THE BEST KIND OF AMERICAN by Kim Ghattas

Smoke rises after an Israeli airstrike in Beirut

(Smoke rises after an Israeli airstrike in Beirut in 2024)

Before the 1975-76 Lebanese Civil War, Beirut was considered by many as the Paris of the Middle East. During the next decade, the city was periodically under bombardment and by mid-June 1982 Israeli forces besieged West Beirut. Israel’s goal was the removal of more than 11,000 PLO fighters and their leader Yasser Arafat who had established a mini-state in Lebanon which was used to launch attacks against Israel . The removal of these forces took place in August and September 1982 as the PLO was relocated to Tunisia.

On September 14, 1982, Lebanon’s newly elected president, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated resulting in the Lebanese Phalangist militia, in an act of revenge, entering the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps and killing between 3000-3500 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians as Israeli forces stood by. International pressure on Israel resulted in an Israeli withdrawal from Beirut by late 1982. Three years later the Israelis would create a security zone in the southern part of the country and would remain until 2000 when they unilaterally withdrew.

This shattered history led to the radicalization of the local Shia population which fostered the creation and growth of Hezbollah, the Party of God, supported by Iran. As Hezbollah spread its influence throughout Lebanon civil war continued which brought about a multi-national peacekeeping force. However, on October 23, 1983, suicide bombers attacked the US Marine Barracks at their headquarters at the Beirut International Airport killing 241 Marines and wounding 100 more. The attack was carried out by Islamic Jihad, an organization linked to Iran and Hezbollah. By early 1984 the Marines, part of the multinational peacekeeping force, were withdrawn from Lebanon by the Reagan administration.

On January 18, 1984, as violence and terror continued to plague Lebanon, Malcom Kerr, the President of the American University of Beirut was assassinated by gunmen outside his office. The chaos in the city allowed for no investigation of the murder and the perpetrators were never caught leaving the Kerr family in the dark to this day.

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(Ann and Malcom Kerr)

In her latest book Emmy award winning journalist Kim Ghattas, the author of BLACK WAVE which develops the forty year competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, has produced a marvelous work that seeks to uncover the truth about the Kerr assassination entitled THE BEST KIND OF AMERICAN. The title itself is somewhat misleading as the book presents as more of a history of Lebanon’s plight from the last quarter of the twentieth century to the present. The story of Malcom Kerr’s career and beliefs and his death are woven into the larger picture of Lebanese history as Ghattas seems to move on from the assassination about halfway through the monograph. The second half of the book brings into focus an insightful presentation and analysis of the second half of the 1980s through the present. This period was highlighted by the Iran-Contra scandal and Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Further, how Hafez al-Assad manipulated events in Lebanon including the intricacies of hostage taking and negotiations to bring about their release. Ghattas also explores how Syria and Iran came together, the creation of the Hamas-Hezbollah-IRGC axis that allowed Iran to penetrate the Palestinian issue, and control events in Lebanon. Throughout this period the incompetence of American Middle East policy would repeatedly manifest itself.  Finally, Ghattas delves into the Kerr family odyssey trying to ascertain who killed their father.


Ghattas explores Kerr and his wife Ann’s commitment to the Lebanese people. They gave up a wonderful career situation in the United States to return to Lebanon as President of the American University Beirut (AUB) in March 1982, for Kerr it was a dream come true. Both his parents had worked at the university, and he was born in Beirut, and met his wife Ann there. When he arrived on campus Beirut was still war torn, but the AUB campus seemed safe, and another Israeli-PLO ceasefire was holding. Kerr would find himself navigating treacherous terrain inside the university. AUB was a microcosm of Lebanon, its students and faculty reflected every political trend but also the country’s deep divisions from rural poor, arrogant Christians, downtrodden Shia, and far-left revolutionaries. Kerr also had to worry about being seen as a CIA operative by some or dealing with other suspicions from the Christians that he harbored sympathy for the Palestinian cause. According to Ghattas, Kerr’s perceptions of Lebanon were shaped by Ras Beirut, a culturally diverse upscale neighborhood in Beirut overlooking the Mediterranean, summers in Ainab, the mountain slopes above Beirut, and by the American Arabist tradition of being sympathetic to Arab nationalism. Kerr firmly believed in improving relations between the Arab world and the United States as he “was anchored in the region’s history going back decades and had become one with it.”

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(Malcolm and Ann Kerr with their four children)

Kerr had a reputation of being very critical of American and Israeli policy toward the Palestinians and had a good relationship with Yassir Arafat, the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). But on June 6, 1982, Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon as part of Israeli General Ariel Sharon’s goal of installing a new friendly Christian-dominated government, cut Syria down to size, and most importantly send the PLO into exile which would facilitate Israel’s task of controlling the West Bank and remake the Middle East and create an era of Israeli supremacy. Sharon believed he had the support of the United States through Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who did not voice any opposition to the Israeli invasion. Sharon would achieve the exile of the PLO, but Lebanon would become Israel’s Vietnam because of its hubris which led to incalculable errors fostering the creation of Hezbollah.

Reading Ghattas’ work one can relive the horrors of the death and destruction that Lebanon has experienced for decades. She carefully recreates what I would call the ambiance of war through the eyes of Kerr family members and Lebanese civilians who had to navigate the obstacles that the violence created on a daily basis as if it were a type of normality – pop up checkpoints, snipers, kidnapping, shelling etc. She describes the complexities of the different Muslim and Christian political factions and militias and how they impacted the bloodshed that encompassed Lebanon. Ghattas also explores Israel’s disingenuous approach to the United States be it the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, its machinations dealing with Iran-Contra, or other examples that should include Benjamin Netanyahu’s influence of Donald Trump which led to the invasion of Iran seven months ago.

Ghattas delves into the positions of the major players in the region including Bashir Gemayel and his brother Amine, Ayatollah Khomeini, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Menachem Begin, Hafez al-Assad, Yasser Arafat, Philip Habib, Rafiq Hariri, members of the Reagan administration, and the leadership of the various political factions and militias active in Lebanon during this period. Ghattas carefully explains the goals of the major characters and tries to untangle the tortured web of Lebanon’s multi-ethnic and religious power structure. Important examples of the realpolitik pursued include Assad’s attempts to control events in Lebanon in creating his “Greater Syria,” by assassinating Bashir Gemayel, the Christian president of Lebanon, and the funding and training Islamic militants or Reagan’s emotional attachment to freeing hostages clouding his memory and judgement.

(President of Syria from 1971 to 2000)

Israel’s involvement in Lebanon has been a disaster, and it is still paying the price for its 1982 invasion. I agree with Ghattas that the invasion was a watershed moment for Israel and the region. It left an indelible mark on Israeli society shaping the psyche of its army and people. The vocabulary the Israelis developed for Lebanon would seep into the same way they talked about Gaza and the West Bank: “eradicating the enemy, destroying enemy infrastructure, cleanup operations,” and by 2024 they would be bombing entire cities in Gaza, leveling them to the ground.

The American approach to Lebanon has also been a disaster that resulted in the Marine barracks massacre in 1983 and the Reagan administration’s lack of a concrete policy as Marines were confused about their role in Lebanon and constantly complained they were “sitting ducks” and their military position was indefensible. This was due to the lack of knowledge of the intricacies of what was occurring in Lebanon. Reagan and company saw things through a Cold War lens and mostly ignored the end goals of the Islamic Republic. Its policy of keeping the Iran-Iraq War going would only increase alienation by both sides against Washington. The Cold War lens can also be seen in the Iran-Contra fiasco as Colonel Oliver North developed a plan to use the money obtained from shipping weapons to Iran through Israel to fund the Contras in their fight against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. In addition, much like the Israelis, the United States was unable or unwilling to understand the impact of the Iranian Revolution, especially its inroads with Lebanese Shias.

Ruhollah Khomeini

(Ayatollah Khomeini)

Ghattas is correct as she argues that the perceived divide between moderates and hardliners in Iran was the holy grail for American diplomacy for decades. Understanding this distinction and correctly acting upon it has proven almost impossible for Washington. All you need to look at are the goals of the Trump administration in invading Iran, decapitating its perceived hardline leadership, and replacing it with moderates. The result has been the opposite as the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameini has led to his replacement by his son Mojtaba who is in line with the radical policies and anti-Americanism of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Council.

Ghattas’ assessments are shrewd. She unmasks Assad as an opportunist who got into bed with Shia fundamentalists of Iran and an opportunist who was overwhelmed with gratitude from the Reagan administration when the TWA hostages were released, who at the same time were creatures of the Syrian state. She further argues that Israel’s decision to supply Iran with modest amounts of weapons throughout the 1980s is not as strange as it seems as many in Israel sought to reinstate Iran as a friend and strategic partner as it had been under the Shah.

In closing it is clear that Ghattas sees Kerr, his wife Ann, and Michel Seurat, a French Sociologist who was seized by Islamic Jihad in 1985 and later executed as heroes as Christopher de Bellaigue argues in his New York Times Book Review of October 12, 2026, “The Professor Who Knew Too Much. And Wound Up Dead” writes, they “rejected Iran’s doctrine of divinely ordained conflict as well as Edward Said’s celebrated skewering of Western scholars of the Middle East in his polemic ORIENTALISM. Like Kerr, Seurat was an “innocent” who sought to “close the gap between civilizations,” Ghattas writes, but while in some respects the gap has indeed narrowed since the 1980s, this has been brought about less by knowledge and integrity than by the exercise of economic and military might. If the best kind of American is one whose view of the Middle East is disinterested, benevolent and untainted by thoughts of commercial or strategic hegemony, Ghattas’s excellent book commemorates a breed that is all but extinct.

Israeli strikes on Beirut's southern suburbs, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran

(Plumes of smoke rise after Israeli strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, March 11, 2026)

BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO FREE THE OCTOBER 7TH HOSTAGES by Brett McGurk

Aftermath of a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen in Kibbutz Beeri

(Children’s toys and personal items lie on the bloodstained floor of a child’s bedroom, following a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel, October 17)

The role of the Gaza War which began with the Hamas massacres of October 7, 2023, plays an important role in our current political climate.  The role of the Israeli response to Hamas’ barbarism has been referred to as genocide against the Palestinian people by elements in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party and their supporters.  This has sparked  a major debate into what should have been the American response to Israeli policy and military action in Gaza as the United States has funneled untold billions in aid and military weapons to the Tel Aviv government.  Israel has become a pariah in the world community due to its destruction in the region and many countries have opposed the Biden administration’s response.

On the domestic political front in the United States as the 2026 Congressional elections approach the current state in Gaza has bifurcated the Democratic Party and created major disagreements among candidates running for office.  Since margins for victory in House and Senate elections are so close, especially in a state like Michigan the issue may swing the election to one political party or another for the control of the two houses of Congress.   In the 2024 presidential election, Vice President Kamala Harris lost Michigan to Donald Trump by roughly 1.5% of the vote in large part because of the significant Arab-American vote in that state.  Today, the Democratic candidate for the Senate, Abdul al-Sayed has alienated a significant part of the Jewish community over his comments concerning Israel and Iran, in addition to his association with Hassan Piker and his supporters who have been accused of anti-Sematic positions on Israel.  With so many “toss-up” states so close to the election an issue like Gaza can have a tremendous impact.

Smoke and flames billow after Israeli forces struck a high-rise tower in Gaza City

(Smoke and flames billow after Israeli forces struck a high-rise tower in Gaza City, October 7)

In this political environment Brett McGurk’s new book, BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO FREE THE OCTOBER 7TH HOSTAGES is important  as it takes the reader inside negotiations transversing power centers in Washington and the Middle East, and inside a crisis that has reshaped the world, with consequences that we are still dealing with today.  McGurk, who served in four presidential administrations, most recently as Assistant for National Security to President Biden where he coordinated policy for the Middle East and Africa was thrust into a situation where he tried bringing about the release of the 251 hostages seized by Hamas on October 7th.  The task was extremely daunting and frustrating due to Hamas’ extreme positions and Israel’s goal of forcing the terrorist organization from its governing position in Gaza as well as disarming it.  It would take fifteen months to reach an agreement to release the hostages, dead or alive making BRINK an important account of the negotiations that took place among President Biden, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and other leaders and diplomats in the region.

McGurk does more than take the reader inside the negotiations that finally led to the release of all hostages, the final twenty on October 13, 2025.  The author delves into the minutiae of the talks, the strategies pursued by all sides, and the human physical and emotional cost to negotiators and the victims of Hamas’ brutal incursion into Israel.  McGurk begins with the awkward relationship between President Joe Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman who was responsible for the murder of Washington Post columnist and Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi on October 2, 2018, inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, by a team of Saudi government agents.  During the 2024 presidential campaign Biden had made a number of unflattering remarks regarding bin Salman making for a rather awkward relationship.  Using Biden’s visit to Riyadh and other diplomatic interactions McGurk explains the complexity of the Saudi-American relationship that continues today. 

The Saudi component in evaluating the Hamas attack is interesting.  Before October 7th, the idea of an Israeli-Saudi reproachment added to the Abraham Accords of the first Trump administration gave credence that the diplomatic balance in the Middle East was changing.  Perhaps Hamas launched the attack in part to block this reorientation, a subject that the author does not address.  If one looks at motive McGurk is clear that Hamas wanted to launch a regional war that would destroy Israel and reap whatever benefit this would produce in the region.

Aftermath of Israeli strikes in Gaza

(People carry the body of a Palestinian killed in Israeli strikes, in Jabalia refugee camp, in the northern Gaza Strip, October 9)

The goals of the Israeli response was clear – remove Hamas from power in Gaza and destroy its military capability.  Secondly, free the hostages.  McGurk does not delve into Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netayahu’s legal problems and its impact on his policy decisions.  For Netanyahu, who was under indictment, war in Gaza would keep him in power and this along with keeping the right wing of his cabinet happy as not to cause the collapse of his government must factor into his obstinacy in negotiations.  By exploring this component of the Israeli political situation, the reader would have greater understanding of Netanyahu’s “Reale politic.”

Apart from these issues McGurk’s memoir/summary of the crisis is well thought out, deeply analyzed, and an important contribution in the understanding of the crisis and its implications for the region.  After describing the attack/massacre McGurk delves into empathetic portraits of the victims, including the murder of approximately 1,195 to 1,219 people, and over 3,400 wounded including Israelis, foreign nationals, and Americans of which 49 were killed.  The author describes his personal relationships with some of the victims as well as their families and the bonds he developed.

The Biden administration was immediately placed in a sensitive position as the humanitarian crisis developed with the Israeli movement into Gaza.  At the outset Israel was accused of killing hundreds in an attack on a hospital which turned out to be due to a missile fired inside Gaza not by the Israeli Defense Force.  Throughout the crisis the Biden administration stressed caution, but a traumatized nation did not want to hear it particularly an Israeli coalition government which depended on extreme right wing politicians like Itamar Ben-Gavit, the Minister of National Security, and Bezalei Smotrich, the Finance Minister to remain in power.  It was soon clear that the United States might delay, try, and shape Israel’s response at the margins, but it could not prevent it.  As the Israeli invasion proceeded, Biden on the one hand was appalled by the rape and murder that Hamas perpetrated but was also faced with domestic opposition to the depth of the Israeli response.  Many of Biden’s decisions had to balance these opposing forces but as he tried to satisfy each he would indirectly give Hamas what it wanted.  A case in point, when it emerged that the Biden administration was threatening to cut off certain military sales to Israel or held up delivery of certain weapons it reinforced Hamas’ belief that the longer it stretched out the crisis the United States would force Israel into granting greater concessions.

Aftermath of Israeli strikes

(A rescuer reacts as he works with others to remove Palestinian casualties from under the rubble of a house destroyed in Israeli strikes, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, October 9)

Concessions are a dominant theme in McGurk’s account as the negotiations were tortuous.  Many times, it appeared agreements were reached when Hamas would go silent or increase its demands.  The key issues revolved around the names of hostages to be released, dead or alive and how it related to a ceasefire and the lines Israeli troops would withdraw to.  Agreement was reached early on, but Hamas ‘ strategy was to drag out talks as long as possible to force Israel to increase the number of Palestinian prisoners they would release and the type of prisoner they would release – convicted terrorists.  Perhaps Yahya Sinwar’s evaluation led him to conclude that seizing individuals ranging from a 9-month old baby to an 85 year old woman would give Hamas the power to make major demands and protection from Israeli revenge as Israel was known to never leave a dead body behind, i.e., the Gilad Shalit case.  This error in judgement was incalculable but based on Hamas’ actions bringing death was their only goal for which they would pay an incalculable price. 

(Brett McGurk)

As excruciating maneuvering evolved McGurk lays out how talks are preceded by including the positions and impact of the negotiators.   Some of the key players were Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thai the Prime Minister of Qatar, a country that hoisted Hamas leadership in Doha; Egyptian Major-General Ahmed Abdel Khalek who shaped Cairo’s policy toward Gaza for decades; and David Barnea, the Chief of the Mossad (Israel’s foreign intelligence agency), who served as the lead negotiator, and Gal Hirsch, a retired IDF Brigadier General appointed by Netanyahu as the official Coordinator for Captives and Missing Persons.  There are many others including Jake Sullivan, Biden’s National Security Advisor, and Steve Witkoff whose role became important after Trump defeated Biden in the 2024 Presidential election.

A number of important conclusions can be drawn from McGurk’s memoir.  First, no matter how close Israel came to accepting Hamas’ demands it was quite clear that Hamas’ leadership did not care about the plight of Gazans. Hamas’ leadership was also a major issue.  If one examines the beliefs of Yahya Sinwar, who oversaw the planning and implementation of the massacre;  his brother Mohammad Sinwar; and Ismail  Haniyeh, Hamas political leader, along with key Hamas negotiating leaders and officials such as Khalil al-Hayya and Khaled Mashal who were centered in Doha negotiations would be a tortuous exercise.  The structure of negotiations was part of the problem.  Talks would take place in Doha and if agreement were reached it also had to be accepted by Sinwar and Haniyeh in Gaz.  This allowed Hamas to fritter away any time component to an agreement.  It took the deaths of  senior Hamas leadership through Israeli assassinations to finally reach a final agreement after Trump took office.

McGurk graciously gives Steve Wytkoff credit for bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion after Trump’s real estate compatriot got involved.  It is interesting that it was a combination of Biden’s team and Witkoff who got the talks across the finish line, but Trump gave his usual public evaluation stating, “This EPIC ceasefire agreement could have only happened as a result of our Historic Victory in November, as it signaled to the entire World that my Administration would seek Peace and negotiate deals to ensure the safety of all Americans, and out Allies.”

(Sinwar holding up a child dressed as a Hamas terrorist in the Gaza Strip on May 24, 2021. Sinwar holds up a child dressed as a Hamas terrorist in the Gaza Strip on May 24, 2021)

McGurk also includes the role of Iran and its proxies, the Houthis, Hezbollah, and groups in Syria and Iraq and their impact on the crisis and negotiations.  Once the Trump administration became involved and assumed the presidency this grouping became paramount as coordinated attacks with Israel in June 2025 and September 2026 are still playing out. 

Fintan O’Toole’s evaluation of McGurk’s memoir is spot on (New York Times, October 6, 2026, “What Went Wrong With the Effort to Free the October 7th Hostages?”) as he writes, “This reads as though the United States was merely a benign outsider, hoping for the best but powerless to prevent the worst. “Biden,” as McGurk concedes, “could not credibly explain how the war might end.” With no American vision of a decent solution, there is still no sense of an ending, just a pulverized population and an Israel whose international standing lies in the dust.

Biden’s own team was deeply divided. By the beginning of April 2024, according to McGurk, “Some advised him to simply tell Netanyahu the war was over. If Netanyahu refused, we’d cut Israel’s support.”

Joe Biden meets with Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv

(President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv on Oct. 18)

McGurk himself was opposed to this strategy, believing that it would merely embolden Hamas and Iran, and Biden vacillated. The chaos of the president’s abortive re-election campaign and his replacement by Vice President Kamala Harris at the top of the Democratic ticket added to the uncertainty. After Trump defeated Harris in November, the national security adviser Jake Sullivan told McGurk that he “suspected that Netanyahu planned to wait us out, preferring to do the deal with Trump.”

While the carnage continued, McGurk did nonetheless manage to facilitate a deal in which over 100 hostages were freed in November 2023 and — working with Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff — to secure the release of 33 more by February 2025.

He rightly takes pride in his contribution to the joyful return of a majority of the hostages to their families. Each life saved is a light in the unspeakable darkness. But if more and more innocent lives are not to be lost, there needs to be a much larger reckoning with America’s failures in the Middle East than McGurk feels able to provide.”

Israeli military officers organise dead bodies before relatives are called to identify them, following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Ramla

(Israeli military officers stand by a container in which bodies of the dead are stored before their relatives are called to identify them, in Ramla, Israel, October 13)

ALL THE PRESIDENT’S WARS: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE WAR ON TERROR by Peter Bergen

File photo of the second tower of the World Trade Center bursting into flames after being hit by an airplane in New York

The title of Peter Bergen’s latest book ALL THE PRESIDENT’S WARS: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE WAR ON TERROR is a misnomer.  The War on Terror did not begin on 9/11 as attacks against American interests took place long before planes flew into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996; or the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 all come to mind.  It seems that the United States has been involved in preventing terrorist attacks for decades before 9/11 and will continue to be involved in counter-terrorism for years to come.  This being the case Peter Bergen’s book is important as it lays the foundation of what took place in the recent past, errors and successes, and what we can learn to be more effective in counteracting terrorism today as recently as last week when a possible attack against a military base in England that housed American bombers was thwarted, in addition to dealing with asymmetric warfare, an outgrowth of President Trump’s invasion of Iran.

In reviewing that past four administration’s policies toward Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran Bergen immediately cuts to the crux of the problem – decision makers needed to frame, “what kind of war are we embarking on” in response to the attacks on 9/11.  Each administration would answer the question quite differently with varying degrees of success.  The Bush administration would come up with the vague term, “the War on Terror,” and it came to mean that the war would be fought globally and for decades into the future.  This created a series of consequences that we are still dealing with today.

FILE PHOTO OF WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF CARD TELLING BUSH ABOUT SECOND PLANE AT TRADE CENTER.

(President George W. Bush listens as White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card informs him of a second plane hitting the World Trade Center while Bush was conducting a reading seminar at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida)

The War on Terror precipitated great change in the Middle East, the sharp increase in sectarian violence between Shia and Sunnis and the rise of Iran as a critical player in the region.  Bergen is correct in arguing that by overthrowing Saddam Hussein after the invasion of Iraq Washington inverted the power structure in Iraq allowing the Shia to come  to power fostering a civil war that included the rise of ISIS and killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.  Further, the true winners of the war were the Shia and their Iranian ally who would emerge as the dominant force in the region in part because of Bush’s invasion of Iraq and currently because of Trump’s invasion of Iran. 

There have been some successes along the way, a surge of troops and a new counter-insurgency strategy after the invasion of Iraq fell apart, but in the end the Shia came to power.  Another short term success was the capture of Osama Bin-Laden and his death resulting in a weakening of Al-Qaeda, however, eventually it reconstituted itself though it did not form a strong alliance with ISIS.  Once Bin Laden was out of the picture President Obama shifted his focus away from Iraq to Afghanistan reinforcing his belief that the US should withdraw from that country as soon as possible.  This led to a number of decisions that would eventually lead to Trump’s signing a withdrawal agreement with the Taliban.

Bergen, a well-respected national security journalist and one of the leading authorities on his subject, has written a sobering, meticulously researched postmortem of U.S. foreign policy encompassing the 2001-2026 time frame.  It is clear that American administrations had policy choices over the last two and a half decades and Bergen, not surprisingly focuses more on the poor decisions as opposed to the positive ones.   He eviscerates the Bush administration, delving into the consequences for poor decisions leading up to the invasion of Iraq and its “occupation” of that country and setting the stage for the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The dilly dallying of the Obama administration decision making, and Trump’s negotiations with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan, and his invasion of Iran are all discussed.  These examples reflect the growing belief in foreign capitals that the United States had little idea as to what it wanted to accomplish or how to achieve it.  This would lead to a change in the global order as the United States has gone from the upholder of a rule based system, to being seen as a destabilizing force as it pursued what Richard Haass describes in his excellent work, WAR OF NECESSITY, WAR OF CHOICE.

Bergen provides many insightful observations throughout the monograph.  First, he points out that Al-Qaeda assassinated Ahmed Shah Masood, the leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, a mortal enemy of the Taliban, and a leader the United States was working with two days before 9/11.  Bin Ladin did so to to mollify the Taliban as he realized that the United States would soon retaliate against the theocratic organization very harshly.  In discussing the Arab Spring of 2011 Bergen interestingly describes it as “the Arab spring would soon turn into the Arab winter.”  Bergen supports this assessment by exploring the overthrow of Muhammar Gahdaffi and the resulting civil war; the rise of ISIS and its expansion to control 33% of Syrian and 40% of Iraq before its “Caliphate” was defeated;

Saddam statue fall of baghdad

(A US Marine watches a statue of Saddam Hussein being toppled in Firdaus Square in downtown Baghdad on April 9, 2003)

Bergen reviews many important events and personalities of the period under discussion that have been dealt with elsewhere from his previous books and the works of Steven Coll, Craig  Whitlock, Lawrence Wright, and the most recent monograph by Carter Malkasian, THE AMERICAN WAR IN AFGHANISTAN.  The run up to the invasion of Iraq and Donald Rumsfeld’s approach to war and his refusal to provide the necessary assets to capture Bin Laden at Tora Bora, the incompetence of Peter Bremer’s de-Bathization and disbanding the Iraqi army that allowed the Shia to come to power after Saddam Hussein was captured and killed reflecting the self-righteousness of the Bush administration.  The author examines the different approaches on fighting the war in Afghanistan focusing on the ideas of General Stanley McCrystal and Colonel H.R. McMaster and disagreements with President Obama in an excellent chapter entitled “We are out of Schlitz.”  The role of Pakistan in harboring the Taliban fearing US withdrawal from Afghanistan and whether they hid Osama Bin Laden (Bergen argues decisively they were not aware of his presence in Abbottabad) are examined as is the lack of competence in the Afghani and Iraqi militaries after years of American training cutting and running from the Taliban and ISIS.  Lastly,  Ahmid Karzai’s relationship with American diplomats and US distrust of the Afghan president.

The Obama administration does not fare very well in Bergen’s analysis.  He argues that Obama was obsessed with not getting into any more “stupid” wars.  However, his inability to make up his mind about how many troops to commit in Afghanistan, whether to go along with a surge, his refusal to enforce his own “red line” pertaining to Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria, his administrations framing the Afghan War as a Taliban insurgency that was supported by Pakistan when in reality it was a three tiered conflict: inter-tribal, inter-ethnic, and inter-state, and for not taking ISIS seriously enough referring to them as the “B” team of terrorists and moving too slowly in confronting the terrorist threat many American felt they presented.   Obama’s Vice-President Joe Biden is also criticized a great deal as he argued to withdraw US troops from Iraq even as the civil war exploded, he was a sceptic who believed little could be done to assist Afghanistan and opposed any surge and wanted to focus on Al-Qaeda, not the Taliban, and even went so far as claiming he supported the attack on Bin Laden’s compound resulting in his capture when in fact he argued against it.  Later  he would claim that the Pentagon did not counsel him to leave 2500 troops in Afghanistan as a means of blocking the Taliban and maintaining security as American troops withdrew.  Generals have argued that Biden was not telling the truth especially when the evacuation turned into a disaster.  All in all, it appears as if the administration was at times in disarray. 

Saddam Hussein capture

(A photo dated December 13, 2003 shows Hussein in what appear to be Flexi-cuffs after his arrest)

One policy that reflects Obama’s willingness to adapt to the new asymmetric warfare was his adoption of the use of drone warfare as a vehicle to avoid committing further US troops as he wanted to pivot American foreign policy toward Asia.  American drone attacks increased substantially under Obama particularly in the tribal regions of Pakistan where the Taliban had sanctuary and Yemen where Muslim extremists were protected.  The Obama administration even went after an American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki who was the brains behind the failed “underwear bomber” attack on a Northwest flight on Christmas day 2009.

Bergen is correct when he points out despite Donald Trump’s bragging about how he would defeat ISIS and disparaged Obama’s approach, he pursued a policy that was developed over a two year period before he became president.  Trump may have speeded up the process but they both deployed a relatively small number of American troops on the ground in Syria and Iraq who operated through local allies.  In Iraq the Counter Terrorism Service, and in Syria with Kurdish fighters.  The ultimate victory over ISIS was fostered by Iraqi and Kurdish troops.  Trump’s Afghan policy was rather disjointed, represented by negotiations to withdraw American troops before the 2020 election.  Bergen dissects negotiations to end the war and it is clear that all that Trump wanted was to get out and did not care about the carnage that would take place once the Americans left.  This would take place under Biden who similarly wanted out of Afghanistan leaving many locals to be victims of Taliban retribution despite their services to America over the years.

If one were to sum up American foreign policy toward the Middle East since 9/11it would center around the fact that Washington creates a plan to get involved be it the invasion of Iraq, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the overthrow of Muhammar Gahdafi, or the invasion of Iran.  All of these actions created unaccounted for consequences because the United States never seems to have a plan for “the day after.”  Today, we are dealing with the fallout from Trump’s invasion of Iran with higher gas and diesel prices causing an increase in inflation that has resulted in  incalculable damage for the American people.

People approach a wall surrounding a compound.

(Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, is shown here, May 4, 2011, two days after he was killed)

As Scott Anderson points out in his September 6, 2026, New York Times review entitled, “Why the War on terror is Still Haunting Us,”  “Quite early in “All the Presidents’ Wars,” the journalist Peter Bergen’s chronicle of the “war on terror,” the reader is likely to conclude that the groups of American officials who have presided over the past two and a half decades of conflict in the Middle East consist of idiots, fools or knaves. The further one progresses into this damning and meticulously researched book, the more this assessment seems confirmed.

In fairness, the war on terror hasn’t been an unmitigated catastrophe. The development of advanced weaponized drones facilitated the killing of Qaeda leaders at long range and with little risk. American military commanders also eventually adopted counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq that proved very effective, even if they failed to change the ultimate outcome of that conflict. And while it is difficult to get all hopped up over something that didn’t happen, the fact is that there hasn’t been a large-scale terrorist attack on American soil since Sept. 11.”

Still, at the cost of trillions of dollars, the lives of some 7,000 U.S. servicemen and women, as well as hundreds of thousands of Iraqi and Afghan civilians, and two failed war efforts — with a third in progress — one would hope for some more bright spots.

Military helicopters hover over a vessel, with the horizon in the background.

(U.S. forces carried out a maritime interdiction and right-of-visit boarding of the Davina, a sanctioned stateless oil tanker, in the Indian Ocean within the Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility, June 4, 2026. The U.S. continues global maritime enforcement to disrupt illicit networks and interdict vessels providing material support to Iran, wherever they operate.)

Anderson goes on to write; “One might wish that “All the Presidents’ Wars” was coming out a few months from now, in time for the full magnitude of the stupidity attending Trump’s war of choice against Iran to be realized. As it is, Bergen’s last words were penned in mid-March 2026, just a few weeks into this latest American misadventure.

As has been the case so many times over the past 25 years, this folly, too, was peddled as part of the war on terror, but undertaken with even less forethought than its predecessors. Incredibly, Trump seemed to take no notice of how the weaponized drone has enabled Ukraine to keep the vastly larger Russian Army at bay for over four years. Nor did he seem to consider how this innovation might factor into a conflict with Iran, one of the world’s pioneers in the manufacturing of cheap and sophisticated drones..

A major theme of Bergen’s book is the repeated failure of American leaders to plan for “the day after” a military action is taken, but in Iran, he makes clear, Trump didn’t even plan for “the day of.” As a result, it is now all but certain that the United States is headed for another major defeat in its war on terror. For the gory details on that, though, one will have to wait for Bergen’s next book.”

YEAREND PICTURES 2001.

DAYS OF LOVE AND RAGE: A STORY OF ORDINARY PEOPLE FORGING A REVOLUTION by Anand Gopal

Turkish-backed Syrian rebels stand on the back of a truck at Manbij countryside

(Turkish-backed Syrian rebels stand on the back of a truck at Manbij countryside, December 29, 2018. Turkey-backed rebels have been mobilizing for an attack on Manbij in nearby areas that have been under Turkey’s control since it swept into northern Syria in 2016, part of its effort to roll back the YPG).

Syria is a country that has been at war with itself for almost fifteen years.  It survived the Assad family which ruled Syria for more than five decades. Hafez al-Assad seized power in a 1970 military coup, creating a brutal, authoritarian regime. Following his death in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad assumed the presidency.  Bashar, who was educated in England raised hopes that his reign would be more liberal than his father.  But that was not to be.  He callous rule would foster the brutal suppression of the 2011 protests which triggered a civil war.  This resulted in a government that sought to retain power at any cost and committing incalculable atrocities against its own people including the use of chemical weapons.  There were a number of rebel groups that sought to overthrow Assad, including extremist factions and the rise of ISIS.  In his new book, journalist Anand Gopal creates a far reaching, disturbing, and novelistic account of the Syrian Civil War entitled; DAYS OF LOVE AND RAGE: A STORY OF ORDINARY PEOPLE FORGING A REVOLUTION.

Head shot of Bashar al-Assad

(Bashar al-Assad in 2018)

Gopal focuses the northern Syrian city of Manbij and a small group of people who developed a movement to try and overthrow the Bashir al-Assad dictatorship.  The author collected over 2000 interviews, viewed hundreds of war-time videos and read a myriad of books to tell the story of six ambitious people from a remote provincial town that many Syrians have never heard of until these rebels helped unleash a war and the revolution that encompassed it.  Among the rebels are a pair of best friends torn apart by political polarization, a mother who stands up to a misogynistic culture, and a worker who risks everything in the hope of establishing a democracy.

Gopal’s work provides the reader an insightful approach to the horror that was Syria as people tried to overthrow the Assad regime, the ensuing civil war that created many factions, many of which turned against each other, and produced another brutal dictatorship in the form of the Islamic State of Syria.  Gopal focuses on a group of individuals who lived in Manbij, a strategic city in the northeast Aleppo Governorate of northern Syria, located roughly 30 kilometers west of the Euphrates River and 12 kilometers from the Turkish border. Historically an ancient and diverse hub, the city became part of the battleground that was Syria during this period.  The fighting produced a Revolutionary Council to govern the city made up of elites which led to an opposition under the heading of the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) which believed that the needs of the masses were not being addressed.  The factionalism that eventually evolved pitted friends and relatives against each other as the fabric of the city fell to extreme poverty and violence.

The key characters include Ibrahim Kasem, who originated from the village of Little Hyena where his family worked on the land until they learned of the construction of a dam that would submerge his farm and fostered a rage within.  Kasem and his family would move to Manbij as a laborer where his anger increased against far away forces he did not understand.  Nasan Fefi, lived in Manbij and loved to read and write poetry.  He would be arrested and tortured by the Assad regime and was sent to the notorious Palmyra Prison where he was offered his freedom in return for spying for the regime.  Abdul Qader Oseb, a Kurd who lived in a hamlet near Manbij was known as Abel O.  A laborer and karate expert he left home very young and returned when his father died taking over his business.  He would be sucked into dealing with loan sharks who got the regime police to pressure him.  Mina Saba , a teacher would try and improve the condition for women within an Islamist society and will eventually create a women’s freedom movement.  Gopal offers wonderful chapters describing these characters and how their experiences eventually brought them together to overthrow the regime in Manbij.  Gopal explains the dual nature of Syrian society where a small rich class centered in Damascus supported Assad and the smaller cities and villages throughout the country that resented the regime.  Over the years poverty and drought were not dealt with by the regime resulting in a lack of bread and other necessities.  By 2008 and the world economic crisis would devastate the Syrian economy.

Author photo of Anand Gopal

(Anand Gopal)

In February 2011, the Arab Spring had broken out in Tunisia and would spread to Egypt giving people in Syria false hope for a better life.  Men like Oday al-Hema had always supported Assad because of the government’s modernization program and services it offered.  However, when the masses in the south did not experience any benefits torture, beatings, and murder on the part of the regime turned Oday against the government.  Soon demonstrations against the Baath Party headquarters in Damascus broke out.

Gopal does an effective job weaving aspects of Syrian history into his narrative to highlight contemporary events.  For example, the massacre of demonstrators at Daraa is juxtaposed against Hafez el-Assad’s destruction of Hama were 50-60,000 people were killed.  By 2012 a massacre in Homs and reports of other massacres and shootings by regime soldiers helped radicalize many who had been supporters of Asad.  Among those are Oday and Abel O.  These men would ally with others to create “flash demonstrations” against the government resulting in their arrest.  Gopal goes on to describe in detail the horrors faced by these men in Assad’s Gulag and how prisoners were forced to depend on each other for survival.

As the narrative continues Gopal introduces more characters who greatly impacted the overthrow of the regime in Manbij.  Abdul Hadi Bisher, a former promising soccer player was convinced by Abel O. and Oday to join a protest movement against the government.  Another ally of this developing group was Abdul Hadi would be arrested by security forces as was Oday and others were they would be tortured and forced to admit they were terrorists to gain their release.  Increasingly, more protests developed and a burgeoning military component against the regime was formed.  The end result is the regime is over in Manbij is overthrown leading to the 2011 Syrian uprising in the city. Gopal will chronicle a remarkable 18-month democratic experiment before being torn apart by political polarization and economic inequality.

When the citizens of Manbij overthrew the regime, they created their own grassroots system from the ground up. For a brief window, this included citizen assemblies, free civic organizations, and local newspapers to replace forty years of authoritarian silence.  The problem that developed was that people grew tired of waiting for things to improve as bread prices skyrocketed and the masses blamed the new Revolutionary Council as being elitist and not addressing the economic needs of people and focusing too much on creating overly democratic institutions.  This will spark an opposition which will split Manbij and create an opening for the arrival of ISIS by 2013.

Gopal will trace the fighting against the Assad regime and the horrors it perpetrated against the Syrian people.  The situation was exacerbated by the defacto embargo on weapons by the Western powers who feared radical Islamists and terrorist groups benefiting from their aid as opposed to damaging Assad.  With the Arab Spring, the Gulf states feared for their own regimes. As Iran sent Hezbollah to fight to save the Assad government the situation in the small cities and villages deteriorated further.  Finally, Jordan and Turkey would begin to arm the rebels.  The Obama administration did little and even after he announced a “Red Line” if Assad resorted to chemical weapons – once sarin gas was used Obama did nothing.  This was after a period when the CIA worked to make sure rebel groups did not acquire lethal weapons.

The ISIS-controlled area of Deir-ez Zor appears to be greatly damaged by artillery and aerial bombing, while the government section of the city has suffered relatively minor damage.  An explosion was possibly caused by a rocket-propelled grenade fired from a government position, May 24, 2015.

(The ISIS-controlled area of Deir-ez Zor appears to be greatly damaged by artillery and aerial bombing, while the government section of the city has suffered relatively minor damage. An explosion was possibly caused by a rocket-propelled grenade fired from a government position, May 24, 2015)

Within Manbij a civil war of its own broke out between elements of the Revolutionary Council and the RYM over who was in charge of the city.  Both sides were guilty for intransigence in trying to reach a settlement in what can be seen as a class war as Abel O upon reflecting on events compared life in prison to life dealing with the split between the Revolutionary Council and the RYM.  The debate according to Gopal centered on what type of government Manbij should have.  The author develops the arguments over democracy, freedom, and a more authoritarian rule.  The issues of secularism on Islamism come center stage as Islamists argue that secularism is what led to the brutal Assad regime and an inability of the Revolutionary Council to meet the needs of the people.

As these debates and conflict proliferate Gopal does an exceptional job discussing how ISIS was able to ingratiate itself into the Manbij community.  However, once some of their efforts emerged the people of Manbij threw them out only having them return a month later taking over the city as the price of bread skyrocketed.  ISIS would take over the RYM and the result was a split between Abdul Hadi and Oday and their followers highlighting the convoluted political situation in Manbij that was in the background throughout 2012 and 2014.  The factionalism that was on display is a major theme of the book and a reason for the devastation caused by the Assad regime and the arrival of ISIS.

A young woman crosses a street in Ghazi Ayaash, a residential neighborhood of Deir-ez Zor a few hundred feet from the frontline, after a mortar attack from an ISIS position. The city is an outpost of modernity surrounded by ISIS-controlled areas where strict Islamic law is enforced, May 20, 2015.

(A young woman crosses a street in Ghazi Ayaash, a residential neighborhood of Deir-ez Zor a few hundred feet from the frontline, after a mortar attack from an ISIS position. The city is an outpost of modernity surrounded by ISIS-controlled areas where strict Islamic law is enforced, May 20, 2015.)

One of the many strengths of Gopal’s work is his description of what it was like to live under ISIS rule.  He is particularly effective employing Mina’s experiences in dealing with day to day life under extreme Islamist rule i.e., the almost hourly arrival of trucks with loudspeakers blaring the rules that one must live by under the new ISIS regime.  Gopal explained that people came to follow ISIS because they needed security and were willing to trade for freedom.  The Islamic State achieved what the Revolutionary Council could not.  For Oday, people succumbed to a collective delusion.

As Gopal describes the fighting for Manbij in 2014 as American backed Kurdish forces and other rebel groups fought ISIS he delves into Oday’s seizure.  Once he is taken he is tortured by ISIS which is emblematic of the split between the old revolutionary embodied in Oday and his former compatriot, Abdul Hadi.  The author describes Oday’s courage and unshakeable commitment to freedom which eventually results in ISIS’ defeat which at the same time chronicle’s Abel O’s fight for survival under a reign of bombs.  The most interesting character at this point is Abdul Hadi who founded the RYM and morphed into an ISIS leader.  As the slaughter and bombs he experiences extreme guilt for his life’s path because of his belief in the Caliphate.  Gopal portrays these friends on different sides of the revolution who have come full circle.  It is a morose description of what war can do to friendship and commitment to the same cause.

Charles Glass’ review in the March 5, 2026, entitled, “This Story of Ordinary Syrians Who Fought Tyranny is a Masterpiece” in the New York Times captures the essence of what Gopal achieved in his excellent monograph that at times reads like a novel.  As Glass writes he captures the dichotomy the people of Manbij faced; “As Gopal follows his characters around the city streets, he interlaces personal dramas with political conflicts, hopeful gatherings of aspiring democrats with the torture of young idealists, citizens uniting for liberty with families torn apart, the poor fighting for a share of resources against extortionate merchants, of government apparatchiks switching allegiances to join the revolution, of local soccer and karate heroes finding themselves on opposite sides of the barricades, of hope as much as despair.  Many of the young people who emerged as revolutionary leaders were at first loyal followers of Assad, of whom they said, “Our president is a good man.” Government attacks on peaceful protesters requesting simple reforms turned them into rebels determined to rid the country of a leader and a system they blamed for the wretchedness of their lives. Gopal plays fair, pointing out that Baathist rule provided the peasants of Manbij with electricity, education, roads, health care and land reform that took them out of feudal bondage. In exchange for security, all they sacrificed was freedom.”

Demonstrators in Daraa rally in celebration after Bashar al-Assad's collapse in December 2024 (Mahmoud Sulaiman/Unsplash)

(Demonstrators in Daraa rally in celebration after Bashar al-Assad’s collapse in December 2024)

Glass accurately evaluates Gopal’s monograph as he brings Manbij to its present situation; “As they had fought Assad, the people of Manbij turned against ISIS and, with the assistance of the Free Syrian Army and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (S.D.F.), expelled it in 2016. The largely Kurdish S.D.F. proved as repressive in Manbij as Assad had been. “The Syrian Democratic Forces were democratic in name only,” Gopal writes. “There was no freedom of speech or assembly, no free and fair elections. The government in Manbij was a dictatorship.”

Politics can be a dirty business, but in Days of Love and Rage, Gopal makes the enduring optimism of his subjects movingly clear. For 40 years, everything from labor unions to chess clubs had been subject to the dictatorship. “Yet when the people of Manbij overthrew the government, independent councils and assemblies and newspapers and charities and unions appeared overnight,” Gopal writes. “In other words, the people of Manbij started doing politics.”

Despite falling under tyranny again, the city’s inhabitants learned from their mistakes and banished the subservience to power inherited over four centuries of Ottoman rule, 26 years of French occupation and, since 1949, local dictatorship.

When Assad fled to Moscow in December 2024, ending the civil war, Gopal and many of the town’s exiles returned to Manbij. A new council, Gopal writes, “appointed officials who had been tainted by corruption allegations during the revolution.” The people protested, marching and chanting in the streets and squares. “They came out simply because it is who they are,” Gopal concludes, “because of what has been awakened, because of the fire that cannot be put out.”

A woman holds a bag on her head at a souk in Manbij city

[4/20]

(A woman holds a bag on her head at a souk in Manbij city, December 29, 2018. Manbij has changed hands three times since the Syrian conflict began in 2011. Free Syrian Army rebels seized it from President Bashar al-Assad’s government early in the conflict. Then it fell to Islamic State which declared it part of its ‘caliphate’)

WHILE ISRAEL SLEPT: HOW HAMAS SURPRISED THE MOST POWERFUL MILITARY IN THE MIDDLE EAST by Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot

Aftermath of a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen in Kibbutz Beeri

(Children’s toys and personal items lie on the bloodstained floor of a child’s bedroom, following a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel, October 17)

By now I can’t imagine that anyone living in our media dominated world has not heard of Hamas’ brutal attack against Israel on October 7, 2023.  The Israeli reaction to the attack has resulted in the destruction of  large parts of the Gaza Strip and the death of tens of thousands of Palestinians according to the Gazan Health Ministry and accusations of genocide.  This barbaric attack carried out by Hamas and other affiliated terrorist groups, took the lives of at least 1,219 people and led to the taking of 251 hostages, most of them Israeli civilians.

 As of today, the remaining hostages who are alive and the bodies of those who perished have finally been returned.  Even though the Trump administration has brokered a ten step peace plan and America’s Arab allies have promised to help fund the rebuilding of Gaza, based on past history, Hamas’ continued slaughter of anyone who opposes them, and the intransigence of right wing politicians in Israel the odds of a major settlement are from my perspective almost nil. 

The current skepticism surrounding a meaningful settlement rests on a number of factors which center around Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu whose political career is on the line.  Many have argued that Netanyahu continued the war even as Israeli generals argued that there were no more meaningful targets.  Netanyahu who remains under indictment in Israel may have kept the war going to postpone further legal action against himself even as he tried to alter the Israeli judicial system to offset any further prosecution.

Israel-Hamas War In Seventh Week

(Wall dividing Israel and the Gaza Strip)

The other aspect of Netanyahu’s culpability rests on his government’s prewar policies, particularly his actions toward Hamas.  Critics, including former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, argue that Netanyahu’s long-standing policy of allowing the transfer of Qatari funds to Gaza in order to prop up Hamas’s rule and “buy” quiet ultimately backfired, allowing the group to strengthen and eventually launch the October 7th attack.  Further, multiple Israeli security officials, including the heads of the IDF and Shin Bet have admitted their failure to prevent the attack, with Netanyahu being criticized for initially deflecting personal responsibility onto the intelligence services. Warnings from within the military and intelligence apparatus were reportedly disregarded or not acted upon by Netanyahu’s government.   However, the larger question is how did we get here, as opposed to where we are today.

Israeli soldiers carry the body of a victim of an attack by militants from Gaza at Kibbutz Kfar Aza, in southern Israel

(Israeli soldiers carry the body of a victim of an attack by militants from Gaza at Kibbutz Kfar Aza, in southern Israel, October 10)

A number of partial answers to this puzzle have been tackled by Yaakov Katz, a former editor and chief of the Jerusalem Post and Amir Bohbot, a journalist and lecturer at Ben-Gurion University in their provocative new book, WHILE ISRAEL SLEPT: HOW HAMAS SURPRISED THE MOST POWERFUL MILITARY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

The word “partial” is used because there is no definitive answer provided in the book as to why Israel was caught so unaware on October 7, 2023.  The best the authors can offer is that there was a failure at all levels of command and leadership as they responded to situations filled with chaos.  In trying to ascertain why the attack occurred when it did and why Israeli leadership responded the way it did the authors looked at the mindset of decision makers as 2023 they evolved.  The basic problem is that Israel believed it was invincible and that Hamas was incapable of launching such a massive assault.  Israeli policy was one of containing Hamas, but by October 2023 that was no longer possible. 

The policy of containment dates to Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2006 under the government of Ariel Sharon.  From that time Israel, according to the authors responded to the attacks, be they rocket or terror attacks in Israel proper with incursions into Gaza, refusing to commit to an all-out invasion for fear of too many Israeli military and Palestinian casualties. This would send a message to Hamas that Israel was afraid to launch a major operation against Gaza.   Another factor that developed was the appearance and growth of Hezbollah as a major fighting force in possession of thousands of rockets on the Lebanese border which was a proxy of Iran.  Israel’s attention was also diverted to the Iranian nuclear program.  Despite intelligence to the contrary the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was caught in a dangerous complacency, believing that Hamas was more interested in a long-term truce and economic stability rather than war.  These arguments are well developed based on Israeli documents, interviews with Israeli national security and military officials, and their own reporting over the years.

It is clear that there was enough intelligence that Israeli officials should have been more proactive before the attack took place.  The authors begin their account describing the story of seven female soldiers who were part of an IDF unit called “tatzpitaniyot,” Hebrew for observers.  These young women, ages nineteen and twenty, were stationed at the Nachal Oz base, a few hundred yards from the Gaza Strip border.  These soldiers were tasked to monitor every inch of the Israel-Gaza border.  They employed the available technology and their own intuition that something was wrong.  They reported their findings to their superiors and were not listened to – they would be killed in the Hamas attack.  The authors conclude there was no operational plan for a full-scale offensive in Gaza, and no detailed strategy in the event of war.

Israeli police stand near the bodies of two men who were killed following a deadly mass-infiltration by gunmen from the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Sderot

(Israeli police stand near the bodies of two men who were killed following a deadly mass-infiltration by gunmen from the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Sderot, southern Israel October 7, 2023)

The authors ask many pertinent questions, one of which is why did the attack occur when it did.  With the Abraham Accords brokered by the first Trump administration normalizing Israeli relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco in 2020, Hamas did not want Saudi Arabia to join in the normalization process as it seemed they were about to do so by the end of 2023.  Since Egypt and Jordan had already abandoned Hamas this may have contributed to the decision  to act.  Further, Israeli domestic politics may have played a key role.  Hamas always wanted to make the Israeli people less resilient which Netanyahu’s plan to overhaul the Israeli judicial system to protect himself as he was under indictment was sure to do.  Netanyahu’s action provoked the Israeli left seeing the Prime Minister’s actions as a threat to democracy resulting in massive protests throughout Israel and threats by Israeli reserve Air force pilots not to fly missions and by military personnel to do the same.  The split in Israeli society certainly contributed to Hamas’ calculations.  Hamas’ decision  was developed over a long period of time, but its mindset was clear that eventually they would launch a massive attack, an attack they had been preparing for at least a decade.

According to the authors the crisis began on October 6 when the IDF’s premier signal collection unit that monitored activity in Gaza had crashed.  Possibly a cyber-attack to blind Israeli surveillance.  Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency received troubling alerts on their system but did little in response even as Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar was told, “there is an unclear preparation by Hamas for something” as its leadership was moving toward its bunkers in tunnels.  Analysts concluded it was just a “military exercise” not a full scale attack. 

West Bank Separation Wall

(Wall dividing Israel and Gaza)

The authors effectively lays out an almost hour by hour description of the information garnered by AMAN, the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate and how they reacted.  The problem for any Israeli response was it needed to be done  without Hamas being aware of it – they didn’t want to burn intelligence assets or push Hamas to attack if it was only a training exercise as they had done in the past.  In addition, Israel did not have one human asset among thousands of Hamas operatives waiting to attack.  

Despite intense communication among Israel’s national security apparatus on October 6, the government was caught between the idea Hamas was engaged in a military exercise or was about to launch a low level attack against Israel.  This inability to discern what Hamas was up to would have dire consequences as under the cover of 1300 rockets, over 3000 terrorists crossed into Israel at 60 locations.

The authors devote a considerable amount of time laying out and analyzing what Hamas’ leadership was planning and how sophisticated there approach was in developing their plans.  Over a decade Hamas operatives, including Gazans who were allowed to work in Israel developed exacting intelligence including maps of kibbutzim, IDF bases, offices of senior commanders, weapons depots etc.  Further, carrying out the ideas of Yahya Sinwar they had evaluated the state of the Israeli psyche and developed a plan in a sense to enter into the minds of the Israeli public and make them fear Hamas and force get them to turn against their government as terror attacks increased over the years, and culminating it with a massive assault which came to be October 7.

Israeli soldiers operate in northern Gaza amid the ongoing ground operation against Palestinian Islamist group Hamas.

(Israeli soldiers walk through what Israel’s military says is an iron-girded tunnel designed by Hamas to disgorge carloads of Palestinian fighters for a surprise storming of the border, amid the Israeli army’s ongoing ground operation against Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, close to Erez crossing in the northern Gaza Strip, December 15, 2023)

The chapter that explores the biography, thought process, and hatred toward Israel of Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza is perceptive and provides the reader with insights into a terrorist’s mind and how he would carry out his beliefs.  The authors trace his ideological development, particularly as it relates to Israel and its people.  His imprisonment for decades allowed him to study Israel, learning Hebrew and developing the ability to think like an Israeli.  His release from prison with 1026 other terrorists in return for Galid Shalit, a captured Israeli soldier allowed him to eventually make his way to Gaza, work his way up the Hamas chain of command, and become their ideological leader and convince his compatriots to go along with his goals of revenge and destruction of Israel.

Once Sinwar was released other events allowed Hamas to expand its military preparedness.  The arrival of the Arab spring in January 2011 brought to power Mohammed Morsi, a member of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt which opened up the Egyptian-Gazan tunnel complex allowing Hamas to import massive amounts of material, weapons, and building equipment allowing them to expand their tunnel network, military industrial production, and in effect enhance a tunnel complex which was 40-70 meters under Gaza and 300 miles in length.  In 2014 Israel responded to an increase in terror attacks and rockets with Operation Protective Edge.  By focusing close to the Israel-Gaza border and not launching an invasion, the Israeli government sent the wrong message.  Sinwar and his cohorts were convinced that Israel would not hit Hamas hard for fear of casualties.  In addition, Sinwar was able to convince Israel that he was committed to improving Palestinian economic conditions, needed to continue to collect subsidies for Qatar, to the point Israel believed Hamas was “deterred,” a term that appears repeatedly among Israeli officials.  According to Charles Lane in his Wall Street Journal book review of September 16, 2025;  “The Israeli government persuaded itself instead that improving economic conditions, or “facilitating proper civilian life in the Gaza strip,” as one intelligence official put it, would give Gazans a material stake in peace and, by extension, induce pragmatism in Hamas. Israel allowed the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars from Qatar to Gaza—much of which the terror group diverted into tunnel building and salaries for its militants.”

Image of an Israeli soldier secures a tunnel underneath Al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.

(An Israeli soldier secures a tunnel underneath Al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, November 22, 2023)

There are other important chapters that provide interesting and surprising aspects of Hamas’ development.  The chapter that describes the tunnel network that Hamas created is eye opening.  They built an entire world underground with tunnels at different levels depending on their purpose.  The thoroughness, sophistication, ingenuity, and efficiency of the various types of tunnels amazes, i.e., administrative, attack, logistical tunnels, something that was unimaginable.  They integrated their tunnel network as a key component of their military strategy.  This was all accomplished under Israel’s nose.  Soldiers and civilians heard or felt something was happening below, but officials did little to oppose it. 

The Israelis had to develop a new concept of warfare to offset the approach that Hamas employed.  Fighting underground was something Israel had never encountered, especially as the tunnels were under homes, apartment buildings, hospitals, mosques, and schools which allowed Hamas fighters to hide and then jump out and attack IDF soldiers.  In fact, Hamas’s leadership tunnel bunker was under the al-Shifa hospital.  Israel was able to develop Artificial Intelligence (AI) to create a digital map that included all the tunnels which became invaluable.  The author’s description is fascinating.

Getty Images Yahya Sinwar speaks during Ramadan in Gaza City, Gaza in 2022(Israel had hunted Gaza for more than a year to find Yahya Sinwar)

The Netanyahu government and the Prime Minister in particular believed Hamas was happy with their monthly transfer of financial assistance from Qatar which was provided with the government’s blessing and were not interested in escalation.  The Netanyahu government and intelligence services may have thought it knew its enemy’s intentions. But it was effectively deceived and found out the opposite of its beliefs was true.  There were deep flaws in the way Aman thought it understood Hamas.  Aman failed to grasp Hamas’ intentions and mistakenly believed that the organization’s leadership wanted a truce rather than war.  On the operational level, Israeli intelligence grossly underestimated the scale of Hamas’ plan, even though they had in their possession the “Jericho Plan” that provided clues as to what Hamas might implement.  Lastly, on a tactical level, the IDF’s belief that its border defenses would prevent an attack was inadequate.  The so-called “iron wall” erected along the border at the cost of over $1 billion was believed to be impenetrable.  The authors conclude everything and everyone were wrong – the idea that a fanatical Islamist terror group could be contained and Hamas had been deterred and wanted quiet is tough to accept with hindsight.

I agree with Charles Lane’s conclusions in September 16, 2025, review that “Pondering his dream of an Islamist state erected on the ruins of the Jewish one, Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar observed all of this from Gaza. He sensed that Israel was distracted and divided, its strategists in the grip of an errant conceptzia. He brilliantly fed those illusions through disinformation and deception, while pursuing his phenomenally detailed long-term plan. As Messrs. Katz and Bohbot imply the bloody assault on Israel was an intelligence failure by Israel as well as an intelligence triumph for Hamas.

File:Benjamin Netanyahu, February 2023.jpg

(Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu)

It was an ironic outcome for a nation helmed by Mr. Netanyahu. He had correctly told the United Nations General Assembly in 2009 to beware “the unfortunate habit of civilized societies to sleep until danger nearly overtakes them.” He quoted Winston Churchill on the “want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong.”

Messrs. Katz and Bohbot conclude their book with well-taken recommendations to help Israel’s political, military and intelligence institutions prevent another such debacle. But there’s no organizational cure for human nature, with its tendencies toward groupthink and confirmation bias. “The unfortunate habit” is a stubborn one. Even the most vigilant nations struggle to break it.”

An aerial view shows damage caused following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel

(An aerial view shows damage caused following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel, October 11)

BEING JEWISH AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF GAZA by Peter Beinart

Map showing the aid entry points and the military zone bifurcating north and south Gaza.

A few months ago, I had a conversation with an old friend from my Yeshiva days in Brooklyn.  At Yeshiva and in high school we were very close, and it is the case with many people we drifted apart over the years but intermittently we kept in touch.  Holiday greetings, a periodic email, or phone call were our communication over the decades, and I still have fond memories of our relationship.  It was during that conversation and his reaction to a number of my book reviews which I posted on my web site that I realized that a wall might be developing between us.  The foundation of our disagreement involved our reactions to events in Gaza that followed Hamas’ brutal attack of October 7, 2023, when over 1200 Israelis were slaughtered and 250 hostages were seized by the Palestinian terrorist group.  In our last conversation we “agreed to disagree” as he said so we could continue our friendly catch up conversation.  The crux of our disagreement rested on Israel’s reaction to the October 7th massacre which led to the destruction in Gaza making large parts of the territory almost inhabitable.

Evgenia Simanovich runs to the reinforced concrete shelter of her family’s home, moments after rocket sirens sounded in Ashkelon, Israel, on October 7. “In Ashkelon, residents have just seconds to seek shelter before a rocket launched from Gaza could strike,” photographer Tamir Kalifa told CNN. “Evgenia yelled for me to follow her, and I pressed my camera’s shutter as we sprinted to her home a few meters away.”

(Evgenia Simanovich runs to the reinforced concrete shelter of her family’s home, moments after rocket sirens sounded in Ashkelon, Israel, on October 7. “In Ashkelon, residents have just seconds to seek shelter before a rocket launched from Gaza could strike,” photographer Tamir Kalifa told CNN. “Evgenia yelled for me to follow her, and I pressed my camera’s shutter as we sprinted to her home a few meters away.” )

I went to the Gaza Strip in the spring of 1984 when I had a Fulbright Fellowship at Hebrew University.  It was a time of war after Israel invaded Lebanon to root out Palestinian terrorists who were making life miserable for Israelis living near their northern border.  When I visited Gaza I witnessed many of the living conditions that made refugee camps that were run down and squalid.   At the same time, I was amazed at the beauty of the Mediterranean coast that bordered the Palestinian enclave.  As a Ph. D in history who focused and published on Arab Israeli relations I am keenly aware of the positions of both sides, Arab and Jew when it came to the riots of the 1930s, the Holocaust, and events surrounding the 1948 War that led to the bifurcation of the region between differing viewpoints.  I have always held the belief that peace between the two sides was almost impossible based on ideology, the emotional attachment to the land by all parties, the leadership in the region, and the role of major powers.

Palestinians walk past the rubble of buildings destroyed during the Israeli offensive in Rafah

(Palestinians walk past the rubble of buildings destroyed during the Israeli offensive, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip).

With my mindset I was fortunate to come across Peter Beinart’s latest work; BEING JEWISH AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF GAZA where the author lays out the issues for people who have undying loyalty to the Israeli state, born of the Holocaust, seeing it always morally and ethically correct because of the neighborhood in which it resides, and those who find that the Netanyahu government, dominated by right wing nationalists had gone too far in trying to completely destroy Hamas.  No one can defend the abhorrent behavior of Hamas, but at what point do we draw the line when contemplating the destruction of an entire society through collective punishment.

It seems that every Jewish person has had the conversation with friends, relatives, and acquaintances over whether as Jews we can still support a government that engages in war crimes.  I realize “war crimes” is a difficult term to apply, but I must ask how else can you describe the discriminatory bombing and food deprivation of civilians who are being held hostage by Hamas that has led to the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians.  It is difficult to hold these discussions with people who firmly believe that Jewish goodness and integrity translates into Israeli virtue and exempts the Netanyahu government from the normal laws of humanity.  As Beinart writes, “we are not hard wired to forever endure evil but never commit it.  That false innocence, which pervades contemporary Jewish life, camouflages domination as self-defense,” which is at the core of the debate.

Over the years the author has been a stalwart supporter of Palestinian rights, even as he attends shul arguing that Jews are fallible human beings.  His goal as Benjamin Moser writes in the May 4, 2025, New York Times is “to wrestle with the knottiness and ambiguity in our sacred texts and correct for the omissions in the mythology of purity that so many of us were taught as children and that many continue to subscribe to as adults.”

Ceasefire between Israel and Hamas

(Palestinians walk past the rubble of houses and buildings destroyed during the war, following a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, January 20, 2024).

Beinart relies on Jewish texts and draws lessons from South Africa, where his family is from, to confront Zionism and what he sees as complicity from the American Jewish establishment in Palestinian oppression. He argues for a Jewish tradition that has no use for Jewish supremacy and treats human equality as a core value.  In his book, he appeals to his fellow Jews to grapple with the morality of their defense of Israel.  Beinart has a history of changing his opinions be it his support  for the Iraq War or tolerating workplace sexual harassment.  Beinart’s plea is for the Jewish community to reexamine their views that would require a painful about face concerning views they have held for most of their lives.

Beinart called on American Jews “to defend the dream of a democratic Jewish state before it is too late,” especially in light of the policies perpetrated by a government whose leader is under indictment who clings to power by accommodating the right wing minority in his cabinet.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems to prosecute the war on Gaza as a vehicle to remain in power which would avoid a trial and his possible imprisonment.  Whether you agree or disagree with the author he should be commended for his courage for standing up to what he believes is correct and accepting the consequences of the loss of friendships, anger from family members, and constant criticism and ostracization by his many critics.

One of Beinart’s major themes revolves around the argument that victimhood often feels like the natural state for Jews throughout history.  But this mentality covers up the fact that Jews can be “Pharoah’s too.”  This selective vision permeates Jewish life.  Jews employ the bible to refute the claim that Israel is a settler-colonial state.  Anything that contradicts this contemporary narrative is not accepted.  Interestingly the author weaves the ideas of Vladimir Jabotinsky, an important historical figure for right wing Israelis into the narrative, i.e.; the ideology of virtuous colonization, which today has been replaced by virtuous victimhood to support his views.

Palestinians wait to buy bread, in Gaza City

(Palestinians wait to buy bread in Gaza City, February 3, 2024)

To Beinart’s credit he recounts the brutal Hamas attack of October 7 in detail.  He delves into the impact on Israeli families and society and accurately concludes the entire country was a victim on that horrendous day of murder, rape, and kidnappings, not just those who experienced the immediate impact.  He even points out how Israeli progressives and leftists in the United States and Europe, ones, political partners reacted with indifference to the attack and many justified Hamas’s actions.  The message that was conveyed is that the killing of Jews was nothing new, it’s just the way it has always been.

Many Jews have compared October 7 to the Holocaust, but Beinart concludes there is a fundamental difference .  “To preserve Israel’s innocence, it has transforms Palestinians from a subjugated people into the reincarnation of the monsters of the Jewish past, the latest manifestation of the eternal, pathological, genocidal hatred that to the Passover Haggadah, in every generation rises up to destroy us.” 

A fighter from Izz al-Din al-Qassam stands in front of a...

(Hamas fighter outside the myriad of tunnels under Gaza)

Beinart tries to understand Hamas’s actions; in doing so he tries to explain the Palestinian mindset as they see themselves as victims of colonialism.  They, like other victims in the past, have no army, so they do not follow the rules of warfare and commit barbaric acts characteristic of colonial revolt.  However, countries like China and Russia have armies and they do not follow the rules of law in Ukraine, Georgia, Crimea, Chechnya, and in China’s case the victims are the Uyghur population and other mostly Muslim ethnic groups who can be considered genocide victims. 

In trying to understand, it is clear “that violent dispossession and violent resistance are intertwined.”  In the end Israeli oppression is not the only course of Palestinian violence.  It is Palestinians, like all people who are responsible for their actions.  However, Israeli oppression makes Palestinian violence more likely.  It comes down to despair for the Palestinian people as it is clear there is no way the Netanyahu government will accept a two-state solution.

Israeli soldiers carry the casket of reservist Elkana Yehuda Sfez, who was killed in combat in Gaza, during his funeral at the Mount Herzl military cemetery in Jerusalem, on Jan. 23.

(Israeli soldiers carry the casket of reservist Elkana Yehuda Sfez, who was killed in combat in Gaza, during his funeral at the Mount Herzl military cemetery in Jerusalem, on Jan. 23, 2024).

In analyzing death figures put out by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Gaza Health Ministry it is clear that over 50,000 people have died and 20% are probably children.  Beinart relies on many sources to verify these numbers, but Israeli leaders minimize the toll and shift blame onto Hamas arguing that Hamas uses human shields, seizes food and supplies targeted for Palestinian civilians, and murders any opposition.  However, Beinart’s argument that Hamas’s actions are typical of other insurgent movements is no excuse and to absolve them of one iota of legitimacy is wrong and their actions are considerably heinous when compared to other insurgent movements.  But Israel’s strategy to deliver as much destruction as possible in order to shock the Palestinians and get them to turn against Hamas has not been effective.  Blaming the Palestinians for Hamas’s 2006 victory at the polls is not valid since the Palestinian people had little choice.  Another Israeli argument that they must destroy Hamas to be safe, but it is an impossible task because the alternative Israel must offer, the ability to vote, a high degree of autonomy, and a future state will not be forthcoming so why should Palestinians opt for peace?  They need a viable alternative for Hamas which is not forthcoming.  In reality, as long as Israel tries to destroy each insurgent group, their actions foster the next generation of insurgents.  As Palestinians believe they are not safe, they will do their best to make sure Israelis are not safe also.

In reading Beinart’s work I wondered if there is such a thing as “Jewish exceptionalism” that makes Israel unaccountable for the type of warfare they are waging.  Historically I do not see it as other nations/groups have engaged in atrocities and war against civilians have been condemned with sanctions etc.

Israeli protesters attempt to block the road as aid trucks cross into the Gaza Strip, as Israeli border police watch over them, at the Kerem Shalom border crossing, southern Israel, Jan. 29.

(Israeli protesters attempt to block the road as aid trucks cross into the Gaza Strip, as Israeli border police watch over them, at the Kerem Shalom border crossing, southern Israel, Jan. 29, 2024)

Another major issue that Beinart raises is that of the “new anti-Semitism.”  Israel has equated any criticism of its actions as anti-Semitic as a vehicle of deflecting criticism of what they are doing in Gaza.  In doing so they turn the conversation about the war into a conversation about the motives of people who oppose their actions.  What is clear is that when Israel kills Palestinians, what is perceived to be anti-Semitism increases, but the Israeli government conflates anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism in order to depict Palestinians and their supporters as bigots, therefore turning a conversation about the oppression of Palestinians into a conversation about the oppression of Jews.  In the end Judaism and Israel are separate and Jews, the world over should not be blamed for the actions of the Israeli government.

A great deal of Beinart’s discussion revolves around the actions of American Jews who support Israel’s policies.  It seems as progressives in the United States turn against Israel they are forcing Jews to choose; defend exclusion in Israel or inclusion in the United States and some of America’s leading institutions are choosing the former.

Israeli soldiers practice evacuating wounded people with a helicopter during a military drill in northern Israel, in preparation for a potential escalation in the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah militant group in Lebanon, on Feb. 20.

(Israeli soldiers practice evacuating wounded people with a helicopter during a military drill in northern Israel, in preparation for a potential escalation in the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah militant group in Lebanon, on Feb. 20, 2025)

Beinart offers a comparison of historical situations that are somewhat similar to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  He delves into apartheid in South Africa and the fears of white Afrikaners; he discusses the hatred and fears that existed in Northern Ireland until a settlement was reached overcoming Protestant fears of the IRA; the Reconstruction period in the late 19th century in the United States is explored as southern whites feared the newly freed black population and fueled by northern liberals.  In these situations, the key to avoiding as much violence as possible was to give the aggrieved party the vote and a voice to express their concerns because inclusion yields greater, not total safety.

I do not believe that Beinart is naive enough to support the idea that if a settlement ever arrives between Israel and the Palestinians that peace will break out in the Middle East.  In a region where Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and numerous other terrorist groups abound violence will lessen, but the author’s emotional and heart felt appeal for reconciliation is really the only hope for the future no matter how impossible that appears today.  I admire Beinart’s beliefs and the professional risks he has taken to engage the public in a proper debate – that should be allowed in a free society and the back and forth between those who disagree should be civil, not based on fear.

DEATH IS OUR BUSINESS: RUSSIAN MERCENARIES AND THE NEW ERA OF PRIVATE WARFARE by John Lechner

(Yevgeny Prigozhi in Saint Petersburg in 2016)

In June 2023, it appeared for the first time there was a clear threat to the rule of Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin.  This risk to Putin’s reign was fostered by the inability of Russian forces to achieve a quick victory after it invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and was unable to overthrow and replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.  The danger Putin faced was the work of the Wagner Group, under the leadership of Yevgeny Prigozhin, his former chef and caterer who led the armed rebellion against the Russian government. This rebellion, which lasted for about a day, was a culmination of simmering tensions between the Wagner Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense and the fact that the fighting had reached a World War I type of stalemate.  Prigozhin accused the Russian military of shelling Wagner positions, refusing to resupply his troops, and also criticized the Russian leadership for their “maximalist positions” in the war in Ukraine.  It is interesting to analyze Putin’s response to Prigozhin and his private army since it was Russia’s most effective fighting force against the Ukrainian army.  The rebellion ultimately failed, as Prigozhin got cold feet as his army marched toward Moscow.   Prigozhin turned his forces away from the Russian capital and reached an agreement to move Wagner forces to Belarus.   However, in the end Prigozhin went the way of others who opposed Putin as he died in a plane crash on August 23, 2023.  Despite the death of their leader, the Wagner group lives on with its political business and military ventures as a pillar of the Russian government’s operations the world over.

As the bloody conflict continues to play out in Ukraine journalist John Lechner’s latest book, DEATH IS OUR BUSINESS: RUSSIAN MERCENARIES AND THE NEW ERA OF PRIVATE WARFARE has been published at a propitious time.  Lechner’s excellent monograph is an education describing the origins of the Wagner group, its methods, and operations.  We witness how the Wagner group gains a foothold in fragile nation states, gains access to a country’s natural resources, removes peacekeeping forces, all to cash in on the instability of weak states that possess resources that are viewed as vital for Russian strategic interests, and the profitability of the group itself.

Dirt graves with wooden crosses and red, yellow and black wreaths.

(The US says the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties)

Lechner points out in his introduction that after a two hundred year hiatus, private warfare has returned, albeit in new ways.  For most of history private armies and mercenaries were the norm, nevertheless at the end of the Thirty Years War (1660) European rulers saw the advantage in recruiting public standing armies within their borders.  By the 19th century, the nation state was largely responsible for the prosecution of warfare on the continent.  However, private armies were employed by colonial powers to subdue far-flung regions and governments would outsource the exploitation of colonies to private companies.  Once decolonization made headway following World War II and late in the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union began to relax its financial and military support from previous colonial regions, they would partly turn to privatization both internally and externally.  Newly independent countries would outsource their security requirements to private military companies, and the United States would turn to the privatization of warfare following 9/11.  By 2010, private contractors outnumbered American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, the most famous of which was Blackwater.  Lechner describes two types of private military companies.  First, mercenary companies are private armies that conduct autonomous military campaigns.  Military enterprises, like Blackwater, augment a powerful state’s regular armed forces and embed with one government.  Secondly, the two types were merged into a new novel private military company.  This new organization was cultivated and advanced by Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Donets Basin, or Donbas

(Donbas Basin)

Lechner delves into a number of Private Military Contractors (PMC) providing details on recruitment, operations, geographic involvement, and important personnel.  However, the author’s most important focus is the Wagner Group under the direction and tight control of Yevgeny Prigozhin.  In 2014, on the heels of Russia’s invasion of Crimea, Prigozhin linked up with Dmitry Utkin, a career soldier a member of an intelligence unit, and carried out training and proxy wars for the GRU to create the Wagner Group which would prove to be an effective fighting force with brutal enforcers in the rear.  By 2015, working closely with the Ministry of Defense in Syria, and autonomously in northern and central Africa the group spread its influence and profitability.  By 2018 Wagner forces seemed everywhere from Madagascar to Mozambique, in addition to becoming the “tip of the spear” of Russian assertiveness.  By August 2022 Wagner mercenaries were fighting in eastern Ukraine and successfully reached the outskirts of Bakhmut.  Prigozhin’s success rested on his ability to recognize opportunity in unstable situations, bringing a team together to take advantage of the situation in a nation’s capital and on the ground, especially in Africa which had over 100 million refugees, and employing social media highlighted by misinformation to enhance his reputation and ego.

Alexey DRUZHININ/SPUTNIK/AFP Yevgeny Prigozhin shows Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin his school lunch factory outside Saint Petersburg on September 20, 2010(“I had known Prigozhin for a very long time, since the 1990s,” Vladimir Putin recalled)

Lechner is clear that today there is little distinction between soldiers and mercenaries in large part because of globalization.  When one examines Russian recruitment of PMC and those in other countries it is clear that Lechner is correct.  Russian mercenaries presented as “little green men,” many on “vacation” and began appearing in 2014 in Crimea and the Donbas.  Lechner accurately explains Putin’s motivations involving the expansion of NATO, western plots against Russia, and his desire to recreate the Russian empire.  Putin was supported by the growth of domestic nationalist Russian ideologues witnessed by the number of volunteers who came to fight in Ukraine believing that Ukraine belonged to Russia harkening back to Catherine the Great and Lenin who artificially designated Ukraine and Belarus.

The turning point for Prigozhin  came with the invasion of Crimea as his contacts with the Ministry of Defense provided a degree of access to Putin who allowed him to become the handler of mercenaries in the Donbas – it is here that he and Utkin created the Wagner Group.  Slowly they were able to do away with other mercenary leaders and centralize other separatist militias into one.  This would be accomplished for the most part in 2015.  Prigozhin was an entrepreneur who envisioned a PMC like Erik Prince’s Blackwater.  He would get his start in Syria, supported the regime of Bashir Assad and helped arm, train, and participate in the brutal civil war designed to overthrow the murderous government in Damascus.


Russia formally intervened in Syria in 2015, and the first Wagner fighters entered the conflict in September of that year.  Lechner describes the brutality of the civil war, highlighted by Assad’s use of poisonous gases, cluster bombs, and doing anything to remain in power.  He could not have done so without the Wagner Group.  The key for the group is that it developed its own esprit de corps.  Their soldiers were mercenaries, but they were also Russian patriots, men willing to fight and die for the motherland, more so than the Russian military.  Their success provided Prigozhin with greater access to Putin directly to circumvent the Ministry of Defense.

Reuters Yevgeny Prigozhin helping Vladimir Putin at a dinner table, 2011(Yevgeny Prigozhin (left) pictured serving Vladimir Putin (centre) at a dinner in 2011)

Lechner carefully lays out the structure of the Wagner Group and breaks it down into its military and business components.  Prigozhin would create a corporate structure, first called Evro-Polis from which he negotiated contracts with governments and gained access to their natural resources, provided military services, and protection.  The group drew from varying ideologies and priorities, most of which were various degrees of nationalists and white supremacists.  Much of the group’s strategy was designed to seize oil and gas fields, mineral mining, and other lucrative opportunities in the countries they were involved.

The Wagner Group proliferated across central and northern Africa feasting on the resources of the Central African Republic, Libya, Chad, Sudan, Mali, Syria, and Niger.  Most people think of the Wagner forces as it relates to the Donbas, but Lechner spends a good part of his monograph detailing how Prigozhin penetrated Africa, the contracts he signed, the coups and counter coups he was involved in, and the many personalities he dealt with, many of course were as ruthless as he was – perhaps that was why he was so successful.  By 2021 Prigozhin and his PMC were truly global.  The threat he represented for the west was proof to the Kremlin that his initiatives were a worthy investment.  Their effectiveness was less important than the west’s reaction to them.

In developing his material, Lechner relied on interviews with the relevant government officials and soldiers, especially 30 members of the Wagner Group.   Lechner’s success rests on beautiful first-person writing with granular reporting.  Further, the author is an exceptional linguist as he speaks Russian and Chechen as well as Sango, the language of the Central African Republic.  His interviews saw him travel across war zones in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East to the point he was almost kidnaped.  Lechner witnessed the viciousness and cruelty in which the Wagner Group operated, a group that would eventually morph into a 50,000 man private army.

Reuters Yevgeny Prigozhin makes a statement as he stand next to Wagner fighters in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict in Bakhmut, Ukraine, in this still image taken from video released May 20, 2023(Prigozhin became most vocal in a series of video statements from Bakhmut where he criticised the defence establishment)

Prigozhin’s forces were initially deployed after the annexation of Crimea, a year later the Wagner Group  was sent to the Donbas region to support the pro-Russian separatists.   They would participate in destabilizing the region, taking control of key locations, and directly engaging in combat.  A major component of their actions was to eliminate dissident pro-Russian commanders, potentially through assassination.  The Wagner Group’s actions contributed to the escalation of the Donbas conflict and the overall instability in eastern Ukraine.   By 2022 and onward they played a significant role in the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, even recruiting prison inmates for frontline combat operations – estimated to number between 48-49,000.  These men would die by the thousands in the Donbas meat grinder, but for Prigozhin they served their purpose.  Eventually Prigozhin let his substantial ego get in the way and threatened to march on Moscow, as stated earlier it did not go well.

In the end, according to Nicolas Niarchos in his May 13, 2025, review in the New York Times, the Wagner Group “was an effective boogeyman, mercenaries of all stripes have proliferated across the map of this century’s conflicts, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Yemen.  “The West was happy to leverage Wagner as shorthand for all the evils of a war economy,” Lechner writes. “But the reality is that the world is filled with Prigozhins.”

Lechner is right. When Wagner fell, others rose in its stead, although they were kept on a tighter leash by Russian military intelligence. In Ukraine, prisoners are still being used in combat and Russia maintains a tight lid on its casualty figures. Even if the war in Ukraine ends soon, as President Trump has promised, Moscow’s mercenaries will still be at work dividing their African cake. Prigozhin may be dead, but his hammer is still a tool: It doesn’t matter if he’s around to swing it or not.”

Yevgeny Prigozhin points his finger, his gaze his slightly past the camera

(Yevgeny Prigozhin says he was required to “apologise and obey” in order to secure ammunition for his troops)

THE GATES OF GAZA by Amir Tibon

Memorial candles line the charred desks in the destroyed command center of Nahal Oz base, February 23, 2024. (Used in accordance with Clause 27a of the Copyright Law)

(Memorial candles line the charred desks in the destroyed command center of Nahal Oz base, February 23, 2024.) 

One of this morning’s lead articles in the New York Times read “Fate of Bibas Family Recalls Trauma of October 7, Renewing Fears of Gaza Truce.”  The crux of the article centered on the return of three Israeli citizen’s bodies, two babies and their mother.  The problem emerged that the body of the mother was misidentified, it was another victim of this war.  According to the article the “news set off a paroxysm of fury and agony in Israel rarely seen since the tumultuous days that followed the Hamas led attack on Oct. 7, 2023, when up to 1,200 people were killed and 251 were abducted, including Ms. Bibas and her sons, on the deadliest day in Israeli history.

For Palestinians, the devastation wrought by Israel’s military response to the Oct. 7 raids — a reaction that, among other consequences, razed Palestinian burial grounds and killed thousands of children including some younger than Kfir Bibas — has long overshadowed Hamas’s terrorist attacks at the start of the war.”

Miri Bernovsky-Tibon and Amir Tibon

(Nahal Oz Kibbutz residents Miri Bernovsky-Tibon and Amir Tibon) 

But Israelis remain deeply traumatized by the October assault, and the return of the Bibas boys, coupled with the uncertainty about their mother’s whereabouts and the disrespectful way that Hamas paraded the coffins on Thursday, revived the torment.  The war has resulted in the death of between 40-50,000 Palestinians according to the Arab Red Crescent and the near total destruction of Gaza and its infrastructure.

The brutal attack by Hamas and the Israeli response has set the Middle East on fire resulting in an Israeli invasion of Lebanon targeting Hezbollah, a “pseudo-war” with Iran, and a long range conflict with the Houthis in Yemen.   Currently, the region is experiencing a ceasefire in Gaza, which is only in its first phase and there are doubts it will continue to the next phase.  The question is how did we get here, what was the experience of the attack like, and historically what events led to the attack.  Answers to these questions are discussed and analyzed in Amir Tibon’s THE GATES OF GAZA.  The superb monograph is part memoir as Tibon and his family reside in Nahal Oz, a Kibbutz that borders the Gaza Strip, and a historical look at events and outcomes as Tibon is an award-winning diplomatic correspondent for Haaretz, Israel’s paper of record.

One of the questions that is repeatedly asked is why Israelis settle on land so close to the Gaza border where rockets, snipers, intruders are a constant threat.  The answer lies in Israeli defense policy that emerged in October 1953 when Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and General Moshe Dayan argued that the border with the Gaza Strip needed more military installations in order to be totally fortified.  The border itself was not an “internationally recognized” border, but a cease fire line drawn to end the 1948-9 Israeli War of Independence.  As Tibor writes, “there needed to be civilian life at the border – especially agriculture – before the region would be completely safe.  A permanent population to detect and deter attacks and to convince the Arab world that the young recently founded state of Israel was there to stay.”  The kibbutz which the Tibon family settled on and was attacked on October 7 was founded by sixty men and women members of a military unit called Nahal in 1953.

Israel enters the West Bank with tanks and raided Jenin for the first time since 2002

(Israeli tanks enter the city for the first time since 2002, in Jenin, in the northern West Bank, Feb. 23, 2025.)

The title of the book was derived from a speech given by General Moshe Dayan on a day when four couples were to be married.  Instead, it became a funeral oration, “the Gates of Gaza,” which originated from the biblical story of Samson fighting the Philistines.  In this case the speech was to honor Roi Rothberg who had been murdered by Egyptian fire as he patrolled the boundaries of the kibbutz and tried to return Palestinians who had crossed the “demarcation line” and entered Israeli territory.  The Egyptians did return the “mutilated body” of their victim.

Aftermath of a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen in Kibbutz Beeri

(Children’s toys and personal items lie on the bloodstained floor of a child’s bedroom, following a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel, October 17. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun)

If one fast forwards to 2025 nothing has really changed between Palestinians and Israelis.  Wars seem to break out every few years, constant rocket fire from Gaza with the inevitable Israeli response, border incursions from both sides leading to numerous deaths, and leaders on both sides whose ego’s, lust for power, and what I guess is called ideology dominate.  Tibon focuses on these aspects throughout the narrative, along with his family’s personal journey and survival on October 7.

Israeli military officers organise dead bodies before relatives are called to identify them, following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Ramla

(Israeli military officers stand by a container in which bodies of the dead are stored before their relatives are called to identify them, in Ramla, Israel, October 13. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun)

Tibon structures his book with alternating chapters.  First we have the attack of October 7, then a history lesson.  He moves on with chapters alternating between the events he and his family experienced on October 7, continuing with a careful historical analysis of events and personalities leading up to today.  Tibon integrates the Hamas attack on his family, their escape into the “safe room” in their house to wait out the violence occurring outside the front door.  Tibon assumed that the “all clear” would be sounded within a few hours as usually is the case, but much to his surprise this was different as the bullets, mortars, and rockets continued.  Tibon would soon realize that this was not a random attack by a terror cell, but a large well planned operation that would not be over quickly.  The key for Tibon was his two toddlers, Carmel and Galia, and his wife Miri.  The task was to keep the children quiet as not to give the terrorists another family to murder. Tibon did not realize how bad the situation had become with a nearby military base overrun by Hamas and the hundreds of bodies scattered between Nahal Oz and the base – throughout the early hours, Tibon wondered where the Israeli Defense Force was.  Women and children were being murdered, and the IDF was nowhere to be found.

benjamin netanyahu smiles and looks to the left, he wears a gray suit jacket, light blue dress shirt, red tie and israel flag pin

(Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu)

The historical narrative and analysis are succinct and damning in terms of Israeli and Palestinian Authority and Hamas leadership.  Tibon chooses certain historical aspects as a means of explaining how the Israeli and Palestinian people have reached the abyss they now found themselves in.  A key turning point was reached in 1987 as Palestinians could no longer accept the loss of prime agricultural land, which in part led to the first Intifada.  Interestingly, Yasir Arafat and the PLO ;leadership were totally caught off guard by events.  As a result of the violence Sheik Ahmed Yassin and Palestinian Islamists formed a new organization called Hamas – Islamic Resistance Movement.  The Intifada turned Hamas into a central force in the Palestinian community.  The more forceful the Israel response, the more Hamas’ popularity and ideology were enhanced, reducing the influence and power of the PLO.

Two villains emerge in Tibon’s discussion.  First is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who has been in office most of the last two decades.  In 1993 Tibon argued that Netanyahu worked to prevent a peace settlement following the Oslo Accords.  He worked to incite Israel’s right wing which led to the assassination of then Israeli Prime Minister and architect of Oslo, Yitzhak Rabin.  Netanyahu would defeat Shimon Peres in the next election and slowed down the peace process increasing Hamas’ popularity at the expense of Arafat.  He then ordered the assassination of Khaled Mashal, the head of Hamas’ Political Bureau.  After the attempt was botched, Netanyahu agreed to release Shiek Ahmed Yassin, Hamas’ spiritual leader, and blocked the extradition of Mussa Abu-Marzouk who raised millions of dollars to fund Hamas, allowing him to settle in Jordan.  If one fast forwards to October 7, Netanyahu’s fingerprints are all over the disaster even though he was thrown out of office in 1999.

An aerial view shows damage caused following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel

(An aerial view shows damage caused following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel, October 11. REUTERS/ Ilan Rosenberg)

Netanyahu would return to power in 2009 and would later be accused of corruption. The Israel Police began investigating Netanyahu in December 2016 and subsequently recommended indictments against him. On 21 November 2019, Netanyahu was officially indicted for breach of trust, accepting bribes, and fraud, leading him to legally relinquish his ministry portfolios other than prime minister. His legal problems led to legislation by the Israeli right wing in the Knesset designed to reduce the power of the Israeli Supreme Court which provoked enormous demonstrations in Israel in 2022 and 2023.  For many, Netanyahu’s legal problems were a national security threat for the state of Israel as he put his own personal quest for power to escape prosecution above the needs of the Israeli people.  Netanyahu’s behavior and policies further emboldened Hamas as he approved Qatari funding of Hamas whereby millions of dollars were used to build the tunnel infrastructure that allowed for attacks against Israel for years and finally the events of October 7.

Israel Defense Forces handout at Al Shifa hospital in Gaza City

(Israeli soldiers inspect the Al Shifa hospital complex, in Gaza City, November 15. via Israel Defense Forces)

Netanyahu also approved the trade of 1027 Palestinian prisoners for Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier seized by Hamas in 2007.  Among those released in 2011 was Yihyia Sinwar, the Hamas tactician and ideologue who designed  the plan that was carried out on October 7.  Further damning of Netanyahu took place in 2016 as Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman warned him, a right wing member of Likud that Israel intelligence uncovered a plot which would be catastrophic for Israel: “a secret plan by Hamas to cross the border fence at several points simultaneously, attack a long list of Israeli communities near Gaza, murder hundreds of citizens, and take dozens of hostages into Gaza.  With this evidence and the fact that Hamas was using Qatari money to build tunnels and rockets, Netanyahu did nothing.

There are obviously others who deserve condemnation for the events of October 7.  Yasir Arafat’s refusal to make peace in 2000, the corruption of the PLO and later the fecklessness of Arafat’s replacement Mahmoud Abbas and his corruption laden administration in the Palestinian Authority which was defeated by Hamas in elections and the battlefield.  Sinwar is also a key figure who spent years in an Israeli jail for murdering Israeli citizens.  While in prison he learned Hebrew and studied every aspect of Israeli life and politics he could and began to develop his plan for a massive incursion of Israel from Gaza.  Even when released from prison Sinwar worked methodically applying Qatari money, Netanyahu’s errors, and the fact that by March 2023 Israel was being torn apart from the inside with many reserve soldiers and pilots refusing to carry out orders because of the demonstration by Israeli citizens against Netanyahu’s cohorts in the Knesset’s attempts to reduce the power of the Israeli Supreme Court for the benefit of its Prime Minister.  Sinwar would ramp up attacks in the West Bank in the summer of 2023 in hindsight a diversion for October 7.  Netanyahu sent 30 battalions of soldiers to the West Bank, leaving only 4 to defend the kibbutzim on the Gaza border.  As this was occurring Netanyahu encouraged Qatar to continue to send millions to Hamas.

IDF handout image shows Israeli soldiers take position in the Gaza Strip

(Israeli military vehicles manoeuvre during the ongoing ground operation of the Israeli army against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as seen in an image released on November 13. Israel Defense Forces/via REUTERS)

A key event which Tibon uses to tie Israeli history to the events of October 7 revolves around the first time Nahal Oz was attacked in 1956 when Palestinian fedayeen encouraged by Egyptian president Gamal Nasser crossed the border and killed Roi Rotberg, a young member of the kibbutz, and taking his mutilated body back to Gaza.  As Max Strasser writes in his November 4, 2024, New York Times  book review entitled “The Reckoning”; “The next day, Moshe Dayan, then the military’s chief of staff, delivered the most famous eulogy in Israeli history.

“For eight years they have been sitting in the refugee camps in Gaza, and before their eyes we have been transforming the lands and the villages, where they and their fathers dwelt, into our estate,” Dayan said. “How did we shut our eyes and refuse to look squarely at our fate, and see, in all its brutality, the destiny of our generation? Have we forgotten that this group of young people dwelling at Nahal Oz is bearing the heavy gates of Gaza on its shoulders?”

IDF handout image shows Israeli soldiers taking position in a location given as Gaza

(Israeli soldiers take position during the ongoing ground operation of the Israeli army against Hamas, in a location given as Gaza, in this image released on November 13. Israeli Defense Forces/via REUTERS)

This was, Tibon writes, “a rare recognition by an Israeli leader of the Palestinian Nakba.” Dayan had identified Israel’s tragic endowment — a country built on displacement — and declared that the only response could be strength, a country where thriving in a kibbutz on a border forged in war would help secure peace.

But Tibon does not offer the whole quote. “We are the generation of settlement,” Dayan went on. “Our children will not have a life if we do not dig shelters, and without barbed wire and machine guns we will not be able to pave roads and dig water wells.”

In the epilogue, Tibon goes back to visit his deserted, bullet-scarred kibbutz and stands looking over the border at the rubble of Gaza. He rereads Dayan’s eulogy and wonders if his former neighbors at Nahal Oz will someday be able to return if peace with the people on the other side of the border is conceivable. It’s certainly hard to imagine, so long as the people of Gaza live with barbed wire and machine guns.”

F250219CG114 (1).jpg

(Shiri Bibas and her children Kfir and Ariel)

THE ACHILLES TRAP: SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE CIA, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S INVASION OF IRAQ by Steve Coll

Saddam Hussein on the Saaif Saab Front

(Saddam Hussein)

For years, the United States was involved in a complex relationship with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.  During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s the Reagan administration provided Baghdad with licenses to acquire certain implements of war, provided intelligence as to Iranian positions, and at the same time engaged with Iran with weapons for hostages.  The United States employed Saddam as a counterweight to Teheran from 1979 onward.  Later, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Washington completely altered its policies and organized a coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait.    However, before the war commenced the United States gave false signals to Saddam before he invaded Kuwait which he seemingly misread.  Throughout the 1990s the United States backed a series of possible scenarios to overthrow Saddam, but none was successful.

Fast forward to 2003, the second Bush administration under the influence of neoconservatives fostered policies to invade Iraq remove Saddam and achieving control of Iraqi oil and reorienting the balance of power in the Middle East.  It is clear today that the result of that policy was to elevate Iran’s regional influence as the Iraq counterweight was removed.  The errors fostered by the Bush administration have been a disaster for Washington’s role in the region.  How this all came about is the subject of Pulitzer Prize winning author Steve Coll’s latest book, THE ACHILLES TRAP: SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE CIA, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S INVASION OF IRAQ.

Kuwait political map

What becomes clear from Coll’s account is that there was more to Saddam than American politicians and spies could understand – even when the stakes were so high in dealing with him be it trying to uncover his nuclear capabilities, the sellout of the Kurds in northern Iraq, the invasion of Kuwait, and the final cat and mouse game that led to the Second Gulf War.  Coll’s research consisted of numerous interviews of the participants in this historical relationship in addition to the availability of Saddam’s secret treasure trove of over 2000 hours of tape recordings of leadership meetings – private discussions – meeting minutes- intelligence files – and other materials.  It allows us to see Saddam in new ways, “what drove him in his struggle with Washington, and to understand how and why American thinking about him was often wrong, distorted, or incomplete.”  The result is an incisive monograph that details events and decision making in a readable format providing a review of Iraqi American relations since the 1970s.  Coll pulls no punches in his analysis, and it is an important contribution to the many works that deal with this topic.

From the outset Coll introduces Saddam’s fears of the Iranian Revolution, his hatred for the Ayatollah Khomeini, his obsession with Israel’s nuclear capability, and his need to develop atomic weapons.  He introduces Jafar Dhia Jafar, a British educated physicist who would become the intellectual leader of Iraq’s atomic bomb program who plays a vital role throughout the book as Saddam’s Oppenheimer.  Coll’s discussion of the Iran-Iraq war focuses on the motivations of each side and the key role played by American intelligence, weaponry, and licensing.  It was clear under the Reagan administration that it wanted to work with Saddam but as we did so we misread his goals.   Further Washington’s support for Baghdad fostered deep misunderstand on Saddam’s part as to what they could get away with without American opposition which is the major theme of the book.  Throughout the narrative Coll explains the inability of Iraqi and American officials to understand each other from Washington’s refusal to allow Iraq to buy gun silencers to the nuclear policies of both countries.

Coll does a masterful job presenting the background information for Saddam and his family.  The relationships within the family exemplified by Saddam’s erratic and murderous son Uday and his brother Qusay, or his son-in-law Kemal Hussein are very important in understanding how Saddam ruled and the impact of his relatives on Iraqi society.  Each individual is the subject of important biographical information that include Tarik Aziz, Saddam’s pseudo Foreign Minister, Nizar Hamdoon, close to Saddam who was his liaison to the United States and Iraq’s UN envoy, Ali Hassan al-Majid, better known as “chemical Ali,” who carried out many of Saddam’s most despicable policies,  Ahmad Chalabi, a duplicitous character who lied his way to influence CIA policies toward Saddam, and Samir Vincent, an Iraqi-American who worked on the Oils-For-Food negotiations to revive a diplomatic solution between Baghdad and Washington, among others.

US Vice President Dick Cheney (L) and US

(Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld)

The author raises the question as to why Saddam would risk an invasion when he was aware that he lacked a nuclear option.  He would eventually agree to the return of UN inspectors, but it would be too late.  The problem as correctly points out is that a decade of an American containment policy had conditioned Saddam to doubt the prospect of a land invasion.  Further, since 1991 had threatened military action, but did little.  Further he could not fathom why an invasion would take place when he suspected the CIA and other agencies knew he lacked nuclear weapons – an important miscalculation as the Bush administration was bet on war by late 2002, and the task of US intelligence was to find a causus belli to justify an invasion.

Coll is on firm grounds as he describes the many attempts to overthrow Saddam.  It is clear that the first Bush administration wanted Saddam to be replaced but refused to engage in assassination.  After the first Gulf War, Washington decided not to march to Baghdad and remove him for fear of upsetting the regional balance of power.  During the Clinton administration there were many CIA plots involving Saddam’s overthrow from Chalabi’s conspiracies, supporting Wafiq al-Sarranai, an officer close to Saddam, Ayad Allawi, the head of the Iraqi National Accord who led the opposition to Saddam and was an enemy of Chalabi, to members of his dysfunctional family, particularly his demented son Uday.

U.S. Offers $25 Million For Saddam Hussein's Capture

(Saddam with sons, Uday and Qusay)

A major part of the narrative involves western attempts to uncover and end Saddam’s nuclear program.  Coll takes the reader through the “shell game” involving United Nations and the International Atomic Agency’s inspectors to locate evidence of Saddam’s nuclear program.  A number of important individuals are discussed including Swedish diplomat Hans Blix, and Rolf Ekeus, the Director-General of the IAEA, David McKay, an American inspector and a host of others.  The details of the “cat and mouse” game conducted by the Iraqis is detailed as is the internal dynamic of investigators and their disagreements, including the role of the CIA and American intelligence. They would soon discover that Saddam had a sophisticated bomb program for at least five years without being discovered and Saddam’s capacity to build a bomb was also unknown during that period.  It is clear that by the mid-1990s there were no nuclear weapons, but there were biological agents mounted on missiles. 

Coll takes the reader through the two Gulf wars, the use of chemical weapons against his enemies, the attacks on Kurdistan, the attempts to remove him from power , all topics that have been dealt with by others, but not in the detail and the perspectives that the author presents.  All of this leads to the decision to go to war in 2003 and finally remove Saddam from power and use a new Iraq, dominated by the United States to control the Middle East and its oil resources.  In developing this aspect of the book as he does throughout Coll focuses on how Saddam misread American actions and policies toward him.  This misreading and/or misunderstandings in the end resulted in his death and a quagmire for the United States that lasted for a decade and even today the United States has difficulties with ISIS terrorists ensconced in Iraq, and a Shia dominated government that our policies helped bring to power.

Coll pulls no punches as he discusses aspects of his topic.  A useful example is the relationship between neoconservatives who served during the Reagan administration and Ahmad Chalabi.  Coll describes “neocons” as “a loose network of like-minded internationalists who advocated for an assertive post-Cold War foreign policy that would advance American power by expanding democracy by challenging tyranny all around the world.”  They sought to undermine the Soviet Union and Saddam advocating human and civil rights as a moral imperative.  They would attract the likes of Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld and others who were men who liked ideas on questions  as what to do about Iraq.  The result was Saddam’s actions invigorated a domestic alliance of American hawk’s laser focused on removing the Iraqi dictator.  Chalabi who saw himself as an Iraqi Charles De Gaulle had no following in Iraq and fed numerous lies and conspiracies to the CIA and others and received millions in return – this was the “neocon” darling!  Men like Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle, and Richard Armitage pushed for war when they realized Bill Clinton would not engage in regime change.  American generals thought their ideas were “crackpot.”

George W. Bush’s cabinet read like a “who’s who” of “neocons” with Cheney as Vice President, Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and Wolfowitz as Deputy Secretary of Defense, all backed Chalabi’s “rolling insurgency” plan to overthrow Saddam.  Secretary of State Colin Powell who opposed these ideas offered “smart sanctions” – restrict trade directly related to WMD and avoid policies that hurt children and the general Iraqi populations.  He felt the military option was not in the best interest of the United States, though he did not rule it out.

TOPSHOT-IRAQ-US-SADDAM-CAPTURE

(Saddam captured in Tikrit, Iraq)

The question is why did Saddam want to keep the myth of weapons alive when facing steep economic sanctions and threats of war?  Coll is clear in his study of Saddam that for the Iraqi dictator a “mutually assured destruction” strategy would offset his fear of an Israeli nuclear attack, an ego which was such that it would provide him with greater security internally and externally, and his misunderstanding of Washington’s capacity to stop him.

Coll’s story presents the long and mutually confusing relationship between the United States and Iraq.  It ranges from Saddam’s rise to dictatorial power in 1979, soon after which he started a covert nuclear program, to the 2003 invasion, and his execution in 2006.  Along the way we experience a dark chapter in US foreign relations highlighted by the Reagan administration’s turning a blind eye to Saddam’s use of WMD against Iranian soldiers, and under the Bush administration Kurdish villagers, along with CIA policies that enhanced Saddam’s paranoia which led him to defeatist policies as he misread the United States, who at times he perceived to be an ally.    All in all, it resulted in what the second Bush administration made, in hindsight across ideological lines a terrible geopolitical mistake which we are still paying for.

What sets Coll’s narrative apart from other authors is his knowledge of Iraqi planning and Saddam’s mindset as it was clear that Bush had made up his mind for “preemptive war”.  Coll’s account of the Bush administration’s actions, views, and planning has been detailed by others, but it is his deep dive into Iraqi strategy and the views of Iraqi planners that distinguishes his work.

Charlie Savage in his August 29, 2024, article in the New York Review of Books entitled “A Terrible Mistake” perfectly encapsulates the importance of Coll’s work; “Beyond its value as a history and reappraisal of events, what lessons does this tale of ceaseless misconceptions and miscalculations hold for today? If Iraq was a trap, it was one that a succession of American policymakers clearly did not understand they were getting the country into until extricating it cleanly was nigh impossible. Coll gestures toward the difficulty of understanding dictatorial rulers whose regimes are hard for American intelligence agencies to penetrate and whose own pathologies may also make it hard for them to see the US clearly:

One recurring theme is the trouble American decision-makers had in assessing Saddam’s resentments and managing his inconsistencies. It is a theme that resonates in our present age of authoritarian rulers, when the world’s stressed democracies seek to grasp the often unpredictable decision-making of cloistered rulers, such as Vladimir Putin, or to influence other closed dictatorships, such as North Korea’s.”

Saddam Hussein Giving a Press Conference

GRAND DELUSION: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN AMBITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST by Steven Simon

 

Syrians walk along a severely damaged road in the northeastern city of Deir el-Zour, Jan. 4, 2014. (AFP)

(Syrian Civil War)

Today the Middle East borders on chaos.  In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is under indictment and as a means of retaining his administration pushes to reduce the power of the Israeli Supreme Court resulting in roughly 20% of the country taking to the streets in protest.  Further, Israeli reserve pilots have threatened to refuse missions in dissent.  The West Bank is experiencing renewed violence highlighted by a recent Israeli incursion and a continuing power struggle between Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  In Yemen, the brutal  civil war continues as Saudi Arabia and Iran are fighting a proxy war.  In Iran, the government is still dealing with domestic discontent particularly by the younger generation, exporting weapons to Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and drones and other support for the Russian war in Ukraine.  In Jordan, opposition to King Abdullah increases each time Israeli troops crack down on Palestinians.  Egypt remains a repressive autocracy.  Lastly, Saudi Arabia’s government under the leadership of Mohammad bin Salman further consolidates power of his repressive regime and spreads its wealth seemingly worldwide as it finds itself disagreeing with the Biden administration more and more. 

The above is symptomatic of a failed attempt by the United States to reorient the region toward its goals and in so doing according to Steven Simon in his new history/memoir GRAND DELUSION: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN AMBITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, the region has undergone a forty year period whereby Washington has evolved from deep engagement to a period of retrenchment. 

PHOTO: British soldiers assist in rescue operations at the site of the bomb-wrecked U.S. Marine command center near the Beirut airport in Lebanon, Oct. 23, 1983. A bomb-laden truck drove into the center collapsing the entire four story building.

(1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Lebanon)

According to the author, the process began with the Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of the Shah during the Carter presidency which brought about a collapse of the American position through the final weakening of US resolve under Barack Obama.  In between the Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Bush II administrations tried to retain American hegemony in the region, attempted to foster an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, dominate Iraq, and support Saudi Arabia.  This came to an end as Obama held Israel and the Gulf states in open contempt, failed to arm and train Syrian rebels in a civil war he referred to as “the shit show,” intervened in Libya, stalled in attempts to foster democratic transitions during the Arab spring, dealt with the Islamic State, was unable to forge a constituency for a nuclear deal with Iran, and witnessed a bitter end to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  Obama’s successor, Donald Trump acquiesced in this situation, periodically threatening different parties and trying to see how he could achieve political and personal gains. 

The question is how did the present situation evolve resulting in America’s propensity for self-deception and misadventure in the region particularly after 9/11 – Simon, whose career included a fifteen year career at the State Department, and service on the National Security Council staff as senior director for Middle Eastern and North African affairs provides interesting and evocative answers.

From left, Yitzhak Rabin, Bill Clinton and Yasir Arafat in 1993.

(Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, President Clinton, and PLO Chairman Arafat, 1993)

Simon has written a personal account of his diplomatic career involved in the Middle East, offering many historical observations and insightful analysis.  The monograph seems to offer two major themes.  The first, after the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 the United States changed from a period where American troops where not actively deployed in the region, instead CIA operations, vast military sales were tools used to spread influence, and Washington relied upon autocratic to achieve its goals.  Once Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency for better or worse, American troops at times  became active in the region from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and bases in the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.  In the case of Iraq, the policy has been a disaster which in the end destroyed the region’s balance of power and elevated Iran to being a major player.  This period came to an end with the final withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011.  The second major theme that Simon explores was American policy toward Israel and Saudi Arabia.  Since the end of the Second World War, the United States sought to facilitate Israel’s survival in a hostile Arab world following the Holocaust and preventing any Soviet inroads involving Saudi Arabia.  Up until recently these policies have been mostly successful.  However, the emergence of a right wing Israeli government under Bibi Netanyahu and his ultra-orthodox allies, and the elevation of Mohammad bin-Salman as head of the Saudi government has led to policies that at times are designed to “get even” with President Biden’s comments during the 2020 election his cruelty and repression zeroing in opposition within Saudi society, in addition, his hope of achieving regional super power status does not bode well for the future of American success in the region.

Simon does an excellent job developing the background history for each presidential administration’s policies.  Beginning with President Carter and taking the reader up to the present, the author describes the significant issues that each occupant of the White House faced, the internal debates over policies, the personalities involved, the final execution of the decision-making process, and the ramifications once the dust cleared.  Beginning with Carter’s attempts at Camp David and the Iran hostage situation, Simon moves on to the haphazard NSC decision-making process in relation to the deployment of US Marines to Lebanon and the Iran-Contra scandal under Reagan; the debate in the first Bush administration over whether to remain in Iraq and achieve regime overthrow after Desert Storm, and the Madrid Conference designed to facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace;  Clinton’s need to know whether Saddam’s WMD had been catalogued and destroyed, and his inability to lure Iran to the negotiating table, as well as Clinton’s refusal to issue a presidential decision directive on the Middle East; George W. Bush facing the repercussions of 9/11 leading to an ill fated war in Iraq as well as creating a disastrous policy in Afghanistan; Obama’s attempts to reset US policy in the region, not enforcing his self-imposed red-line dealing with Syria, and achieving the Nuclear arms deal with Iran.  Next, Trump was indifferent to the mechanics of foreign policy and “his ignorance of the conduct of foreign policy clouded his occasionally sensible, if crudely formulated, impulses,” i.e.; pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal allowing Tehran to enhance its nuclear program, the Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, and abandoning the Kurds to Turkish President Erdogan  Lastly, President Biden who inherited unresolved conflicts with Iraq, Iran, and a Saudi relationship whereby Jared Kushner was able to ingratiate himself with Mohammad bin-Salman.  For Biden, faced with deteriorating relations with China, the issue of Taiwan, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and difficulties with Iran leave very little time to devote to the Middle East.  I agree with Simon’s conclusion that the Saudis and Persian Gulf states see Biden as “a speed bump on the road to a more accommodating Republican administration.”

(In this photo released by the Saudi Press Agency, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Biden bump fists as they begin meetings in Jeddah)

Many of the major characters aside from presidents are discussed in Simon’s presentation.  Jimmy Carter employed Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cy Vance and others, though at times he was his own Secretary of State.  Under Ronald Reagan, George Schultz, Casper Wienberger, Robert McFarlane, and William Casey played significant roles.  For George H. W. Bush, James Baker, Colin Powell, Dick Cheney stand out.  President Clinton, who had little foreign policy experience relied upon Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, and William Cohen.  George W. Bush relied heavily on Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condi Rice, and to a lesser extent on Colin Powell.  Barack Obama worked well with Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice, and Robert Gates.  Donald Trump had a series of individuals who he eventually fired and brought in sycophant’s who would do his bidding.  For Biden it is too early to know the impact of those around him particularly Jake Sullivan, Lloyd Austin, and Anthony Blinken.  All of these figures play prominent roles in Simon’s presentation and analysis, and it is interesting to compare the types of people and their experience before they served their respective administrations and how impactful they were.

Simon has written a thoughtful, well-constructed work of fusion that will be useful for the professional and general audience. His viewpoints are based on years of involvement in the region and his commentary is succinct and for the most part dead on no matter which administration he is discussing.   He has done a wonderful job exploring a series of presidential administrations and how they approached the Middle East and must be commended for his ability to synthesize information as each chapter in of itself can be developed into a book of its own.

SYRIA-KURDS-CONFLICT

(Syrian Civil War)