WHILE ISRAEL SLEPT: HOW HAMAS SURPRISED THE MOST POWERFUL MILITARY IN THE MIDDLE EAST by Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot

Aftermath of a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen in Kibbutz Beeri

(Children’s toys and personal items lie on the bloodstained floor of a child’s bedroom, following a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel, October 17)

By now I can’t imagine that anyone living in our media dominated world has not heard of Hamas’ brutal attack against Israel on October 7, 2023.  The Israeli reaction to the attack has resulted in the destruction of  large parts of the Gaza Strip and the death of tens of thousands of Palestinians according to the Gazan Health Ministry and accusations of genocide.  This barbaric attack carried out by Hamas and other affiliated terrorist groups, took the lives of at least 1,219 people and led to the taking of 251 hostages, most of them Israeli civilians.

 As of today, the remaining hostages who are alive and the bodies of those who perished have finally been returned.  Even though the Trump administration has brokered a ten step peace plan and America’s Arab allies have promised to help fund the rebuilding of Gaza, based on past history, Hamas’ continued slaughter of anyone who opposes them, and the intransigence of right wing politicians in Israel the odds of a major settlement are from my perspective almost nil. 

The current skepticism surrounding a meaningful settlement rests on a number of factors which center around Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu whose political career is on the line.  Many have argued that Netanyahu continued the war even as Israeli generals argued that there were no more meaningful targets.  Netanyahu who remains under indictment in Israel may have kept the war going to postpone further legal action against himself even as he tried to alter the Israeli judicial system to offset any further prosecution.

Israel-Hamas War In Seventh Week

(Wall dividing Israel and the Gaza Strip)

The other aspect of Netanyahu’s culpability rests on his government’s prewar policies, particularly his actions toward Hamas.  Critics, including former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, argue that Netanyahu’s long-standing policy of allowing the transfer of Qatari funds to Gaza in order to prop up Hamas’s rule and “buy” quiet ultimately backfired, allowing the group to strengthen and eventually launch the October 7th attack.  Further, multiple Israeli security officials, including the heads of the IDF and Shin Bet have admitted their failure to prevent the attack, with Netanyahu being criticized for initially deflecting personal responsibility onto the intelligence services. Warnings from within the military and intelligence apparatus were reportedly disregarded or not acted upon by Netanyahu’s government.   However, the larger question is how did we get here, as opposed to where we are today.

Israeli soldiers carry the body of a victim of an attack by militants from Gaza at Kibbutz Kfar Aza, in southern Israel

(Israeli soldiers carry the body of a victim of an attack by militants from Gaza at Kibbutz Kfar Aza, in southern Israel, October 10)

A number of partial answers to this puzzle have been tackled by Yaakov Katz, a former editor and chief of the Jerusalem Post and Amir Bohbot, a journalist and lecturer at Ben-Gurion University in their provocative new book, WHILE ISRAEL SLEPT: HOW HAMAS SURPRISED THE MOST POWERFUL MILITARY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

The word “partial” is used because there is no definitive answer provided in the book as to why Israel was caught so unaware on October 7, 2023.  The best the authors can offer is that there was a failure at all levels of command and leadership as they responded to situations filled with chaos.  In trying to ascertain why the attack occurred when it did and why Israeli leadership responded the way it did the authors looked at the mindset of decision makers as 2023 they evolved.  The basic problem is that Israel believed it was invincible and that Hamas was incapable of launching such a massive assault.  Israeli policy was one of containing Hamas, but by October 2023 that was no longer possible. 

The policy of containment dates to Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2006 under the government of Ariel Sharon.  From that time Israel, according to the authors responded to the attacks, be they rocket or terror attacks in Israel proper with incursions into Gaza, refusing to commit to an all-out invasion for fear of too many Israeli military and Palestinian casualties. This would send a message to Hamas that Israel was afraid to launch a major operation against Gaza.   Another factor that developed was the appearance and growth of Hezbollah as a major fighting force in possession of thousands of rockets on the Lebanese border which was a proxy of Iran.  Israel’s attention was also diverted to the Iranian nuclear program.  Despite intelligence to the contrary the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was caught in a dangerous complacency, believing that Hamas was more interested in a long-term truce and economic stability rather than war.  These arguments are well developed based on Israeli documents, interviews with Israeli national security and military officials, and their own reporting over the years.

It is clear that there was enough intelligence that Israeli officials should have been more proactive before the attack took place.  The authors begin their account describing the story of seven female soldiers who were part of an IDF unit called “tatzpitaniyot,” Hebrew for observers.  These young women, ages nineteen and twenty, were stationed at the Nachal Oz base, a few hundred yards from the Gaza Strip border.  These soldiers were tasked to monitor every inch of the Israel-Gaza border.  They employed the available technology and their own intuition that something was wrong.  They reported their findings to their superiors and were not listened to – they would be killed in the Hamas attack.  The authors conclude there was no operational plan for a full-scale offensive in Gaza, and no detailed strategy in the event of war.

Israeli police stand near the bodies of two men who were killed following a deadly mass-infiltration by gunmen from the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Sderot

(Israeli police stand near the bodies of two men who were killed following a deadly mass-infiltration by gunmen from the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, in Sderot, southern Israel October 7, 2023)

The authors ask many pertinent questions, one of which is why did the attack occur when it did.  With the Abraham Accords brokered by the first Trump administration normalizing Israeli relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco in 2020, Hamas did not want Saudi Arabia to join in the normalization process as it seemed they were about to do so by the end of 2023.  Since Egypt and Jordan had already abandoned Hamas this may have contributed to the decision  to act.  Further, Israeli domestic politics may have played a key role.  Hamas always wanted to make the Israeli people less resilient which Netanyahu’s plan to overhaul the Israeli judicial system to protect himself as he was under indictment was sure to do.  Netanyahu’s action provoked the Israeli left seeing the Prime Minister’s actions as a threat to democracy resulting in massive protests throughout Israel and threats by Israeli reserve Air force pilots not to fly missions and by military personnel to do the same.  The split in Israeli society certainly contributed to Hamas’ calculations.  Hamas’ decision  was developed over a long period of time, but its mindset was clear that eventually they would launch a massive attack, an attack they had been preparing for at least a decade.

According to the authors the crisis began on October 6 when the IDF’s premier signal collection unit that monitored activity in Gaza had crashed.  Possibly a cyber-attack to blind Israeli surveillance.  Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency received troubling alerts on their system but did little in response even as Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar was told, “there is an unclear preparation by Hamas for something” as its leadership was moving toward its bunkers in tunnels.  Analysts concluded it was just a “military exercise” not a full scale attack. 

West Bank Separation Wall

(Wall dividing Israel and Gaza)

The authors effectively lays out an almost hour by hour description of the information garnered by AMAN, the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate and how they reacted.  The problem for any Israeli response was it needed to be done  without Hamas being aware of it – they didn’t want to burn intelligence assets or push Hamas to attack if it was only a training exercise as they had done in the past.  In addition, Israel did not have one human asset among thousands of Hamas operatives waiting to attack.  

Despite intense communication among Israel’s national security apparatus on October 6, the government was caught between the idea Hamas was engaged in a military exercise or was about to launch a low level attack against Israel.  This inability to discern what Hamas was up to would have dire consequences as under the cover of 1300 rockets, over 3000 terrorists crossed into Israel at 60 locations.

The authors devote a considerable amount of time laying out and analyzing what Hamas’ leadership was planning and how sophisticated there approach was in developing their plans.  Over a decade Hamas operatives, including Gazans who were allowed to work in Israel developed exacting intelligence including maps of kibbutzim, IDF bases, offices of senior commanders, weapons depots etc.  Further, carrying out the ideas of Yahya Sinwar they had evaluated the state of the Israeli psyche and developed a plan in a sense to enter into the minds of the Israeli public and make them fear Hamas and force get them to turn against their government as terror attacks increased over the years, and culminating it with a massive assault which came to be October 7.

Israeli soldiers operate in northern Gaza amid the ongoing ground operation against Palestinian Islamist group Hamas.

(Israeli soldiers walk through what Israel’s military says is an iron-girded tunnel designed by Hamas to disgorge carloads of Palestinian fighters for a surprise storming of the border, amid the Israeli army’s ongoing ground operation against Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, close to Erez crossing in the northern Gaza Strip, December 15, 2023)

The chapter that explores the biography, thought process, and hatred toward Israel of Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza is perceptive and provides the reader with insights into a terrorist’s mind and how he would carry out his beliefs.  The authors trace his ideological development, particularly as it relates to Israel and its people.  His imprisonment for decades allowed him to study Israel, learning Hebrew and developing the ability to think like an Israeli.  His release from prison with 1026 other terrorists in return for Galid Shalit, a captured Israeli soldier allowed him to eventually make his way to Gaza, work his way up the Hamas chain of command, and become their ideological leader and convince his compatriots to go along with his goals of revenge and destruction of Israel.

Once Sinwar was released other events allowed Hamas to expand its military preparedness.  The arrival of the Arab spring in January 2011 brought to power Mohammed Morsi, a member of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt which opened up the Egyptian-Gazan tunnel complex allowing Hamas to import massive amounts of material, weapons, and building equipment allowing them to expand their tunnel network, military industrial production, and in effect enhance a tunnel complex which was 40-70 meters under Gaza and 300 miles in length.  In 2014 Israel responded to an increase in terror attacks and rockets with Operation Protective Edge.  By focusing close to the Israel-Gaza border and not launching an invasion, the Israeli government sent the wrong message.  Sinwar and his cohorts were convinced that Israel would not hit Hamas hard for fear of casualties.  In addition, Sinwar was able to convince Israel that he was committed to improving Palestinian economic conditions, needed to continue to collect subsidies for Qatar, to the point Israel believed Hamas was “deterred,” a term that appears repeatedly among Israeli officials.  According to Charles Lane in his Wall Street Journal book review of September 16, 2025;  “The Israeli government persuaded itself instead that improving economic conditions, or “facilitating proper civilian life in the Gaza strip,” as one intelligence official put it, would give Gazans a material stake in peace and, by extension, induce pragmatism in Hamas. Israel allowed the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars from Qatar to Gaza—much of which the terror group diverted into tunnel building and salaries for its militants.”

Image of an Israeli soldier secures a tunnel underneath Al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.

(An Israeli soldier secures a tunnel underneath Al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, November 22, 2023)

There are other important chapters that provide interesting and surprising aspects of Hamas’ development.  The chapter that describes the tunnel network that Hamas created is eye opening.  They built an entire world underground with tunnels at different levels depending on their purpose.  The thoroughness, sophistication, ingenuity, and efficiency of the various types of tunnels amazes, i.e., administrative, attack, logistical tunnels, something that was unimaginable.  They integrated their tunnel network as a key component of their military strategy.  This was all accomplished under Israel’s nose.  Soldiers and civilians heard or felt something was happening below, but officials did little to oppose it. 

The Israelis had to develop a new concept of warfare to offset the approach that Hamas employed.  Fighting underground was something Israel had never encountered, especially as the tunnels were under homes, apartment buildings, hospitals, mosques, and schools which allowed Hamas fighters to hide and then jump out and attack IDF soldiers.  In fact, Hamas’s leadership tunnel bunker was under the al-Shifa hospital.  Israel was able to develop Artificial Intelligence (AI) to create a digital map that included all the tunnels which became invaluable.  The author’s description is fascinating.

Getty Images Yahya Sinwar speaks during Ramadan in Gaza City, Gaza in 2022(Israel had hunted Gaza for more than a year to find Yahya Sinwar)

The Netanyahu government and the Prime Minister in particular believed Hamas was happy with their monthly transfer of financial assistance from Qatar which was provided with the government’s blessing and were not interested in escalation.  The Netanyahu government and intelligence services may have thought it knew its enemy’s intentions. But it was effectively deceived and found out the opposite of its beliefs was true.  There were deep flaws in the way Aman thought it understood Hamas.  Aman failed to grasp Hamas’ intentions and mistakenly believed that the organization’s leadership wanted a truce rather than war.  On the operational level, Israeli intelligence grossly underestimated the scale of Hamas’ plan, even though they had in their possession the “Jericho Plan” that provided clues as to what Hamas might implement.  Lastly, on a tactical level, the IDF’s belief that its border defenses would prevent an attack was inadequate.  The so-called “iron wall” erected along the border at the cost of over $1 billion was believed to be impenetrable.  The authors conclude everything and everyone were wrong – the idea that a fanatical Islamist terror group could be contained and Hamas had been deterred and wanted quiet is tough to accept with hindsight.

I agree with Charles Lane’s conclusions in September 16, 2025, review that “Pondering his dream of an Islamist state erected on the ruins of the Jewish one, Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar observed all of this from Gaza. He sensed that Israel was distracted and divided, its strategists in the grip of an errant conceptzia. He brilliantly fed those illusions through disinformation and deception, while pursuing his phenomenally detailed long-term plan. As Messrs. Katz and Bohbot imply the bloody assault on Israel was an intelligence failure by Israel as well as an intelligence triumph for Hamas.

File:Benjamin Netanyahu, February 2023.jpg

(Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu)

It was an ironic outcome for a nation helmed by Mr. Netanyahu. He had correctly told the United Nations General Assembly in 2009 to beware “the unfortunate habit of civilized societies to sleep until danger nearly overtakes them.” He quoted Winston Churchill on the “want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong.”

Messrs. Katz and Bohbot conclude their book with well-taken recommendations to help Israel’s political, military and intelligence institutions prevent another such debacle. But there’s no organizational cure for human nature, with its tendencies toward groupthink and confirmation bias. “The unfortunate habit” is a stubborn one. Even the most vigilant nations struggle to break it.”

An aerial view shows damage caused following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel

(An aerial view shows damage caused following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel, October 11)

BEING JEWISH AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF GAZA by Peter Beinart

Map showing the aid entry points and the military zone bifurcating north and south Gaza.

A few months ago, I had a conversation with an old friend from my Yeshiva days in Brooklyn.  At Yeshiva and in high school we were very close, and it is the case with many people we drifted apart over the years but intermittently we kept in touch.  Holiday greetings, a periodic email, or phone call were our communication over the decades, and I still have fond memories of our relationship.  It was during that conversation and his reaction to a number of my book reviews which I posted on my web site that I realized that a wall might be developing between us.  The foundation of our disagreement involved our reactions to events in Gaza that followed Hamas’ brutal attack of October 7, 2023, when over 1200 Israelis were slaughtered and 250 hostages were seized by the Palestinian terrorist group.  In our last conversation we “agreed to disagree” as he said so we could continue our friendly catch up conversation.  The crux of our disagreement rested on Israel’s reaction to the October 7th massacre which led to the destruction in Gaza making large parts of the territory almost inhabitable.

Evgenia Simanovich runs to the reinforced concrete shelter of her family’s home, moments after rocket sirens sounded in Ashkelon, Israel, on October 7. “In Ashkelon, residents have just seconds to seek shelter before a rocket launched from Gaza could strike,” photographer Tamir Kalifa told CNN. “Evgenia yelled for me to follow her, and I pressed my camera’s shutter as we sprinted to her home a few meters away.”

(Evgenia Simanovich runs to the reinforced concrete shelter of her family’s home, moments after rocket sirens sounded in Ashkelon, Israel, on October 7. “In Ashkelon, residents have just seconds to seek shelter before a rocket launched from Gaza could strike,” photographer Tamir Kalifa told CNN. “Evgenia yelled for me to follow her, and I pressed my camera’s shutter as we sprinted to her home a few meters away.” )

I went to the Gaza Strip in the spring of 1984 when I had a Fulbright Fellowship at Hebrew University.  It was a time of war after Israel invaded Lebanon to root out Palestinian terrorists who were making life miserable for Israelis living near their northern border.  When I visited Gaza I witnessed many of the living conditions that made refugee camps that were run down and squalid.   At the same time, I was amazed at the beauty of the Mediterranean coast that bordered the Palestinian enclave.  As a Ph. D in history who focused and published on Arab Israeli relations I am keenly aware of the positions of both sides, Arab and Jew when it came to the riots of the 1930s, the Holocaust, and events surrounding the 1948 War that led to the bifurcation of the region between differing viewpoints.  I have always held the belief that peace between the two sides was almost impossible based on ideology, the emotional attachment to the land by all parties, the leadership in the region, and the role of major powers.

Palestinians walk past the rubble of buildings destroyed during the Israeli offensive in Rafah

(Palestinians walk past the rubble of buildings destroyed during the Israeli offensive, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip).

With my mindset I was fortunate to come across Peter Beinart’s latest work; BEING JEWISH AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF GAZA where the author lays out the issues for people who have undying loyalty to the Israeli state, born of the Holocaust, seeing it always morally and ethically correct because of the neighborhood in which it resides, and those who find that the Netanyahu government, dominated by right wing nationalists had gone too far in trying to completely destroy Hamas.  No one can defend the abhorrent behavior of Hamas, but at what point do we draw the line when contemplating the destruction of an entire society through collective punishment.

It seems that every Jewish person has had the conversation with friends, relatives, and acquaintances over whether as Jews we can still support a government that engages in war crimes.  I realize “war crimes” is a difficult term to apply, but I must ask how else can you describe the discriminatory bombing and food deprivation of civilians who are being held hostage by Hamas that has led to the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians.  It is difficult to hold these discussions with people who firmly believe that Jewish goodness and integrity translates into Israeli virtue and exempts the Netanyahu government from the normal laws of humanity.  As Beinart writes, “we are not hard wired to forever endure evil but never commit it.  That false innocence, which pervades contemporary Jewish life, camouflages domination as self-defense,” which is at the core of the debate.

Over the years the author has been a stalwart supporter of Palestinian rights, even as he attends shul arguing that Jews are fallible human beings.  His goal as Benjamin Moser writes in the May 4, 2025, New York Times is “to wrestle with the knottiness and ambiguity in our sacred texts and correct for the omissions in the mythology of purity that so many of us were taught as children and that many continue to subscribe to as adults.”

Ceasefire between Israel and Hamas

(Palestinians walk past the rubble of houses and buildings destroyed during the war, following a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, January 20, 2024).

Beinart relies on Jewish texts and draws lessons from South Africa, where his family is from, to confront Zionism and what he sees as complicity from the American Jewish establishment in Palestinian oppression. He argues for a Jewish tradition that has no use for Jewish supremacy and treats human equality as a core value.  In his book, he appeals to his fellow Jews to grapple with the morality of their defense of Israel.  Beinart has a history of changing his opinions be it his support  for the Iraq War or tolerating workplace sexual harassment.  Beinart’s plea is for the Jewish community to reexamine their views that would require a painful about face concerning views they have held for most of their lives.

Beinart called on American Jews “to defend the dream of a democratic Jewish state before it is too late,” especially in light of the policies perpetrated by a government whose leader is under indictment who clings to power by accommodating the right wing minority in his cabinet.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems to prosecute the war on Gaza as a vehicle to remain in power which would avoid a trial and his possible imprisonment.  Whether you agree or disagree with the author he should be commended for his courage for standing up to what he believes is correct and accepting the consequences of the loss of friendships, anger from family members, and constant criticism and ostracization by his many critics.

One of Beinart’s major themes revolves around the argument that victimhood often feels like the natural state for Jews throughout history.  But this mentality covers up the fact that Jews can be “Pharoah’s too.”  This selective vision permeates Jewish life.  Jews employ the bible to refute the claim that Israel is a settler-colonial state.  Anything that contradicts this contemporary narrative is not accepted.  Interestingly the author weaves the ideas of Vladimir Jabotinsky, an important historical figure for right wing Israelis into the narrative, i.e.; the ideology of virtuous colonization, which today has been replaced by virtuous victimhood to support his views.

Palestinians wait to buy bread, in Gaza City

(Palestinians wait to buy bread in Gaza City, February 3, 2024)

To Beinart’s credit he recounts the brutal Hamas attack of October 7 in detail.  He delves into the impact on Israeli families and society and accurately concludes the entire country was a victim on that horrendous day of murder, rape, and kidnappings, not just those who experienced the immediate impact.  He even points out how Israeli progressives and leftists in the United States and Europe, ones, political partners reacted with indifference to the attack and many justified Hamas’s actions.  The message that was conveyed is that the killing of Jews was nothing new, it’s just the way it has always been.

Many Jews have compared October 7 to the Holocaust, but Beinart concludes there is a fundamental difference .  “To preserve Israel’s innocence, it has transforms Palestinians from a subjugated people into the reincarnation of the monsters of the Jewish past, the latest manifestation of the eternal, pathological, genocidal hatred that to the Passover Haggadah, in every generation rises up to destroy us.” 

A fighter from Izz al-Din al-Qassam stands in front of a...

(Hamas fighter outside the myriad of tunnels under Gaza)

Beinart tries to understand Hamas’s actions; in doing so he tries to explain the Palestinian mindset as they see themselves as victims of colonialism.  They, like other victims in the past, have no army, so they do not follow the rules of warfare and commit barbaric acts characteristic of colonial revolt.  However, countries like China and Russia have armies and they do not follow the rules of law in Ukraine, Georgia, Crimea, Chechnya, and in China’s case the victims are the Uyghur population and other mostly Muslim ethnic groups who can be considered genocide victims. 

In trying to understand, it is clear “that violent dispossession and violent resistance are intertwined.”  In the end Israeli oppression is not the only course of Palestinian violence.  It is Palestinians, like all people who are responsible for their actions.  However, Israeli oppression makes Palestinian violence more likely.  It comes down to despair for the Palestinian people as it is clear there is no way the Netanyahu government will accept a two-state solution.

Israeli soldiers carry the casket of reservist Elkana Yehuda Sfez, who was killed in combat in Gaza, during his funeral at the Mount Herzl military cemetery in Jerusalem, on Jan. 23.

(Israeli soldiers carry the casket of reservist Elkana Yehuda Sfez, who was killed in combat in Gaza, during his funeral at the Mount Herzl military cemetery in Jerusalem, on Jan. 23, 2024).

In analyzing death figures put out by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Gaza Health Ministry it is clear that over 50,000 people have died and 20% are probably children.  Beinart relies on many sources to verify these numbers, but Israeli leaders minimize the toll and shift blame onto Hamas arguing that Hamas uses human shields, seizes food and supplies targeted for Palestinian civilians, and murders any opposition.  However, Beinart’s argument that Hamas’s actions are typical of other insurgent movements is no excuse and to absolve them of one iota of legitimacy is wrong and their actions are considerably heinous when compared to other insurgent movements.  But Israel’s strategy to deliver as much destruction as possible in order to shock the Palestinians and get them to turn against Hamas has not been effective.  Blaming the Palestinians for Hamas’s 2006 victory at the polls is not valid since the Palestinian people had little choice.  Another Israeli argument that they must destroy Hamas to be safe, but it is an impossible task because the alternative Israel must offer, the ability to vote, a high degree of autonomy, and a future state will not be forthcoming so why should Palestinians opt for peace?  They need a viable alternative for Hamas which is not forthcoming.  In reality, as long as Israel tries to destroy each insurgent group, their actions foster the next generation of insurgents.  As Palestinians believe they are not safe, they will do their best to make sure Israelis are not safe also.

In reading Beinart’s work I wondered if there is such a thing as “Jewish exceptionalism” that makes Israel unaccountable for the type of warfare they are waging.  Historically I do not see it as other nations/groups have engaged in atrocities and war against civilians have been condemned with sanctions etc.

Israeli protesters attempt to block the road as aid trucks cross into the Gaza Strip, as Israeli border police watch over them, at the Kerem Shalom border crossing, southern Israel, Jan. 29.

(Israeli protesters attempt to block the road as aid trucks cross into the Gaza Strip, as Israeli border police watch over them, at the Kerem Shalom border crossing, southern Israel, Jan. 29, 2024)

Another major issue that Beinart raises is that of the “new anti-Semitism.”  Israel has equated any criticism of its actions as anti-Semitic as a vehicle of deflecting criticism of what they are doing in Gaza.  In doing so they turn the conversation about the war into a conversation about the motives of people who oppose their actions.  What is clear is that when Israel kills Palestinians, what is perceived to be anti-Semitism increases, but the Israeli government conflates anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism in order to depict Palestinians and their supporters as bigots, therefore turning a conversation about the oppression of Palestinians into a conversation about the oppression of Jews.  In the end Judaism and Israel are separate and Jews, the world over should not be blamed for the actions of the Israeli government.

A great deal of Beinart’s discussion revolves around the actions of American Jews who support Israel’s policies.  It seems as progressives in the United States turn against Israel they are forcing Jews to choose; defend exclusion in Israel or inclusion in the United States and some of America’s leading institutions are choosing the former.

Israeli soldiers practice evacuating wounded people with a helicopter during a military drill in northern Israel, in preparation for a potential escalation in the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah militant group in Lebanon, on Feb. 20.

(Israeli soldiers practice evacuating wounded people with a helicopter during a military drill in northern Israel, in preparation for a potential escalation in the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah militant group in Lebanon, on Feb. 20, 2025)

Beinart offers a comparison of historical situations that are somewhat similar to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  He delves into apartheid in South Africa and the fears of white Afrikaners; he discusses the hatred and fears that existed in Northern Ireland until a settlement was reached overcoming Protestant fears of the IRA; the Reconstruction period in the late 19th century in the United States is explored as southern whites feared the newly freed black population and fueled by northern liberals.  In these situations, the key to avoiding as much violence as possible was to give the aggrieved party the vote and a voice to express their concerns because inclusion yields greater, not total safety.

I do not believe that Beinart is naive enough to support the idea that if a settlement ever arrives between Israel and the Palestinians that peace will break out in the Middle East.  In a region where Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and numerous other terrorist groups abound violence will lessen, but the author’s emotional and heart felt appeal for reconciliation is really the only hope for the future no matter how impossible that appears today.  I admire Beinart’s beliefs and the professional risks he has taken to engage the public in a proper debate – that should be allowed in a free society and the back and forth between those who disagree should be civil, not based on fear.

DEATH IS OUR BUSINESS: RUSSIAN MERCENARIES AND THE NEW ERA OF PRIVATE WARFARE by John Lechner

(Yevgeny Prigozhi in Saint Petersburg in 2016)

In June 2023, it appeared for the first time there was a clear threat to the rule of Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin.  This risk to Putin’s reign was fostered by the inability of Russian forces to achieve a quick victory after it invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and was unable to overthrow and replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.  The danger Putin faced was the work of the Wagner Group, under the leadership of Yevgeny Prigozhin, his former chef and caterer who led the armed rebellion against the Russian government. This rebellion, which lasted for about a day, was a culmination of simmering tensions between the Wagner Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense and the fact that the fighting had reached a World War I type of stalemate.  Prigozhin accused the Russian military of shelling Wagner positions, refusing to resupply his troops, and also criticized the Russian leadership for their “maximalist positions” in the war in Ukraine.  It is interesting to analyze Putin’s response to Prigozhin and his private army since it was Russia’s most effective fighting force against the Ukrainian army.  The rebellion ultimately failed, as Prigozhin got cold feet as his army marched toward Moscow.   Prigozhin turned his forces away from the Russian capital and reached an agreement to move Wagner forces to Belarus.   However, in the end Prigozhin went the way of others who opposed Putin as he died in a plane crash on August 23, 2023.  Despite the death of their leader, the Wagner group lives on with its political business and military ventures as a pillar of the Russian government’s operations the world over.

As the bloody conflict continues to play out in Ukraine journalist John Lechner’s latest book, DEATH IS OUR BUSINESS: RUSSIAN MERCENARIES AND THE NEW ERA OF PRIVATE WARFARE has been published at a propitious time.  Lechner’s excellent monograph is an education describing the origins of the Wagner group, its methods, and operations.  We witness how the Wagner group gains a foothold in fragile nation states, gains access to a country’s natural resources, removes peacekeeping forces, all to cash in on the instability of weak states that possess resources that are viewed as vital for Russian strategic interests, and the profitability of the group itself.

Dirt graves with wooden crosses and red, yellow and black wreaths.

(The US says the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties)

Lechner points out in his introduction that after a two hundred year hiatus, private warfare has returned, albeit in new ways.  For most of history private armies and mercenaries were the norm, nevertheless at the end of the Thirty Years War (1660) European rulers saw the advantage in recruiting public standing armies within their borders.  By the 19th century, the nation state was largely responsible for the prosecution of warfare on the continent.  However, private armies were employed by colonial powers to subdue far-flung regions and governments would outsource the exploitation of colonies to private companies.  Once decolonization made headway following World War II and late in the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union began to relax its financial and military support from previous colonial regions, they would partly turn to privatization both internally and externally.  Newly independent countries would outsource their security requirements to private military companies, and the United States would turn to the privatization of warfare following 9/11.  By 2010, private contractors outnumbered American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, the most famous of which was Blackwater.  Lechner describes two types of private military companies.  First, mercenary companies are private armies that conduct autonomous military campaigns.  Military enterprises, like Blackwater, augment a powerful state’s regular armed forces and embed with one government.  Secondly, the two types were merged into a new novel private military company.  This new organization was cultivated and advanced by Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Donets Basin, or Donbas

(Donbas Basin)

Lechner delves into a number of Private Military Contractors (PMC) providing details on recruitment, operations, geographic involvement, and important personnel.  However, the author’s most important focus is the Wagner Group under the direction and tight control of Yevgeny Prigozhin.  In 2014, on the heels of Russia’s invasion of Crimea, Prigozhin linked up with Dmitry Utkin, a career soldier a member of an intelligence unit, and carried out training and proxy wars for the GRU to create the Wagner Group which would prove to be an effective fighting force with brutal enforcers in the rear.  By 2015, working closely with the Ministry of Defense in Syria, and autonomously in northern and central Africa the group spread its influence and profitability.  By 2018 Wagner forces seemed everywhere from Madagascar to Mozambique, in addition to becoming the “tip of the spear” of Russian assertiveness.  By August 2022 Wagner mercenaries were fighting in eastern Ukraine and successfully reached the outskirts of Bakhmut.  Prigozhin’s success rested on his ability to recognize opportunity in unstable situations, bringing a team together to take advantage of the situation in a nation’s capital and on the ground, especially in Africa which had over 100 million refugees, and employing social media highlighted by misinformation to enhance his reputation and ego.

Alexey DRUZHININ/SPUTNIK/AFP Yevgeny Prigozhin shows Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin his school lunch factory outside Saint Petersburg on September 20, 2010(“I had known Prigozhin for a very long time, since the 1990s,” Vladimir Putin recalled)

Lechner is clear that today there is little distinction between soldiers and mercenaries in large part because of globalization.  When one examines Russian recruitment of PMC and those in other countries it is clear that Lechner is correct.  Russian mercenaries presented as “little green men,” many on “vacation” and began appearing in 2014 in Crimea and the Donbas.  Lechner accurately explains Putin’s motivations involving the expansion of NATO, western plots against Russia, and his desire to recreate the Russian empire.  Putin was supported by the growth of domestic nationalist Russian ideologues witnessed by the number of volunteers who came to fight in Ukraine believing that Ukraine belonged to Russia harkening back to Catherine the Great and Lenin who artificially designated Ukraine and Belarus.

The turning point for Prigozhin  came with the invasion of Crimea as his contacts with the Ministry of Defense provided a degree of access to Putin who allowed him to become the handler of mercenaries in the Donbas – it is here that he and Utkin created the Wagner Group.  Slowly they were able to do away with other mercenary leaders and centralize other separatist militias into one.  This would be accomplished for the most part in 2015.  Prigozhin was an entrepreneur who envisioned a PMC like Erik Prince’s Blackwater.  He would get his start in Syria, supported the regime of Bashir Assad and helped arm, train, and participate in the brutal civil war designed to overthrow the murderous government in Damascus.


Russia formally intervened in Syria in 2015, and the first Wagner fighters entered the conflict in September of that year.  Lechner describes the brutality of the civil war, highlighted by Assad’s use of poisonous gases, cluster bombs, and doing anything to remain in power.  He could not have done so without the Wagner Group.  The key for the group is that it developed its own esprit de corps.  Their soldiers were mercenaries, but they were also Russian patriots, men willing to fight and die for the motherland, more so than the Russian military.  Their success provided Prigozhin with greater access to Putin directly to circumvent the Ministry of Defense.

Reuters Yevgeny Prigozhin helping Vladimir Putin at a dinner table, 2011(Yevgeny Prigozhin (left) pictured serving Vladimir Putin (centre) at a dinner in 2011)

Lechner carefully lays out the structure of the Wagner Group and breaks it down into its military and business components.  Prigozhin would create a corporate structure, first called Evro-Polis from which he negotiated contracts with governments and gained access to their natural resources, provided military services, and protection.  The group drew from varying ideologies and priorities, most of which were various degrees of nationalists and white supremacists.  Much of the group’s strategy was designed to seize oil and gas fields, mineral mining, and other lucrative opportunities in the countries they were involved.

The Wagner Group proliferated across central and northern Africa feasting on the resources of the Central African Republic, Libya, Chad, Sudan, Mali, Syria, and Niger.  Most people think of the Wagner forces as it relates to the Donbas, but Lechner spends a good part of his monograph detailing how Prigozhin penetrated Africa, the contracts he signed, the coups and counter coups he was involved in, and the many personalities he dealt with, many of course were as ruthless as he was – perhaps that was why he was so successful.  By 2021 Prigozhin and his PMC were truly global.  The threat he represented for the west was proof to the Kremlin that his initiatives were a worthy investment.  Their effectiveness was less important than the west’s reaction to them.

In developing his material, Lechner relied on interviews with the relevant government officials and soldiers, especially 30 members of the Wagner Group.   Lechner’s success rests on beautiful first-person writing with granular reporting.  Further, the author is an exceptional linguist as he speaks Russian and Chechen as well as Sango, the language of the Central African Republic.  His interviews saw him travel across war zones in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East to the point he was almost kidnaped.  Lechner witnessed the viciousness and cruelty in which the Wagner Group operated, a group that would eventually morph into a 50,000 man private army.

Reuters Yevgeny Prigozhin makes a statement as he stand next to Wagner fighters in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict in Bakhmut, Ukraine, in this still image taken from video released May 20, 2023(Prigozhin became most vocal in a series of video statements from Bakhmut where he criticised the defence establishment)

Prigozhin’s forces were initially deployed after the annexation of Crimea, a year later the Wagner Group  was sent to the Donbas region to support the pro-Russian separatists.   They would participate in destabilizing the region, taking control of key locations, and directly engaging in combat.  A major component of their actions was to eliminate dissident pro-Russian commanders, potentially through assassination.  The Wagner Group’s actions contributed to the escalation of the Donbas conflict and the overall instability in eastern Ukraine.   By 2022 and onward they played a significant role in the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, even recruiting prison inmates for frontline combat operations – estimated to number between 48-49,000.  These men would die by the thousands in the Donbas meat grinder, but for Prigozhin they served their purpose.  Eventually Prigozhin let his substantial ego get in the way and threatened to march on Moscow, as stated earlier it did not go well.

In the end, according to Nicolas Niarchos in his May 13, 2025, review in the New York Times, the Wagner Group “was an effective boogeyman, mercenaries of all stripes have proliferated across the map of this century’s conflicts, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Yemen.  “The West was happy to leverage Wagner as shorthand for all the evils of a war economy,” Lechner writes. “But the reality is that the world is filled with Prigozhins.”

Lechner is right. When Wagner fell, others rose in its stead, although they were kept on a tighter leash by Russian military intelligence. In Ukraine, prisoners are still being used in combat and Russia maintains a tight lid on its casualty figures. Even if the war in Ukraine ends soon, as President Trump has promised, Moscow’s mercenaries will still be at work dividing their African cake. Prigozhin may be dead, but his hammer is still a tool: It doesn’t matter if he’s around to swing it or not.”

Yevgeny Prigozhin points his finger, his gaze his slightly past the camera

(Yevgeny Prigozhin says he was required to “apologise and obey” in order to secure ammunition for his troops)

THE GATES OF GAZA by Amir Tibon

Memorial candles line the charred desks in the destroyed command center of Nahal Oz base, February 23, 2024. (Used in accordance with Clause 27a of the Copyright Law)

(Memorial candles line the charred desks in the destroyed command center of Nahal Oz base, February 23, 2024.) 

One of this morning’s lead articles in the New York Times read “Fate of Bibas Family Recalls Trauma of October 7, Renewing Fears of Gaza Truce.”  The crux of the article centered on the return of three Israeli citizen’s bodies, two babies and their mother.  The problem emerged that the body of the mother was misidentified, it was another victim of this war.  According to the article the “news set off a paroxysm of fury and agony in Israel rarely seen since the tumultuous days that followed the Hamas led attack on Oct. 7, 2023, when up to 1,200 people were killed and 251 were abducted, including Ms. Bibas and her sons, on the deadliest day in Israeli history.

For Palestinians, the devastation wrought by Israel’s military response to the Oct. 7 raids — a reaction that, among other consequences, razed Palestinian burial grounds and killed thousands of children including some younger than Kfir Bibas — has long overshadowed Hamas’s terrorist attacks at the start of the war.”

Miri Bernovsky-Tibon and Amir Tibon

(Nahal Oz Kibbutz residents Miri Bernovsky-Tibon and Amir Tibon) 

But Israelis remain deeply traumatized by the October assault, and the return of the Bibas boys, coupled with the uncertainty about their mother’s whereabouts and the disrespectful way that Hamas paraded the coffins on Thursday, revived the torment.  The war has resulted in the death of between 40-50,000 Palestinians according to the Arab Red Crescent and the near total destruction of Gaza and its infrastructure.

The brutal attack by Hamas and the Israeli response has set the Middle East on fire resulting in an Israeli invasion of Lebanon targeting Hezbollah, a “pseudo-war” with Iran, and a long range conflict with the Houthis in Yemen.   Currently, the region is experiencing a ceasefire in Gaza, which is only in its first phase and there are doubts it will continue to the next phase.  The question is how did we get here, what was the experience of the attack like, and historically what events led to the attack.  Answers to these questions are discussed and analyzed in Amir Tibon’s THE GATES OF GAZA.  The superb monograph is part memoir as Tibon and his family reside in Nahal Oz, a Kibbutz that borders the Gaza Strip, and a historical look at events and outcomes as Tibon is an award-winning diplomatic correspondent for Haaretz, Israel’s paper of record.

One of the questions that is repeatedly asked is why Israelis settle on land so close to the Gaza border where rockets, snipers, intruders are a constant threat.  The answer lies in Israeli defense policy that emerged in October 1953 when Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and General Moshe Dayan argued that the border with the Gaza Strip needed more military installations in order to be totally fortified.  The border itself was not an “internationally recognized” border, but a cease fire line drawn to end the 1948-9 Israeli War of Independence.  As Tibor writes, “there needed to be civilian life at the border – especially agriculture – before the region would be completely safe.  A permanent population to detect and deter attacks and to convince the Arab world that the young recently founded state of Israel was there to stay.”  The kibbutz which the Tibon family settled on and was attacked on October 7 was founded by sixty men and women members of a military unit called Nahal in 1953.

Israel enters the West Bank with tanks and raided Jenin for the first time since 2002

(Israeli tanks enter the city for the first time since 2002, in Jenin, in the northern West Bank, Feb. 23, 2025.)

The title of the book was derived from a speech given by General Moshe Dayan on a day when four couples were to be married.  Instead, it became a funeral oration, “the Gates of Gaza,” which originated from the biblical story of Samson fighting the Philistines.  In this case the speech was to honor Roi Rothberg who had been murdered by Egyptian fire as he patrolled the boundaries of the kibbutz and tried to return Palestinians who had crossed the “demarcation line” and entered Israeli territory.  The Egyptians did return the “mutilated body” of their victim.

Aftermath of a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen in Kibbutz Beeri

(Children’s toys and personal items lie on the bloodstained floor of a child’s bedroom, following a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel, October 17. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun)

If one fast forwards to 2025 nothing has really changed between Palestinians and Israelis.  Wars seem to break out every few years, constant rocket fire from Gaza with the inevitable Israeli response, border incursions from both sides leading to numerous deaths, and leaders on both sides whose ego’s, lust for power, and what I guess is called ideology dominate.  Tibon focuses on these aspects throughout the narrative, along with his family’s personal journey and survival on October 7.

Israeli military officers organise dead bodies before relatives are called to identify them, following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Ramla

(Israeli military officers stand by a container in which bodies of the dead are stored before their relatives are called to identify them, in Ramla, Israel, October 13. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun)

Tibon structures his book with alternating chapters.  First we have the attack of October 7, then a history lesson.  He moves on with chapters alternating between the events he and his family experienced on October 7, continuing with a careful historical analysis of events and personalities leading up to today.  Tibon integrates the Hamas attack on his family, their escape into the “safe room” in their house to wait out the violence occurring outside the front door.  Tibon assumed that the “all clear” would be sounded within a few hours as usually is the case, but much to his surprise this was different as the bullets, mortars, and rockets continued.  Tibon would soon realize that this was not a random attack by a terror cell, but a large well planned operation that would not be over quickly.  The key for Tibon was his two toddlers, Carmel and Galia, and his wife Miri.  The task was to keep the children quiet as not to give the terrorists another family to murder. Tibon did not realize how bad the situation had become with a nearby military base overrun by Hamas and the hundreds of bodies scattered between Nahal Oz and the base – throughout the early hours, Tibon wondered where the Israeli Defense Force was.  Women and children were being murdered, and the IDF was nowhere to be found.

benjamin netanyahu smiles and looks to the left, he wears a gray suit jacket, light blue dress shirt, red tie and israel flag pin

(Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu)

The historical narrative and analysis are succinct and damning in terms of Israeli and Palestinian Authority and Hamas leadership.  Tibon chooses certain historical aspects as a means of explaining how the Israeli and Palestinian people have reached the abyss they now found themselves in.  A key turning point was reached in 1987 as Palestinians could no longer accept the loss of prime agricultural land, which in part led to the first Intifada.  Interestingly, Yasir Arafat and the PLO ;leadership were totally caught off guard by events.  As a result of the violence Sheik Ahmed Yassin and Palestinian Islamists formed a new organization called Hamas – Islamic Resistance Movement.  The Intifada turned Hamas into a central force in the Palestinian community.  The more forceful the Israel response, the more Hamas’ popularity and ideology were enhanced, reducing the influence and power of the PLO.

Two villains emerge in Tibon’s discussion.  First is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who has been in office most of the last two decades.  In 1993 Tibon argued that Netanyahu worked to prevent a peace settlement following the Oslo Accords.  He worked to incite Israel’s right wing which led to the assassination of then Israeli Prime Minister and architect of Oslo, Yitzhak Rabin.  Netanyahu would defeat Shimon Peres in the next election and slowed down the peace process increasing Hamas’ popularity at the expense of Arafat.  He then ordered the assassination of Khaled Mashal, the head of Hamas’ Political Bureau.  After the attempt was botched, Netanyahu agreed to release Shiek Ahmed Yassin, Hamas’ spiritual leader, and blocked the extradition of Mussa Abu-Marzouk who raised millions of dollars to fund Hamas, allowing him to settle in Jordan.  If one fast forwards to October 7, Netanyahu’s fingerprints are all over the disaster even though he was thrown out of office in 1999.

An aerial view shows damage caused following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel

(An aerial view shows damage caused following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel, October 11. REUTERS/ Ilan Rosenberg)

Netanyahu would return to power in 2009 and would later be accused of corruption. The Israel Police began investigating Netanyahu in December 2016 and subsequently recommended indictments against him. On 21 November 2019, Netanyahu was officially indicted for breach of trust, accepting bribes, and fraud, leading him to legally relinquish his ministry portfolios other than prime minister. His legal problems led to legislation by the Israeli right wing in the Knesset designed to reduce the power of the Israeli Supreme Court which provoked enormous demonstrations in Israel in 2022 and 2023.  For many, Netanyahu’s legal problems were a national security threat for the state of Israel as he put his own personal quest for power to escape prosecution above the needs of the Israeli people.  Netanyahu’s behavior and policies further emboldened Hamas as he approved Qatari funding of Hamas whereby millions of dollars were used to build the tunnel infrastructure that allowed for attacks against Israel for years and finally the events of October 7.

Israel Defense Forces handout at Al Shifa hospital in Gaza City

(Israeli soldiers inspect the Al Shifa hospital complex, in Gaza City, November 15. via Israel Defense Forces)

Netanyahu also approved the trade of 1027 Palestinian prisoners for Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier seized by Hamas in 2007.  Among those released in 2011 was Yihyia Sinwar, the Hamas tactician and ideologue who designed  the plan that was carried out on October 7.  Further damning of Netanyahu took place in 2016 as Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman warned him, a right wing member of Likud that Israel intelligence uncovered a plot which would be catastrophic for Israel: “a secret plan by Hamas to cross the border fence at several points simultaneously, attack a long list of Israeli communities near Gaza, murder hundreds of citizens, and take dozens of hostages into Gaza.  With this evidence and the fact that Hamas was using Qatari money to build tunnels and rockets, Netanyahu did nothing.

There are obviously others who deserve condemnation for the events of October 7.  Yasir Arafat’s refusal to make peace in 2000, the corruption of the PLO and later the fecklessness of Arafat’s replacement Mahmoud Abbas and his corruption laden administration in the Palestinian Authority which was defeated by Hamas in elections and the battlefield.  Sinwar is also a key figure who spent years in an Israeli jail for murdering Israeli citizens.  While in prison he learned Hebrew and studied every aspect of Israeli life and politics he could and began to develop his plan for a massive incursion of Israel from Gaza.  Even when released from prison Sinwar worked methodically applying Qatari money, Netanyahu’s errors, and the fact that by March 2023 Israel was being torn apart from the inside with many reserve soldiers and pilots refusing to carry out orders because of the demonstration by Israeli citizens against Netanyahu’s cohorts in the Knesset’s attempts to reduce the power of the Israeli Supreme Court for the benefit of its Prime Minister.  Sinwar would ramp up attacks in the West Bank in the summer of 2023 in hindsight a diversion for October 7.  Netanyahu sent 30 battalions of soldiers to the West Bank, leaving only 4 to defend the kibbutzim on the Gaza border.  As this was occurring Netanyahu encouraged Qatar to continue to send millions to Hamas.

IDF handout image shows Israeli soldiers take position in the Gaza Strip

(Israeli military vehicles manoeuvre during the ongoing ground operation of the Israeli army against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as seen in an image released on November 13. Israel Defense Forces/via REUTERS)

A key event which Tibon uses to tie Israeli history to the events of October 7 revolves around the first time Nahal Oz was attacked in 1956 when Palestinian fedayeen encouraged by Egyptian president Gamal Nasser crossed the border and killed Roi Rotberg, a young member of the kibbutz, and taking his mutilated body back to Gaza.  As Max Strasser writes in his November 4, 2024, New York Times  book review entitled “The Reckoning”; “The next day, Moshe Dayan, then the military’s chief of staff, delivered the most famous eulogy in Israeli history.

“For eight years they have been sitting in the refugee camps in Gaza, and before their eyes we have been transforming the lands and the villages, where they and their fathers dwelt, into our estate,” Dayan said. “How did we shut our eyes and refuse to look squarely at our fate, and see, in all its brutality, the destiny of our generation? Have we forgotten that this group of young people dwelling at Nahal Oz is bearing the heavy gates of Gaza on its shoulders?”

IDF handout image shows Israeli soldiers taking position in a location given as Gaza

(Israeli soldiers take position during the ongoing ground operation of the Israeli army against Hamas, in a location given as Gaza, in this image released on November 13. Israeli Defense Forces/via REUTERS)

This was, Tibon writes, “a rare recognition by an Israeli leader of the Palestinian Nakba.” Dayan had identified Israel’s tragic endowment — a country built on displacement — and declared that the only response could be strength, a country where thriving in a kibbutz on a border forged in war would help secure peace.

But Tibon does not offer the whole quote. “We are the generation of settlement,” Dayan went on. “Our children will not have a life if we do not dig shelters, and without barbed wire and machine guns we will not be able to pave roads and dig water wells.”

In the epilogue, Tibon goes back to visit his deserted, bullet-scarred kibbutz and stands looking over the border at the rubble of Gaza. He rereads Dayan’s eulogy and wonders if his former neighbors at Nahal Oz will someday be able to return if peace with the people on the other side of the border is conceivable. It’s certainly hard to imagine, so long as the people of Gaza live with barbed wire and machine guns.”

F250219CG114 (1).jpg

(Shiri Bibas and her children Kfir and Ariel)

THE ACHILLES TRAP: SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE CIA, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S INVASION OF IRAQ by Steve Coll

Saddam Hussein on the Saaif Saab Front

(Saddam Hussein)

For years, the United States was involved in a complex relationship with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.  During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s the Reagan administration provided Baghdad with licenses to acquire certain implements of war, provided intelligence as to Iranian positions, and at the same time engaged with Iran with weapons for hostages.  The United States employed Saddam as a counterweight to Teheran from 1979 onward.  Later, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Washington completely altered its policies and organized a coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait.    However, before the war commenced the United States gave false signals to Saddam before he invaded Kuwait which he seemingly misread.  Throughout the 1990s the United States backed a series of possible scenarios to overthrow Saddam, but none was successful.

Fast forward to 2003, the second Bush administration under the influence of neoconservatives fostered policies to invade Iraq remove Saddam and achieving control of Iraqi oil and reorienting the balance of power in the Middle East.  It is clear today that the result of that policy was to elevate Iran’s regional influence as the Iraq counterweight was removed.  The errors fostered by the Bush administration have been a disaster for Washington’s role in the region.  How this all came about is the subject of Pulitzer Prize winning author Steve Coll’s latest book, THE ACHILLES TRAP: SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE CIA, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA’S INVASION OF IRAQ.

Kuwait political map

What becomes clear from Coll’s account is that there was more to Saddam than American politicians and spies could understand – even when the stakes were so high in dealing with him be it trying to uncover his nuclear capabilities, the sellout of the Kurds in northern Iraq, the invasion of Kuwait, and the final cat and mouse game that led to the Second Gulf War.  Coll’s research consisted of numerous interviews of the participants in this historical relationship in addition to the availability of Saddam’s secret treasure trove of over 2000 hours of tape recordings of leadership meetings – private discussions – meeting minutes- intelligence files – and other materials.  It allows us to see Saddam in new ways, “what drove him in his struggle with Washington, and to understand how and why American thinking about him was often wrong, distorted, or incomplete.”  The result is an incisive monograph that details events and decision making in a readable format providing a review of Iraqi American relations since the 1970s.  Coll pulls no punches in his analysis, and it is an important contribution to the many works that deal with this topic.

From the outset Coll introduces Saddam’s fears of the Iranian Revolution, his hatred for the Ayatollah Khomeini, his obsession with Israel’s nuclear capability, and his need to develop atomic weapons.  He introduces Jafar Dhia Jafar, a British educated physicist who would become the intellectual leader of Iraq’s atomic bomb program who plays a vital role throughout the book as Saddam’s Oppenheimer.  Coll’s discussion of the Iran-Iraq war focuses on the motivations of each side and the key role played by American intelligence, weaponry, and licensing.  It was clear under the Reagan administration that it wanted to work with Saddam but as we did so we misread his goals.   Further Washington’s support for Baghdad fostered deep misunderstand on Saddam’s part as to what they could get away with without American opposition which is the major theme of the book.  Throughout the narrative Coll explains the inability of Iraqi and American officials to understand each other from Washington’s refusal to allow Iraq to buy gun silencers to the nuclear policies of both countries.

Coll does a masterful job presenting the background information for Saddam and his family.  The relationships within the family exemplified by Saddam’s erratic and murderous son Uday and his brother Qusay, or his son-in-law Kemal Hussein are very important in understanding how Saddam ruled and the impact of his relatives on Iraqi society.  Each individual is the subject of important biographical information that include Tarik Aziz, Saddam’s pseudo Foreign Minister, Nizar Hamdoon, close to Saddam who was his liaison to the United States and Iraq’s UN envoy, Ali Hassan al-Majid, better known as “chemical Ali,” who carried out many of Saddam’s most despicable policies,  Ahmad Chalabi, a duplicitous character who lied his way to influence CIA policies toward Saddam, and Samir Vincent, an Iraqi-American who worked on the Oils-For-Food negotiations to revive a diplomatic solution between Baghdad and Washington, among others.

US Vice President Dick Cheney (L) and US

(Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld)

The author raises the question as to why Saddam would risk an invasion when he was aware that he lacked a nuclear option.  He would eventually agree to the return of UN inspectors, but it would be too late.  The problem as correctly points out is that a decade of an American containment policy had conditioned Saddam to doubt the prospect of a land invasion.  Further, since 1991 had threatened military action, but did little.  Further he could not fathom why an invasion would take place when he suspected the CIA and other agencies knew he lacked nuclear weapons – an important miscalculation as the Bush administration was bet on war by late 2002, and the task of US intelligence was to find a causus belli to justify an invasion.

Coll is on firm grounds as he describes the many attempts to overthrow Saddam.  It is clear that the first Bush administration wanted Saddam to be replaced but refused to engage in assassination.  After the first Gulf War, Washington decided not to march to Baghdad and remove him for fear of upsetting the regional balance of power.  During the Clinton administration there were many CIA plots involving Saddam’s overthrow from Chalabi’s conspiracies, supporting Wafiq al-Sarranai, an officer close to Saddam, Ayad Allawi, the head of the Iraqi National Accord who led the opposition to Saddam and was an enemy of Chalabi, to members of his dysfunctional family, particularly his demented son Uday.

U.S. Offers $25 Million For Saddam Hussein's Capture

(Saddam with sons, Uday and Qusay)

A major part of the narrative involves western attempts to uncover and end Saddam’s nuclear program.  Coll takes the reader through the “shell game” involving United Nations and the International Atomic Agency’s inspectors to locate evidence of Saddam’s nuclear program.  A number of important individuals are discussed including Swedish diplomat Hans Blix, and Rolf Ekeus, the Director-General of the IAEA, David McKay, an American inspector and a host of others.  The details of the “cat and mouse” game conducted by the Iraqis is detailed as is the internal dynamic of investigators and their disagreements, including the role of the CIA and American intelligence. They would soon discover that Saddam had a sophisticated bomb program for at least five years without being discovered and Saddam’s capacity to build a bomb was also unknown during that period.  It is clear that by the mid-1990s there were no nuclear weapons, but there were biological agents mounted on missiles. 

Coll takes the reader through the two Gulf wars, the use of chemical weapons against his enemies, the attacks on Kurdistan, the attempts to remove him from power , all topics that have been dealt with by others, but not in the detail and the perspectives that the author presents.  All of this leads to the decision to go to war in 2003 and finally remove Saddam from power and use a new Iraq, dominated by the United States to control the Middle East and its oil resources.  In developing this aspect of the book as he does throughout Coll focuses on how Saddam misread American actions and policies toward him.  This misreading and/or misunderstandings in the end resulted in his death and a quagmire for the United States that lasted for a decade and even today the United States has difficulties with ISIS terrorists ensconced in Iraq, and a Shia dominated government that our policies helped bring to power.

Coll pulls no punches as he discusses aspects of his topic.  A useful example is the relationship between neoconservatives who served during the Reagan administration and Ahmad Chalabi.  Coll describes “neocons” as “a loose network of like-minded internationalists who advocated for an assertive post-Cold War foreign policy that would advance American power by expanding democracy by challenging tyranny all around the world.”  They sought to undermine the Soviet Union and Saddam advocating human and civil rights as a moral imperative.  They would attract the likes of Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld and others who were men who liked ideas on questions  as what to do about Iraq.  The result was Saddam’s actions invigorated a domestic alliance of American hawk’s laser focused on removing the Iraqi dictator.  Chalabi who saw himself as an Iraqi Charles De Gaulle had no following in Iraq and fed numerous lies and conspiracies to the CIA and others and received millions in return – this was the “neocon” darling!  Men like Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, Richard Perle, and Richard Armitage pushed for war when they realized Bill Clinton would not engage in regime change.  American generals thought their ideas were “crackpot.”

George W. Bush’s cabinet read like a “who’s who” of “neocons” with Cheney as Vice President, Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and Wolfowitz as Deputy Secretary of Defense, all backed Chalabi’s “rolling insurgency” plan to overthrow Saddam.  Secretary of State Colin Powell who opposed these ideas offered “smart sanctions” – restrict trade directly related to WMD and avoid policies that hurt children and the general Iraqi populations.  He felt the military option was not in the best interest of the United States, though he did not rule it out.

TOPSHOT-IRAQ-US-SADDAM-CAPTURE

(Saddam captured in Tikrit, Iraq)

The question is why did Saddam want to keep the myth of weapons alive when facing steep economic sanctions and threats of war?  Coll is clear in his study of Saddam that for the Iraqi dictator a “mutually assured destruction” strategy would offset his fear of an Israeli nuclear attack, an ego which was such that it would provide him with greater security internally and externally, and his misunderstanding of Washington’s capacity to stop him.

Coll’s story presents the long and mutually confusing relationship between the United States and Iraq.  It ranges from Saddam’s rise to dictatorial power in 1979, soon after which he started a covert nuclear program, to the 2003 invasion, and his execution in 2006.  Along the way we experience a dark chapter in US foreign relations highlighted by the Reagan administration’s turning a blind eye to Saddam’s use of WMD against Iranian soldiers, and under the Bush administration Kurdish villagers, along with CIA policies that enhanced Saddam’s paranoia which led him to defeatist policies as he misread the United States, who at times he perceived to be an ally.    All in all, it resulted in what the second Bush administration made, in hindsight across ideological lines a terrible geopolitical mistake which we are still paying for.

What sets Coll’s narrative apart from other authors is his knowledge of Iraqi planning and Saddam’s mindset as it was clear that Bush had made up his mind for “preemptive war”.  Coll’s account of the Bush administration’s actions, views, and planning has been detailed by others, but it is his deep dive into Iraqi strategy and the views of Iraqi planners that distinguishes his work.

Charlie Savage in his August 29, 2024, article in the New York Review of Books entitled “A Terrible Mistake” perfectly encapsulates the importance of Coll’s work; “Beyond its value as a history and reappraisal of events, what lessons does this tale of ceaseless misconceptions and miscalculations hold for today? If Iraq was a trap, it was one that a succession of American policymakers clearly did not understand they were getting the country into until extricating it cleanly was nigh impossible. Coll gestures toward the difficulty of understanding dictatorial rulers whose regimes are hard for American intelligence agencies to penetrate and whose own pathologies may also make it hard for them to see the US clearly:

One recurring theme is the trouble American decision-makers had in assessing Saddam’s resentments and managing his inconsistencies. It is a theme that resonates in our present age of authoritarian rulers, when the world’s stressed democracies seek to grasp the often unpredictable decision-making of cloistered rulers, such as Vladimir Putin, or to influence other closed dictatorships, such as North Korea’s.”

Saddam Hussein Giving a Press Conference

GRAND DELUSION: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN AMBITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST by Steven Simon

 

Syrians walk along a severely damaged road in the northeastern city of Deir el-Zour, Jan. 4, 2014. (AFP)

(Syrian Civil War)

Today the Middle East borders on chaos.  In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is under indictment and as a means of retaining his administration pushes to reduce the power of the Israeli Supreme Court resulting in roughly 20% of the country taking to the streets in protest.  Further, Israeli reserve pilots have threatened to refuse missions in dissent.  The West Bank is experiencing renewed violence highlighted by a recent Israeli incursion and a continuing power struggle between Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  In Yemen, the brutal  civil war continues as Saudi Arabia and Iran are fighting a proxy war.  In Iran, the government is still dealing with domestic discontent particularly by the younger generation, exporting weapons to Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and drones and other support for the Russian war in Ukraine.  In Jordan, opposition to King Abdullah increases each time Israeli troops crack down on Palestinians.  Egypt remains a repressive autocracy.  Lastly, Saudi Arabia’s government under the leadership of Mohammad bin Salman further consolidates power of his repressive regime and spreads its wealth seemingly worldwide as it finds itself disagreeing with the Biden administration more and more. 

The above is symptomatic of a failed attempt by the United States to reorient the region toward its goals and in so doing according to Steven Simon in his new history/memoir GRAND DELUSION: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN AMBITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, the region has undergone a forty year period whereby Washington has evolved from deep engagement to a period of retrenchment. 

PHOTO: British soldiers assist in rescue operations at the site of the bomb-wrecked U.S. Marine command center near the Beirut airport in Lebanon, Oct. 23, 1983. A bomb-laden truck drove into the center collapsing the entire four story building.

(1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Lebanon)

According to the author, the process began with the Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of the Shah during the Carter presidency which brought about a collapse of the American position through the final weakening of US resolve under Barack Obama.  In between the Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Bush II administrations tried to retain American hegemony in the region, attempted to foster an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, dominate Iraq, and support Saudi Arabia.  This came to an end as Obama held Israel and the Gulf states in open contempt, failed to arm and train Syrian rebels in a civil war he referred to as “the shit show,” intervened in Libya, stalled in attempts to foster democratic transitions during the Arab spring, dealt with the Islamic State, was unable to forge a constituency for a nuclear deal with Iran, and witnessed a bitter end to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  Obama’s successor, Donald Trump acquiesced in this situation, periodically threatening different parties and trying to see how he could achieve political and personal gains. 

The question is how did the present situation evolve resulting in America’s propensity for self-deception and misadventure in the region particularly after 9/11 – Simon, whose career included a fifteen year career at the State Department, and service on the National Security Council staff as senior director for Middle Eastern and North African affairs provides interesting and evocative answers.

From left, Yitzhak Rabin, Bill Clinton and Yasir Arafat in 1993.

(Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, President Clinton, and PLO Chairman Arafat, 1993)

Simon has written a personal account of his diplomatic career involved in the Middle East, offering many historical observations and insightful analysis.  The monograph seems to offer two major themes.  The first, after the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 the United States changed from a period where American troops where not actively deployed in the region, instead CIA operations, vast military sales were tools used to spread influence, and Washington relied upon autocratic to achieve its goals.  Once Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency for better or worse, American troops at times  became active in the region from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and bases in the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.  In the case of Iraq, the policy has been a disaster which in the end destroyed the region’s balance of power and elevated Iran to being a major player.  This period came to an end with the final withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011.  The second major theme that Simon explores was American policy toward Israel and Saudi Arabia.  Since the end of the Second World War, the United States sought to facilitate Israel’s survival in a hostile Arab world following the Holocaust and preventing any Soviet inroads involving Saudi Arabia.  Up until recently these policies have been mostly successful.  However, the emergence of a right wing Israeli government under Bibi Netanyahu and his ultra-orthodox allies, and the elevation of Mohammad bin-Salman as head of the Saudi government has led to policies that at times are designed to “get even” with President Biden’s comments during the 2020 election his cruelty and repression zeroing in opposition within Saudi society, in addition, his hope of achieving regional super power status does not bode well for the future of American success in the region.

Simon does an excellent job developing the background history for each presidential administration’s policies.  Beginning with President Carter and taking the reader up to the present, the author describes the significant issues that each occupant of the White House faced, the internal debates over policies, the personalities involved, the final execution of the decision-making process, and the ramifications once the dust cleared.  Beginning with Carter’s attempts at Camp David and the Iran hostage situation, Simon moves on to the haphazard NSC decision-making process in relation to the deployment of US Marines to Lebanon and the Iran-Contra scandal under Reagan; the debate in the first Bush administration over whether to remain in Iraq and achieve regime overthrow after Desert Storm, and the Madrid Conference designed to facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace;  Clinton’s need to know whether Saddam’s WMD had been catalogued and destroyed, and his inability to lure Iran to the negotiating table, as well as Clinton’s refusal to issue a presidential decision directive on the Middle East; George W. Bush facing the repercussions of 9/11 leading to an ill fated war in Iraq as well as creating a disastrous policy in Afghanistan; Obama’s attempts to reset US policy in the region, not enforcing his self-imposed red-line dealing with Syria, and achieving the Nuclear arms deal with Iran.  Next, Trump was indifferent to the mechanics of foreign policy and “his ignorance of the conduct of foreign policy clouded his occasionally sensible, if crudely formulated, impulses,” i.e.; pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal allowing Tehran to enhance its nuclear program, the Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, and abandoning the Kurds to Turkish President Erdogan  Lastly, President Biden who inherited unresolved conflicts with Iraq, Iran, and a Saudi relationship whereby Jared Kushner was able to ingratiate himself with Mohammad bin-Salman.  For Biden, faced with deteriorating relations with China, the issue of Taiwan, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and difficulties with Iran leave very little time to devote to the Middle East.  I agree with Simon’s conclusion that the Saudis and Persian Gulf states see Biden as “a speed bump on the road to a more accommodating Republican administration.”

(In this photo released by the Saudi Press Agency, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Biden bump fists as they begin meetings in Jeddah)

Many of the major characters aside from presidents are discussed in Simon’s presentation.  Jimmy Carter employed Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cy Vance and others, though at times he was his own Secretary of State.  Under Ronald Reagan, George Schultz, Casper Wienberger, Robert McFarlane, and William Casey played significant roles.  For George H. W. Bush, James Baker, Colin Powell, Dick Cheney stand out.  President Clinton, who had little foreign policy experience relied upon Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, and William Cohen.  George W. Bush relied heavily on Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condi Rice, and to a lesser extent on Colin Powell.  Barack Obama worked well with Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice, and Robert Gates.  Donald Trump had a series of individuals who he eventually fired and brought in sycophant’s who would do his bidding.  For Biden it is too early to know the impact of those around him particularly Jake Sullivan, Lloyd Austin, and Anthony Blinken.  All of these figures play prominent roles in Simon’s presentation and analysis, and it is interesting to compare the types of people and their experience before they served their respective administrations and how impactful they were.

Simon has written a thoughtful, well-constructed work of fusion that will be useful for the professional and general audience. His viewpoints are based on years of involvement in the region and his commentary is succinct and for the most part dead on no matter which administration he is discussing.   He has done a wonderful job exploring a series of presidential administrations and how they approached the Middle East and must be commended for his ability to synthesize information as each chapter in of itself can be developed into a book of its own.

SYRIA-KURDS-CONFLICT

(Syrian Civil War)

AMERICA AND IRAN: A HISTORY 1720 TO THE PRESENT by John Ghazvinian

The_Shah_of_Iran_and_President_Nixon_-_NARA_-_194301
(Reza Pahlavi Shah and Richard M. Nixon)

In a world where the war in Ukraine and economic sanctions dominate foreign policy discussions relations with Iran could have been pushed to the back burner instead they are now coming to the fore.  As the Russian army continues its bloody war against Ukrainian civilians, the need to sanction Moscow’s energy industry which finances its genocide is paramount.  The Biden administration is focusing on increasing the world’s supply of energy and to this end has reengaged with Iran after the Trump administration abrogated the Iran nuclear deal negotiated during the Obama administration. The odds of coming to a quick agreement with Iran is very low, in part because Russia was a signatory of the original agreement and Iran’s contorted history with the United States since the 1950s.  To understand the background to the American relationship with Iran which emphasizes the    viewpoints from Washington and Tehran John Ghazvinian, a former journalist, and currently the Director of the Middle East Center at the University of Pennsylvania has filled this major gap with his new book, AMERICA AND IRAN: A HISTORY 1720 TO THE PRESENT.  Written in a clear and concise style Ghazvinian provides insightful analysis, a deep understanding of the issues between Iran and the United States, and with a degree of subjectivity focuses on the motivations and actions of the major historical figures involved.

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(Ayatollah Khomeini)

In tackling the American-Iranian conundrum one comes across many watershed moments and dates be it the competition between England and Russia during the 19th century through World War II better known as “the Great Game,” the emergence of the United States filling the vacuum created by London’s withdrawal from the region, the American “love affair” with Reza Pahlavi Shah beginning with the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddeq, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism spear headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, the 1979 hostage situation, the Iran-Iraq War, and the overt and covert war between the two countries that continues to this day.  For scholars and the general public these issues are quite familiar, however, Ghazvinian brings a deft pen and immense knowledge in presenting a fresh approach to this historical relationship.

Ghazvinian goal was objectivity, hoping to avoid casting dispersions on either side, and dispensing with the ideological baggage that has encumbered past writings on the subject.  Despite this goal, periodically he falls into the trap of bias.  Having been born in Iran he conducted ten years of research and was allowed access to Iranian sources that were not available to most western scholars.  One of Ghazvinian’s major themes is that the United States and Iran, at least in the 18th and 19th centuries through the end of World War I could have been natural allies.  Decade after decade Iranian governments looked to the United States as a “third force” that could counteract the pressures of Britain and Russia.  Presenting the early American thoughts of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, Iran perceived the United States as an anti-colonial power so there seemed to be a community of fate between the two countries that Ghazvinian successfully investigated.

(American hostages seized in Iran, 1979)

Ghazvinian explores America’s romanticized version of “Persophilia” and Washington’s impact on Iran through missionary work that provided hospitals, schools, and trade with Tehran.  It is clear that the United States, despite its interest in Iran was hindered by an amateurish group of “diplomats” who were sent to Tehran during the late 19th century to promote American interests.  Most had little or no foreign experience and they did little to foster a new relationship.  With the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, Iran could no longer play off the two competing powers against each other so Tehran invited the United States to assume the role of counterbalancing the “new” allies to the point of inviting and allowing an American citizen who would become a hero to the Iranian people, W. Morgan Shuster to take control of Iran’s convoluted finances.  The author goes on to trace Iranian attitudes and hopes that were fostered by Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points and the concept of self-determination.

A second dominant theme that Ghazvinian introduces is Iran’s battle to achieve modernity and not being viewed as a backward desert kingdom that was more than a source of oil.  To that end it seemed that no matter who was the Shah this issue had to be dealt with which resulted in policies that provided wealth and a lifestyle for the Pahlavi Dynasty but poverty and ignorance for the masses.

The concept that historian J.C. Hurewitz developed dealing with the Middle East that regional actors “never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity” applies to Iranian-American relations after World War II.  Ghazvinian skillfully explores the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddeq and his removal from power in 1953 by the CIA and as he does in a number of instances sets straight the historical record.  The issue for the United States was its fear of communism as is evidenced by the Russian refusal to withdraw from northern Iran in 1946.  Supposedly the stalemate was settled when Harry Truman issued an ultimatum to Moscow, which Ghazvinian points out that there was no record of such an ultimatum.  However, the fear of Russian expansion in the Persian Gulf drove American policy.  In addition to this fear of the Soviet Union, Washington had to deal with British arrogance and stupidity (repeatedly referring to Tehran as Persian pip-squeaks) in trying to establish a sound relationship with the Mosaddeq government.

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(Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq)

Mosaddeq was not a communist, he was an Iranian nationalist, but in the American diplomatic lexicon nationalist meant communist.  The result was that the Eisenhower administration ignored reports that Mosaddeq was “a Western educated aristocrat with no reason to be attracted to socialism or communism.”  Rather than listen to the advice of his own spies and bureaucrats,  Eisenhower supported a policy designed to undermine Mosaddeq’s government which would lead to his overthrow and assist the return of the Shah to Tehran where despite his autocratic and megalomaniac tendencies the US would support at various levels until his overthrow in 1979. 

Another major theme put forth by Ghazvinian is the role played by the 1953 coup in Iranian ideology.  From the end of World War II to the arrival of the Ayatollah Khomeini the Shah was faced with three domestic enemies that wanted to curb his power or overthrow his monarchy – the Iranian left made up of a diverse group of Marxists that leaned toward the Soviet Union, the religious establishment, and a coalition of secular liberals, democrats, and progressive nationalists.  Despite the diverse nature of the opposition, they all believed that the 1953 coup could be repeated at any time should the Shah’s reign end.  This belief forms the background to any American-Iranian negotiation, particularly the 1979 hostage situation.

Ghazvinian cleverly compares the attitudes of the different presidents towards the Shah.  For Eisenhower, named the “coup president” by historian Blanche Wiesen Cook, his policy was driven by the anti-communism of the Dulles brothers to provide the Shah with loans and military hardware.  Once John F. Kennedy assumed the oval office he put pressure on the Shah to reform his reign, but once he was assassinated the Shah was relieved since Lyndon Johnson was too busy with Vietnam and appreciated an anti-communist ally who would help control rising Arab nationalism and the Persian Gulf.  The key was Richard M. Nixon who developed a friendship with the Shah during the Eisenhower administration and with pressure from the likes of Henry Kissinger to honor any military requests that the Shah asked for resulted in billions for the American military-industrial complex and advanced weaponry for the Iranian army.  The result was a man who believed he had card blanche from the United States resulting in violent domestic opposition against the Shah in Iran.  Finally, Jimmy Carter’s human rights rhetoric scared the Shah, but he too would give in to the Shah’s demands until his overthrow.

(Iran-Iraq War)

Ghazvinian’s discussion of the rise of Khomeini and American ignorance concerning the proliferation of his ideas and support in Iran is well thought out.  From exile in Iraq and later Paris the United States made no attempt to understand the reasons behind Khomeini’s rise and the conditions of poverty and oppression that existed among the Iranian masses.  Washington’s blindness and tone deafness is highlighted by the appointment of former CIA Director Richard Helms as US Ambassador to Iran in 1973.

Once the Shah is overthrown Ghazvinian explains the different factions that existed in Iran and that it was not a foregone conclusion that Islamic fundamentalism would be victorious.  American intelligence underestimated Khomeini’s skill as a politician, not just a religious leader. The reader is exposed to intricate details about the creation of the Islamic Republic, the hostage situation, and the Iran-Iraq War which found the US playing a double game of supporting both sides.  This would lead to the Iran-Contra scandal that showed the duplicitous nature of the Reagan administration that should have ended the Reagan presidency.

Though Ghazvinian breezy history is immensely readable it becomes biased as he delves into the post 1988 Iranian-American relations.  The author discusses efforts by George H. W. Bush and Barack Obama to reset the relationship between Teheran and Washington ultimately to be thwarted by disinterest after the Soviet Union collapsed and the role of the Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu whose bombast was designed to block any Iranian-American rapprochement.  At times slipping into partiality, Ghazvinian downplays the bombast of the Iranian government and its avoidance of the nuclear issue, its role in Lebanon with its ally Hezbollah, and arming Hamas in the West Bank.  I realize the many  flaws and general stupidity of Bush’s neocon gang, but the soft presentation of Iran under Mahmoud Ahmadinjad also leaves a lot to be desired.

Despite some areas that could be developed further, Ghazvinian has produced a needed reappraisal of his subject and the quality of the writing makes the book an easy read for the general public which makes it a valuable contribution despite some shortcomings.

Richard Nixon, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi President Richard M. Nixon with The Shah of Iran, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi when he visited Washington on a state visit on
(The Shah of Iran and President Nixon)

REDLINE: THE UNRAVELING OF SYRIA AND AMERICA’S RACE TO DESTROY THE MOST DANGEROUS ARSENAL IN THE WORLD vy Joby Warrick

Syria's President Bashar al-Assad speaks during an interview with Yahoo News in this handout picture provided by SANA on Feb. 10, 2017.
(Syrian President Bashir Assad)

In his presidential memoir A PROMISED LAND Barack Obama does not reveal much about his thinking when it came to events in Syria other than that “our options were painfully limited…and Assad could count on Russia to veto any efforts we might make to impose international sanctions through the U.N. Security Council.”  This was the conundrum the US faced as it approached how to deal with the slaughter that was Syria since the Arab spring in 2011; a president who was seemingly obsessed with the fear Washington could be drawn into another war in the Middle East, and who if any of the rebel groups the US could rely on and not face blowback if Assad were overthrown.  Eventually President Obama announced his “red line” warning that if Assad continued to employ nerve agents in the Syrian civil war it would be a game changer for the US.  The warning that was issued on August 20, 2012 did not deter Assad and the American response was marginal at best.  With twenty-twenty hindsight this was one of the worst decisions the Obama administration made in relation to the carnage that was Syria and its results have been catastrophic.  In Obama’s defense had the US bombed Syria and taken out most of Assad’s chemical weapons would it have altered the war – we will never know.  The decision-making surrounding American “red line” policy its impact, and the attempt to destroy Assad’s chemical “stash” throughout 2014 is the subject of an informative new book RED LINE: THE UNRAVELING OF SYRIA AND AMERICA’S RACE TO DESTROY THE MOST DANGEROUS ARSENAL IN THE WORLD by Pulitzer Prize winning Washington Post reporter Joby Warrick which takes a microscope to American decision-making and the diplomatic and military policies pursued to try and obviate the horrors that the Assad regime was perpetrating.

Warrick’s effort is more than a narrative history of events sprinkled with keen analysis of the players and policies involved, but more a true to life thriller with a cast of characters that includes world leaders, physicians, weapons hunters, spies, and a number of heroes and villains.  Warrick’s account begins with the introduction of a CIA spy whose nomenclature was Ayman, “the chemist,” a Syrian scientist who informed his handlers that Damascus had constructed an efficient manufacturing center with a network of laboratories that had produced 1300-1500 tons of binary sarin, VX, and mustard gas.  Warrick lays out the issue of nerve agents produced by Syria and its implication for US policy makers.  The author’s approach is methodical as he examines all areas that impacted the Syrian weapons cache and what the US should and could do to mitigate the problem.  Once Assad employed nerve agents dropping three canisters on the city of Sarageb held by rebels who fought for overthrowing the Syrian regime on April 29, 2013, President Obama response had done little to deter Damascus.

(Timothy Blades’ “Margarita Machine”)

By 2012 Syria had become the most dangerous place on earth and after the April 2013 attack the US and the UN began to work on providing evidence for Assad’s WMD crimes.  Warrick introduces a series of important characters into the narrative who are pivotal to his story.  UN Team Leader Ake Sellstrom, who had experience hunting WMD in Iraq in the 1990s was sent to Syria and found evidence that military grade sarin gas had been used.  The list includes Andrew C. Weber, the Pentagon’s Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs who feared that should Assad be overthrown his 1300 nerve agents could fall into the hands of the al Nusra Front and its ally al-Qaeda in Iraq (which would soon morph into the Islamic State). Timothy Blades, an ingenious individual who headed the US Civilian Chemical Biological Application and Risk Reduction team developed a process referred to as “hydrolysis” and the machinery to carry out the task of breaking down and making Assad’s nerve agents inert should the US come into possession of them.  Dr. Houssam Alnahhas, also known as “Chemical Hazem,” as he prepared areas of Syria for possible chemical attacks and worked to save victims of those attacks.  Samantha Powers, the US Ambassador to the United Nations who worked tirelessly to hold Assad responsible for the atrocities he ordered but she was up against Russian and Chinese vetoes, but her work cannot be ignored as she was able to create the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) under the auspices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical weapons headquartered in the Hague.  By 2017 JIM’s work continued as it investigated another Syrian nerve strike against the town of Khan Sheikhoun.  Lastly, Brett McGurk, the special presidential envoy for the global coalition to counter ISIS.  McGurk was the last American official to witness the Syrian conflict in its entirety,” from the earliest pro-democracy uprisings through the rise of ISIS; from the regime’s first experimental use of sarin to the dramatic; if incomplete, mission to destroy Syria’s stockpile; from the hopeful declaration that ‘Assad must go’ to the despairing reality of an entrenched Syrian dictatorship propped up by Russian and Iranian protector’s intent on reshaping the region in their own image.” (303) There are many other important players in the narrative, many of which must be given credit for the eventual destruction of much of Assad’s nerve WMD, and those who were a hinderance and supported Assad outright.

Warrick description of a UN investigation led by Sellstrom and Scott Cairns his Canadian Deputy reflected Syrian obstructionism.   However, while in Damascus their group witnessed the results of a chemical attack that killed at least 1400 in the Ghouta suburbs.  Warrick’s connections and knowledge allowed him to describe in detail the components of the WMD, its impact on the civilian population, Syrian governments obfuscation, and what the world was prepared to do about what was occurring in Syria.  Everyone points to the Obama administration for its almost “feckless” response to Assad’s actions.  Warrick correctly points out that the Obama administration in part placed itself in a bind in its response.  Obama, keen to avoid a major military commitment in the Middle East decided that he needed Congressional approval for any military response.  After the events in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 there was little or no support in Congress.  Further, Germany’s Angela Merkel warned Obama that the US should not act and wait until the UN investigation had run its course.  In England, Prime Minister David Cameron could not convince Parliament to support military action, and lastly many feared what could happen to the UN team still in Syria.  Facing congressional humiliation Obama was saved in part by the Russians who agreed to force Assad to turn over his nerve agents to UN authorities.

(UN chemical weapons experts will use a battery of analytical techniques)

Warrick clearly explains how the deal came about and its implications for the future.  The Russians would go along with practically everything assuming that Blades’ “Margarita Machine” was a fantasy that could only fail thereby embarrassing the US.  Warrick’s account of how the “Blades’ Machine” was built, tested, and deployed is well conceived and easy to understand.  He follows the politics behind the strategy, the actual obstacles overcome particularly those set by the Syrians, and its ultimate deployment. This section of the book is perhaps the most important for the reader as Warrick builds the tension as if writing a novel that in the end would produce a mission at sea where the machines were bolted to the decks of the ship Cape Ray, deployed to the Mediterranean Sea to receive the nerve agents from the Syrian port of Latakia, run the nerve agents through Blades’ process, and then deliver the waste to cooperating countries.  Warrick employs a reporter’s eye to describe the political difficulties, delays, and roadblocks on the ground as the UN Mission tried to secure the nerve agents and even after the mission was a success one wonders how it was achieved.  For Blades and others, it came down to ingenuity, sheer guts, and a great deal of luck.

The entire process became a race to keep the nerve agents out of Islamist hands.  This became an even greater problem when on July 14, 2014, the day the ship sailed into the Mediterranean, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced from Mosul the creation of the Islamic Caliphate that stretched from Raqqa its capital in Central Syria deep into Iraq.  ISIS would miss out on Assad’s nerve agents, but began a developing a process of their own, particularly when Assad set the example by dropping barrel bombs loaded with chlorine gas which is less toxic than sarin on his subjects.

Samantha Power during Barack Obama’s first presidential election campaign, in 2008. Photograph: Hirolo Masuike/New York Times
(US UN Ambassador Samantha Power)

Graeme Wood is dead on when he writes in the February 19, 2021 edition of the Washington Post:  “Overwhelmingly, Warrick’s emphasis is where it should be, on Assad, for whom chemical weapons were a highly developed and strategic program of terror. “Syrians died every day from bullets, blast wounds, and shrapnel injuries,” Warrick writes, “but to exterminate human beings with chemicals, as though they were fleas and cockroaches” — this was “a different order of savagery.” Lacking any legitimate military purpose, Assad’s chemical weapons existed to terrorize civilian populations by killing as indiscriminately as possible. Eliminating his arsenal was therefore a top international priority.”

It is clear today that the Syrian Civil War continues to torture millions of Syrians in Syria and in refugee camps in the Middle East and Turkey.  While the US concentrated on ISIS for the next two years its policies would allow Russia and Hezbollah, Syria’s Iranian ally to route many of the rebels and keep Assad in power. According to Warrick Assad would engage in over 300 chemical attacks over the next four years.  It does not take a serious imagination to believe that Assad, who turned over tons of nerve agents to the UN kept a secret stash somewhere.  Once the Trump administration came aboard and abruptly ended aid to the rebels and abandoned our Kurdish allies to be destroyed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğanit it was obvious that Putin had won and Iran’s goal of a “land bridge” across the Levant was in reach – Assad had won.

Brett H. McGurk (2).jpg
(US Special Envoy Brett McGuirk)

Warrick is to be commended for his research, clear and thoughtful writing, and describing for all to see what the truth is concerning Assad’s nerve gas war on his own people. Perhaps someday he and his enablers will be held accountable by the world community – but I doubt it.

President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, pictured in December. His office said he would isolate at home with his wife for two weeks.
(Syrian President Bashir Assad)

MBS: THE RISE TO POWER OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN by Ben Hubbard

Mohammed bin Salman

(Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman)

Who is Mohammed bin Salman, aka MBS?  Is he a young visionary reformer that he purported to be when he first came on the scene; the man who most probably ordered the death of Washington Post reporter, Jamal Khashoggi; or a rising dictator whose lack of experience has led to rash decisions like the war in Yemen which has greatly contributed to the destabilization of the volatile Middle East.  In Ben Hubbard’s new book MBS: THE RISE TO POWER OF MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN, we are treated to a deep dive into how he rose to power in Saudi Arabia and what his policies have done to impact the daily lives of the Saudi people and the countries that must deal with the Riyadh regime, it’s oil wealth, and its influence in the Persian Gulf and beyond.

Hubbard, the Beirut bureau chief for the New York Times is very adept at digging deep into his subject area and developing astute observations.  At first, he provides the background history that resulted in the creation of the Saudi Arabian kingdom and the context of the Salman family in particular MBS whose actions always seem driven by how he could maximize his own personal power and influence.  Hubbard concentrates on the dynastic “pecking order” and how MBS, the sixth son of the twenty-sixth son of the kingdom’s founder would rise to power through luck and a series of deaths that unclogged the narrow path to achieve the position he coveted.  With the passing of a number of princes MBS would then develop a strong relationship with his father as they realized that they held many things in common. This renewed relationship was the cornerstone that MBS rode to power which should result in his succeeding his father on the throne in the not too distant future.

Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi during an interview on Jan. 23, 2016, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

(Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi during an interview on Jan. 23, 2016, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.)

In examining MBS’ life, Hubbard points out that he did little to make his mark before 2015, with no experience in the military, corporate policy, or knowledge how the United States functioned.  This would result in a number of miscalculations in how he thought Washington would view his adventurous policies.

Despite extensive experience in the region, Hubbard viewed Saudi Arabia as a black hole because of its murky politics and opaque society that was dominated by social conservatism, support for terrorists, and its Wahhabis beliefs encouraging the likes of al-Qaeda and ISIS. Saudi influence appeared invisible, but Hubbard, a perceptive writer soon saw through what MBS was all about.  The book is an easy read and points are understandable for the layman as Hubbard relies on his extensive knowledge in the region, interviews with people from all walks of life, and traveling the country extensively learning about the pre and post-MBS period before his visas were terminated in 2018.

Hubbard carefully details the political machinations within the royal family focusing on MBS’ competition with Mohammed Bin Nayef, a moderate who was next in line to the throne ahead of him.  By 2016, MBS publicized his “Saudi Vision 2030” plan that was the core of his reform program which at the outset was his calling card to gain support.  Throughout this period the Obama administration remained skeptical when it came to MBS’ plans.  They felt he had all the ”buzz words” but little substance calling for economic reforms, but no political reform, privately arguing that he was too cocky despite the fact that his economic program made sense when he argued that his government suffered from an oil addiction.  MBS’ world view saw Iran as the major threat, along with the Moslem Brotherhood and the German intelligence service, the BND warned that the new assertive Saudi Arabia that MBS proposed could destabilize the region, i.e.; confrontational stance toward Iran, promoting proxy wars in Syria and Yemen.  However, MBS’ new approach called for improved relations with Israel.  MBS shared Israel’s view of Iran and its puppet, Hezbollah and admired the country’s technological and economic power.  MBS had never been totally supportive of the Palestinians, seeing them as an impediment to peace and in the not too distant future it is quite possible that an Israeli-Saudi rapprochement may be in the offering.

Jared Kushner

(Jared Kushner)

Hubbard introduces the reader to the contradictions of Wahhabism by focusing on a moderate cleric named al-Ghamdi Ahmed Qassam who confronted the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice which he believed went too far and was much too intrusive in the lives of the Saudi people.  Hubbard explores a number of examples ranging from the lack of woman’s rights, religious fealty, and support for the dynasty reflecting how absurd their actions were. 

Hubbard’s incisive analysis is on full display in discussing the life and impact of Jamal Khashoggi, a reporter who in his early career had links to Osama bin-Laden, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and the mujahedeen who fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.  He believed that the Afghan revolt would reform Afghanistan, but he would be greatly disappointed particularly after 9/11 when he broke with al-Qaeda.  The later Arab Spring further encouraged Khashoggi’s belief in reform in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia which would soon be another major disappointment.  He continued to write about the Saudi Dynasty as a reporter for a number of Arab newspapers and the Washington Post, but his repeated criticisms of Saudi policies in Yemen and Saudi society led to his murder, a murder that Hubbard chronicles in detail despite the Crown Prince’s denials that he was responsible.

Hubbard does a good job digging up important information particularly the implications of an Iranian backed Wikileaks dump of the hacked Saudi Foreign Ministry.   Among the documents leaked was details concerning Saudi Wahabis missionary work worldwide training clerics and spreading the Saudi version of Islam.  Hubbard’s observations are quite astute as he states, “the funding was not just to promote Islam, but to promote the right kind of Islam, which meant undermining the wrong kind of Islam,” – stop the spread of Shiism in China, India, and Africa.  Further, Hubbard presents the actions and results of MBS’ disastrous policy of going after the Houthis in the Yemeni Civil War with almost full American support.  The devastation of Saudi bombing and resulting death and infrastructure loss is eye opening.  Hatred for Iran who supported the Houthi rebels was and remains the driving force for MBS.

(Ben Hubbard)

MBS’ obsession with Iran led to confrontation with the Obama administration who eventually grew tired of death and devastation in Yemen, his refusal to consider the civil rights of his people, and his opposition to the Iran Nuclear Deal.  In perhaps the most important part of the narrative Hubbard recounts MBS’ anger at President Obama apart from his nuclear deal, and his lack of action in the Syrian Civil War.  As disagreement mounted MBS looked forward to the arrival of the Trump administration.

Hubbard’s remarks on the similarities between MBS and Jared Kushner are well thought out and he develops their similar ideologies and needs for power and wealth.  Hubbard refers to the “the two princelings” as the key to the new burgeoning relationship between the Trump administration and MBS’ government.  After eight years of sparring with Obama, Riyadh saw a breath of fresh air as issues like Iran, Yemen, arms deals, peace with Israel all seemed to come into greater focus as Trump, led by Kushner were open to whatever MBS offered, especially Saudi money entering the US economy, and kowtowing to Trump’s ego.  By March 2017, the depth of the MBS-Kushner relationship was clear as joint plans were being developed and implemented.

There are few new revelations in Hubbard’s book, but a useful synthesis of how ruthless MBS is and how he achieved power and developed a close relationship with the Trump administration.  The strength of the book is Hubbard’s thorough reporting and anonymous interviews of people inside the kingdom until the Saudi government stopped providing him visas in 2018.  As critical Hubbard is in detailing MBS’ rise and policies he does point out that women can now drive, and he did work to break through some of the barriers that many young Saudis found suffocating.  In April 2016 he striped the Commission of its powers and allowed certain forms of entertainment that previously had been banned.  But despite some progress, Hubbard warns that authoritarian regimes can do popular things, but when it comes to opposition it will not be tolerated.  Hubbard credits MBS for countering centuries of Saudi history by uncoupling the clerics from the monarchy.  “Under MBS, the states’ authority comes less from its claim to defending religious orthodoxy than from a sense of authoritarian nationalism.”

The question must be raised as to which direction MBS will go in the future, but part of that answer may lie in American presidential politics.  Trump has given him a free hand with little or no criticism especially when it came to Khashoggi’s murder and dismemberment.  Hopefully, a Biden administration would demand greater accountability, if not MBS can continue to exercise his power with little restraint and based on his  age the United States will have to deal with him for years to come.


The Western media, foreign business and politicians will no longer be able to fete MBS as a great moderniser and visionary pulling his desert kingdom into the 21st century, writes Law [Reuters]

THE WORLD: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION by Richard Haass

UN Headquarter - United Nations - New York, NY

(The United Nations building in NYC)

As the American presidential election seems to creep closer and closer it is difficult to accept the idea that a substantial part of the electorate remains ignorant when it comes to knowledge of American foreign policy, or is apathetic when it comes to the issues at hand, or believe that Donald Trump has led the United States effectively in the realm of world affairs.   It is in this environment that Richard Haass, the president of the Council of Foreign Relations, and author of a number of important books, including, WAR OF NECESSITY, WAR OF CHOICE: A MEMOIR OF TWO IRAQ WARS, and A WORLD IN DISSARAY: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER has written a primer for those interested in how international relations has unfolded over the last century, and what are the issues that United States faces today.  The new book, THE WORLD: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION may be Haass’ most important monograph as he is trying to educate those people who have not had the opportunity to be exposed to his subject matter in the past, and make them more literate followers of international relations in the future.

Haass states that his goal in writing his latest work is to provide the basics of what “you need to know about the world, to make yourself globally literate.”  At a time when the teaching of and the knowledge of history and international relations is on the decline, Haass’ book is designed to fill a void.  He focuses on “the ideas, issues, and institutions for a basic understanding of the world” which is especially important when the Trump administration has effectively tried to disassemble the foundation of US overseas interests brick by brick without paying attention to the needs of our allies, be they Kurds, NATO, the European Union, and most importantly the American people with trade deals that are so ineffective that $29 billion in taxpayer funds had to be given to farmers because of our tariff policy with China.  Perhaps if people where more knowledgeable the reality of what our policy should be would replace the fantasy that currently exists.

 

 

Xi Jinping with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 28 September 2010

Haass has produced a primer on diplomatic and economic history worthy of a graduate seminar in the form of a monograph.  Haass’ sources, interviews, and research are impeccable from his mastery of secondary materials like Henry Kissinger’s A WORLD RESTORED: METTERNICH, CASTLEREAGH, AND THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE, 1812-1822 and Jonathan Spence’s THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA.  Haass has created an educational tool that is a roadmap for those who would like to further their knowledge on a myriad of subjects.  Further, the author offers a concluding chapter entitled, “Where Do You Go for More” which augments his endnotes that should be of great assistance to the reader.

(Vladimir Putin)
Haass’ writing is clear and evocative beginning with chapters that review the diplomatic history of a number of world regions which encompasses about half of the narrative.  He returns to The Treaty of Westphalia which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648 as his starting point.  Haass then divides history into four periods.  First, the roughly three hundred years from the early seventeenth century to the outbreak of World War I in 1914.  Second, 1914 to the end of World War II in 1945.  Third, the Cold War, roughly 1945 to 1989.  Lastly, the post Cold War period to the present.  In each section he reassesses the history, major players, and issues that confronted the world community at the time drawing conclusions that are well thought out and well grounded in fact, the opinion of others, and documentary materials available.

A case in point is Haass’ analysis of China focusing on her motivations based on its interaction with the west which was rather negative beginning with the Opium War in 1842 to the Communist victory in 1949.  In large part, China’s past history explains her need for autocracy and an aggressive foreign policy.  Haass delves into the US-Chinese relationship and how Beijing unlike Russia embraced integration with the world economy stressing trade and investment in the context of a state-controlled economy that provides China with advantages in domestic manufacturing and exports.  A great deal of the book engages China in numerous areas whether discussing globalization, nuclear proliferation, trade, currency and monetary policy, development, and climate change.  A great deal of the material encompasses arguments whether the 21st century will belong to Asia, with China replacing the United States as the dominant power on the globe.  Haass does not support this concept and argues a more nuanced position that depending on the immediate political needs of both countries will determine the direction they choose.  The key for Haass is that the United States must first get its own house in order.

Haass carefully explains the fissures in US-Russian relations as being centered on Vladimir Putin’s belief that his country has been humiliated since the fall of the Soviet Union.  Haass’ argument is correct and straight forward as Putin rejected the liberal world that sought to bring democratic changes to Russia and integrate her economy into more of a world entity.  Putin’s disdain and need to recreate a strong expansionist military power has led to the undermining of elections in the US and Europe.  Putin’s “feelings” have been exacerbated by NATO actions in the Balkans in the 1990s and its expansion to include the membership of former Soviet satellites like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.  The end result is that Moscow pursued an aggressive policy in Georgia, the Crimea, and eastern Ukraine resulting in western sanctions which have done little to offset Putin’s mind set.

Haass is on firm ground when he develops the economic miracle that transpired in China, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea as the reduced role of the military in these societies, except for China have contributed greatly to their economic success.  Their overall success which is evident today in how they have dealt with the Covid-19 pandemic is laudatory, but there are a number of pending problems.  The China-Taiwan relationship is fraught with negativity.  Japanese-Chinese claims in areas of the South China Sea and claims to certain islands is a dangerous situation,  the current situation on the Korean peninsula is a problem that could get out of hand at any time.  Lastly, we have witnessed the situation in Hong Kong on the nightly news the last few weeks.

The Syrian situation is effectively portrayed to highlight the tenuousness of international agreements.  It is clear, except perhaps to John Bolton that the US invasion of Iraq has led to the erosion of American leadership in the Middle East.  American primacy effectively ended when President Obama did not enforce his “red-line” threat concerning Bashir al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons, and President Trump’s feckless response  to the use of these weapons in 2017.  The result has been the elevation of Iran as a military and political force in the region, as well as strengthening Russia’s position as it has supported its Syrian ally in ruthless fashion.  Haass’ conclusion regarding the region is dead on arguing that its future will be defined like its past, by “violence within and across borders, little freedom or democracy, and standards of living that lag behind much of the world.”

Map of Africa Political Picture

In most regions Haass’ remarks add depth and analysis to his presentation.  This is not necessarily the case in Africa where his remarks at times are rather cursory.  This approach is similar in dealing with Latin America, a region rife with drug cartels, unstable economies, and state weakness which is a challenge to the stability of most countries in the region.

One of the most useful aspects of the book despite its textbook type orientation is the breakdown of a number of concepts in international affairs and where each stand relative to their success.  The discussion of globalization or interconnected markets has many positive aspects that include greater flows of workers across borders, tourism, trade, and sharing of information that can help negate issues like terrorism and pandemics.  However, globalization also means that for certain issues like climate change borders do not matter.  Global warming is a fact and though some agreements have been reached the self-interest of burgeoning economies like China and India that rely on coal are a roadblock to meaningful change.  Interdependence can be mutually beneficial but also brings vulnerability, i.e., trade agreements can result in job loss in certain countries and increased unemployment, Covid 19 knows no borders, as was the case with the 2008 financial crisis.  Haass is very skeptical that mitigation of climate change will have a large enough impact, he also discusses the negative aspects of the internet, and the world-wide refugee problem adding to a growing belief that future international relations will carry a heavy load and if not solved the planet will be in for major problems that include global health.  Haass’ conclusions are somewhat clairvoyant as I write this review in the midst of a pandemic, which the author argues was inevitable.

Image of Map and Wallpapers: Asia Map

Haass shifts his approach in the final section of the book where he considers diplomatic tools like alliances, international law, and vehicles like the United Nations as governments try and cope with the problems facing the world.  In this section he focuses on the features of order and disorder or order v. anarchy to provide tools that are needed to understand both the state of play and the trends at the regional and global levels.   He breaks down issues as to their positivity and negativity as he does in other areas of the book, but here he makes a case for American leadership supported by military power as the best hope for stability and progress.  But even in making this argument, Haass presents certain caveats that must be considered.  For example, do nations have the right to interfere in a sovereign country to prevent genocide, can a country’s sovereignty be violated if they are providing resources and protection to terrorist groups, or does an ethnically like minded people deserve to have their own country based on self-determination.  Apart from these questions is the issue of enforcement.  Does international law exist since there is no uniform vehicle to force compliance, and what tools are available to convince nations to support decisions by international bodies or groupings.

All in all Haass has written a primer for his readers, but does this audience even understand the complexities of foreign policy and do they have the will to learn about it and then elect representatives who themselves have a grasp of issues to direct the United States on a well-reasoned path that can maintain effective global activism?  Only the future can answer that question, but for me I am not that optimistic in terms of the American electorates interest in the topic or its commitment to educating itself.

FILE - In this Sept. 18, 2007 file photo, the flags of member nations fly outside of the United Nations headquarters. In a move likely to upset Israel's government, the Palestinians are seeking to raise their flags at the U.N., just in time for Pope Francis' visit in September 2015. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer, File)