A CALCULATED RESTRAINT: WHAT ALLIED LEADERS SAID ABOUT THE HOLOCAUST by Richard Breitman

File:Yalta Conference (Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin) (B&W).jpg

(Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin at Yalta 2/1945)

The most frequent question concerning the Holocaust centers on what allied leaders knew about the genocide against the Jews and what they spoke about it in public and private.  In previous monographs, FDR AND THE JEWS and OFFICIAL SECRETS: WHAT THE NAZIS PLANNED AND WHAT THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN KNEW Holocaust historian Richard Breitman addresses when these men knew what was occurring in the death camps.  In his latest work, A CALCULATED RESTRAINT: WHAT ALLIED LEADERS SAID ABOUT THE HOLOCAUST Breitman shifts his focus as it took until December 1942 for allied leaders to issue a joint statement concerning Nazi Germany’s policy of eradicating Jews from Europe.  It would take President Franklin D. Roosevelt until March 1944 to publicly comment on what was occurring in the extermination camps.  In his new book, Breitman asks why these leaders did not speak up earlier.  Further he explores the character of each leader and concludes that the Holocaust must be understood in light of the political and military conditions exhibited during the war that drove their decision-making and commentary.

Breitman begins his account by introducing Miles Taylor, a Steel magnate turned diplomat representing Franklin Roosevelt in a September 22, 1942, meeting with the Pope.  Taylor described the Nazi genocide against the Jews and plans to exterminate millions.  He pressured the Pontiff to employ his moral responsibility and authority against Hitler and his minions.  In the weeks that followed Taylor conveyed further evidence of Nazi plans to the White House.

(Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary) in 1942

The Papacy’s response was much less than could be hoped for.  Monsignor Dell’Acqua warned the Pope that any negative commentary concerning Nazi actions could be quite detrimental to the church, ultimately producing a Papal reaction that it was impossible to confirm Nazi actions, and the Vatican had no “practical suggestions to make,”  apparently believing that only military action, not moral condemnation could end Nazi atrocities.  It would take until 2020 for the Vatican to open records of Pius XII’s tenure to outside researchers.

Breitman states his goal in preparing his monograph was to discern what “Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin knew about the Holocaust to what they said about it in their most important statements on the subject.”  The author’s approach rests on two key avenues of research and analysis.  First, the extent to which allied leaders sought to create and mobilize the international community based on a common morality.  Second, how allied leaders understood the relationship between the Holocaust and the war itself during different stages of the conflict.  Breitman’s account relies on thorough research based on years of archival work, in addition to correspondence among allied leaders, numerous biographies and secondary works on the subject.

Despite the release of most allied documents pertaining to the war, except for Russia which has become more forthcoming since the fall of the Soviet Union there is a paucity of material relating to allied leaders.  Further, there is little, if any record of allied leaders themselves addressing the Holocaust in any of their private conversations, though Stalin’s public commentary does allude to Nazi atrocities more so than Roosevelt and Churchill.

It is clear from Breitman’s account that with Hitler’s January 30, 1939, speech to the Reichstag that the Fuhrer was bent on the total annihilation of the Jews, not just pressuring them to leave Germany and immigrate elsewhere.  It is also clear that Churchill and Roosevelt were fully aware of the threat Hitler posed to the international order, but were limited  in their public reaction to the sensitive issue that a war against Germany to save Jews was not politically acceptable, particularly as it related to communism at a time when anti-Semitism was pervasive worldwide.  Fearing Nazi propaganda responses, allied leaders generalized the threat of Nazi atrocities, thereby subsuming Nazi policies to exterminate Jews among a broader range of barbaric behaviors, thereby limiting explicit attacks on the growing Holocaust.

Breckinridge Long (1881–1958). Long was an Assistant Secretary in the US State Department during World War II, from 1940-1944.

(Breckinridge Long, anti-Semitic State Department official did his best to block Jewish immigration to the United States during the Holocaust)

The author is correct in arguing that had allied leaders spoken out and confronted Nazi behavior earlier it might have galvanized more Jews to flee and go into hiding and perhaps encourage gentiles to take serious steps to assist Jews.  No matter what the result it would have confirmed the rumors and stories concerning Nazi “resettlement in the east,” and possibly encouraged neutral governments to speak out and do more.

Breitman’s overall thesis is correct pertaining to why allied leaders did not speak out publicly about the Holocaust, though they did comment on the barbarity of the Nazis.  The reasons have been presented by many historians that Roosevelt was very concerned about providing the Nazis a propaganda tool because any comments would be used to reinforce the view that the Roosevelt administration was controlled by Jews and it would anger anti-Semites, particularly those in his own State Department, and isolationists in Congress.  FDR reasoned the best way to approach the Holocaust was not to single out Jews and concentrate on the larger issue of winning the war.  The faster victory could be achieved, the more Jews that could be saved.  This opinion was similar to Winston Churchill’s beliefs.

The author spends the first third of the book focusing on the “Big Three,” and their early views as to what policies the Nazis were implementing in Eastern Europe.  Breitman will focus on four examples of public commentary which he analyzes in detail.  On August 24, 1941, Winston Churchill made a speech denouncing Nazi executions in the east.  He singled out what the Germans were doing to the Russians on Soviet soil, with no mention of the Jews as victims.  However, his last sentence read; “we are in the presence of a crime without a name.”  Was Churchill referring to the Holocaust?  Was he trying to satisfy Stalin?  It is difficult to discern, but British intelligence released in the 1990s and early 2000s provide an important picture of what the SS and police units were doing behind battle lines in the Soviet Union in July and August 1941 – mass executions of Jews, Bolsheviks, and other civilian targets.  Churchill’s rationale for maintaining public silence regarding the Holocaust was his fear that the Luftwaffe’s Enigma codes that had been broken by cartographers at Bletchley Park would be compromised should he make statements based on British intelligence.  It is interesting according to Breitman that after August 1941, Churchill no longer favored receiving “execution numbers” from MI6, fearing that the information could become public.  Churchill’s overriding goal was to strengthen ties with the US and USSR and would worry about moral questions later.

In Stalin’s case he made a speech on November 6, 1941, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 at the Mayakovsky Metro Station.  According to Alexander Werth, a British journalist who was present it was “a strange mixture of black gloom and complete confidence.”  Aware of Nazi mass murder of Jews, Stalin mentioned the subject directly only once, saying the Germans were carrying out medieval pogroms just as eagerly as the Tsarist regime had done.  In a follow up speech the next day, Stalin said nothing about the killing of Jews.  Stalin generalized the threat of extermination so all Soviet people would feel the threat facing their country, but at least he mentioned it signaling that subject could now be openly discussed, but Stalin’s overriding concern was to focus on the Nazi threat to the state and people of the USSR and believed that references to the Nazi war against the Jews could only distract from that.  After his November remarks he made no further public comments about the killing of Jews for the rest of the war.

(Jan Karski (born Jan Kozielewski, 24 June 1914[a] – 13 July 2000) was a Polish soldier, resistance-fighter, and diplomat during World War II. He is known for having acted as a courier in 1940–1943 to the Polish government-in-exile and to Poland’s Western Allies about the situation in German-occupied Poland. He reported about the state of Poland, its many competing resistance factions, and also about Germany’s destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto and its operation of extermination camps on Polish soil that were murdering Jews, Poles, and others)

FDR’s approach was to prepare for war and his comments were designed to do so and not say anything that could rile up anti-New Dealers who opposed war preparation.  At press conferences on July 31 and February 1, 1941, FDR did not raise the subject of Hitler’s threat to annihilate the Jews of Europe and was not questioned about it.  Roosevelt feared any publicity surrounding saving Jews would create greater opposition to aiding the democracies of Europe to fight the Nazis.  It took Roosevelt until August 21, 1942, for the president to denounce barbaric crimes against innocent civilians in Europe and Asia and threatened those responsible with trials after the war.  He would reaffirm these comments in a statement on October 7, 1942, but in both instances he was unwilling to denounce the Nazi war against the Jews.  However, if we fast forward to FDR’s March 24, 1944, press conference, shortly after the Nazis occupied Hungary, the president called attention to Hungarian Jews as part of the Nazi campaign to destroy the Jews of Europe, accusing the Nazis of the “wholesale systematic murder of the Jews in Europe.”   Articles written by the White House press corps and government broadcasts were disseminated to a large audience in the United States and abroad.

Nazi camps in occupied Poland, 1939-1945 [LCID: pol72110]

Breitman dissects a fourth speech given on January 30, 1939, where Adolf Hitler lays out his plans in front of the Reichstag.  The speech recounted the usual Nazi accusations against the west, praise for Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, virulent comments and threat against the Jews, and fear of the Bolshevik menace.  He was careful not to attack Roosevelt as he wanted to limit American aid.  According to Chief AP correspondent Louis Lochner who was present at the speech Hitler reserved his most poisonous verbiage for the Jews as he would welcome the complete annihilation of European Jewry.

The title of the book, A CALCULATED RESTRAINT  is somewhat misleading as Breitman focuses a great deal on events and personalities that may tendentiously conform to the title, but do not zero in exactly on that subject matter.  The author details the negotiations leading up to the Nazi-Soviet Pact and its implications for Poland and Eastern Europe in General.  Further, he comments on the American and British about faces in dealing with communism.  Breitman focuses on the “Palestine question” and its role in Nazi strategy and how the British sought to protect its Arab “possessions,” – oil!  Operation Torch, as a substitute for a second in Europe is discussed; the battle of El Alamein and the role of General Erwin Rommel.  Other prominent individuals  are covered including Reinhard Heydrich who chaired the Wannsee Conference outlining the Holocaust and the Lidice massacre after he was assassinated.  Breitman does deal with the Holocaust, not commentary by the “Big Three” as he introduces Gerhart M. Riegner, a representative of the World Jewish Congress and Polish diplomat Jan Karski, who met with Roosevelt, and Peter Bergson who did his best to publicize the Holocaust and convince the leaders to focus more on containing it through his Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe.  Another important American official that Breitman spends a great deal of time on is Oscar Cox, general counsel of the Foreign Economic Administration, which included the Lend-Lease  Administration who tried to enlist others in the battle against anti-Semites, like Breckinridge Long inside the State Department. Both men played an integral role in making the Holocaust public and trying to convince Churchill and Roosevelt to be more forthcoming about educating the public about the annihilation of the Jews.  This would lead to the Bermuda Conference and the War Refugee Board in the United States, neither of which greatly impacted the plight of the Jews.  Breitman also includes a well thought out and incisive analysis of the murder of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews at Auschwitz toward the end of the war.

SS chief Heinrich Himmler (right) during a visit to the Auschwitz camp. [LCID: 50742]

(SS chief Heinrich Himmler (right) during a visit to the Auschwitz camp. Poland, July 18, 1942)

Perhaps, Breitman’s best chapter is entitled, “The Allied Declaration”  in which he points out that by the second half of 1942 there was enough credible information that reached allied governments and media that affirmed the genocide of the Jews.  However, as Breitman argues, the atmosphere surrounding this period and the risks of going public were too much for allied leaders.

It is clear the book overly focuses on the course of the war, rather than on its stated title.  The non-Holocaust material has mostly been mined by other historians, and in many cases Breitman reviews material he has presented in his previous books.  Much of the sourcing is based on secondary materials, but a wide variety of documentary evidence is consulted.  In a sense if one follows the end notes it provides an excellent bibliography, but the stated purpose of the book does not receive the coverage that is warranted.

In summary, Breitman’s book is a concise and incisive look at his subject and sheds some new light on the topic.  We must accept the conclusion that the allied leader’s responses and why they chose what to say about the Holocaust must be understood in light of the political and military demands that existed in the war and drove their decision making.  I agree with historian Richard Overy that Breitman spends much more time discussing what was known about the murder of Jews, how it was communicated and its effect on lower-level officials and ministers, rather than discussing the response of the Allied big three, which again reveals a generally ambivalent, even skeptical response to the claims of people who presented evidence as to what was occurring.

(Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill at the Tehran Conference, November, 1943)

IN THE MIDST OF CIVILIZED EUROPE: THE POGROMS OF 1918-1921 AND THE ONSET OF THE HOLOCAUST by Jeffrey Veidlinger

(Victims of a pogrom perpetrated by Ukrainian forces in Khodorkiv, 1919)

According to Webster’s dictionary a “pogrom” is an organized massacre of a particular ethnic group, in particular that of Jewish people in Russia or eastern Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  It is a Russian word meaning to “wreak havoc, to demolish violently.”  Historically, the term refers to violent attacks by local non-Jewish populations on Jews in the Russian Empire and in other countries. The first such incident to be labeled a pogrom is believed to be anti-Jewish rioting in Odessa in 1821. As a descriptive term, “pogrom” came into common usage with extensive anti-Jewish riots that swept the southern and western provinces of the Russian Empire in 1881–1884, following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II. 

One of the most impactful pogroms took place in Kishinev located in the southwest corner of Imperial Russia in April 1903.  It resulted in the death of 49 Jews, an untold number of Jewish women were raped, and 1,500 Jewish homes were damaged. This sudden rush of hoodlum violence — prompted by accusatory rumors of Jewish ritual murder — quickly became a talisman of imperial Russian brutality against its Jews. More than that, the incident brought the word pogrom to the world stage and set off reverberations that changed the course of Jewish history for the next century.

Pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe at the end of the 19th and early 20th century became the impetus for Jewish immigration to the United States.  Between 1880 and 1924 over 2,000,000 Jews immigrated to the United States to escape persecution and poverty.  My own grandparents left their small village north of Kyiv in 1905 on arriving at Ellis Island and settling in the New York area. 

(A funeral held for desecrated Torah scrolls following the Kishinev pogrom of 1903, in which 49 Jews were murdered and hundreds of women raped)

For those who have difficulty imagining what a pogrom is or looks like I refer them to the film “The Fixer” based on the novel of the same name by Bernard Malamud. THE FIXER was based on an infamous case known as the “Beilis case” or the “Beilis trial” of 1913, in which the mutilated corpse of a Christian boy was found in a cave outside Kiev in 1911, and it became the cause célèbre for myriad virulent antisemitic groups to propagate widespread persecution of Jews. A Jewish laborer named Menahem Mendel Beilis (Yacov Bok in the film and novel) was arrested on ludicrous trumped-up charges for ritualistically extracting the child’s blood to be used in Passover matzos and it led to his imprisonment and torture –a prelude to further pogroms and the coming Bolshevik Revolution. In a highly publicized trial akin to the Russian version of the Dreyfus affair, Beilis was ultimately acquitted by an all-Christian jury.

The latest use of the term pogrom has sparked controversy when it was applied to the devastating actions of Hamas terrorists perpetrated on October 7, 2024, against Israel.  The end result  was 1,180 people killed, of which 797 were civilians, including 36 children and 379 security forces.  A further,  3,400 civilians and soldiers were wounded, and 251 civilians and soldiers were taken captive (74 later died in captivity or were confirmed dead).  Hamas’ savagery fits the definition of the term “pogrom” with all the elements of violence, sexual attack, and antisemitism.

(Symon Petliura, a 1920s Ukrainian statesman blamed for the murder of 50,000 Jewish compatriots)

In his latest book IN THE MIDST OF CIVILIZED EUROPE: THE POGROMS OF 1918-1921 AND THE ONSET OF THE HOLOCAUST  Jeffrey Veidlinger tackles the pogrom-like violence in western Belorussia (Belarus) and Poland’s Galicia province (now West Ukraine), that resulted in the murder of over a hundred thousand Jews between 1918 and 1921. According to Veidlinger, apart from murders, “approximately 600,000 Jewish refugees were forced to flee across international borders, and millions more were displaced internally.  About two-thirds of all Jewish houses and over half of all Jewish businesses in the region were looted or destroyed.  The pogroms traumatized the affected communities for at least a generation and set off alarm bells around the world.”

The perpetrators of pogroms organized locally, sometimes with government and police encouragement. They raped, murdered their Jewish victims, and looted their property. During the civil war that followed the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Ukrainian nationalists, Polish officials, and Red Army soldiers perpetrated these massacres blaming the Jews for the turmoil and destruction of World War I and the ensuing Russian Revolution.  At the time reports of this violence were published in the press and many warned that the Jews were in danger of extermination – a prediction that would come to fruition in the Nazi imposed Holocaust between 1939-1945.

Veidlinger relies on long-neglected materials that include recently discovered eyewitness accounts, trial records, and government orders concluding that the genocidal violence created the conditions for the Holocaust.  He explains how and why so many groups believed that the murder of Jews was a suitable reaction to their perceived problems, allowing “pogroms” to be seen as one of the defining moments of the 20th century.

Veidlinger

(Professor Jeffrey Veidlinger)

The development of pogroms as a threat to the existence of Jews came to a stage.  First, the reaction to the assassination of Alexander II which Russian newspapers and right-wing Christians blamed the Jews.  Next is the results of the Russo-Japanese war which set off a wave of pogroms as the Russian people could not accept defeat.  The situation was further exacerbated by the 1905 Revolution allowing the Black Hundreds and individuals within the Tsarist police to unleash devastating pogroms.  It took until 1906 for the pogroms to subside.  The pogroms unleashed between 1903-1906 helped model behavioral patterns that were further refined with each wave of unrest.  Tensions were heightened with the appearance of THE PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION, first circulated by the Black Hundreds in 1903 it would be widely disseminated across Russia (and Europe) accusing the Jews of a global conspiracy to take control of world finances and manipulate government leaders.  The next stage in the development and implementation of pogroms was a result of World War I where Jews were accused of financing the German war machine and supporting Russia’s arch enemy, Germany.  Rumors of Jewish betrayal throughout the war led to their removal by Russian troops from front line areas leading to thousands of Jews imprisoned and others becoming refugees forced out of their homes and sent to other parts of the empire or forced to emigrate elsewhere when possible to eradicate what was perceived as a world Jewish revolutionary movement.

One of Veidlinger’s most important themes revolves around what happened to Jews in Ukraine during World War II, having its roots in what happened to Jews in the same geographic area in the post-World War I era.  The massacres established violence against Jews as an acceptable response to the excesses of Bolshevism due to the unrelenting exposure to bloodshed which habituated local populations to bloodshed and barbarism.  When the Germans arrived in 1941 they found a decades-old killing ground where the mass murder of innocent Jews was an acceptable reality.

Veidlinger correctly points out how Jews could not escape victimhood as after the Treaty of Brest Litovsk was signed in March 1918 by the Bolsheviks and Germans, the Jews would once again found themselves as victims.  As the Germans occupied Ukraine the Bolsheviks accused them of collaboration with the enemy as well as being members of the bourgeois class.  The Germans accused them of being Bolshevik sympathizers and engaging in violent attacks against German officials.  The Jews were victims of attacks from both sides further reinforcing the concept that it was acceptable to beat up and kill Jews.  Things grew worse when the Bolsheviks created the “Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Corruption” (Cheka) under Felix Dzerzhinsky which employed torture and terror to root out the opposition.  Interestingly, with so many Bolshevik leaders with Jewish backgrounds it was easy to spread lies pertaining to them by opposition to the new Soviet regime.  The remnants of the central powers, the White Army, the Black Hundreds all developed strong rationalizations to unleash further pogroms.

Leon Trotsky

(Leon Trotsky)

With the collapse of the German and Austro-Hungarian empire the nationalist goals of the Poles for their own nation ensued.  Joseph Pilsudski, a Polish military figure and statesman called for a multi-ethnic Polish state and became the first Chief of State for the new country.  However, for Jews the situation was complex as they once again were caught in the middle of divergent forces and soon became victims of pogramatic violence as Poles, Ukranians, and others fought for control of cities within the new Ukrainian and Polish republics.  Violence in Lviv set a new pattern as soldiers deliberately targeted Jews in their homes and businesses with no apparent military objective.  This seemed different as now soldiers were added to gangs of ruffians and local discontented types who openly attacked Jews.  This spread across Poland and Galicia resulting in over 130 pogroms against Jews by soldiers with the general population participating in the violence as crowds cheered them on.  Once again Jews were caught in the middle as a Ukrainian Republic had been proclaimed that seemed to be more tolerant of Jews when compared to the new Polish state.

The author does an excellent job exploring in insightful detail four of the 85 attacks on Jewish life and property between January and March 1919.  The four include pogroms in Ovruch, two in Zhytomyr, and Proskuriv.  What set them apart from previous pogroms was that they were not necessarily an unprompted spree committed spontaneously by unruly soldiers rampaging through civilian neighborhoods, but part of a protracted reign of terror perpetrated by officers, or leaders who achieved some military control acting under the authority of the state military.  They became a watershed for Jews because the Ukrainian government when it came to pass was predicated on the principle of minority rights and national autonomy and their lack of action showed they could not protect them.  For Jews targeted for supporting  Bolsheviks it betrayed the trust Jews had in their government. 

(A 1934 edition by the Patriotic Publishing Company of Chicago)

The problem that emerges in all four pogroms is that the high minded ideals of the Ukrainian cabinet and intellectual elites were not shared by the rest of the military leadership.  Instead, the officers and soldiers, many of whom had been poisoned by the anti-Semitic rhetoric of the Imperial Russian army which they had served and by prejudices learned in their villages, continued to view Jews as speculators stealing the wealth of the Ukrainian people, as enemies of the church, and the agents of Bolshevism.  It was a belief system that reverberated throughout the region to the detriment and of the well-being of Jews.  This would continue in the battles for Kyiv, Fastiv and other areas as the White army with their Cossacks entered the picture.

Fastiv is another example of the horrors Jews faced in September and October 1919 as the White army entered the fray resulting in the death of over 8000 Jews, some the result of outright murder and the rest the effects of hunger, exposure and the lack of any medical care.  The Whites wanted to eradicate the Jewish population anywhere they could find them.  The Whites were made up of former Tsarist officers and soldiers, along with the Cossacks just enhanced the terror Jews faced under the leadership of Anton Denikin, a former peasant and disgruntled Tsarist officer.  The former Tsarist officers saw the Jews as the progenitors of Bolshevism and as an internal enemy whose perfidy had led to Russia’s defeat in the Great War.  Their goal was to restore the Tsarist empire sans Jews.

Portrait of Russian army General Anton Denikin 1842-1947.

(Anton Denikin)

As previously mentioned the Jews were once again caught in the crossfire between the Red army, the White army, the Ukrainian People’s Republic, and the new Polish nation.  With the settlement at the Versailles conference unclear when it came to borders and the fate of Ukraine, it left an opening for these disparate elements to continue to fight and for Jews who grew confused as to whom to support as the political situation was a minefield.  The battlefield consisted of Whites fighting Reds, the Red Army fighting Poland, Poland fighting the Ukrainian People’s Republic, and sorted warlords seizing property and randomly killing Jews as opportunities presented themselves.  Throughout Ukraine and border areas with the new nation of Poland, government control of territory was always tenuous giving anti-Semites the perfect opportunity to engage in pogroms.  Fueled by conspiracy theories and past learning under the Tsar and the fact that Bolshevik leaders had Jewish backgrounds the plight of Jews seemed preordained.  As Veidlinger describes the many pogroms with its executions, shootings, rapes, seizures of property, and outright torture physically and psychologically one has to wonder how depraved the perpetrators of these atrocities were.

Veidlinger sums up the plight of the Jews very clearly: “Jewish civilians were singled out for persecution by virtually everyone.  The Bolsheviks despised them as bourgeois nationalist; the bourgeois nationalists branded them Bolsheviks; Ukrainians saw them as agents of Russia; Russians suspected them of being German sympathizers; and Poles doubted their loyalty to the newly founded Polish Republic.  Dispersed in urban pockets and insufficiently concentrated in any one contiguous territory, Jews were unable to make a credible claim to sovereignty, no party trusted them.  Regardless of one’s political inclination, there was always a Jew to blame.”

The concept of scapegoating stands out.  If one follows the plight of Jews in Europe since the Middle Ages , the Jew was the perfect target.  No matter what century we are speaking about pogroms would draw local people, at times the victim’s neighbors in what the author describes as a “carnivalesque atmosphere” of inebriated singing and dancing.  The perpetrators were often young peasants who had suffered greatly during World War I, who lacked any guidance from their elders who also participated in the bloodshed.

POSTPONED – Pogroms and the Origins of the European Genocide of the Jews

(1919 map of Ukraine)

As the Nazis rose to power and consolidated their rule in Germany in the 1930s the situation for Jews grew untenable.  The Nazi invasion of Poland and the Soviet Union created an invitation for “liberated peoples” to take out their frustrations against Jews.  The Nazis encouraged  anti-Semitism in the Ukraine taking advantage of its previous history of persecuting Jews.  In 1941, Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Reich Security Main Office, told subordinates “not to hinder attempts of local anti-communist and anti-Jewish circles to the newly occupies territories to engage in cleansing activities. On the contrary, they should be carried out and intensified, if necessary, and channeled in the right direction, but without leaving a trace.”  Heydrich would organize the Wannsee Conference where the decision labeled the ‘Final Solution” was reached. 

Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the SD (Security Service) and Nazi governor of Bohemia and Moravia. [LCID: 91199]

(Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the SD (Security Service) and Nazi governor of Bohemia and Moravia.. Place uncertain, 1942)

Pogroms broke out throughout the Ukraine in 1941 as the Nazis were aided by those who had participated in the horrors that took place between 1918 and 1921, and the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police.  The Germans would incite the Ukrainians by equating Jews with Bolsheviks, drawing upon the same language which peasants and Cossack militias had massacred Jews twenty years earlier.  The most deadly massacre took place in Kyiv on September 26, 1941, when Jews were marched to an open meadow, part of the Babyn Yar system were 33, 771 Jews were killed over thirty-six hours.  By the spring of 1942, the genocide of the Jews of Ukraine was complete, with over 500,000 Jews, , one-third of the prewar population murdered.  The pogroms Veidlinger describes in his deeply researched monograph had been mostly spontaneous and scattered, but once the Nazis crossed into Poland, the Ukraine, and the Soviet Union the Holocaust became increasingly systematic.   The intellectual preparation lingered from twenty years before, became a reality.  The precedent of1918-1921 came to fruition.  The script of twenty years before was reenacted.

In the end Veidlinger’s scholarly presentation concluded that few of the perpetrators of the Holocaust were punished when compared to their victims.  Some higher ups escaped, some were convicted, and many lesser accomplices had been sentenced to death by tribunals or vigilantes, but the reality is clear, as Veidlinger states, “the value of Jewish life had been debased.”

(Bodies of the Jewish victims of the pogrom in Orvuch, Ukraine, in February of 1919)

AFTERMATH: LIFE IN THE FALLOUT OF THE THIRD REICH 1945-1955 by Harald Jahner

The area extending north beyond the Brandenburg Gate was later controlled by Soviets for almost 40 year. Note the portrait of Stalin in the center.

(Berlin at the end of World War II)

Today Germany finds itself as the strongest economic power in Europe, in addition to possessing  major military influence due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  Its influence in Europe is strong and many of the goals of the Nazi regime during World War II have been achieved peacefully since unification following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  If one thinks back to 1945 Germany was devastated as it suffered from pervasive allied bombing be it Dresden, Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, and other German cities.  Living in one of these cities in the summer of 1945 and to imagine Germany’s dominant position in Europe today as a member of the European Union would be unthinkable.  The question is how did Germans face up to their Nazi past and how did they move on, for most with no sense of responsibility or guilt for the Holocaust and other atrocities committed by the Hitlerite regime domestically and across Europe?  Harald Jahner a German cultural journalist and former editor of the Berliner Zeitung focuses on the immediate postwar period in trying to determine why this happened in his book AFTERMATH: LIFE IN THE FALLOUT OF THE THIRD REICH 1945-1955.

Jahner immediately asks a series of questions which he hopes to convey the answers to.  For the nine million Germans who were bombed out of their homes and evacuees, the fourteen million refugees and exiles, the ten million released from forced labor and imprisonment, and the countless millions of returning prisoners of war the question was clear; “How was this horde of ragged, displaced, impoverished and leftover people broken up and reassembled?  And how did former national comrades (Volksgenossen), as German nationals were known under Nazism, gradually become ordinary citizens again?”  This process would lay the foundation of the “German economic miracle” of the postwar period and as a result is an important aspect of western history for historians to explore.

(The Nuremburg Trials)

Interestingly, the Holocaust had a negligible impact on the consciousness of most Germans during the period.  Many were aware of the crimes that took place in the name of Aryan unity and lebensraum (living space in the east) and perhaps guilt about causing the war, but there was little guilt concerning the death of six million Jews.  In fact, the whitewashing of the existence of the extermination camps was common even as the allies tried to confront the German people with evidence of Nazi crimes.  This coverup in part was due to the prevalent view of many Germans that they were now the victims.  As Jahner writes; “the survival instinct shuts out feelings of guilt.”

The postwar period was riddled with instances of imprisonments during the war for minor offenses who remained imprisoned after the war, some for years.  Disturbingly, at the same time former Nazi elites, scientists, and spies emerged in the bureaucracy of the new Federal Republic and cooperated with former allies as the Cold War approached.  At the same time ordinary people starved, lost their shelter, and tried to survive with the absence of authority.

Jahner begins his narrative by describing the plight of the German people.  Examples abound during the early months of the postwar period of suffering of the survivors of the war, and the author concludes as far as any guilt was concerned; “forgetting was the utopia of the moment.”  As a cultural historian Jahner’s main focus is how German culture evolved after the war as a tool to denazify the German people.  The author’s focus is broadly encapsulating a broad realm of cultural issues including film, music, art, newspapers, literature, furniture design, clothing, architecture, etc.  Jahner delves into the acceptance and rejection of certain cultural avenues following the war. In film, comedies rather than dramatizations were seen as more acceptable.  The cultural leaders were concerned about the general public’s taste and understanding of art.  The Third Reich had conditioned people in terms of aesthetic judgement, now they needed to break the intellectual chains of the past, i.e.; accepting modern abstract art which was seen as positive as it represented the denazification of culture. 

Road Work

(German soldiers returned home after WWII)

In an interesting comparison between the American and Soviet view of how to denazify and integrate the German people after the war, Jahner focuses on how the United States relied on art as a vehicle to promote democracy.  Employing the CIA as a vehicle to transfer funds to promote western culture, US intelligence services funneled money to particular cultural leaders as a means of obtaining their ends.  The Americans however were less likely to offer the Germans the chance of rehabilitation so soon after the war as the Soviets did.  Americans had no communist theory of history that would have enabled them to view Germans as victims of Hitler.  On the contrary Americans saw the average German as “a militaristic, authoritarian, hard hearted character for whom the Fuhrer’s state was the most representative form of government.”  The Russian approach was simpler, purging who they felt threatened by,  offering what became known as East Germans an off ramp to acceptability, and a culture that was much more digestible like “Socialist Realism.”

Jahner offers a window into how the German people coped economically on a daily basis exploring rationing, the black market, crime, exploitation, and the lack of housing which he argues would eventually lead to a market economy.  He explores topics like sex, love, the plight of orphans, returning POWs, forced laborers, demobilized soldiers, and other wandering human beings who had been displaced by war.  However, the most important insights he offers centers around the belief by Germans that the Nazis had humiliated them and the argument that they too were victims of Hitler.  This rationalization made it easy to avoid discussion of the Holocaust after the war and any German responsibility.  Hitler worshipers were “duped” rather than guilty for the events that led to war and what transpired during the war.  The positive is Jahner’s belief that what he terms as “intolerable insolence” is the belief that to establish democracy in post war Germany this denialism was a necessary prerequisite because it created the foundation of a new beginning.  The victim narrative reached its apex in April 1945 when the Germans were in fact liberated.

Jahners concludes that the majority of surviving Germans were so preoccupied with their own suffering that the dominant mood was one of self-pity.  Since they were victims they “had the dubious good fortune of not having to think about the real ones.”  As grim as Jahner’s discussion is concerning the amount of rubble that was left for the Germans to clear and live with, for many it is just punishment for a sophisticated people who succumbed so easily to the Nazi regime.  The eventual robust economic recovery of the East and West was a boon, according to Jahner, “but such good fortune had nothing to do with historical justice.”

Excellent aerial view showing devastation and bombed out buildings over wide area.

(Berlin at the end of World War II)

BLOOD AND IRON: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 1871-1918 by Katja Hoyer

(German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck)

It might surprise most of you that Germany has only been a country since 1871.  By the mid-19th century Germany was a series of states, thirty nine to be exact.  The dominant principalities were Prussia and Bavaria, one dominated the Lutheran north, the other the Catholic south.  The question must be asked, how was it unified?  Many argue it was the work of the eventual German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck whose brilliant realpolitik fostered wars with Denmark, Austria, culminating with the unification of the north and south through war with France.  Another important question revolves around the idea that Germany was unified because of Bismarck’s brilliance and his opponents in other countries/kingdoms were not exceptional intellects, particularly King Louis Napoleon III.  Did Bismarck lure his foreign opponents into wars, creating a nationalist movement that gave the Chancellor the opportunity to use Prussia as the cudgel to bring about the new country. 

If one has read the works of Otto Pflanze, Jonathan Steinberg, or A.J.P. Taylor it is clear that Bismarck learned an important lesson during the Revolutions of 1848 – Germany could not be unified from below – it had to be unified from above, superimposing Prussia on the rest of the German states.  It is obvious that the unification of Germany was a complex endeavor that engenders many questions, and it lends itself to an important book by Katja Hoyer, a German-British historian entitled, BLOOD AND IRON: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 1871-1918.

Photograph of an elderly Wilhelm, a bald man with side whiskers

(German Emperor Wilhelm I)

Hoyer does an excellent job of synthesis as she tackles “the Second Reich” under Wilhem I through his grandson, Wilhelm II in this short volume.  Do not let its length take away from Hoyer’s incisive analysis as she explains how Germany was unified, then remarkably how Bismarck decided that after unification, Germany was satiated and turned to domestic issues and away from further foreign wars.  He resorted to diplomacy by isolating France through a series of alliances and stole the socialist domestic thunder by adopting some of their programs.  Further, he did not want to get involved in the imperialist race for colonies since Germany’s creation had upended the European balance of power; he did not want to create enemies that would lead to war.  Hoyer argues correctly that once Bismarck passed from the scene in 1888, Wilhelm II would negate the Bismarckian realpolitik for a much more aggressive foreign policy which would eventually lead to the events of August 1914 and four years later Germany’s defeat in World War I.

Despite the fact that Hoyer’s monograph is only 239 pages, it is crammed with historical assessments, personality analysis, and a deep dive into the cause and effect of important events.  Hoyer displays a firm knowledge of sources and writes in an easy style that allows a clear understanding of information that at times can be dense.  The author offers many interesting points that seem off the beaten track, but in reality impact the course of German history.  A case in point is her discussion of the Grimm brother’s fairy tales and its impact on the unity of German culture.  Others include the relationship between Kaiser Wilhelm I, his son Friedrich III, and Wilhelm II, the Kaiser’s grandson.  The Kaiser tried to stay in the background and let Bismarck lead, Friedrich who died after 99 days on the throne was much more liberal than his father, and his son Wilhelm II was an aggressive and insecure man who would lead Germany to ruin.

File:Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany - 1902.jpg

(German Emperor Wilhelm II)

Hoyer carefully explains the rise of Otto von Bismarck and his relationship with Wilhelm I.  She examines his approach to domestic and foreign policy, and it is clear from her presentation that Bismarck was far more competent than anyone he dealt with as he manipulated people and events to achieve his goals.  She vociferously argues against the idea that there is a straight line in German history between Bismarck and Adolf Hitler.  She continues stating the Bismarckian system was inherently flawed, but it did not set Germany upon the inevitable path to war and genocide.  Bismarck was aware how the unity of the German states threatened the European balance of power after 1871 and was very careful not to create situations that would foster foreign intervention into German affairs.  Obviously, Bismarck used war as a political tool, but once his goals were achieved he turned more to protect unification and deal with domestic issues like the perceived socialist and Catholic threats, resulting in social legislation and the Kulturkampf which was a response to Papal overreach.

The key figure apart from Bismarck in Hoyer’s rendition of German history is Wilhelm II who saw himself as another Frederick Barbarossa who would lead Germany’s return to greatness.  According to Hoyer, Wilhelm II saw no need for Chancellors, Ministers, or political realities to mitigate his power, which was an unworkable concept at the turn of the century which only became apparent to him when it was already too late.  Wilhelm II had no comprehension of the complexity of Bismarck’s schemes in domestic and foreign affairs that held Germany together and allowed it to prosper. Despite his succumbing to flattery from certain officials resulting in cunning manipulation, feelings of insecurity, and his rejection of republicans and liberals his belief in the glory of Germany which deserved its rightful place in the world power structure was very popular with the German people.  The belief in authoritarianism and militarism is supported by a wonderful vignette dealing with an unemployed cobbler named Wilhelm Frederick Voight who acquired military costumes, dressed up as an officer and ordered soldiers and officials around as he seized Berlin City Hall with no one questioning his actions – according to Hoyer, a response to the uniform, highlighting German respect for authoritarianism and militarism.

gwimage274

(German soldiers in the trenches of World War I)

Hoyer is on point as she argues that for disparate Germans to come together they needed a sense of the common enemy, further she argues “the system fell because it was flawed from the outset, built on foundations of war, not fraternity.”  German historian Gerard DeGroot’s review sums up well what an effective job Hoyer has done; “There’s nothing particularly new in this assessment. The most impressive feature of this book is not its thesis but its brevity. Until now, I didn’t realize that it was possible to write a short book about Germany. Succinctness is an impressive and sadly undervalued quality in an author. A strict word count is a cruel tyrant; difficult decisions about what goes in have to be made and creativity inevitably curtailed. Hoyer nevertheless manages to pepper her trim narrative with some lovely frills. The mark of a really good short book is its ability to inspire curiosity. “Blood and Iron” achieves just that.  Careless historians often draw a straight line from Bismarck to Hitler. That, Hoyer argues, is “simplistic.” There’s much to admire in what Bismarck created and Wilhelm ruined. Important elements of the Second Reich survive in today’s Germany, a nation widely respected as stable, mature and responsible. What this story reveals is how easily governmental institutions can be destroyed when people are led astray by intoxicating notions of a place in the sun. That, perhaps, is a lesson for us all.”*

  • DeGroot, Gerard. “One Man, Three Wars, and the Creation of Germany,” Washington Post. January 7, 2022.
Wall Art - Photograph - Untitled 64 by © Ken Welsh