very low, in part because Russia was a signatory of the original agreement and Iran’s contorted history with the United States since the 1950s.  To understand the background to the American relationship with Iran which emphasizes the    viewpoints from Washington and Tehran John Ghazvinian, a former journalist, and currently the Director of the Middle East Center at the University of Pennsylvania has filled this major gap with his new book, AMERICA AND IRAN: A HISTORY 1720 TO THE PRESENT.  Written in a clear and concise style Ghazvinian provides insightful analysis, a deep understanding of the issues between Iran and the United States, and with a degree of subjectivity focuses on the motivations and actions of the major historical figures involved.

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(Ayatollah Khomeini)

In tackling the American-Iranian conundrum one comes across many watershed moments and dates be it the competition between England and Russia during the 19th century through World War II better known as “the Great Game,” the emergence of the United States filling the vacuum created by London’s withdrawal from the region, the American “love affair” with Reza Pahlavi Shah beginning with the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddeq, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism spear headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, the 1979 hostage situation, the Iran-Iraq War, and the overt and covert war between the two countries that continues to this day.  For scholars and the general public these issues are quite familiar, however, Ghazvinian brings a deft pen and immense knowledge in presenting a fresh approach to this historical relationship.

Ghazvinian goal was objectivity, hoping to avoid casting dispersions on either side, and dispensing with the ideological baggage that has encumbered past writings on the subject.  Despite this goal, periodically he falls into the trap of bias.  Having been born in Iran he conducted ten years of research and was allowed access to Iranian sources that were not available to most western scholars.  One of Ghazvinian’s major themes is that the United States and Iran, at least in the 18th and 19th centuries through the end of World War I could have been natural allies.  Decade after decade Iranian governments looked to the United States as a “third force” that could counteract the pressures of Britain and Russia.  Presenting the early American thoughts of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, Iran perceived the United States as an anti-colonial power so there seemed to be a community of fate between the two countries that Ghazvinian successfully investigated.

(American hostages seized in Iran, 1979)

Ghazvinian explores America’s romanticized version of “Persophilia” and Washington’s impact on Iran through missionary work that provided hospitals, schools, and trade with Tehran.  It is clear that the United States, despite its interest in Iran was hindered by an amateurish group of “diplomats” who were sent to Tehran during the late 19th century to promote American interests.  Most had little or no foreign experience and they did little to foster a new relationship.  With the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, Iran could no longer play off the two competing powers against each other so Tehran invited the United States to assume the role of counterbalancing the “new” allies to the point of inviting and allowing an American citizen who would become a hero to the Iranian people, W. Morgan Shuster to take control of Iran’s convoluted finances.  The author goes on to trace Iranian attitudes and hopes that were fostered by Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points and the concept of self-determination.

A second dominant theme that Ghazvinian introduces is Iran’s battle to achieve modernity and not being viewed as a backward desert kingdom that was more than a source of oil.  To that end it seemed that no matter who was the Shah this issue had to be dealt with which resulted in policies that provided wealth and a lifestyle for the Pahlavi Dynasty but poverty and ignorance for the masses.

The concept that historian J.C. Hurewitz developed dealing with the Middle East that regional actors “never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity” applies to Iranian-American relations after World War II.  Ghazvinian skillfully explores the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddeq and his removal from power in 1953 by the CIA and as he does in a number of instances sets straight the historical record.  The issue for the United States was its fear of communism as is evidenced by the Russian refusal to withdraw from northern Iran in 1946.  Supposedly the stalemate was settled when Harry Truman issued an ultimatum to Moscow, which Ghazvinian points out that there was no record of such an ultimatum.  However, the fear of Russian expansion in the Persian Gulf drove American policy.  In addition to this fear of the Soviet Union, Washington had to deal with British arrogance and stupidity (repeatedly referring to Tehran as Persian pip-squeaks) in trying to establish a sound relationship with the Mosaddeq government.

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(Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq)

Mosaddeq was not a communist, he was an Iranian nationalist, but in the American diplomatic lexicon nationalist meant communist.  The result was that the Eisenhower administration ignored reports that Mosaddeq was “a Western educated aristocrat with no reason to be attracted to socialism or communism.”  Rather than listen to the advice of his own spies and bureaucrats,  Eisenhower supported a policy designed to undermine Mosaddeq’s government which would lead to his overthrow and assist the return of the Shah to Tehran where despite his autocratic and megalomaniac tendencies the US would support at various levels until his overthrow in 1979. 

Another major theme put forth by Ghazvinian is the role played by the 1953 coup in Iranian ideology.  From the end of World War II to the arrival of the Ayatollah Khomeini the Shah was faced with three domestic enemies that wanted to curb his power or overthrow his monarchy – the Iranian left made up of a diverse group of Marxists that leaned toward the Soviet Union, the religious establishment, and a coalition of secular liberals, democrats, and progressive nationalists.  Despite the diverse nature of the opposition, they all believed that the 1953 coup could be repeated at any time should the Shah’s reign end.  This belief forms the background to any American-Iranian negotiation, particularly the 1979 hostage situation.

Ghazvinian cleverly compares the attitudes of the different presidents towards the Shah.  For Eisenhower, named the “coup president” by historian Blanche Wiesen Cook, his policy was driven by the anti-communism of the Dulles brothers to provide the Shah with loans and military hardware.  Once John F. Kennedy assumed the oval office he put pressure on the Shah to reform his reign, but once he was assassinated the Shah was relieved since Lyndon Johnson was too busy with Vietnam and appreciated an anti-communist ally who would help control rising Arab nationalism and the Persian Gulf.  The key was Richard M. Nixon who developed a friendship with the Shah during the Eisenhower administration and with pressure from the likes of Henry Kissinger to honor any military requests that the Shah asked for resulted in billions for the American military-industrial complex and advanced weaponry for the Iranian army.  The result was a man who believed he had card blanche from the United States resulting in violent domestic opposition against the Shah in Iran.  Finally, Jimmy Carter’s human rights rhetoric scared the Shah, but he too would give in to the Shah’s demands until his overthrow.

(Iran-Iraq War)

Ghazvinian’s discussion of the rise of Khomeini and American ignorance concerning the proliferation of his ideas and support in Iran is well thought out.  From exile in Iraq and later Paris the United States made no attempt to understand the reasons behind Khomeini’s rise and the conditions of poverty and oppression that existed among the Iranian masses.  Washington’s blindness and tone deafness is highlighted by the appointment of former CIA Director Richard Helms as US Ambassador to Iran in 1973.

Once the Shah is overthrown Ghazvinian explains the different factions that existed in Iran and that it was not a foregone conclusion that Islamic fundamentalism would be victorious.  American intelligence underestimated Khomeini’s skill as a politician, not just a religious leader. The reader is exposed to intricate details about the creation of the Islamic Republic, the hostage situation, and the Iran-Iraq War which found the US playing a double game of supporting both sides.  This would lead to the Iran-Contra scandal that showed the duplicitous nature of the Reagan administration that should have ended the Reagan presidency.

Though Ghazvinian breezy history is immensely readable it becomes biased as he delves into the post 1988 Iranian-American relations.  The author discusses efforts by George H. W. Bush and Barack Obama to reset the relationship between Teheran and Washington ultimately to be thwarted by disinterest after the Soviet Union collapsed and the role of the Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu whose bombast was designed to block any Iranian-American rapprochement.  At times slipping into partiality, Ghazvinian downplays the bombast of the Iranian government and its avoidance of the nuclear issue, its role in Lebanon with its ally Hezbollah, and arming Hamas in the West Bank.  I realize the many  flaws and general stupidity of Bush’s neocon gang, but the soft presentation of Iran under Mahmoud Ahmadinjad also leaves a lot to be desired.

Despite some areas that could be developed further, Ghazvinian has produced a needed reappraisal of his subject and the quality of the writing makes the book an easy read for the general public which makes it a valuable contribution despite some shortcomings.

Richard Nixon, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi President Richard M. Nixon with The Shah of Iran, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi when he visited Washington on a state visit on
(The Shah of Iran and President Nixon)

REDLINE: THE UNRAVELING OF SYRIA AND AMERICA’S RACE TO DESTROY THE MOST DANGEROUS ARSENAL IN THE WORLD vy Joby Warrick

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, Middle Eastern History Leave a comment

Syria's President Bashar al-Assad speaks during an interview with Yahoo News in this handout picture provided by SANA on Feb. 10, 2017.
(Syrian President Bashir Assad)

In his presidential memoir A PROMISED LAND Barack Obama does not reveal much about his thinking when it came to events in Syria other than that “our options were painfully limited…and Assad could count on Russia to veto any efforts we might make to impose international sanctions through the U.N. Security Council.”  This was the conundrum the US faced as it approached how to deal with the slaughter that was Syria since the Arab spring in 2011; a president who was seemingly obsessed with the fear Washington could be drawn into another war in the Middle East, and who if any of the rebel groups the US could rely on and not face blowback if Assad were overthrown.  Eventually President Obama announced his “red line” warning that if Assad continued to employ nerve agents in the Syrian civil war it would be a game changer for the US.  The warning that was issued on August 20, 2012 did not deter Assad and the American response was marginal at best.  With twenty-twenty hindsight this was one of the worst decisions the Obama administration made in relation to the carnage that was Syria and its results have been catastrophic.  In Obama’s defense had the US bombed Syria and taken out most of Assad’s chemical weapons would it have altered the war – we will never know.  The decision-making surrounding American “red line” policy its impact, and the attempt to destroy Assad’s chemical “stash” throughout 2014 is the subject of an informative new book RED LINE: THE UNRAVELING OF SYRIA AND AMERICA’S RACE TO DESTROY THE MOST DANGEROUS ARSENAL IN THE WORLD by Pulitzer Prize winning Washington Post reporter Joby Warrick which takes a microscope to American decision-making and the diplomatic and military policies pursued to try and obviate the horrors that the Assad regime was perpetrating.

Warrick’s effort is more than a narrative history of events sprinkled with keen analysis of the players and policies involved, but more a true to life thriller with a cast of characters that includes world leaders, physicians, weapons hunters, spies, and a number of heroes and villains.  Warrick’s account begins with the introduction of a CIA spy whose nomenclature was Ayman, “the chemist,” a Syrian scientist who informed his handlers that Damascus had constructed an efficient manufacturing center with a network of laboratories that had produced 1300-1500 tons of binary sarin, VX, and mustard gas.  Warrick lays out the issue of nerve agents produced by Syria and its implication for US policy makers.  The author’s approach is methodical as he examines all areas that impacted the Syrian weapons cache and what the US should and could do to mitigate the problem.  Once Assad employed nerve agents dropping three canisters on the city of Sarageb held by rebels who fought for overthrowing the Syrian regime on April 29, 2013, President Obama response had done little to deter Damascus.

(Timothy Blades’ “Margarita Machine”)

By 2012 Syria had become the most dangerous place on earth and after the April 2013 attack the US and the UN began to work on providing evidence for Assad’s WMD crimes.  Warrick introduces a series of important characters into the narrative who are pivotal to his story.  UN Team Leader Ake Sellstrom, who had experience hunting WMD in Iraq in the 1990s was sent to Syria and found evidence that military grade sarin gas had been used.  The list includes Andrew C. Weber, the Pentagon’s Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs who feared that should Assad be overthrown his 1300 nerve agents could fall into the hands of the al Nusra Front and its ally al-Qaeda in Iraq (which would soon morph into the Islamic State). Timothy Blades, an ingenious individual who headed the US Civilian Chemical Biological Application and Risk Reduction team developed a process referred to as “hydrolysis” and the machinery to carry out the task of breaking down and making Assad’s nerve agents inert should the US come into possession of them.  Dr. Houssam Alnahhas, also known as “Chemical Hazem,” as he prepared areas of Syria for possible chemical attacks and worked to save victims of those attacks.  Samantha Powers, the US Ambassador to the United Nations who worked tirelessly to hold Assad responsible for the atrocities he ordered but she was up against Russian and Chinese vetoes, but her work cannot be ignored as she was able to create the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) under the auspices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical weapons headquartered in the Hague.  By 2017 JIM’s work continued as it investigated another Syrian nerve strike against the town of Khan Sheikhoun.  Lastly, Brett McGurk, the special presidential envoy for the global coalition to counter ISIS.  McGurk was the last American official to witness the Syrian conflict in its entirety,” from the earliest pro-democracy uprisings through the rise of ISIS; from the regime’s first experimental use of sarin to the dramatic; if incomplete, mission to destroy Syria’s stockpile; from the hopeful declaration that ‘Assad must go’ to the despairing reality of an entrenched Syrian dictatorship propped up by Russian and Iranian protector’s intent on reshaping the region in their own image.” (303) There are many other important players in the narrative, many of which must be given credit for the eventual destruction of much of Assad’s nerve WMD, and those who were a hinderance and supported Assad outright.

Warrick description of a UN investigation led by Sellstrom and Scott Cairns his Canadian Deputy reflected Syrian obstructionism.   However, while in Damascus their group witnessed the results of a chemical attack that killed at least 1400 in the Ghouta suburbs.  Warrick’s connections and knowledge allowed him to describe in detail the components of the WMD, its impact on the civilian population, Syrian governments obfuscation, and what the world was prepared to do about what was occurring in Syria.  Everyone points to the Obama administration for its almost “feckless” response to Assad’s actions.  Warrick correctly points out that the Obama administration in part placed itself in a bind in its response.  Obama, keen to avoid a major military commitment in the Middle East decided that he needed Congressional approval for any military response.  After the events in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 there was little or no support in Congress.  Further, Germany’s Angela Merkel warned Obama that the US should not act and wait until the UN investigation had run its course.  In England, Prime Minister David Cameron could not convince Parliament to support military action, and lastly many feared what could happen to the UN team still in Syria.  Facing congressional humiliation Obama was saved in part by the Russians who agreed to force Assad to turn over his nerve agents to UN authorities.

(UN chemical weapons experts will use a battery of analytical techniques)

Warrick clearly explains how the deal came about and its implications for the future.  The Russians would go along with practically everything assuming that Blades’ “Margarita Machine” was a fantasy that could only fail thereby embarrassing the US.  Warrick’s account of how the “Blades’ Machine” was built, tested, and deployed is well conceived and easy to understand.  He follows the politics behind the strategy, the actual obstacles overcome particularly those set by the Syrians, and its ultimate deployment. This section of the book is perhaps the most important for the reader as Warrick builds the tension as if writing a novel that in the end would produce a mission at sea where the machines were bolted to the decks of the ship Cape Ray, deployed to the Mediterranean Sea to receive the nerve agents from the Syrian port of Latakia, run the nerve agents through Blades’ process, and then deliver the waste to cooperating countries.  Warrick employs a reporter’s eye to describe the political difficulties, delays, and roadblocks on the ground as the UN Mission tried to secure the nerve agents and even after the mission was a success one wonders how it was achieved.  For Blades and others, it came down to ingenuity, sheer guts, and a great deal of luck.

The entire process became a race to keep the nerve agents out of Islamist hands.  This became an even greater problem when on July 14, 2014, the day the ship sailed into the Mediterranean, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced from Mosul the creation of the Islamic Caliphate that stretched from Raqqa its capital in Central Syria deep into Iraq.  ISIS would miss out on Assad’s nerve agents, but began a developing a process of their own, particularly when Assad set the example by dropping barrel bombs loaded with chlorine gas which is less toxic than sarin on his subjects.

Samantha Power during Barack Obama’s first presidential election campaign, in 2008. Photograph: Hirolo Masuike/New York Times
(US UN Ambassador Samantha Power)

Graeme Wood is dead on when he writes in the February 19, 2021 edition of the Washington Post:  “Overwhelmingly, Warrick’s emphasis is where it should be, on Assad, for whom chemical weapons were a highly developed and strategic program of terror. “Syrians died every day from bullets, blast wounds, and shrapnel injuries,” Warrick writes, “but to exterminate human beings with chemicals, as though they were fleas and cockroaches” — this was “a different order of savagery.” Lacking any legitimate military purpose, Assad’s chemical weapons existed to terrorize civilian populations by killing as indiscriminately as possible. Eliminating his arsenal was therefore a top international priority.”

It is clear today that the Syrian Civil War continues to torture millions of Syrians in Syria and in refugee camps in the Middle East and Turkey.  While the US concentrated on ISIS for the next two years its policies would allow Russia and Hezbollah, Syria’s Iranian ally to route many of the rebels and keep Assad in power. According to Warrick Assad would engage in over 300 chemical attacks over the next four years.  It does not take a serious imagination to believe that Assad, who turned over tons of nerve agents to the UN kept a secret stash somewhere.  Once the Trump administration came aboard and abruptly ended aid to the rebels and abandoned our Kurdish allies to be destroyed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğanit it was obvious that Putin had won and Iran’s goal of a “land bridge” across the Levant was in reach – Assad had won.

Brett H. McGurk (2).jpg
(US Special Envoy Brett McGuirk)

Warrick is to be commended for his research, clear and thoughtful writing, and describing for all to see what the truth is concerning Assad’s nerve gas war on his own people. Perhaps someday he and his enablers will be held accountable by the world community – but I doubt it.

President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, pictured in December. His office said he would isolate at home with his wife for two weeks.
(Syrian President Bashir Assad)

MBS: THE RISE TO POWER OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN by Ben Hubbard

szfreiberger Biography, Middle Eastern History Leave a comment

Mohammed bin Salman

(Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman)

Who is Mohammed bin Salman, aka MBS?  Is he a young visionary reformer that he purported to be when he first came on the scene; the man who most probably ordered the death of Washington Post reporter, Jamal Khashoggi; or a rising dictator whose lack of experience has led to rash decisions like the war in Yemen which has greatly contributed to the destabilization of the volatile Middle East.  In Ben Hubbard’s new book MBS: THE RISE TO POWER OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN, we are treated to a deep dive into how he rose to power in Saudi Arabia and what his policies have done to impact the daily lives of the Saudi people and the countries that must deal with the Riyadh regime, it’s oil wealth, and its influence in the Persian Gulf and beyond.

Hubbard, the Beirut bureau chief for the New York Times is very adept at digging deep into his subject area and developing astute observations.  At first, he provides the background history that resulted in the creation of the Saudi Arabian kingdom and the context of the Salman family in particular MBS whose actions always seem driven by how he could maximize his own personal power and influence.  Hubbard concentrates on the dynastic “pecking order” and how MBS, the sixth son of the twenty-sixth son of the kingdom’s founder would rise to power through luck and a series of deaths that unclogged the narrow path to achieve the position he coveted.  With the passing of a number of princes MBS would then develop a strong relationship with his father as they realized that they held many things in common. This renewed relationship was the cornerstone that MBS rode to power which should result in his succeeding his father on the throne in the not too distant future.

Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi during an interview on Jan. 23, 2016, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

(Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi during an interview on Jan. 23, 2016, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.)

In examining MBS’ life, Hubbard points out that he did little to make his mark before 2015, with no experience in the military, corporate policy, or knowledge how the United States functioned.  This would result in a number of miscalculations in how he thought Washington would view his adventurous policies.

Despite extensive experience in the region, Hubbard viewed Saudi Arabia as a black hole because of its murky politics and opaque society that was dominated by social conservatism, support for terrorists, and its Wahhabis beliefs encouraging the likes of al-Qaeda and ISIS. Saudi influence appeared invisible, but Hubbard, a perceptive writer soon saw through what MBS was all about.  The book is an easy read and points are understandable for the layman as Hubbard relies on his extensive knowledge in the region, interviews with people from all walks of life, and traveling the country extensively learning about the pre and post-MBS period before his visas were terminated in 2018.

Hubbard carefully details the political machinations within the royal family focusing on MBS’ competition with Mohammed Bin Nayef, a moderate who was next in line to the throne ahead of him.  By 2016, MBS publicized his “Saudi Vision 2030” plan that was the core of his reform program which at the outset was his calling card to gain support.  Throughout this period the Obama administration remained skeptical when it came to MBS’ plans.  They felt he had all the ”buzz words” but little substance calling for economic reforms, but no political reform, privately arguing that he was too cocky despite the fact that his economic program made sense when he argued that his government suffered from an oil addiction.  MBS’ world view saw Iran as the major threat, along with the Moslem Brotherhood and the German intelligence service, the BND warned that the new assertive Saudi Arabia that MBS proposed could destabilize the region, i.e.; confrontational stance toward Iran, promoting proxy wars in Syria and Yemen.  However, MBS’ new approach called for improved relations with Israel.  MBS shared Israel’s view of Iran and its puppet, Hezbollah and admired the country’s technological and economic power.  MBS had never been totally supportive of the Palestinians, seeing them as an impediment to peace and in the not too distant future it is quite possible that an Israeli-Saudi rapprochement may be in the offering.

Jared Kushner

(Jared Kushner)

Hubbard introduces the reader to the contradictions of Wahhabism by focusing on a moderate cleric named al-Ghamdi Ahmed Qassam who confronted the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice which he believed went too far and was much too intrusive in the lives of the Saudi people.  Hubbard explores a number of examples ranging from the lack of woman’s rights, religious fealty, and support for the dynasty reflecting how absurd their actions were. 

Hubbard’s incisive analysis is on full display in discussing the life and impact of Jamal Khashoggi, a reporter who in his early career had links to Osama bin-Laden, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and the mujahedeen who fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.  He believed that the Afghan revolt would reform Afghanistan, but he would be greatly disappointed particularly after 9/11 when he broke with al-Qaeda.  The later Arab Spring further encouraged Khashoggi’s belief in reform in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia which would soon be another major disappointment.  He continued to write about the Saudi Dynasty as a reporter for a number of Arab newspapers and the Washington Post, but his repeated criticisms of Saudi policies in Yemen and Saudi society led to his murder, a murder that Hubbard chronicles in detail despite the Crown Prince’s denials that he was responsible.

Hubbard does a good job digging up important information particularly the implications of an Iranian backed Wikileaks dump of the hacked Saudi Foreign Ministry.   Among the documents leaked was details concerning Saudi Wahabis missionary work worldwide training clerics and spreading the Saudi version of Islam.  Hubbard’s observations are quite astute as he states, “the funding was not just to promote Islam, but to promote the right kind of Islam, which meant undermining the wrong kind of Islam,” – stop the spread of Shiism in China, India, and Africa.  Further, Hubbard presents the actions and results of MBS’ disastrous policy of going after the Houthis in the Yemeni Civil War with almost full American support.  The devastation of Saudi bombing and resulting death and infrastructure loss is eye opening.  Hatred for Iran who supported the Houthi rebels was and remains the driving force for MBS.

(Ben Hubbard)

MBS’ obsession with Iran led to confrontation with the Obama administration who eventually grew tired of death and devastation in Yemen, his refusal to consider the civil rights of his people, and his opposition to the Iran Nuclear Deal.  In perhaps the most important part of the narrative Hubbard recounts MBS’ anger at President Obama apart from his nuclear deal, and his lack of action in the Syrian Civil War.  As disagreement mounted MBS looked forward to the arrival of the Trump administration.

Hubbard’s remarks on the similarities between MBS and Jared Kushner are well thought out and he develops their similar ideologies and needs for power and wealth.  Hubbard refers to the “the two princelings” as the key to the new burgeoning relationship between the Trump administration and MBS’ government.  After eight years of sparring with Obama, Riyadh saw a breath of fresh air as issues like Iran, Yemen, arms deals, peace with Israel all seemed to come into greater focus as Trump, led by Kushner were open to whatever MBS offered, especially Saudi money entering the US economy, and kowtowing to Trump’s ego.  By March 2017, the depth of the MBS-Kushner relationship was clear as joint plans were being developed and implemented.

There are few new revelations in Hubbard’s book, but a useful synthesis of how ruthless MBS is and how he achieved power and developed a close relationship with the Trump administration.  The strength of the book is Hubbard’s thorough reporting and anonymous interviews of people inside the kingdom until the Saudi government stopped providing him visas in 2018.  As critical Hubbard is in detailing MBS’ rise and policies he does point out that women can now drive, and he did work to break through some of the barriers that many young Saudis found suffocating.  In April 2016 he striped the Commission of its powers and allowed certain forms of entertainment that previously had been banned.  But despite some progress, Hubbard warns that authoritarian regimes can do popular things, but when it comes to opposition it will not be tolerated.  Hubbard credits MBS for countering centuries of Saudi history by uncoupling the clerics from the monarchy.  “Under MBS, the states’ authority comes less from its claim to defending religious orthodoxy than from a sense of authoritarian nationalism.”

The question must be raised as to which direction MBS will go in the future, but part of that answer may lie in American presidential politics.  Trump has given him a free hand with little or no criticism especially when it came to Khashoggi’s murder and dismemberment.  Hopefully, a Biden administration would demand greater accountability, if not MBS can continue to exercise his power with little restraint and based on his  age the United States will have to deal with him for years to come.


The Western media, foreign business and politicians will no longer be able to fete MBS as a great moderniser and visionary pulling his desert kingdom into the 21st century, writes Law [Reuters]

THE WORLD: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION by Richard Haass

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, Chinese History, Cold War, Middle Eastern History, Modern European History, Russian History, The Environment, United States Foreign Policy, War in Iraq, War on Terror Leave a comment

UN Headquarter - United Nations - New York, NY

(The United Nations building in NYC)

As the American presidential election seems to creep closer and closer it is difficult to accept the idea that a substantial part of the electorate remains ignorant when it comes to knowledge of American foreign policy, or is apathetic when it comes to the issues at hand, or believe that Donald Trump has led the United States effectively in the realm of world affairs.   It is in this environment that Richard Haass, the president of the Council of Foreign Relations, and author of a number of important books, including, WAR OF NECESSITY, WAR OF CHOICE: A MEMOIR OF TWO IRAQ WARS, and A WORLD IN DISSARAY: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER has written a primer for those interested in how international relations has unfolded over the last century, and what are the issues that United States faces today.  The new book, THE WORLD: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION may be Haass’ most important monograph as he is trying to educate those people who have not had the opportunity to be exposed to his subject matter in the past, and make them more literate followers of international relations in the future.

Haass states that his goal in writing his latest work is to provide the basics of what “you need to know about the world, to make yourself globally literate.”  At a time when the teaching of and the knowledge of history and international relations is on the decline, Haass’ book is designed to fill a void.  He focuses on “the ideas, issues, and institutions for a basic understanding of the world” which is especially important when the Trump administration has effectively tried to disassemble the foundation of US overseas interests brick by brick without paying attention to the needs of our allies, be they Kurds, NATO, the European Union, and most importantly the American people with trade deals that are so ineffective that $29 billion in taxpayer funds had to be given to farmers because of our tariff policy with China.  Perhaps if people where more knowledgeable the reality of what our policy should be would replace the fantasy that currently exists.

 

 

Xi Jinping with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 28 September 2010

Haass has produced a primer on diplomatic and economic history worthy of a graduate seminar in the form of a monograph.  Haass’ sources, interviews, and research are impeccable from his mastery of secondary materials like Henry Kissinger’s A WORLD RESTORED: METTERNICH, CASTLEREAGH, AND THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE, 1812-1822 and Jonathan Spence’s THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA.  Haass has created an educational tool that is a roadmap for those who would like to further their knowledge on a myriad of subjects.  Further, the author offers a concluding chapter entitled, “Where Do You Go for More” which augments his endnotes that should be of great assistance to the reader.

(Vladimir Putin)
Haass’ writing is clear and evocative beginning with chapters that review the diplomatic history of a number of world regions which encompasses about half of the narrative.  He returns to The Treaty of Westphalia which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648 as his starting point.  Haass then divides history into four periods.  First, the roughly three hundred years from the early seventeenth century to the outbreak of World War I in 1914.  Second, 1914 to the end of World War II in 1945.  Third, the Cold War, roughly 1945 to 1989.  Lastly, the post Cold War period to the present.  In each section he reassesses the history, major players, and issues that confronted the world community at the time drawing conclusions that are well thought out and well grounded in fact, the opinion of others, and documentary materials available.

A case in point is Haass’ analysis of China focusing on her motivations based on its interaction with the west which was rather negative beginning with the Opium War in 1842 to the Communist victory in 1949.  In large part, China’s past history explains her need for autocracy and an aggressive foreign policy.  Haass delves into the US-Chinese relationship and how Beijing unlike Russia embraced integration with the world economy stressing trade and investment in the context of a state-controlled economy that provides China with advantages in domestic manufacturing and exports.  A great deal of the book engages China in numerous areas whether discussing globalization, nuclear proliferation, trade, currency and monetary policy, development, and climate change.  A great deal of the material encompasses arguments whether the 21st century will belong to Asia, with China replacing the United States as the dominant power on the globe.  Haass does not support this concept and argues a more nuanced position that depending on the immediate political needs of both countries will determine the direction they choose.  The key for Haass is that the United States must first get its own house in order.

Haass carefully explains the fissures in US-Russian relations as being centered on Vladimir Putin’s belief that his country has been humiliated since the fall of the Soviet Union.  Haass’ argument is correct and straight forward as Putin rejected the liberal world that sought to bring democratic changes to Russia and integrate her economy into more of a world entity.  Putin’s disdain and need to recreate a strong expansionist military power has led to the undermining of elections in the US and Europe.  Putin’s “feelings” have been exacerbated by NATO actions in the Balkans in the 1990s and its expansion to include the membership of former Soviet satellites like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.  The end result is that Moscow pursued an aggressive policy in Georgia, the Crimea, and eastern Ukraine resulting in western sanctions which have done little to offset Putin’s mind set.

Haass is on firm ground when he develops the economic miracle that transpired in China, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea as the reduced role of the military in these societies, except for China have contributed greatly to their economic success.  Their overall success which is evident today in how they have dealt with the Covid-19 pandemic is laudatory, but there are a number of pending problems.  The China-Taiwan relationship is fraught with negativity.  Japanese-Chinese claims in areas of the South China Sea and claims to certain islands is a dangerous situation,  the current situation on the Korean peninsula is a problem that could get out of hand at any time.  Lastly, we have witnessed the situation in Hong Kong on the nightly news the last few weeks.

The Syrian situation is effectively portrayed to highlight the tenuousness of international agreements.  It is clear, except perhaps to John Bolton that the US invasion of Iraq has led to the erosion of American leadership in the Middle East.  American primacy effectively ended when President Obama did not enforce his “red-line” threat concerning Bashir al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons, and President Trump’s feckless response  to the use of these weapons in 2017.  The result has been the elevation of Iran as a military and political force in the region, as well as strengthening Russia’s position as it has supported its Syrian ally in ruthless fashion.  Haass’ conclusion regarding the region is dead on arguing that its future will be defined like its past, by “violence within and across borders, little freedom or democracy, and standards of living that lag behind much of the world.”

Map of Africa Political Picture

In most regions Haass’ remarks add depth and analysis to his presentation.  This is not necessarily the case in Africa where his remarks at times are rather cursory.  This approach is similar in dealing with Latin America, a region rife with drug cartels, unstable economies, and state weakness which is a challenge to the stability of most countries in the region.

One of the most useful aspects of the book despite its textbook type orientation is the breakdown of a number of concepts in international affairs and where each stand relative to their success.  The discussion of globalization or interconnected markets has many positive aspects that include greater flows of workers across borders, tourism, trade, and sharing of information that can help negate issues like terrorism and pandemics.  However, globalization also means that for certain issues like climate change borders do not matter.  Global warming is a fact and though some agreements have been reached the self-interest of burgeoning economies like China and India that rely on coal are a roadblock to meaningful change.  Interdependence can be mutually beneficial but also brings vulnerability, i.e., trade agreements can result in job loss in certain countries and increased unemployment, Covid 19 knows no borders, as was the case with the 2008 financial crisis.  Haass is very skeptical that mitigation of climate change will have a large enough impact, he also discusses the negative aspects of the internet, and the world-wide refugee problem adding to a growing belief that future international relations will carry a heavy load and if not solved the planet will be in for major problems that include global health.  Haass’ conclusions are somewhat clairvoyant as I write this review in the midst of a pandemic, which the author argues was inevitable.

Image of Map and Wallpapers: Asia Map

Haass shifts his approach in the final section of the book where he considers diplomatic tools like alliances, international law, and vehicles like the United Nations as governments try and cope with the problems facing the world.  In this section he focuses on the features of order and disorder or order v. anarchy to provide tools that are needed to understand both the state of play and the trends at the regional and global levels.   He breaks down issues as to their positivity and negativity as he does in other areas of the book, but here he makes a case for American leadership supported by military power as the best hope for stability and progress.  But even in making this argument, Haass presents certain caveats that must be considered.  For example, do nations have the right to interfere in a sovereign country to prevent genocide, can a country’s sovereignty be violated if they are providing resources and protection to terrorist groups, or does an ethnically like minded people deserve to have their own country based on self-determination.  Apart from these questions is the issue of enforcement.  Does international law exist since there is no uniform vehicle to force compliance, and what tools are available to convince nations to support decisions by international bodies or groupings.

All in all Haass has written a primer for his readers, but does this audience even understand the complexities of foreign policy and do they have the will to learn about it and then elect representatives who themselves have a grasp of issues to direct the United States on a well-reasoned path that can maintain effective global activism?  Only the future can answer that question, but for me I am not that optimistic in terms of the American electorates interest in the topic or its commitment to educating itself.

FILE - In this Sept. 18, 2007 file photo, the flags of member nations fly outside of the United Nations headquarters. In a move likely to upset Israel's government, the Palestinians are seeking to raise their flags at the U.N., just in time for Pope Francis' visit in September 2015. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer, File)

BLACK WAVE: SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN, AND THE FORTY YEAR RIVALRY THAT UNRAVELED CULTURE, RELIGION, AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY by Kim Ghattas

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The original.
(Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini)

Four years ago, I read Kim Ghattas’ account of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s tenure at Foggy Bottom.  The book was personal, clear, concise and analytical.  Her latest book, BLACK WAVE: SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN, AND THE FORTY-YEAR RIVALRY THAT UNRAVELED CULTURE, RELIGION, AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY piqued my interest in light of recent events.  Iran’s attack on Saudi oil fields, the proxy war in Yemen between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran’s machinations dealing with shipping in the Persian Gulf, and President Trump’s recent order resulting in the assassination of Qassim Suleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and the head of its Quds force makes the book extremely timely, but also very important as we seek to understand events in the most explosive region in the world trying to discern how the competition between the world’s leading Sunni and Shi’a countries will unfold.

Ghattas’ task is a difficult one, but she has met the challenge by presenting the relevant facts, personalities, theological ideologies, and major power interests in the area. She is able to break down  the apparent and hidden complexities involved in the Saudi-Iran relationship and provides numerous insights.

KSA Iran map

In 2001, David W. Lesch wrote a short volume, 1979: THE YEAR THAT SHAPED THE MIDDLE EAST arguing that events that year; the rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran; the seizure of American hostages; the occupation of the Holy Mosque in Mecca by radical students and Islamists; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan all created a watershed for the Middle East and the world balance of power.  Ghattas builds upon Lesch’s hypothesis and argues that 1979 began a process that transformed societies and altered cultural and religious currents in the region fostering an evolution that bears little resemblance to what existed before.  For Ghattas, the year 1979 and the forty years that followed witnessed “the Saudi-Iran rivalry that went beyond geopolitics, descending into an ever-greater competition for Islamic legitimacy through religious and cultural domination, changing societies from within – not only in Saudi Arabia and Iran, but throughout the region.”  The influence of this rivalry spread to Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria, and Afghanistan and unleashed sectarian identities and killings that had never defined these countries in the past.

Ghattas’ approach is to present her material in a clear and concise manner that is easily understood by the laymen as well as scholars.  She begins in 1974 focusing on events in Iran under the Shah and the plight of the Palestinians and the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini and his vision for an Islamic state.  She explains the developing opposition to the Shah and the revolution that seemed to begin in 1977 with the death of Ali Shariati, a leftist Muslim revolutionary.  The blame for the death fell on SAVAK, the Shah’s internal security service exacerbating the public outcry.  In exile in Paris, Khomeini prepared cassette tapes of his ideas and promises which were smuggled into Iran provided a vehicle to chip away at the Shah’s popularity and reach the masses to foster revolution.

In this Nov. 15, 1977 photo, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran visits Washington. (AP)

(The Shah of Iran, Rheza Pahlavi)

Once Khomeini replaced the Shah, Ghattas details how his movement consolidated power; founded the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corporation; dealt with foreign movements like the Moslem Brotherhood, the creation of Hezbollah or “Party of Guard;” Khomeini’s uncompromising approach to government and gaining the approval of the Iranian people; and of course the many important personalities involved.  In creating the Islamic Republic, a tightly organized authoritarian regime, more repressive and murderous than the Shah’s emerges.  Mass shootings resulted, students and clerics disappeared, newspapers shut down, and emissaries were sent throughout the Middle East to foster a regional movement led by the Shi’a.

Ghattas does a wonderful job unearthing information that was not generally known before as well as refocus on concepts and arguments that now appear acceptable with hindsight.  First, the role of Yasir Arafat and how he developed a relationship with Khomeini from the outset hoping to gain support for his war against Israel.  Khomeini would use Arafat for his own ends and never really earned the support he craved as only weapons and training were provided.  Another example involves Saddam Hussein who wanted to kill Khomeini but would not act without agreement of the Shah.  The Shah would refuse, and one could only imagine how history would have unfolded had he agreed.  Ghattas also argues that though Khomeini did not order the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran, feeling pressure from nationalists, Marxist students, and others who hated the United States dating to the assassination of Mohamad Mosaddeq in 1953 he would manipulate the situation for his benefit by publicizing his radical credentials.

(Seizure of American hostages at US Embassy in Iran, 1979)

Ghattas employs a number of individuals to create her narrative about important events.  The seizure and occupation of the Holy Mosque in Mecca is told through the eyes of Sami Angawi, an architect and lover of history who describes the changes in Saudi Arabia after the 1973 Oil embargo and the massive wealth that flowed to the Saudi royal family.  The zealots who took the mosque wanted the country to cut ties to the west, expel all foreigners, redistribute the oil wealth to the poor, and remove the House of Saud and their clerics who failed to uphold the purity of Islam.  For the Saudi royal family this reflected weakness and they needed to counter the move to place the holy sites in Medina and Mecca under the trusteeship of the Moslem world.

The author does a nice job comparing the cultural changes in Saudi Arabia and Iran.  In the case of Saudi Arabia, it was a case of arrested development, in Iran it felt like whiplash as a violent and dramatic undoing of decades of social, political, and cultural advancement that took place under the Shah was gutted.  Khomeini created a cultural revolution accompanied by a reign of terror.  Ghattas correctly points out that “these revolutions were amplified by the bitter rivalry that emerged that same year between two countries that had once been allies, a rivalry born out of Khomeini’s desire to upstage the Saudis as the leaders of the Moslem world.

All the events of 1979 seemed to be linked.  After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 the Saudi government fresh from the embarrassment of the Holy Mosque seizure, its recapture and its high death toll saw an opportunity to recoup its lost image by supporting and championing a move against “godless communists,” in addition it provided a vehicle to send radicals outside the country to fight against the infidels.

(Seizure of the Holy Mosque in Mecca, November 20, 1979)

Ghattas describes the relationship between Hafez al-Assad, the Syrian strongman and Khomeini which portends a great deal for the future destruction of Syria that we are witnessing today.  In 1982 when Assad crushed the Moslem Brotherhood and killed over 15,000 people in Hama, Khomeini just stood by.  Though Khomeini was an Islamist, he was also a pragmatist and with Assad, an Alawite (a sect of Islam that made up about 15% of the Syrian population) an alliance with Shi’a Iran was formed that continues to this day.

Saddam Hussein witnessed the instability in Iran and began to expel Iraqi Shi’a, placed clerics under house arrest, brutalized the Kurds, leftists, and anyone who opposed his regime.  After Saddam executed Ayatollah Mohammad Bager al-Sadr, the “Iraqi Khomeini,” Khomeini called for Saddam’s overthrow.  On September 22, 1980, Saddam declared war on Iran as the Iraqi military deemed Iran weak, isolated and unable to defend itself. Saddam believed he could win a quick war cutting Khomeini’s ambitions down to size.  As we know the war would continue for most of the decade causing hundreds of thousands of deaths.

(Soviet Mig-17s at airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan after the invasion)

Events in Egypt also would come to a head in 1979 as President Anwar Sadat took the gamble of recognizing Israel and agreeing to the Camp David Accords as a means of gaining US aid with his economy disintegrating and the poor ready to take to the streets.  Ghattas describes her narrative through Nageh Ibrahim, a medieval studies student who helped create Gama ‘a, a radical Moslem organization that was gaining strength believed that Sadat’s negotiations went too far, particularly as it left out the Palestinians. By 1981 opposition to Sadat had increased especially with the purge of 3000 Islamists, leftists, and socialists including journalists, feminists and others.  Sadat had managed to unite disparate groups to assassinate him.  The killing was carried out by Gama’a who believed conservative Egyptian society was ready for a revolution.  It was not as the military under Hosni Mubarak would retain power.  Interestingly Ghattas argues the killing of Sadat had less to do with religion because he was a pious Moslem, he called himself the “believer president,” and more to do with the attempt to seize power by radical Islamists.  What is increasingly clear as one digests Ghattas’ narrative, if 1979 was a turning point, 1980 was the point of no return.

Ghattas offers clear explanations as she discusses the disparate relationships among the leading characters she explores; in addition to their policies, beliefs, actions, governments they led and movements they represented.  Whether analyzing the strategies of Khomeini, Saddam, Assad, Arafat, or Saudi princes she is able to link their narrative to each other reflecting the powder keg the Iranian Revolution sparked in the Middle East.  Events in Lebanon and Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s fit well into her narrative.  Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, “Operation Peace for Galilee” would contribute to the fracturing of Lebanese society.  Iran would take a major role as they ensconced themselves in the Beqaa Valley with the Syrian army and Hezbollah would ramp up its participation in Lebanese society into the poor areas of Beirut.  In Pakistan the 1980s witnessed a proxy war between followers of Iran and Saudi Arabia which would result in Shi’a-Sunni sectarian violence as the ideological war spread.  Ghattas tells the story of their differences through the eyes of Allama Ehson Elahu Zaheer who attended an Islamic University in Medina and Allama Arif Hussaini who studied in Najaf and was a follower of Khomeini.

Women drivers are set to transform the auto market in Saudi Arabia

(Saudi woman driving for the first time unaccompanied by a man!)

Saudi Arabia had a great deal of influence in Pakistan with longstanding ties to Pakistani clerics like Maarout Dawalibi who became a pseudo advisor to the Saudi leaderships well as Jamatt-eIslami a radical Pakistani Moslem organization.  In February 1979, General Zia-ul-Haq, who overthrew Prime Minister Zulfikar ali Bhutto imposed Shari’a law on Pakistan and Daealibi wrote the new legal code.  Pakistan experienced a cultural revolution similar to what occurred in Saudi Arabia and Iran, but Zia would become an ally of the US against the Soviets in Afghanistan as he needed American and Saudi support for his survival.  Pakistan had a tradition of using religion as a balm to soften defeat, i.e.; the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, the overthrow of Bhutto in July 1977, and its overall relationship with India.  Pakistan’s radicalization is linked to Peshawar, a city near the Afghanistan border which became a center for radical mujahedeen fighting the Soviet Union.  It was also the location for Ayman Zawahiri, an Egyptian doctor who was implicated and jailed for his role in Sadat’s assassination who later would become number two to Osama Bin-Laden in the al-Qaeda hierarchy who would move his family to Peshawar in the mid-1980s.  Peshawar would become the nerve center for Arab jihad.  As Ghattas astutely remarks, if Beirut was the supermarket of the left in the 1970s for Palestinians, Iraqis, Egyptians and Marxists, then Peshawar was the supermarket of the Islamists in the 1980s where “Islamic law, fatwas, the war of the believers, the unity of the Muslim nation, and the humanitarian needs of Afghan refugees” was discussed and acted upon.

As Saudi money poured into Peshawar, Zia allowed Saudi charities to build hundreds of madrassas, religious seminaries along the border with Afghanistan that taught the exclusionary teachings of fundamentalist schools of Saudi puritanism.  Many of the graduates of these schools became the core of the Taliban in the 1990s.  Ghattas writes that “the Saudis were helping to create an environment in which ideas and actions could be taken to the extreme, and they were blinded to the consequences of their creation because they could not recognize the intolerance of their own ideology,” a problem that haunts us in 2020.

Ghattas comes to a number of important conclusions with the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan which the Saudis took a great deal of credit.  Teheran wanted a say in the post war period but when they were not able to impose their will Khomeini unleashed a culture war by calling for the death of Salman Rushdie for his depiction of Mohammad in his book SATANIC VERSES.  Another major point was the removal of Saddam’s forces from Kuwait.  President Bush made a grave error by allowing the Syrians to dominate the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon along with their Hezbollah ally in return for Damascus’ support against Saddam.  The American presence in Saudi Arabia because of the war was part of the impetus for Osama Bin-Laden and the creation of al-Qaeda as “the infidels” seemed all over the kingdom.  The Saudis had their own culture war with women and radical clerics continued to rail against the royal family.  Ghattas is dead  pointing out that “until 1979, the kings had bent that product and the clerics to their will, keeping them in check.  After 1979, the Wahhabi religious establishment had become king.”

The bomb damaged building which housed U.S. military personnel and served as the headquarters for the U.S. Air Force's 4404th Wing (Provisional), Southwest Asia is in the foreground of this aerial photograph taken of the Khobar Towers complex near King Abdul Aziz Air Base, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on June 29, 1996. The explosion of a fuel truck set off by terrorists at 2:55 p.m. EDT, Tuesday, June 25, 1996, outside the northern fence of the facility killed 19 and injured over 260. U.S. and Saudi law enforcement and military personnel are combing through the blast area searching for clues to the identity of the terrorists.

(Khobar Towers, Dhaharan, Saudi Arabia before bombing of June 29, 1996)

It is fascinating to explore the rapprochement that was reached between the Saudis and Iran following the death of Khomeini.  They did share a common interest that trumped their ideological differences as Teheran wanted to lessen the Sunni-Shi’a rift to allow greater access to the holy places in Mecca.  Even the Al-Khobar Towers bombing by Hezbollah elements did not cause a renewed rift.  But dark forces existed on both sides that hampered a continuation of any honeymoon.   For Iran supporters of Khomeini’s revolution remained in power – the Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah, and radical clerics.  On the Saudi side money was used to pursue an anti-western ideology in the madrassas and they continued to fund radical clerics throughout the region as well as the remaining mujahedeen from the Afghan War.

The Saudi-Iranian rivalry continued unabated after their brief lessening of tension in the 1990s.  It was rekindled after 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq and it resurfaced with a vengeance during the Arab Spring.  With the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in 2011, elections brought about the rise to the presidency of Mohammad Morsi, a member of the Moslem Brotherhood.  Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei compared the overthrow of Mubarak to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 and called for an Arab awakening in the region.  The Saudis were not amused, and they feared their own people would rise up and worked behind the scenes with the Egyptian army to get rid of Morsi which occurred on July 3, 2013.   The result was Field Marshall Abdel Fattah Sissi assuming the presidency.  Sissi was a friend of the Saudis who was officially elected President in May 2014 and maintains his hold on power in Egypt today.

In the last pages of her narrative Ghattas discusses the tragedies that are Syria and Yemen, with the spotlight on the roles Saudi Arabia and Iran in the carnage.  In Iran domestic opposition and demonstrations against Teheran’s expansionist policies were met with violence and repression.  In Saudi Arabia, the new king and his Defense Minister son, Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS) proceeded to use its American military toys to wreak havoc in Yemen and kill Saudi citizens at home and abroad.  Ghattas recounts the murder of Washington Post reporter and Saudi citizen, Jamal Khashoggi by MbS and his minions  providing the reader a taste of what the new Saudi regime was like and who President Trump’s latest “buddy” really is.

There are many themes in Ghattas’ presentation.  The exploitation of Islam by dictators stands out.  Further, the chaos that has convulsed the region over the last four decades; the Iran-Iraq War, the upheavals in Afghanistan, the assassinations in Pakistan and civil wars in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen are all in some ways fallout from the fierce competition between two parallel “Islamic revolutions” in 1979.  Ghattas also reminds us that the region was not always this intolerant as before 1979 as modern art, abstract sculptures, and literature was allowed to proliferate in certain areas of the Middle East.  What makes Ghattas’ book special is that she tells many of her stories through the eyes of numerous men and women who spoke out against the repression that emerged after 1979 making the history relatable to the reader and an important contribution to the literature that tries to explain events that are at times incomprehensible, but continue to plague us.

 

ASSAD OR WE BURN THE COUNTRY: HOW ONE FAMILIES LUST FOR POWER DESTROYED SYRIA by Sam Dagher

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(Hafez al-Assad and son Bashar al-Assad)

In the last few years a number of important books dealing with the Syrian tragedy have appeared.  They all reflect the gruesome nature of how Bashar al-Assad and his family have clung to power as they have slowly destroyed their country by killing over 500,000 people and creating millions of refugees.  Many of these books are journalistic accounts of Assad’s murderous policies or personal memoirs as their authors scream on the written page for the world to listen and act.  Sam Dagher, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal new contribution to this ever-growing list  is his ASSAD OR WE BURN THE COUNTRY: HOW ONE FAMILIES LUST FOR POWER DESTROYED SYRIA which focuses on the generational saga of the Assad and Tlass families, once deeply intertwined and now estranged by Assad’s bloody quest to retain the country that his father seemingly bequeathed to him.

Since the 2011 Arab Spring Syria has emerged from hopes of democracy and some type of governmental reform that was the calling card for the Middle East as the west which could not make up its mind as to what should be done to stop the ongoing slaughter.  President Barrack Obama’s feckless approach fearing American involvement in another Middle Eastern country as he tried to extricate the United States from Iraq and Afghanistan or President Donald Trump’s callous and amoral abandonment of the Kurds last month leaving Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia with a further foothold in the region reflects the bankruptcy of US policy in the area and raises the question of what might have been done differently.

A scene from Hama after the 1982 massacre.

Dagher the last western journalist to be kicked out of Syria in 2014 relies on interviews with Assad’s former army commander, Manaf Tlass, now a defector, numerous other witnesses and participants in the events described, and his own extensive first-hand experience reporting from Damascus to take the reader behind the scenes to explore a ruthless family that is responsible for the destruction of Syria and the resulting chaos that still haunts the region. Dagher puts forth a number of important themes that dominate the narrative.

First,  Bashar al-Assad inner struggle to live up to his father to justify his own reign which led him to replicate the violence that had been used in the past.  Second, the role of the Tlass family particularly Manaf’s evolution from childhood friend of Bashar, a key cog in implementing his violent strategy, and finally breaking with him and achieving asylum in France.  Third, how the Assad family, including Bashar’s brother Maher, cousins like the Makhloufs, a number of which led different segments of the Mukhabarat ruled the country.  Fourth, Bashar’s inability to manipulate the west as successfully as his father.  Fifth, how the Assad family helped arm Hezbollah and its militias and allowing their patrons, Iran to protect him.  Sixth, the evolution of Bashar from a young western oriented individual who many Syrians and foreign governments saw as the hope for reform in Syria to one who quickly learned that to preserve power he had to crush the aspirations for general political reform and all challenges to the system.  For Bashar continued to repeat the comment; “you can only rule these people with the shoe” which became a nasty reality for the Syrian people.

The al-Assad Family and the Syrian Government

Dagher provides exceptional coverage of the Arab Spring and its impact on Syria.  He follows the developments of the protests and opposition and the Assad regime’s response.  There is special focus on cities of Hama that feared a replication of the slaughter and destruction that resulted in the death of 10-20,000 Syrians at the hands of Hafez al-Assad in 1982; Homs, Daraa, Aleppo, and Damascus itself.  As the violence spread in 2011 and 2012 different factions within the Assad government, the army, even inside the Mukhabarat began to appear.  This fracturing was also evident on the part of the opposition as they tried to figure out a plan to deal with the regime’s violence.  As the foreign media and You Tube began to show the truth of what was occurring Bashar resorted to describing events as “fake news,” all part of a western conspiracy to overthrow him.  “Like his father before him, it was absolutely vital for Bashar to shift the narrative from one about a brutal clan and regime killing protesters and political activists to that of a state battling armed insurgents and gangs linked to a foreign conspiracy.”

Dagher is correct that once the west with its UN mandate overthrew Muhammar Gaddafi in Libya, Bashar close minded approach to the opposition became even more recalcitrant to the point that he would destroy his country instead of stepping down.  The Russians felt the US had lied about its approach to Gaddafi, and Putin vowed he would not let that happen to the Assad’s.  For the Bashar his vision was clear, and he would do anything to remain in power as he seemed to purposely lose territory to ISIS as a means of scaring the world even if it meant sacrificing a few thousand of his own militiamen and conscripts.  Bashar was willing to pull out from peripheral areas deemed unimportant and allow ISIS to seize them and carry out their version of atrocities.  This would fit Putin’s realpolitik, also as now Assad and the Russian President could argue that they were saving the world from Islamic terrorism.

Russian president is also set to meet leaders of Iran, Turkey to discuss a postconflict settlement in Syria

The Assad regime’s duplicity whether under Hafez or Bashar is evident throughout the narrative.  Dagher stresses how neither could be trusted but the west needed Syria as a means of controlling terrorism, its Middle East peace plans, events in Lebanon, and Israel.  Washington at times was naïve in dealing with the Assad family and when it was obvious that something needed to be done they could not act, i.e.; Obama’s “red line” with chemical weapons which he did not enforce, refusal to provide weapons to certain opposition groups etc.  Bashar craved rewards for engaging the West at the same time he fully embraced Iran, Hezbollah, and “the so-called axis of resistance against the West.”  The corruption of the Assad regime is on full display as they practiced the tactics of a typical mob family.  Dagher focuses on a number of interesting characters like Rami Makhlouf, another cousin who developed business partnerships with the regime and by 2010 his companies controlled almost 65% of the Syrian economy; Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah; Hafez Makhlouf, who was deeply involved as head of the Mukhabarat when Hama was destroyed; Atief Najib, head of the Mukhabarat during the Arab Spring who implemented Bashar’s violent approach to demonstrators among many others.

Dagher performs an important service explaining what really transpired in Syria during the Arab Spring.  He concentrates on a number of important personages  including Bashar, Maher, his younger brother, Manaf, a host of cousins and protestors like Khlaed al-Khani, an artist who survived the Hama debacle in 1982 as a little boy in which his father was killed, Darwish Mazen, a human rights lawyer who was imprisoned and repeatedly tortured by the regime before he was released and went into exile in Germany, and Sarah Masalmeh, who survived the destruction of Daraa to join the opposition eventually fleeing the country with her brother to create an easy to understand narrative that the general reader can absorb.  As the protests and violence spread Dagher has an uncanny knack of zeroing in on Bashar’s thinking, the impact of foreign interference in events, and the devastation that the Syrian people as a whole had to deal with.

The author delves out a great deal of criticism for the Obama administration, much of which is on point.  When Bashar’s regime used barrel bombs on civilians, delivered chlorine bombs on opposition cities targeting civilians, among the atrocities delivered by air either by Syrian or Russian forces in 2014, Obama refused to consider a no-fly-zone.  Obama did authorize non-lethal aid to rebels and hundreds of millions of dollars to assist refugees but in the end when confronted whether to deal with the Assad regime and its massacres or the Islamic State, Washington chose ISIS.  However, once Donald Trump was elected any pressure on the Assad regime ended.  Trump’s bromance with Putin and his own authoritarian tendencies shut the door on any assistance to the Syrian opposition that was being decimated.  Trump as Dagher points out probably secretly admired Assad as he had the type of power in his country that Trump craved.

2013MENA_Syria_ChemicalWeapons

(A mother and father weep over the body of their child, who was killed in an alleged chemical weapons attack on Ghouta, Syria, on August 21, 2013)

In the end the winner of the Syrian civil war was Russia as Putin was now the arbiter of the Middle East, a renewed great power, and used the war as a means of testing over 200 new weapons.  Turkey also is a victor as President Erdogan made his peace with Bashar and Trump’s abandonment of the Kurds a few months ago allowed the Turkish military to root out the Kurds and set up the buffer zone Ankara had always wanted.  Iran and its puppet Hezbollah remain a bulwark in maintaining the Assad regime’s rule and provides Teheran with cudgel to hammer its enemies and threaten its arch foe Saudi Arabia.  Lastly, of course is the Assad regime.  No matter how many crimes against humanity they engaged in, they remain in power as France and Germany have given up trying to remove him from power, and the United States is seen as unreliable as Trump continues to kowtow to Putin in all areas.

Dagher’s monograph is part memoir and part a history of the Assad family that explains how we have gotten to where we are in Syria.  His easy prose and analysis is important because he has created the most comprehensive history of what has transpired which is an important service for those who seek to understand American policy in addition to why Bashar al-Assad and his cronies still remain in power and continue to inflict countless deaths on the Syrian people.

Giant images of Bashar al-Assad and his late father Hafez al-Assad at the Damascus hotel. Photo by Getty Images.

(Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad)

THE AMBASSADORS: AMERICAN DIPLOMATS ON THE FRONT LINES by Paul Richter

szfreiberger Afghanistan, American Diplomatic History, Middle Eastern History Leave a comment
Image result for photo of robert ford and ryan crocker(American Ambassador to Libya Christopher Steven)

The past two weeks the American people witnessed the professionalism and commitment to American national security on the part of diplomatic personnel before the House Intelligence Committee.  Career diplomats like acting Ambassador to the Ukraine, William B. Taylor, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent, Fiona Hill, a former official at the U.S. National Security Council specializing in Russian and European affairs, and Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch who was fired as ambassador to the Ukraine by President Trump, along with a number of others displayed their honesty and integrity as they were confronted by conspiracy theories and lies developed to defend administration attempts to coerce and bribe Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to encourage him to launch investigations into former Vice President Joe Biden and his son Hunter.  The preciseness of their presentations left no doubt as to their credibility and points to the importance of having experienced professionals advising and carrying out American foreign policy.

In our current political climate it is very difficult to conduct foreign policy in a more traditional manner when you have a president who makes decisions from his “gut,” or spur of the moment as he did when he recently allowed Turkey to expand into Syria and crush the Kurds.  It is interesting to compare how “normal” foreign policy should be conducted and how important these diplomats are.  The publication of Paul Richter’s new book, THE AMBASSADORS: AMERICAN DIPLOMATS ON THE FRONT LINES  is important because it supports the kind of work that was performed by the witnesses before the House Impeachment Inquiry and reflects the antithesis of the Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy.

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(American Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford)

Richter has chosen to explore the careers of four American ambassadors who since 9/11 contributed to what insiders’ term “expeditionary diplomats” who have served in battle zones in the Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Pakistan, and Libya.  Because of the nature of these conflicts these career professionals have been involved with traditional diplomacy in addition to helping generals and spy chiefs decide how to wage war, as well as try to end them.  When Washington found itself with a country on the edge with no real plan it was these diplomats who helped improvise and make policy decisions.

Ryan Crocker emerges as America’s most knowledgeable source on Iraq throughout his career having served there when Saddam Hussein came to power in 1980 and in 1998, yet he was left out of planning sessions dealing with the run up to the invasion of Iraq.  Richter reviews Bush administration ignorance and agendas that are all too familiar, but Crocker’s warnings about an invasion all came to fruition; sectarian warfare, violence and looting, and the emergence of Iran as the region’s dominant player.  Crocker left Iraq in August 2003 and served as ambassador to Pakistan for almost three years.  He would return to Iraq and worked well with General David Petraeus replacing Robert Ford as ambassador as they oversaw the somewhat successful surge between 2007 and 2009.    Ford another exceptional diplomat, whose experiences reinforce the arrogance and outright stupidity of Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith and numerous others in the Bush administration.  The reduced role of Colin Powell and the State Department is plain to see, and Crocker and Ford did their best to overcome America’s mistakes.

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(American Ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker)

Richter successfully highlights the importance of the diplomats as they tried to keep a lid on the violence in Iraq and nudge the government toward democracy.  Their contact within the Iraqi government, outside militias, and other groups is evident, and their role was extremely important  when compared to personnel in Washington who at times seemed to have no clue.  Crocker’s success rested on the respect that the Iraqis including President Maliki had for him.  He thought nothing of traveling to meet all elements in the Iraqi ethnic puzzle as a means of trying to keep the fractured country together. According to Emma Sky, a British Middle East expert, Crocker “had provided the strategic direction and guidance the military so craved from civilian leaders, and so rarely received.”  It is not surprising that once Crocker left Iraq in February 2009 the situation deteriorated according to Richter because of the changes in approach implemented by his replacement, Christopher Hill, and the overall policy pursued by the Obama administration.

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(Syrian President Bashir Assad)

By 2011, Crocker shifted his focus to Afghanistan and returned to government service after being chosen by President Obama to try and work out agreements for a strategic partnership. Obama’s goal was to reduce US troop levels from 150,000 to 15,000 and turn the fighting over to Afghan troops as much as possible.  Crocker’s relationship with Karzai was tested as the Afghanistan president reaffirmed old grudges against Washington as he tried to maneuver among militias, the Taliban and his administration’s corruption.  Once again Crocker did give it his best under extremely trying conditions.

Perhaps America’s most important ally in the war on terror was Pakistan, a country that could never be relied upon with its own agenda visa vie the Taliban, al-Qaeda, India, and numerous militias.  Richter is correct when he describes the Pakistani-American relationship as a bad marriage with both partners cheating but had no choice but to stay together.  Anne Patterson entered this quagmire in 2007 and served as ambassador to Pakistan for three years.  Her main goal was preventative.  She needed to help keep the country’s politics from becoming so chaotic or dangerous that the army, Pakistan’s most powerful institution, would feel the need to install new leaders to restore order.  During her term as ambassador she successfully played the role of political counselor, military advisor, banker, and sometimes psychotherapist.  Richter takes the reader through all the crisis attendant to the United States-Pakistani relationship dealing with the duplicitous Parvez Musharraf, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and her husband’s attempts to succeed her as President, the Mumbai attacks and numerous others.  She did her best to keep the lid on and for the most part did an admirable job.  For the latest work that deals with the topic in full see Steven Coll’s THE DIRECTORATE: THE CIA AND AMERICA’S SECRET WARS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN.

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(American Ambassador to Pakistan and Egypt Anne Patterson)

Patterson would be sent to Egypt with the onset of the Arab Spring.  Once the country politically imploded and Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, she moved from the conflagration in Islamabad and found herself amidst another crisis situation.  Egypt was the cornerstone of US security strategy for the Middle East by maintaining peace with Israel, fighting counterterrorism, and keeping sea lanes open for the transport of oil.  The fall of Mubarak caught the Obama administration by surprise.  After the revolution, Washington continued to be blindsided by developments in Egypt.  Patterson would arrive when the Egyptian military and civilians were furious at the Obama administration whom they felt had abandoned their country.  She was plain speaking and knowledgeable and with a reputation in the State Department that one colleague described as “bad ass” and she was eventually able to earn respect from Egyptian military and intelligence leaders.  Further she had to diffuse the Egyptian belief that the US was involved in a conspiracy to push democratic reform.  Further she was confronted with the harassment and intimidation by Egyptian authorities against American backed reform NGOs and Embassy staff which she worked to deflate so she could try and influence Egyptian government actions even as Washington seemed to dither.

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(Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi)

Following the Moslem Brotherhood victory with the election of Mohamed Morsi as President, Patterson met with the new Egyptian leader and tried to pin him down as to his views on Israel, human rights, etc.  She did her best to work with Morsi and even gave him a certain leeway, all for naught as Morsi had an overstated view of his own importance.  His major error was to appoint the ruthless General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as Defense Minister.  As Morsi became more authoritarian, she tried to curb his lack of political skill and quest for more and more power to no vail.  With the Arab Emirates and Saudis working with the Egyptian military Morsi was arrested and a coup brought Sisi to power.  The entire episode was not the Obama administrations finest hour.  Granted they had little leeway with Morsi, but they did not do enough to try and steer him toward a more democratic approach.  The problem as Patterson pointed out was not that Morsi was an Islamist extremist, “but that he simply didn’t know what he was doing.”  Patterson was vilified by reform groups, foreign leaders and certain members of Congress as having assisted in bringing Morsi to power, criticism that is unwarranted but reflected that Patterson was damned no matter what course she chose.

Image result for photo of obama with anne patterson(Egyptian demonstrations against American Ambassador Anne Patterson)

Perhaps the most unsolvable problem facing American diplomats discussed in Richter’s narrative is Syria.  Robert Ford was placed in the breach as the Arab Spring left its mark on the country and civil war ensued due to the forty-year repressive and murderous reign of the Assad family.  Obama came to the presidency naively hoping to engage the Syrian and Iranian regimes. Ford was the first American ambassador to Damascus since 2006.  Ford had a working relationship with the Syrian opposition, and he advised them to focus on reform not regime change.  In his heart of hearts, Ford realized that Assad would never give up power.  Ford’s secondary role was to educate Washington concerning events in Syria, but the Obama administration policy was faulty as it called for Assad to resign, publicized a “red line” as a response to the use of chemical weapons, and opening the door for Russia.  Ford did his best, risking his life repeatedly confronting Assad and developing relationships with the opposition, but by December 2011 he would return to Washington where he worked to try and merge the different opposition groups.  This task was impossible because at the same time jihadist opposition began to infiltrate into eastern Syria enabling them to seize control of the uprising from more moderate Syrians. Ford argued to no avail that Obama administration needed to arm more moderate elements or Jihadists in eastern Syria would join those in western Iraq.  Obama refused to supply weapons for more moderate elements and with Iranian and Russian aid the moderates had nowhere to turn to but Islamists for help.  For Ford, the lack of weapons aid made a radical take over a self-fulfilling prophecy.  When Obama did little about Assad chemical attacks it further fueled opposition by moderates and members of Congress.  Richter describes Ford as a pinata as he was bashed by everyone for the lack of US aid including Senate Foreign Relations Committee members.   Finally, in total frustration he left the Foreign Service in 2014.

 

The diplomat most familiar to the American people was J. Christopher Stevens who was killed in a jihadist raid in Benghazi in 2012 fostering a partisan uproar in Washington as Republicans used his death as a political vehicle against Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.  According to Richter the details of how Stevens died and who is responsible remains open to conjecture, but one thing is certain, there is plenty of blame to go around.  When Stevens accepted the assignment, he knew what he was getting into, but his career long love of the Libyan people clouded his vision.  Stevens had to start from scratch to carve out his own rules for working with the Libyan opposition who he met with frequently earning their trust even though they did not always follow his advice.  The problem was the inability of the opposition to control the varied militias who had access to weaponry left over from the Qaddafi regime.  At the time, according to Jake Sullivan, a Clinton foreign policy advisor; “post-conflict stabilization in Libya, while clearly a worthy undertaking at the right level of investment, cannot be counted on as one of our highest priorities.”  Stevens concern that the administration wasn’t paying enough attention to what was going on in Benghazi in the eastern region around it would result in his death.  In discussing Stevens, as with Crocker, Ford, and Patterson, Richter provides a nice balance of historical detail, Washington policy and his own insights and analysis which are dead on.

If one wants to gain an understanding of the problems the United States faced in the Middle East and Afghanistan after 9/11 in a succinct and compact approach, then Richter’s monograph should be consulted.  At a time when American decision makers made what proved to be disastrous decisions that we are still confronting today, it is refreshing to explore the careers and work of four individuals who devoted their lives to unravel and try and rectify these mistakes, and one who gave his life believing in the importance of his work and having the ability to the tell truth to power.

The late U.S. ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens, left, shakes hands with a Libyan man in Tripoli, Libya, in a photo posted on the U.S. Embassy Tripoli Facebook page on Aug. 27. | AP Photo
(American Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and a Libyan citizen)

 

A STATE AT ANY COST: THE LIFE OF DAVID BEN-GURION by Tom Segev

szfreiberger Arab-Israeli Conflict, Biography, Middle Eastern History Leave a comment
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(David Ben-Gurion)

A STATE AT ANY COST: THE LIFE OF DAVID BEN-GURION is an apt title for Israeli journalist and historian Tom Segev’s new biography of Israel’s first Prime Minister.  Segev is a prolific writer who is the author of seven books ranging from a biography of Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal; THE SEVENTH MILLION; 1967: ISRAEL, THE WAR AND THE YEAR THAT TRANSFORMED THE MIDDLE EAST; and  ONE PALESTINE, COMPLETE.  Segev’s books reflect impeccable research that includes archival work, interviews, and a strong command of secondary materials in addition to examining previously unavailable materials.  This approach dominates all of his previous books as well as his newest effort.  For those familiar  with Ben-Gurion’s life  and decision making it is clear that the creation of an Israeli state was paramount, even to the point of sacrificing refugees from Europe during and after the Holocaust or turning against other leaders and organizations who would not accept his leadership.  He was a man who did not change and from the outset Segev points out he “exhibited ideological devotion that awed those around him.  The Zionist dream was the quintessence of his identity and the core of his personality, and its fulfillment his greatest desire.”

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(the “young” David Ben-Gurion)

Ben-Gurion wanted to be a leader and aspired to a specific place in history – the man who facilitated the creation of a Jewish state. He often referred to the Bible and Jewish destiny but realized that achieving his dream required “exhausting labor, and tiny, often exasperating steps forward.”  Segev is correct that many shared his vision, but few of his contemporaries were as obsessed with politics.  Few of his colleagues were as diligent and addicted to detail and these characteristics made him “an indispensable leader, though not an omnipotent one.”  If he had to use people, lie about them, manipulate situations for his benefit he had no compunction that it might be wrong, as long as it contributed to his overall goals.

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(Albert Einstein and David Ben-Gurion)

Segev does a very good job explaining the different organizations associated with Palestine.  Be it Zionist groups in Poland before World War II, groups in America or London, groups in Russia, or those in Palestine, Segev dissects their ideologies as well as the important personalities involved.  For supporters of Zionism they were required to reconsider their traditional identities and position themselves between the values of Jewish tradition and a new Jewish nationalism.  Most Jewish immigrants who came to Palestine before World War I arrived with the belief that they came to a land that belonged to them, land that God had promised Abraham.  For Ben-Gurion taking control of the labor market which, these immigrants reinforced was the key in turning Jews who had run from pogroms back into normal people.

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(Ben-Gurion and Israeli Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister Golda Meir)

Segev’s biography puts forth a number of important themes.  First, his subject is a deeply flawed individual who suffered from bouts of anxiety, depression, and at times manic behavior.  Segev is at his best when probing the human side of this complex leader.  His integration of excerpts from his diaries and letters show a lonely man despite his iron will and outwardly self-assured manner.  His personality at times touched levels of megalomania that fostered a series of internal and external conflicts.  But one must realize that the price of creating a Jewish state was steep and it took a personal toll on Ben-Gurion as thousands would die and he had to cope with that fact and so many other details.

These characteristics are present in Segev’s second theme as Ben-Gurion worked his way up the Zionist leadership ladder, he would also engage in nonstop, often rivalrous and sometimes divisive power struggles with just about everyone.  Among those he competed with include the likes of Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the founder of an uncompromising Revisionist Zionist Movement, Menachem Begin, the leader of the Irgun and future Prime Minister of Israel, and fellow Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann whom he argued with over strategy and who would be the dominant voice in Zionist leadership.  Despite his strident behavior and beliefs Ben-Gurion did have the ability to compromise if he perceived that he could adopt a position that would further the goal of a Jewish state.  This strategy manifested itself with his attitude toward Holocaust survivors, compromises with the British during World War II, and support for partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs.  Ben-Gurion could be pragmatic when necessary particularly when it came to partition.  For example, the 1936 Peel Commission allotted Jews a small territory which elated Ben-Gurion as he argued the fact that having a state was more important than borders; besides, “borders are not forever.” In every instance Ben-Gurion always believed in the righteousness of his approach.

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A third theme that drives the entire narrative focuses on Ben-Gurion’s ideology and belief system which he used to try and encourage people to immigrate to Palestine and win over political allies as he traveled to the United States, London, and throughout Europe rarely staying at home for more than a few months at a time.  Ben Gurion’s world view contributed to the factionalism that existed within the Zionist and non-Zionist movements be it the Zionist Congress, Hapo’el Hatzair, Ahdut Ha’avodah and others.  This factionalism is evident as Segev does a marvelous job describing the rhetorical and personal hatred that existed between Ben-Gurion and Jabotinsky; Ben-Gurion and Weizmann; the creation of a Jewish army; disagreements with the likes of Israel Galili, the Chief of the National Command a few weeks before the Arab attack in May 1948; and the final creation of the Mapai party among many examples.

A fourth theme encompasses Ben-Gurion’s personal life as he chose power politics over family.  His marriage to Pauline Moonweis seemed at times cold, but at times loving.  Ben-Gurion’s travel presented many opportunities for at least four mistresses and other affairs which he engaged in repeatedly despite his wife’s knowledge of them.  Ben-Gurion had three children, but he was a poor father at best and his relationship with his son and daughters was quite distant.

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Segev points out a number of interesting aspects of Ben-Gurion’s political development.  He would visit Moscow in 1923 and stay for four months and he came to admire Lenin’s ability to reshape his people’s destiny apart from his ideology.  He would learn the structure of authoritarian leadership and use it systematically to achieve his life’s goals.  According to Segev “Ben-Gurion intended to be a Zionist Lenin.”  This approach to leadership was exhibited in his reaction to Arab Revolts of 1921 and 1936, the issuance of British White Papers throughout the 1930s, and the rise of Nazi Germany.  Ben-Gurion’s principle occupation as a leader was to respond to events, he had no control over and do the best he could in manipulating them for his future goals.

Segev is very clear in his view of Ben-Gurion’s callousness in response to the Holocaust.  The European Jews who escaped extermination were those who immigrated to the United States or elsewhere before the killings began.  Ben-Gurion blamed the Holocaust on those Jews who remained.  Segev points out that “Zionist ideological negation of the Exile presented the Jews of the Diaspora as passive and weak and thus contemptible.  It was a common claim—instead of coming to Palestine, the Jews of Europe let the Nazis murder them, and thus undermined the Zionist project.”  Ben-Gurion stated, “they refused to listen to us.”  This attitude contributed to Ben-Gurion’s approach toward the Holocaust as he realized that was little that could be done. Segev speculates that Ben-Gurion’s guilt over his inability to help Holocaust victims was responsible for distancing himself from their suffering when he visited them in Displaced Persons camps in Germany after the war.  For Ben-Gurion, any plan or strategy should focus on bringing “able” survivors of the Nazi death camps to Palestine after the war as labor would be crucial to achieving the Zionist state.  The only way Ben-Gurion could deal with his helplessness during the Holocaust was to place it behind him emotionally and focus on the future.  Ben-Gurion’s fear was that the annihilation of European Jewry would obliterate Zionism, it was a crime against the future State of Israel as he feared there would be no one left to build the country.

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(Ben-Gurion finally meets Winston Churchill who is 87 years old!)

According to Segev, who has often been associated with revisionist historians who have challenged Israel’s founding narrative, one of the most controversial aspects of Ben-Gurion’s  role in Israel’s founding was Plan Dalet.  A formal written order seems to have been written in May 1948 expelling Arabs from entire villages solving the problem of depopulating areas of Arabs and supposedly clogging the roads with Arab refugees hindering the progress of Arab armies. A further goal was to prevent Arab settlements from being used as bases for enemy forces resulting in the destruction of entire villages and forcing the Arabs to flee.  Other plans were employed using propaganda, “whispering campaigns,” shutting off water and electricity to encourage people to leave their homes.  In the end according to historian Ilan Pappe in his ETHNIC CLEANSING OF PALESTINE at least four to six hundred thousand Arabs if not more fled or were uprooted.   Ben-Gurion’s role according to other historians like Benny Morris in THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949, is that the Israeli leader was present on May 10, 1948 at a meeting in Tel Aviv where the decision to depopulate certain Arab population centers and the forcible depopulation and destruction of villages was made.

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(Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan)

Segev spends a great deal of time on the development of the United Nations Partition Plan once the British decide to leave Palestine as the cost of keeping the peace and dealing with terrorism and the bankruptcy of their empire was too much.  The reparations negotiations with West Germany receive fair coverage as does the 1956 Suez War, which provides a great deal of new information about the Israeli security mindset leading up to the war.  All in all, Segev’s comprehensive monograph will probably leave Ben-Gurion admirers and critics equally unhappy but it cannot be in doubt that Israel’s first Prime Minister was the most important figure in Israel’s founding and eventual survival.

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IN EXTREMIS: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF WAR CORRESPONDENT MARIE COLVIN by Lindsey Hilsum

szfreiberger Biography, Middle Eastern History, War in Iraq Leave a comment

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(Marie Colvin in the Chechen Mountains, 1999)

“Why do I cover wars…. It is a difficult question to answer.  I did not set out to become a war correspondent.  It has always seemed to me what I write about is humanity in extremis, pushed to the unendurable, and that it is important to tell people what really happens in war—declared and undeclared.” (Marie Colvin, The Sunday Times, Sri Lanka, April 22, 2001)

 

Lindsey Hilsum’s new biography of Marie Colvin is a stark reminder of the plight of journalists in our ever-dangerous world.  According to the Washington Post at least 43 journalists were killed in 2018 with another 12 deaths whose causes are not totally clear.  The role of a journalist is to report the news as accurately as possible so citizens can make intelligent judgements about world events.  The life of Colvin presented in IN EXTREMIS: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE WAR CORRESPONDENT MARIE COLVIN reflects that dedication and commitment to that truth.  Hilsum, international editor for Channel 4 News in England is the perfect candidate to write about Colvin’s life as she herself covered wars and conflicts in the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, and Africa.  The recent murder of Washington Post reporter Jamal Khashoggi by the Saudi Arabian government reflects the danger journalists face.  The evidence points to the murder being ordered by the Saudi Royal Prince, Mohammed Bin Salman because of Khashoggi’s negative reporting of Saudi policies.  In this case a journalist was not killed on the battlefield, though in a sense he was.  In Colvin’s case she would give her life reporting from Homs, Syria district of Baba Amir, killed by an artillery attack in 2012 during the civil war that continues to this day.

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(Colvin in Cairo during the Arab Spring, 2011)

Colvin was raised in a comfortable middle-class Catholic family on Long Island, a lifestyle she would totally reject after studying with legendary journalist John Hersey at Yale and move on to a dangerous yet rewarding career as a war correspondent.   Hersey was one of the first individuals who impacted Colvin’s life and work.  Another, her role model, Martha Gellhorn whose work during World War II was exemplary.  Hilsum meticulously chronicles Colvin’s relationships and how they affected her love life and career.  Perhaps the most important being Sunday Times correspondent, David Blundy.  This bond was less sexual and more of a lifetime friendship as they shared the same approach to their work, humor, and the way they approached the world.  Hilsum details other important relationships pointing out their importance to Colvin’s life and work which both seemed conceived as a war zone.  Colvin was married twice to husbands who repeatedly lied to her, had her own series of affairs and one-night stands, suffered miscarriages, and would resort to alcohol to deal with her pain.

Colvin’s big break came in 1985 as a UPI reporter she was sent to Morocco with other journalists to witness the celebration of King Hassan’s twenty-five-year reign.  This morphed into an assignment in Libya as its leader, Muammar Gaddafi, the self-declared revolutionary and supporter of terrorism decided to engage the United States in a manner that could only bring President Reagan to respond with overwhelming force.  During their relationship Colvin was able to score several interviews with the Libyan strong man, and while avoiding his sexual advances enabling her to explore his rogue ideology and what he might do next.  Hilsum delves into how Colvin conducted interviews and developed her approach to revolutionaries, terrorists, or as they described themselves, freedom fighters.   For Colvin, her reporting was designed to focus on “the role and feelings of the individual in the collective violence of war.” (56)

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Hilsum’s approach reflects Colvin’s dedication to her craft and the dangers she faced on a regular basis.  Be it confronting Muammar Gaddafi, her special relationship with Yasir Arafat, or interviewing other individuals who rebelled against existing power structures.  The reader is presented with an inside look at the pitfalls and obstacles journalists like Colvin faced each day in Libya, Iraq, Israel, Kosovo, Chechnya, East Timor, Afghanistan, and finally in Syria over the last three decades.  Hilsum relies on over three hundred journals maintained by Colvin, interviews with her peers, and impeccable research to construct a fascinating picture of Colvin’s private life and career which she had difficulty keeping separate.

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Hilsum does a nice job presenting the background history of each conflict area Colvin explores.  The author tries to explain the myriad factions in Lebanon as Beirut is divided at a green line with Maronite Christians, Amal,  Palestinian groups, bourgeoning Hezbollah all backed by different powers be it Iran, Russia or Syria.  In dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Hilsum bores down deep to explain its origins, the constant explosion into violence be it the Intifadas, the wars against Hamas, and the attempts at peace.  Hilsum describes Colvin’s approach to reporting as other journalists would file from the relative safety of Paris and Cyprus when covering Middle East tension, Colvin would get up close and want to experience events before she reported.  Danger be damned, as her journalism was distinguished  by her personal experience and she would become part of the nomadic group of journalists who wandered the landscape of the Middle East.

For Colvin the Middle East held a tremendous fascination which explains many of her stories.  She was able to develop a trusting relationship with the elusive Yasir Arafat and interviewed him over twenty times.  Hilsum describes the arcane nature of Palestinian politics and the reclusive nature of the Palestinian Chairman.  Arafat is the perfect example to study as Colvin had the uncanny ability to get people to speak to her.  Colvin’s reputation was secured as she was able to sneak into Basra in 1986 during the Iran-Iraq war, Beirut during the 163-day siege of the Bourj al-Barajneh refugee camp in 1987, and her reporting helped create world pressure to get the Syrians to force their surrogates to stop the fighting.  The following year her stories describing the first Intifada against Israel reaffirmed her status as a war correspondent.  Colvin was not known for her stylistic approach to writing, but she got the facts and the human-interest component, at times leaving it to her editors in London to fit the puzzle of her reporting together in a more coherent whole.

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(Homs, Syria where Colvin was targeted and killed by Syrian intelligence in 2012

The years 1998 through 2001 found Colvin moving from what area of conflict to another with seemingly no time in between.  1998 saw her in Kosovo reporting on the devastation caused by Serbian nationalists. 1999 revolved around Indonesia as rebels in East Timor declared their independence.  Later that same year Colvin moved on to Chechnya as the new President of Russia, Vladimir Putin decided to crush Chechen rebels who had broken away from Russia during the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Finally, becoming involved in the Sri Lankan Civil War where she was shot trying to leave a Tamil rebel held area, resulting in a loss of her eye, and a deep depression as she tried to recover physically as well as emotionally.

Hilsum chronicles Colvin’s eventual psychological spiral as she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder for which she received treatment.  But her developing alcoholism was never treated.  As Hilsum vividly explains, “She could not unseen what she had seen, and he [a colleague] feared she was losing her ability to distance herself from horror.”  (Washington Post, December 21, 2018)  As Colvin describes herself in a November 12, 2010 piece it was difficult to distinguish between bravery and bravado. (294)

Colvin was a remarkable woman who had many irreconcilables demons within, but she found herself to a large extent as a war correspondent that made life, at times tolerable.  She witnessed and personally suffered a great deal of sadness and joy in her life, but her work is a testament for what journalism can accomplish, and the hope that those in power will care when reporting reaches the newspapers, websites, or television.  Hilsum has done an excellent job capturing the essence of who Colvin was and how she made her life meaningful.

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(Marie Colvin on assignment)

POGROM: KISHINEV AND THE TILT OF HISTORY by Steven Zipperstein

szfreiberger Middle Eastern History, Modern European History, Russian History Leave a comment
(Victims of the Kishinev pogrom, 1903)

At a time when American society is confronted with pictures of immigrants incarcerated at the US border with Mexico it is a good time to step back and try and understand why people choose to flee their homelands and come to America.  In the case of people arriving on our southern borders their motivations are diverse from economic hardship to fear of death.  These reasons are in a sense universal when examined from a historical perspective.  Earlier in American history we witnessed a flood of Jewish immigrants, roughly two million from Eastern Europe and Russia between 1890 and 1914.  This has had a tremendous impact on our history and growth as a nation.  This mass migration was due in large part because of the anti-Semitic policies of the Tsarist government that resulted in years of persecution, and violent acts against Jews.  Throughout the late 19th and early 20th century these acts, labeled “pogroms” seemed to occur on a regular basis fostering the need for Jewish families to begin a chain of migration to America and other areas of the world.  Perhaps the most famous pogrom occurred in 1903 in the provincial city of Kishinev located at the edge of the Russian Empire which is the subject of Steven J. Zipperstein’s fascinating and informative new book POGROM: KISHINEV AND THE TILT OF HISTORY.

The term “pogrom” enters the western lexicon toward the end of the 19th century in Russia as violence and scapegoating of Jews proliferates.  It would be invoked in numerous towns and villages reaching a crescendo between 1918 and 1920 as 100,000 Jews may have been victimized as they were thought to be Bolsheviks.  Jews were supposed to be wealthy, but the vast majority lived in poverty.  They were thought to be well educated and involved in commerce, but what the Russians resented the most was their secrecy and refusal to be absorbed into the larger society.

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The accusation against Jews that seems to have been the foundation of many pogroms was that of the “ritual killing of Christian children” during the Passover holiday under government sanction.  For an interesting novel that highlights this topic see Bernard Malamud’s THE FIXER which presents the major issues that Zipperstein discusses in a fictional format.

The Kishinev pogrom was seen as shorthand for barbarism, “for the behavior akin to the worst medieval atrocities.”  It would become the only “significant event embraced by all sectors of the severely fractured Russian Jewish scene.”  However, as the author argues throughout the narrative, though agreement was reached concerning the horrors that took place, it became an agreement wrought with myths, half-truths, and outright distortions.  The strength of Zipperstein’s presentation is the dissection of the myths and other components by explaining what occurred in the spring of 1903 in the Kishinev district.  The author carefully examines all aspects of the tragedy from its causes, the persons responsible, the victims and survivors, and the implication for Jewish history in the future.  Kishinev would become the epitome of evil in the west, a jarring glimpse of what the 20th century would hold in store.

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The theme of book rests on how “history is made and remade, what is retained and elided, and why.”  The author examines how “one particular moment managed to chisel onto contemporary Jewish history and beyond that it held meaning even for those who never heard of the town, know nothing of its details, and nonetheless draw lessons from it.”

Forgeries and myths surround the history of the pogrom that greatly impacted how people who participated and survived viewed what they experienced, what had actually transpired, as well as how it was perceived years later.  For example; there was supposedly a letter from the Russian Minister of the Interior, V.K. Plehve instructing the local authorities not to intercede once the massacre began.  This is untrue, no letter existed, though a forgery may have appeared.  Another example revolves around who wrote and was responsible for the dissemination of the PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION which accused Jews of a worldwide conspiracy to dominate all people and their lives.  It was said to have been a creation of the Russian secret police, the Okhrana in 1897, when in fact it was most likely the work of Pavel Krushevan, a publisher, novelist and owner of the newspaper Bessarabets which made the scurrilous lies of the PROTOCOLS available to the public.

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Zipperstein’s sources have been mined thoroughly ranging from the literary works of Alexander Pushkin to Serge S. Urussov, the Governor-General of Bessarabia’s diaries.  The two most important sources are Hayyam Nahman Bialik, the Jewish national poet who wrote, “In the City of Killing,” describing the massacre; and Michael Davitt, an Irish revolutionary and a reporter for Randolph Hearst’s New York American, who would go on to write WITHIN THE PALE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE ANTI-SEMETIC PERSECUTIONS IN RUSSIA, published in 1903.  Zipperstein examines the lives of these two important figures, how they went about their research and who they interviewed.  Excerpts of their work dot the narrative as Zipperstein dissects what occurred hour by hour and both men reach a controversial conclusion that Jewish men were weak and cowards.

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Bialik’s poem, “In the City of Killing” has impacted Jewish history up until today and even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has referred to it in his speeches.  Zipperstein argues that Bialik conflated his entire life experience, particularly his childhood with the plight of Jews – one of helplessness.  His “rage leads him to construct the Jews of Kishinev as abject, and in the process to reshape and reconstruct his own identity.”  The poem recreates the violence, rape, and plunder perpetrated against the Jews, but the core of the poem is a devastating conclusion concerning Jewish male cowardice.  The appearance of the poem would overshadow what had transpired as it focused on the moral failings of Kishinev’s men and soon it became “shorthand for the utter vulnerability of the Jewish people, their devastation of soul and body alike.” Zipperstein examines the poem line by line and concludes that Bialik’s approach is literary poetry, while Davitt ‘s account is accurate as a whole and is first rate journalism, in addition to being reliable history.

Zipperstein asks why did the pogrom occur in Kishinev, a town that was on the outskirts of the Russian empire.  He concludes that a number of events, thought processes, and socio-economic relationships are responsible.  First, though day to day relations among the population seemed amiable, the peasants felt exploited by Jews engaging in a significant amount of commerce.  Second, in the spring of 1903 agricultural prices were on the decline reducing the supply of money.  Third, right wing elements were obsessed with Jewish visibility in the town.  Four, the supposed “ritual killings” in Dubossary, a town near Kishinev a few months before the pogrom.  Five, the fanning of anti-Semitic flames by Pavel Krusheran and his newspaper.  Lastly, Pogroms were seen as a reasonable response to a pariah people as rumors of ritual killing swirled.  Keeping in mind that in 1897 the population of the Kishinev district was 280,000 of which 54.910 were Jewish; and of the city’s 39 factories, 29 were owned by Jews could help explain people’s exacerbated feelings reactions once the violence spread.

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Zipperstein also dissects the political implications of the pogrom.  He explores how it was used by different political factions for their own ends be they Zionists, socialists, Labor, Bundists etc. Many saw the pogrom as an opportunity to foster immigration to Palestine, others were resigned to trying to survive in Russia as they hoped the violence was spent.  The pogrom also touched off a nasty debate in American politics as the pogrom was compared to the lynchings of blacks in the south.  The American left used Kishinev as vehicle to make Americans aware of the treatment of blacks.  This also created a schism within the black communities because of its response to Kishinev and dealing with their own issues.  Interestingly, as Zipperstein describes at the end of the book, the uproar in the United States and its link to lynching’s helped push for the creation of the NAACP in 1909.

Overall the book is quite comprehensive and incorporates a great deal of information that is knew, i.e., Zipperstein’s acquisition of Krusheran’s teenage diaries among other sources.  If you would like to try and understand what occurred in Kishinev, with its historical implications, POGROM: KISHINEV AND THE TILT OF HISTORY is an excellent resource.

Chișinău  ~  Кишинев  ~  Kishinev

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List of Victims of Kishinev Pogrom of 1903

The list below is the result of merging information contained in 2 published documents:

Within the Pale: The True Story of Anti-Semitic Persecutions in Russia, Michael Davitt, London, 1903

Davitt was an Irish journalist who visited Kishinev after the pogrom, and reported on it for two New York newspapers. The list there is an early one and is incomplete, but does have the genealogical benefit of often including the patronymic names.

Ha-Pogrom Be-Kishineff – Pesach 1903-Pesach 1963, Tel Aviv, 1963

This book, published on the 60th anniversary of the pogrom includes a copy of an original incomplete list (in Hebrew, awkwardly translated by a colleague and I).

Some of the other details here are either from Easter in Kishinev: Anatomy of a Pogrom, and excellent book written by Edward H. Judge (New York University Press, 1992; recently published in paperback as well) or from personal correspondence with Judge.

There were apparently 49 Jewish victim who died during or as a result of the pogrom (38 male, 11 females, including several children). According to the chief surgeon of the Kishinev Jewish Hospital, 37 were dead when they were brought to the hospital during the pogrom, 4 died at home following the pogrom, and 8 died in the hospital as a result of injuries received during the pogrom.

My list has only 46 people (including 6 females and one child of unknown gender). It is possible that I have listed someone as dead who was only injured, or that I have listed a single person twice due to a confusion of names. Clearly, not all those who lost their lives due to the pogrom are mentioned in the two lists I have located. Nevertheless it is a start.

I hope to get additional information from Prof. Judge and a colleague of his in Kishinev (now Chisinau, Moldova) who has done extensive pogrom research. If I ultimately have additional information, I will integrate it.

In some cases, the sources have additional information about how the person died (often a very ugly story).

Where the different sources yielded several names for the same person, I have included both (as in “Mordechai/Mottel”).

Alan Greenberg: alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca

I have added the 47th victim based on the article provided by Rosemarie Cohen (see article Morris Cohen Keeps a Promise)Ariel Parkansky

Kishinev 1903 Pogrom Victims

First Name(s) Surname Gender
1 Benja/Benjamin Shimenov Baranovitz M
2 Isaac/Yitschok Belitzkah/Byeletsky M
3 Itlia/Itel Berger F
4 Hosea/Joshua Abramovitz Berladsky M
5 Hirsch/Tsvi Chaimov Bolgar M
6 Aaron Isaacov Brachman M
7 David Abrahamov Charidon M
8 (sister – age 12) Chatzkalovitz/Chaskelevitz F
9 David Nissleov Chatzkalovitz/Chaskelevitz M
10 Abraham Router Cohen/Kogan M
11 David Drachman M
12 Chaia Sarah Abramovna Fanarzei/Fanarnei M
13 Eiss/Zusya Davidovitz Fanarzei/Fanarnei M
14 Simeon/Shimon Fishman M
15 Ben-Zion Leibov Galantor/Salapter M
16 (child) Golder ?
17 Chaim Leib/Leibov Goldiss M
18 Joseph Hirsch/Tsvi Danilov Greenberg M
19 Mordecai/Mottel Greenspoon M
20 Kopel Davidovitz Kainarsky M
21 Joseph Abramovitz Kantor M
22 Rose/Raiza Falikovna Katzap M
23 Kaela Kaza/Konza M
24 (husband) Keigelman M
25 Chaia Leah Keigelman F
26 Moshe Samuel/Tsvi Kiegel M
27 Beila Leiserovna Kodja? F
28 Idel/Jehudah Krupnik M
29 Isaac/Yitschok Krupnik M
30 Shmuel/Michel Shaev Lashkoff M
31 Hirsch/Tsvi Yankelev Liss M
32 Moses/Moshe Chaskelov Makhlin M
33 Mottel/Mordechai Davidovitz Menduk M
34 (man) Newman M
35 Chaim Nissinov Nissenson M
36 Isaac/Yitzshok Yankelov Rosenfeld M
37 Israel Leiserovitz Selstein/Shalistal M
38 Michel/Yachael Josiphov Seltzer M
39 Pinya Isaacov Spivak F
40 Jacob Elchunov Tounik M
41 Israel Yacoblewitz Ulmer M
42 Samuel/Shmuel Baruch Urrman M
43 Feiga Voulyar/Wouller F
44 Leinha/Simcha Voulyar/Wouller M
45 Abraham Yitschok/Router Weinstein M
46 Kalman Wolowitz/Volovitz M
47 (Rabbi) Mordecai Alpert M
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(Damaged Torahs used at funerals for Kishinev pogrom)

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