SURVIVING KATYN: STALIN’S POLISH MASSACRE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH by Jane Rogoyska

December 6, 2025szfreiberger Russian History, World War II Leave a comment

(Mass grave of Polish officers in Katyn Forest, exhumed by Germany in 1943)

The Katyn forest massacre committed by the Soviet Union occurred between April and May 1940. Though killings took place in Kalinin and Kharkiv prisons operated by the NKVD and elsewhere, the massacre is named after the Katyn forest where mass graves were first discovered by the Nazis in April1943. Roughly 22,000 Polish military, police officers, border guards, intellectual prisoners of war were executed by the Soviet Secret Police, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin issued the orders. Once the Nazis announced their findings Stalin severed diplomatic relations with the London based Polish government in exile because they asked for an investigation by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbles realized the publicity value of the find he immediately contacted the Polish Red Cross to investigate but the Kremlin denied culpability and blamed the Germans. The British and their allies, dependent upon Soviet participation to defeat the Nazis, went along with the falsehood. The Kremlin continued to deny responsibility for the massacre until 1990, when it finally accepted accountability for NKVD’s actions and the concealment of the truth by the Soviet government.

At that time Russian president Boris Yerltsin released top-secret documents pertaining to the investigation and forwarded them to Lech Walesa, Poland’s new President. Among the documents was a plan written by Lavrentiev Beria, the head of the NKVD until 1953 dated March 5, 1940, calling for the execution of 25,700 Poles from the Kozelsk, Ostashkov, and Starobelsk prisoner of war camps, and from prisons in Ukraine and Belarus. After the fall of the Soviet Union the prosecutors general of the Russian Federation admitted Soviet responsibility for the massacres but refused to admit to a war crime or an act of mass murder.

(Aerial view of the Katyn massacre grave)

The historical record acknowledges that Stalin was behind the genocidal atrocity and it was part of his larger plan to remove anyone who might conceivably pose a threat to the imposition of future Soviet rule in Poland – “a decapitation of Polish society strikingly similar to Nazi policy in occupied Poland at the same time.” He wanted to eliminate large elements of the Polish elite to remove any potential obstacle to the later imposition of communist rule. For Stalin, Poland was an artificial creation of the 1919 Versailles Treaty that undid the 1772, 1793 and 1795 partitions of Poland between Russia, Prussia, and the Austrian Empire. Because of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 26, 1939, Poland would be divided a fourth time between Germany and the Soviet Union. Stalin could retake Russia’s Polish holdings, Western Ukraine and Belorussia without worrying about German opposition. A second line of reasoning for Stalin centers around the Soviet dictator’s knowledge of Adolf Hitler’s intentions. Stalin had read MEIN KAMPF and was fully cognizant of Hitler’s endgame- Lebensraum or “living space” in the east, and how Russia was to be Germany’s “breadbasket.” By invading Poland on September 16, 1939, completing the fourth partition of Poland he would create a buffer zone for the eventual German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. For Stalin it was a defensive measure.

The mystery clouding responsibility over the massacre is the subject of historian and biographer Jane Rogoyska’s book, SURVIVING KATYN: STALIN’S POLISH MASSACRE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH which chronicles how the NKVD worked to reshape the facts pertaining to the massacre blaming it on the Nazis. Planting documents on dead bodies to pursuing a truck full of evidence across Europe, destroying records, to staging incidents in European capitals the Stalinist government left no stone unturned in quashing the truth. Only 395 men survived the massacre who were unwitting witnesses to a crime that theoretically never officially happened. In a striking narrative, Rogoyska brings the victims out of the shadows, telling their stories as well as those of the people who desperately searched for them. In a work of moral clarity and precision, the author does not just supply statistics about another World War II atrocity, but how individuals were sacrificed for no reason and whose memory was lost, a sideshow in the battle between two psychotic and demented dictators.

(Map of the sites related to the Katyn massacre)

At the outset Rogoyska introduces the reader to the prisoners of war and their overseers. She lays out the incarceration process, the paranoia of the NKVD, and the incompetence of the bureaucracy of those in charge. Recounting the interrogation process, attempts to propagandize the Poles, and presenting intimate pictures of the prisoners, the author employs interviews, memoirs, and whatever documentation was available in order to the provide the most complete picture of the personalities and events pertaining to the massacre since Allen Paul’s KATYN: STALIN’S MASSACRE AND THE TRIUMPH OF TRUTH.

Initially the prisoners were taken to three camps, Starobelsk, Kozelsk, and Ostashkov. Rogoyska discusses life in all three camps and focuses mostly on Starobelsk as she follows the lives of Bronislav Mlynarski, Jozef Czapski, and Zygmunt Kwarcinke. They would be among the last group that left Starobelsk and were sent to a transit camp at Pavlishchev Bor in a group of 395 out of 14,800 from all three prison camps. On June 14, 1940, they were taken to the Griazovets camp located halfway between Moscow and the Arctic port of Arkhangelsk.

While in Griazovets, Beria, with Stalin’s support, worked to create a Polish Division within the Red Army, a topic that Rogoyska spends a great deal of time discussing. Beria and his henchmen tried to recruit Polish officers to lead it, most refused, but a few from a pro-Soviet group from Starobelsk known as the “Red Corner” agreed. The NKVD was concerned about the officer’s attitudes toward the exiled Polish government in London. While questioning other officers who remained POWs who wanted information about the whereabouts and availability of their compatriots, Beria responded “no, we made a big mistake.” From this phrase the author develops Beria’s guilt in the death of thousands. It would take until May of 1943 for the creation of the Polish 1^st Tadeusz Kosciuszko infantry division within the Red Army led by General Zigmunt Berling, an NKVD collaborator. This would satisfy Beria’s goal of a division with a “Polish Face” within the Soviet military.

( Director of the Soviet secret police-NKVD Lavrenty Beria)

During training at Griazovets, the NKVD invested a great deal of time trying to gain the loyalty of the Poles. They created a cultural school employing film, lectures, music, better treatment, etc. to no avail. The NKVD attempt to re-educate these men was an abject failure.

Finally on June 22, 1941, Stalin’s greatest fear came to fruition when the Nazis invaded Russia. The invasion impacted the prisoners in a number of ways. First, conditions at Griazovets worsened as rations were cut 50%, clothing became unavailable, and freedoms were lessened. Secondly, the Polish POWs feared as the Russians collapsed they would be seized and imprisoned by the Germans. Thirdly, a large influx of new prisoners created chaos. Lastly, the London Poles came to an agreement with the Kremlin, known as the Sikorski-Maisky Agreement, restored diplomatic relations between Poland and Russia, instituted an amnesty for all prisoners in Russia, including thousands of women and children. It was decided that General Wladyslaw Andres would command the Polish army after his release from prison on August 4, 1941. The Poles, no longer prisoners, wondered the fate of their comrades – they had no idea that 14,500 of them from the three camps had been massacred.

From this point on Rogoyska explores who was responsible for the deaths of thousands of POWs, who was responsible for their deaths, and how the truth was covered up. Despite the amnesty for prisoners during their arrests they were sent deeper into Russia. These deportations took place between 1940 and 1941 numbered between 1.25 and 1.6 million, though the NKVD argues it “was only” 400,000. The death toll was about 30%.

( Jozef Czapski in uniform, January 1943)

Rogoyska focuses on the major players in her investigation. Generals Anders and Zygmunt Bohusz-Szysk met with Marshal Georgy Zuhkov and General Ivan Pantilov asking for a list of Polish soldiers taken by the Soviet Union. They met six times and meetings were pleasant until the fate of the prisoners were brought up and Zhukov would change the subject and remarked they would eventually be found. Professor Stanislaw Kot, a Polish academic was placed in charge of the prisoner issue by Andres, but he also was stonewalled and got nowhere. His meetings with Andrey Vyshinsky (Stalin’s purge prosecutor in the 1930s) and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov who offered to assist but claimed the NKVD did not maintain detailed records on the missing officers. Kot knew it was a lie, and the author details the meticulous records the NKVD kept. Rogoyska integrates transcripts of their meetings and Kot grows increasingly angry and frustrated with Vyshinsky’s responses. Molotov wrote General Sikorski in December 1941 that “all Polish citizens detained as POWs had now been released and that Soviet authorities had given them all necessary assistance.”

The author addresses the silence surrounding the missing men that gave rise to theories as to their fate. The most plausible thing was that they had been sent to one of the Soviet Union’s remote regions and had not yet been able to make their way south. Another theory rests on the claim that Polish prisoners were working in the mines and construction of military facilities in the Gulag region of Kolyma in the far east of Russia. Andres put former prisoner Jozef Czapski in charge of investigating the plight of these men and basically took over from Professor Kot. After meeting with Major Lenoid Raikhman, who was in charge of the Polish section at the notorious Lubyanka prison in Moscow who plead ignorance about the fate of the 14,500 officers, Czapski concluded they were probably sent to the remotest parts of the country and very few returned, and even those who made it back could not provide any useful information. Czapski was limited because he was appointed by the exiled Polish government in London and since the British were dependent on their Soviet allies in defeating Hitler they did not want to create waves.

Another key figure in the investigation was Lt. Stanislaw Swianiewicz, a former prisoner in the Kozelek camp and a distinguished professor of economics. The NKVD was interested in him because he had authored a book explaining how the Germans had rearmed. His story is right out of a movie set as the Russians interrogated him, released him, and tried to rearrest him but he escaped. Rogoyska’s chapters on his escapades provide a glimpse into Soviet thinking, the diplomatic game that was taking place between the Polish government in exile, the allies, and the Soviet Union, and Russian duplicity throughout. Swianiewicz was important to the Stalin because he was a witness to Soviet war crimes.

(Andrey Vyshinsky in 1940)

The Soviet smokescreen began in the fall of 1943 after the Red Army retook the Smolensk area. Before the Soviets arrived, the Germans allowed a group of Allied journalists to watch an autopsy prepared by Professor Gerhard Buhtz, the head of Germany’s Army Group Medical Services who pointed out that the bodies were all shot through the back of the head. Not to be out done, the Soviet Union conducted its own investigation headed by Lt. General of the Medical Corps and one time doctor to Stalin, brain specialist Nikolai Burdenko. NKVD operational workers arrived at Katyn in September 1943 under the direction of BG Major Leonid Raikhman whose men proceeded to rearrange the site, swaying witnesses, planting documents on dead bodies to support the charge that the massacre did not occur in 1940, but in August 1941 during the Nazi occupation. After allowing a group of journalists to visit the site, Alexander Werth, British journalist concluded that the evidence was very thin, and the site had a “prefabricated appearance.” He agreed with others that Moscow had committed the massacre. To her credit, the author delves into minute detail of the investigations and the personalities involved who could only conclude based on their findings it was not Germany that was responsible, but the Stalinist regime. She also includes primary source material like the Burdenko Commission report and others that were issued after careful investigations of the site and the exhumed bodies.

(Formal portrait, 1932 Josef Stalin)

The British and the Poles were convinced the NKVD was responsible, but it did not matter as the Soviet Union was needed to defeat Germany, so the allies swallowed their concerns. After the war, the communist government in Warsaw pursued anyone who tried to alter occurrences that would contradict the Soviet rendering of events.

Since the topic of the massacre has fostered a great deal of scholarship it is not surprising that the author does not contain any new revelations. But to her credit her account is lucid and powerful as she recreates the lives of the officers who were artists, scientists, engineers, poets, lawyers, as well as career military men. She chose to examine her topic through the lens of the investigation rather than describing it as it happened which may have been more thought provoking for the reader.

(A mass grave at Katyn, 1943)

THE WOUNDED GENERATION: COMING HOME AFTER WORLD WAR II by David Nasaw

November 17, 2025szfreiberger American Social History, World War II Leave a comment

(GIs returning after WWII)

During his presidential campaigns Donald Trump has described American veterans as “suckers and losers.” He “strongly” wonders why veterans went off to fight when it was clear there was nothing in it for them. President Trump’s attitude toward men like John McCain and millions of others is both despicable and ungrateful. These men and women are heroes who defended our country and in most cases selflessly. Those who have survived war zones returned home with numerous ailments from the physical to the psychological. Today, the mental issues have been labeled post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) with veterans suffering from recurring nightmares and flashbacks, uncontrollable rages, social isolation, fears of places and events that evoked memories of the war, resulting in behaviors that they did not have before they shipped out. The label has been mostly applied to Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan war veterans, but symptoms were clearly evident for those who fought in and survived World War I and II.

In his latest book, award winning author David Nasaw, who has written such excellent works including; THE LAST MILLION which traces the plight of displaced persons after World War II, THE PATRIARCH a biography of Joseph P. Kennedy, THE CHIEF a biography of William Randolph Hearst, and ANDREW CARNEGIE, has just released a marvelous monograph entitled, THE WOUNDED GENERATION: COMING HOME AFTER WORLD WAR II. Nasaw’s focus in the book is not on the heroism of World War II veterans, but how they adapted to civilian life upon their return from the war, how their wartime experiences impacted familial and other personal relations, and how the country they returned to treated them. Nasaw’s most salient points revolve around the idea that these men and women were not the same people emotionally and physically as they were before the war, and the country which they returned to was quite different than the one they returned to. How they adjusted to their issues and their surroundings are the key to the narrative.

(American Sgt. George Black addressing the crowd of homesick GI’s as they staged a demonstration outside the US Embassy in the French capital in January, 1946. They protested the slowdown in their redeployment from Europe to the US)

As the author writes in his introduction, “if we are to understand the pain and hardship veterans brought home with them we must acknowledge their experiences in the war and of war, their wounds, injuries, and illnesses, their realization that they were expendable, that chance alone would determine whether they lived or dies or returned home body and soul intact,” therefore we must begin, not with their home coming but their actual experiences in the war.

Nasaw spends almost half the book discussing what soldiers experienced in combat, and at the same time how carefully the government informed the public of their plight with an eye on the issues they perceived would emerge once they were discharged. From the outset Nasaw focuses on the issue of “neuropsychiatric disorders” as the term PTSD was not known. It is clear that about 40% or about one million soldiers who were discharged or disabled during the first two years of the war fell into the category of “neuropsychiatric disorders.” The problem for military authorities was that the army and naval medical corps were totally unprepared to deal with psychiatric disorders. They were trained to deal with physical injuries, not mental, which were 33% of all injuries. With the shortage of men, many of these individuals were returned to the front suffering from symptoms of anxiety and depression. In treating these men, medical professionals were unsure if victims would ever recover.

As the narrative progresses the author makes many salient points, some obvious and others based on deeper analysis. The American public was fully aware of what their sons and daughters were experiencing despite military censorship. With an abundance of newspapers, magazines, books, and diaries the public was exposed to information on a delayed basis. However, radio reports made the experience more immediate. The government was in a bind, if it reported too many victories, particularly after the Battle of Midway authorities feared people would become complacent and the war might be close to an end. The government knowingly believed that in “total war” the fighting could drag on for years, particularly against Japan and wanted the public to be educated to that belief. By 1943, authorities in Washington wanted a more accurate representation of the fighting to be used as a tool against complacency in a war that had distinct racial elements to it.

John Dower’s book, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR develops this racial thesis, especially in Asia as the reason for the horrible conditions that soldiers faced when dealing with the enemy. As Nasaw correctly points out, “American boys and men, once peaceful and non-violent souls, had to become merciless, pitiless killers in order to stay alive and defeat a merciless, pitiless enemy.” The American media would caricature the “Japanese as vicious, conniving, beastly hordes of ‘monkeys’ and ‘rats,’ unstoppable, demonic torturers and killers,” while Germans were said to be more law-abiding according to international convention ignoring the Holocaust.

(American troops in a snow-filled trench during the Battle of the Bulge)

An interesting point that Nasaw describes deals with how soldiers spent their spare time. We have all heard the saying “hurry up and wait” pertaining to the military and even in combat that was true. Soldiers did not fight constantly, and outlets had to be provided for men and women. The creation of paperback books was boosted during the war as “pocketbooks” were created for soldiers to read as free reading material by the thousands was provided. The most important ancillary product provided was cigarettes which was seen as a military tool that would calm nerves before and after battle, suppress hunger, and keep soldiers alert when they should have been sleeping. During D-Day they helped to ward off sickness, reduce fear and shaking and sustain men. They were given to soldiers at every opportunity – 63 tons worth of tobacco were delivered to the army, and tobacco farmers were deemed “essential workers during the war. Soldiers were also seen as different if they did not smoke. Cigarettes were provided with C rations and were available everywhere as they were a major resource for soldiers to trade. Other activities that were employed to keep soldiers “sane” were alcohol and condoms. As with nicotine addiction, drinking habits acquired during the war would carry over into peacetime. Drinking served a similar purpose to smoking to calm soldiers and allow them to cope with the atrocities of combat. In addition, during the war over 50 million condoms were distributed by authorities who could not control the sexual drive of soldiers especially after they arrived in Italy in 1943. Women were readily available as prostitutes as locals resorted to sex as a means to earn money, cigarettes to trade on the black market, and just to survive.

The racism that existed after the war, especially as Jim Crow was restored in the south, was a continuation of what went on in military theaters. At first negro soldiers were given menial jobs – cleaning, cooking, waiting tables, and general labor. Later as troop shortages continued experimentally, segregated units were created. These units did quite well, i.e., the Tuskegee Airman, and a few combat units. The fear on the part of southern senators was that if negroes got used to fair treatment and a better racial experience in the army it would carry over into civilian life and there would be certain expectations. They wanted Jim Crow in the army, so negroes did not get any ideas once they were discharged. The behavior of southern whites after the war reinforced Jim Crow as blocking voter registration, the return of brutal lynchings, and the refusal to hire negroes for other than menial jobs they had before the war, as opposed to employment which would allow them to use their military training and wartime experiences dominated race relations below the Mason-Dixon line.

Nasaw does an excellent job discussing problems that developed once the allies proved victorious. The issue was demobilization. With the end of the war in Europe soldiers wanted to be discharged, not sent to the Pacific as the Japanese were seen as fighting to the death and after Okinawa, Saipan and the rest of the island hopping strategy was implemented they knew fighting could be brutal. European theater veterans were given 30 days leave and were then to be sent to the Pacific. The dropping of the atomic bomb ended the war for good and domestic politics called for a rapid demobilization, however the United States needed troops for occupation duty. Demobilization would be slow and about 1.5 million would be needed for occupation.

The author spends the remaining 60% of the book on how the war affected American society once fighting ended. Nasaw recounts the repatriation process and once again the racial issue arose as negroes were the last to be discharged. By stressing the racial component to the post war period, the author relies on excellent source material, diaries, interviews of families, and other primary materials.

Politicians in Washington did not want to deal with racial equality as the Democrats needed the support of southern senators to try and create a program which would reintegrate men and women back into civil society. Memories of the Bonus Army of 1931 during the depression and the use of the military to crush it were still fresh in people’s minds. The solution would evolve into the GI Bill whose rationale was not totally one of empathy but one to avoid unemployment, inflation , and retrofitting industry back to peacetime. By providing educational funding for tuition and books it would allow veterans to attend college and not enter the labor force which was undergoing a dramatic change as women began to lose their jobs as the men returned and wanted to reclaim their place in society. Whatever the motivation was for the GI Bill the government implemented a “veteran’s welfare state” throughout the 1940s.

What is clear is that the federal government spent a great deal on white returning veterans. Though Nasaw cannot settle on a figure as to how much the government spent; at times he states it is $17.3 billion, later it is $24 billion, and even later it is closer to $30 billion for the GI, bill the amount dwarfs what was spent on the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after the war. Whatever the final figure was between 1945 and 1950 it was in the billions and went along way to implement the veterans’ welfare state of education, job training, medical care, and housing relief. Many in Congress called for expanding this approach to all civilians, but that was not in the cards for decades, and even then it did not match what was spend on white veterans.

Nasaw is clear that the major issue was that veterans brought the war home with them – many were psychologically wounded and many carried diseases within their bodies. Millions returned with undiagnosed untreated psychic wounds that would haunt them for years to come. Men had to live with what they saw and experienced no matter how emotionally devastating it was. For many, these experiences remained with them for the remainder of their lives. Men came home with the characteristics of PTSD, though it was called “combat fatigue” or something similar. When they returned they exhibited what psychiatrist, Robert Jay Lifton describes in his seminal work on survivors of the atomic bombings, DEATH AS IN LIFE as flashback, nightmares, violent tempers, survival guilt, psychic numbing, all indicative of PTSD. To make it even worse for women, children and the family unit, the military and society in general put the onus of helping their spouses recover on them. They had to grant veterans the leeway to recover which the military stated would eventually occur over time. Most veterans did not commit suicide and learned to live with nightmares and flashbacks they could not erase. In addition to PTSD, many individuals suffered traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) from concussive explosions during the war from which they had not recovered. All this made the recreation of the family unit as it was known before the war, impossible to recapture.

(Tuskegee Airmen)

Nasaw spends a great deal of time on the impact of the war on the family unit discussing the role of women who had lived independently during the war and now were faced with giving that up and allowing the husband to recapture his place as the breadwinner. Many could not and the divorce rate would almost double. The increase was also due to the fact that many men and women could not accept the infidelity of their spouses, women lonely at home, and men lonely overseas seeking comfort.

Nasaw seems to cover every aspect of how service in World War II impacted a myriad of issues following the fighting. His coverage is comprehensive, but he also provides a wonderful touch illustrating his monograph with Bill Mauldin cartoons which were rather provocative for the time period. Tom Brokaw has labeled those who were victorious in World War II as the “greatest generation.” After reading Nasaw’s excellent book I would change that label to the “long suffering generation.”

(Doctors returning to the United States in the Mediterranean or Atlantic circa October 1945, The National WWII Museum)

ANNAPOLIS GOES TO WAR: THE NAVAL ACADEMY CLASS OF 1940 AND ITS TRIAL BY FIRE IN WORLD WAR II by. Craig L. Symonds

November 8, 2025szfreiberger Biography, Military History, World War II Leave a comment

Aerial view of U.S. Naval Academy looking Northeast. U.S. Naval Air Station, Anacostia, Washington, D.C.

(An aerial view of the U.S. Naval Academy, looking northeast, mid-1930s)

In the tradition of Robert Timberg’s THE NIGHTINGALE’S SONG, Bill Murphy, Jr.’s IN A TIME OF WAR: THE PROUD AND PERILOUS JOURNEY OF WEST POINT CLASS 0F 2002, Rick Atkinson’s THE LONG GRAY LINE: THE AMERICAN JOURNEY OF WEST POINT CLASS OF 1966 and Joseph Waugh’s THE CLASS OF 1846 FROM WEST POINT TO APPOMATTOX: STONEWALL JACKSON, GEORGE MCCLELLAN, AND THEIR BROTHERS, Professor Emeritus at the U.S. Naval Academy, Craig L. Symonds latest book, ANNAPOLIS GOES TO WAR: THE NAVAL ACADEMY CLASS OF 1940 AND ITS TRIAL BY FIRE IN WORLD WAR II examines the graduates of one of our service academies and how they were educated, trained, and adapted to warfare. Symonds, who has taught naval history for thirty years and has authored numerous books that include THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY, NIMITZ AT WAR, LINCOLN AND HIS ADMIRALS, and OPERATION NEPTUNE has produced a poignant and disturbing story of how the Annapolis Class of 1940 experienced personal growth, pain, loss, and dedication as they participated in many noteworthy battles in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters during World War II.

The class of 1940 consisted of 456 men out of the 750 who graduated , though not everyone received a commission. Of those who did, 401 became Navy Ensigns, and 25 became Second Lieutenants in the US Marine Corps. They arrived at Annapolis as Adolf Hitler ordered the seizure of the Rhineland, the Spanish Civil War was beginning, the Japanese had already seized Manchuria, Mussolini forces were ensconced in Abyssinia, and Stalin had instituted his purges. Despite these events most of the plebes were more concerned with how they would survive the naval academy for the next four years. Symonds follows in detail a number of members of the class who would experience four transformative years, followed by four more hard years in the cauldron of war. The end result was that 76 graduates of the “forties” as the Class of 1940 was known would perish in the war, the highest death rate of any class from either Annapolis or West Point.

(Class of 1940 graduation from the US Naval Academy, June 6, 1940)

Symonds begins his narrative by introducing members of the new class and their socio-economic makeup. What is interesting to note is their diverse backgrounds, the reasons they wanted to attend the academy, and how they achieved their admission. Some were from privileged classes in terms of wealth who used their families political connections to gain an appointment. Others saw it as a free education as their families could not afford college tuition as the depression continued to impact Americans throughout the 1930s. A few saw it as a dream come true from the time they witnessed naval destroyers or cruisers at harbor when they were young men. Curiously, of the new appointees, only one was black, and one was Filipino. Symonds explores the plebes’ daily schedule that could be summed up as “reveille, formation, breakfast, class, lunch, athletics, dinner, study, lights out, repeat!”

The author does an excellent job integrating world events as he relates the experiences of his subjects. He provides important aspects of events, in depth analysis, and the possible impact of what had transpired outside the “Naval Academy bubble” on its newest class. A good example is Symonds discussion of the 1936 Army-Navy game which Navy was victorious by a score of 7-0 and the growing partnership developing between Japan and Germany which the following year would result in the anti-Comintern Pact, and the Panay Incident the following year when the Japanese attacked a US gun boat on the Yangtze River. By September 1939, the fall of Warsaw provoked a growing interest on the part of the “forties” as they could imagine war on the horizon and their renewed commitment to their training resulted.

The USS Arizona (BB ) burning after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Decth

(USS Arizona, Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941)

The narrative reflects how racist American society was during this period. Aside from racial makeup of the class, their behavior toward certain staff members of the academy was indicative of American values. For example, the “forties” would pay janitors 25 cents a week to sweep their rooms and make their bunks. They would also refer to them as “mokes” which translated to “colored corridor boy!”

Symonds intimate detail is impressive and reflects how intrusive academy regulations could be. The navy had a regulation that men could not marry until they served two years as commissioned officers at sea. Those who secretly married were dismissed from the academy and lost their commissions. However, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the losses the United States suffered in the Pacific the need for more naval officers was acute and the regulation was changed, and men no longer had to wait two years to marry. But again, if they did so before the change was implemented they were dismissed. It did result in a number of the class of 1940 getting married before they shipped out.

(USS Yorktown at sea in the Pacific)

Symonds does not devote much detail on the last three years the Class of 1940 spent at Annapolis. After about a third of the book discussing the ”forties” he jumps to graduation as the situation in Europe, England, and the Atlantic deteriorates as the Nazis become even more aggressive. Upon graduation 50 men are assigned to aircraft carriers, 167 are assigned to battleships, and another 101 are assigned to cruisers. Others transfer to the Marine Corps, submarines, and aviation services. At this time, the Atlantic was more dangerous than the Pacific as German U boats sought to cut off American shipments to England. President Roosevelt would gain passage of the Lend Lease program which expanded the navy’s role in the Atlantic. As US ships conducted search patrols as far as the Azores the navy became more engaged in an undeclared war against the Germans and naval preparation and operations increased and the training of the members of the Class of 1940 was put to use.

By September 1941 it became clear the US navy was increasingly escorting allied convoys in the Atlantic and active combat resulted as the USS Kearny was hit by a German torpedo and the USS Reuben James was sunk. Symonds as he does with the course of the growing conflict explains correctly that Hitler was careful not to push naval confrontation with the United States at this time because he wanted to defeat the Soviet Union which Germany had invaded in June 1941. The US would continue to increase its convoy role in bringing aid to England in the Atlantic, at the same time Roosevelt ratcheted up sanctions against the Japanese in the Pacific which would ultimately lead to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Symonds description of the attack on Pearl Harbor reflects the standard account of events. What makes it more personal for the reader is how the author integrates the experiences of Class of 1940 graduates. Men like Irving Davenport and Sideny Sherwin served on the USS Oklahoma which was sunk resulting in 429 deaths. Dave Davison was the Officer of the Day on the USS Arizona as was Virgil Gex who made up two the seven “forties” with the over 1000 men who did not survive the attack. Others from the Class of 1940 like Nick Nicholson was the Officer of the Day on the USS California as were a number of others. Symonds stories of those who survived and those who did not reflect the heroism and personal sacrifice so many men experienced on December 7^th.

(Photo Robert Kaufman, 97, has of the Japanese surrender ceremony, which ended the U.S.’ involvement in World War II. Kaufman is one of the few remaining Naval Academy 1940 graduates).

The author’s expertise as a naval historian dominates and enhances the monograph. His views are supported by years of research and familiarity with primary and secondary materials. Symonds relies on letters, diaries, family archives, and interviews to augment his portrayal of events and the role of the members of the Class of 1940. One example in particular stands out as he relates General Douglas MacArthur’s fears that building defenses and stockpiling food on Bataan would appear defeatist to Japan. He convinced Washington to allow him to defend all of Luzon, including Manila once the Japanese attacked. This was a grave error as the Japanese landed on Luzon on December 22 and MacArthur was forced to move his headquarters from Bataan to the small, fortified island of Corregidor. Allied forces would surrender on April 7, 1942, after fierce fighting and “Sparky” Campo, the lone Filipino in the Class of 1940 was able to escape by executing a bold torpedo attack against Japanese destroyers.

By 1942 the Class of 1940 was in the thick of combat as convoy escorts became the primary function of the Atlantic fleet. Despite tremendous losses it was decisive for the war effort because of the American ability to build new ships and filling the need to increase protection for the convoys . This increase in American shipping created the need for more naval officers which tapped a number of the 1940 Class’s members. They would fill many new staff positions; engineering, torpedo and gunnery officers, in addition to executive officers on smaller craft.

Symonds describes the difficulty and danger faced by the navy in convoying across the Atlantic. The author provides the speed and size of the convoys, their strategy designed to avoid U boats, even the inability to sleep and eat due to conditions caused by storms and high seas. Symonds zeros in on the USS Buck and USS Bristol as he relates the dangers and anxiety that naval personnel faced. The situation became even more difficult as the US began supplying lend lease aid to the Soviet Union as convoys had to transit the Arctic Ocean around northern Norway where the Nazis had an air base in their attempts to reach the Barent Sea. It became even more difficult as losses caused Roosevelt to suspend certain shipping to Russia which fed Joseph Stalin’s paranoia about the allies using Moscow as a vehicle to defeat the Nazis and at the same time destroy his country. This paranoia and anger against London and Washington would fester and cause difficulties throughout the war and even contributed to the cause of the Cold War after 1945.

(Midshipmen go aboard the battleship Texas (BB-35) near Annapolis on 8 June 1940)

Symonds’ topic is vast because of the geography of the war. His narrative encompasses the Atlantic and Pacific theaters but also devotes his coverage to the Mediterranean theater. What stands out is the convoy support in the Atlantic which suffered tremendous losses of material and lives as we tried to supply our allies. In the Pacific, the battles of Midway and Guadalcanal dominate as the Japanese zeroed in on the USS Yorktown, an aircraft carrier at the battle of Midway at the end of May 1942. Luckily, they could not zero in on other carriers, the USS Hornet and USS Enterprise. By chance, the officer on deck was Lt. Junior Grade Peck Greenbacker of the Class of 1940 who was at the center of the storm and eventually the Yorktown could not be saved as it was repeatedly hit by Japanese torpedoes. At Guadalcanal, the US Navy suffered its worst defeat in its history as it lost the USS Quincy killing 370, the USS Vincennes with the loss of 322 men in early August 1942. In addition, more ships were lost and the death total encompassing all losses included a number from the Class of 1942 as class members were involved throughout the battles. So many ships were sunk in the waters off Guadalcanal that it soon earned the nickname, “Ironbottom Sound.”

(Midshipmen holystone the deck of the USS Missouri (BB-63) during their summer training cruise)

In the Mediterranean Operation Torch became Roosevelt’s response to domestic pressure and Winston Churchill to finally take it to the Nazis. Symonds fittingly points out that General George C. Marshall feared diverting assets to North Africa would cause a postponement of any landing in France in 1943, which in the end was the result. The main obstacle to Torch was the French Vichy destroyer, Jean Bart in Casablanca Harbor. Lt. Warren Walker’s USS Massachusetts and his compatriots were able to take out the ship allowing General George Patton’s troops to invade Morocco in November 1942, and later, Walker was involved with the cruiser USS Tuscaloosa’s heavy guns which assisted allied troops as they landed at Utah Beach on D-Day. Another sailor associated with the Class of 1940 was Sam Edelsein who in early July 1943 was sent to the Mediterranean on the eve of the invasion of Sicily to supervise the installation of SG radar sets on Admiral Richard Connolly’s flagship, the USS Biscayne. Edelstein would oversee the acquisition and dissemination of radar intelligence throughout the invasion.

ANNAPOLIS GOES TO WAR is a well written account of the lives of the Class of 1940, and their contribution to the war effort. Based on impressive research his narrative encompasses the vast geography of the naval battles of World War II and in the end is an acknowledgement and salute to those who gave their lives and those who contributed to victory.

United States Naval Academy Annapolis Maryland

(U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, MD)

THE RAIDER: THE UNTOLD STORY OF A RENEGADE MARINE AND THE BIRTH OF U.S. SPECIAL FORCES IN WORLD WAR II by Stephen R. Platt

October 30, 2025October 30, 2025szfreiberger Biography, Chinese History, World War II Leave a comment

(Lt. Colonel Evan Carleson)

There have been many exceptional people throughout history. People who emit bravery, compassion, and genius whose impact on others is immeasurable. Many of these people have been somewhat anonymous historically. One such person was Major Evans Carleson the subject of Stephen R. Platt’s new book; THE RAIDER: THE UNTOLD STORY OF A RENEGADE MARINE AND THE BIRTH OF U.S. SPECIAL FORCES IN WORLD WAR II.

As the book title suggests Major Carleson made many important contributions as to how the American military conducts itself. A career that spanned fighting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the Japanese in China, the Makin Islands, Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Saipan saw him implement combat tactics that he observed and studied while watching the Chinese Communists engage Japanese forces in the 1930s. The type of fighting is framed as “guerilla warfare,” which would be developed by Carson’s battalion that would be the precursor of US Special Forces known as “the Marine Raiders.”

(Mao Zedong and Zhu De)

According to Platt, Major Evans Carleson may be the most famous figure from World War II that no one has ever heard of. He was a genuine hero whose life was full of contradictions, and he would wind up disowned by his service, pilloried as a suspected radical, and forgotten in the postwar era. Platt makes a number of astute observations, perhaps the most important being Carleson’s repeated warnings not to allow the wartime alliances in China to collapse. Today, US-Chinese relations are in part hindered by events at the end of World War II – something Carleson saw coming.

After reviewing Carleson’s early life and career Platt places his subject in China for the first time in 1927 where he would carry out his lifelong ambition to make a difference in that theater. Carleson would spend the next fifteen years observing the Communist Chinese, promoting democracy, fighting the Japanese, developing a philosophy of warfare which rested on a non-egalitarian approach to training men and leading them in combat. Carleson was a complex individual, and like many people he had his flaws as well as his strengths. On a personal level he had difficulties devoting himself to family life and was happier away from his wives and son, than trying to work on his familial relationships. On a professional level he was an excellent leader of men as his approach was to have the same experience as his men in the field which led to success on the battlefield.

(Chiang Kai-Shek)

It is obvious from the narrative that Platt has a firm command of his subject. He successfully integrates the flow of Chinese history from the late 1920s through the Second World War and the immediate post war era. Platt’s commentary and analysis dealing with Chinese Communists and Kuomintang relations, Chiang Kai-Shek’s authoritarian leadership, the strategies pursued by the Japanese and the United States are well founded and based on intensive research. This allows the reader to gain a clear picture of what Carleson faced at any given time from the “Warlord Era” in China in the late 1920s, his meetings with Communist officials, particularly Zhu De whose combat strategies became the model for what Carleson created with his Marine Raiders, and events on the ground, and other important personalities he interacted with.

Platt is accurate in his comments pertaining to the balance of power in China. He introduces the Soviet threat in the region as Joseph Stalin supplied Chiang Kai-Shek’s forces throughout the 1930s, reigning in the Chinese Communists as he wanted to develop a buffer to thwart any Japanese incursions on Russian territory. The Soviet Union financed the reign of Sun Yat-Sen and continued to do so with Chiang Kai-Shek. Stalin also forced the Communists to work with the Kuomintang and create a “United Front’ against the Japanese, a strategy that Carleson supported. Carleson’s influence on American policy toward China and Japan was enhanced because of the special relationship he developed with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his son James who was his executive officer and helped create the “Marine Raiders.” A case in point is when Carleson finally learned that the US was supplying oil, weapons, and other resources to Japan to use in China, he helped convince FDR to embargo these items.

In examining Carleson’s approach to the Sino-Japanese war after he was appointed to be China’s Marine 1^st Regimental intelligence officer in 1927, Platt correctly points out that many of his views were formulated because of his closeness to Chiang Kai-Shek, a man he admired despite his authoritarian rule. Since he was getting his information from one source he seemed to follow the Kuomintang line. This will change as he is permitted to imbed himself with Communists forces fighting Japan and his “special relationship” with Zhu De who commanded Chinese Communist forces.

(Agnes Smedley)

Platt will spend an inordinate amount of time tracing his subjects ideological development and personality traits. He stresses Carleson’s need to improve. After reading Ralph Waldo Emerson’s ideas as a young man, he becomes a convert to the concept of “self-reliance,” which he intermingled with the concept of “Gung Ho,” or working together which he learned from Zhu De. He pursued a lifetime goal of educating himself and he always seemed to crave a literary career. An important source that Platt makes great use of are Carleson’s letters to his parents where he relates his beliefs concerning the China theater and his own command career which allows him to develop analysis of his subject and the world with which he was involved.

Carleson developed many important relationships during his time in China. Obviously, Zhu De was seen as a model for conducting war against the Japanese, but others like Edgar Snow greatly impacted Carleson. Snow also had access to Chinese Communists leaders and wrote RED STAR OVER CHINA and including in part using Carleson’s intelligence work that the Chinese Communists were not like they had been described in the media. He argued they were friendly, not hostile and open to democracy in the short run, but we know that was Mao Zedong’s strategy before the socialist revolution would emerge. Snow argued that they were well organized, open to an alliance with the United States, and most importantly were not in the pocket of the Soviet Union. Carleson and Snow developed an important relationship intellectually and personally and Carleson agreed with most of Snow’s conclusions.

Platt is a master of detail and is reflected in what Carleson experienced meeting Mao and observing Chinese Communist military strategies. If you explore Zhu De’s approach to training his forces, which he argued were at least as psychological and moral as it was physical, we can see how Carleson mirrored that approach. Apart from Mao and Zhu De, Platt introduces a number of different characters that impacted Carleson’ s life. One in particular is fascinating and had influence over Carleson – Agnes Smedley. Smedley was a left leaning journalist who developed a strong relationship with Carleson, in fact they fell in love with each other, but according to Platt they were never lovers.

(These Japanese prisoners were among those captured by U.S. forces on Guadalcanal Island in the Solomon Islands, shown November 5, 1942).

Carleson was exposed to Japanese military tactics in China and developed ideas as to why Japan could never be totally successful. They had the antithesis of military structure from that of Carleson. He believed the Japanese would fail because of their hierarchical military structure and were extremely vulnerable to surprise attacks and unexpected situations. He further believed that Japanese were not well trained or allowed to think and act on their own. They were more robotic in their approach when compared to Zhu De. Carleson’s positive views on Zhu De would be openly mocked by higher ups, but no matter what was said he continued to speak his mind in interviews, written articles, and reports to FDR and other officials. He would be admonished and warned not to publicize his opinions, but he never wavered by imparting his views no matter what others thought, i.e., he blamed the catastrophe of Pearl Harbor on America’s privileged officer class who lacked incentives to innovate and improve. He argued “they were fearful of any experimentation that might threaten their appearance of infallibility or diminish their prestige.” In the end his superiors had enough of his popularity, refusal to fit in, blurring the boundaries between officers and enlisted men, and idealistic politics promoting him as a means of taking his “Raiders” command away and giving it to a more conventional officer.

Platt delves into the training of the “Marine Raiders,” and the plans for different operations. The results were mixed as the landing on Makin Island, a diversion the US sought to keep supply lines open to Australia which was not a success, while the amphibious landing at Guadalcanal was seen as a victory over Japan as 488 Japanese soldiers were killed as opposed to 16 Americans – eventually the Japanese withdrew from the island. Part of Carleson’s success resides in the area of post-traumatic stress syndrome. It seems that Carleson’s raiders did not suffer from mental issues related to combat as did others. Platt points out that one-third to one-half of all US casualties were sent home because of mental trauma, while the “Marine Raiders” only had one person sent home.

World War II Battle of Saipan photographed by W. Eugene Smith 1944.

(A U.S. Marine rested behind a cart on a rubble-strewn street during the battle to take Saipan from occupying Japanese forces)

Platt has not written a hagiography of Carleson as he points out his warts. One in particular is interesting is that he would not take Japanese prisoners of war, he instructed his men to shoot them because they had no way to imprison or care for them but also revenge for what they did to Americans. On a personal level he basically abandoned his wives and his only son for his career and was seen as somewhat inflexible in dealing with higher ups in the military chain of command. Many above him felt he had become a communist because of his association with Zhu De, Agnes Smedley, and his criticisms of Chiang Kai-Shek which would follow him for the remainder of his life as his reputation was destroyed during the McCarthy era as J. Edgar Hoover kept a file on him for years.

If there are other biographies to compare Platt’s work to it would be Barbara Tuchman’s STILWELL AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN CHINA , 1911-1945 and Neil Sheehan’s BRIGHT SHINING LIE: JOHN PAUL VANN AND AMERICA IN VIETNAM. One book provides similar reasons to Platt as to why the “United States lost China” after World War II and examines very carefully Washington’s approach to the Chinese Civil War which ended in 1949, the other tells a familiar story why the Vietnam War was such a fiasco. Platt’s work is based on strong research as he was the first historian to receive access to Carleson’s family letters, correspondence, and private journals, allowing him to develop complex personality and belief systems alongside the dramatic events of his life. The result of Platt’s efforts according to Publisher’s Weekly “is a gripping, complex study of a military romantic who mixed ruthlessness with idealism.”

(Japanese expansion in the late 19th and 20th centuries)

Alexander Rose’s review; “The Raider” Review: Evans Carleson Made the Marines Gung Ho, June 6, 2025, Wall Street Journal is dead on when he writes; “Hence Mr. Platt’s superficially disproportionate focus on Carlson and his activities in China before Pearl Harbor and the formation of the Raiders—which was really a capstone to his long fascination and relationships with the Chinese Communists and Nationalists. By the late 1930s, Carlson was regarded as the China expert at home. His reports were circulated at the cabinet level and within the most senior ranks of the Navy department; he even enjoyed a secret, direct line of communication with President Roosevelt.

Yet in some quarters there were concerns that Carlson had, to use a perhaps dated expression, gone native. He had developed a severe case of Good Cause-itis and needed to be reminded, as one analyst commented at the time, that he worked for “Uncle Samuel, not China, the Soong Dynasty, or”—referring to one of the Chinese Communist party’s forces fighting against Japan—“the 8th Route Army.”

These suspicions were not baseless. If Carlson had a weakness, it was that he associated with too many American fellow travelers and idealized the Communists, seeing them as nothing more than slightly zealous New Dealers. He told Roosevelt that Mao had assured him that agrarian revolution, one-party rule and proletarian dictatorship might be on the agenda, but only after a prolonged period of capitalist democracy to guarantee everyone’s individual freedoms..

Similarly, Carlson promoted the astoundingly corrupt Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek and seems to have believed that they and the Communists would make a great team to secure China’s independence, once they ironed out a few inconsequential political differences. It was in 1944 that he finally tired of Chiang and wrote him off as a reactionary warlord. The Communist Party was the sole executor of the “welfare of the people,” he judged, and thus America’s natural friend.

One gets the impression from his reports that Carlson was often told what he wanted to hear and saw what his hosts wanted him to see. He never grasped that the insurgents’ interests rarely matched American ones, even when the two forces were temporarily allied against a common enemy. Carlson, in other words, broke the cardinal rule of being an observer: Don’t fall in love with the side you’re backing; they’re fighting a different war than you are.

For a time, Carlson’s views held sway in the U.S.—he was a popular, progressive figure immediately after the war and was set to run for the U.S. Senate representing California—but his career soon began to go wrong. A heart attack ended his political ambitions, and in his final years he was castigated as a “red in the bed.” He died a disappointed man, as his illusions shattered against the hard rocks of reality. But American understandings of China have often been founded, or have foundered, on self-deception, both before Carlson’s time, and since.”

(Lt. Colonel Evan Carleson after Makin Island raid)

A CALCULATED RESTRAINT: WHAT ALLIED LEADERS SAID ABOUT THE HOLOCAUST by Richard Breitman

May 31, 2025szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, British History, European History, German History, Holocaust, Nazi Germany, Russian History, United States Foreign Policy, World War II Leave a comment

(Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin at Yalta 2/1945)

The most frequent question concerning the Holocaust centers on what allied leaders knew about the genocide against the Jews and what they spoke about it in public and private. In previous monographs, FDR AND THE JEWS and OFFICIAL SECRETS: WHAT THE NAZIS PLANNED AND WHAT THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN KNEW Holocaust historian Richard Breitman addresses when these men knew what was occurring in the death camps. In his latest work, A CALCULATED RESTRAINT: WHAT ALLIED LEADERS SAID ABOUT THE HOLOCAUST Breitman shifts his focus as it took until December 1942 for allied leaders to issue a joint statement concerning Nazi Germany’s policy of eradicating Jews from Europe. It would take President Franklin D. Roosevelt until March 1944 to publicly comment on what was occurring in the extermination camps. In his new book, Breitman asks why these leaders did not speak up earlier. Further he explores the character of each leader and concludes that the Holocaust must be understood in light of the political and military conditions exhibited during the war that drove their decision-making and commentary.

Breitman begins his account by introducing Miles Taylor, a Steel magnate turned diplomat representing Franklin Roosevelt in a September 22, 1942, meeting with the Pope. Taylor described the Nazi genocide against the Jews and plans to exterminate millions. He pressured the Pontiff to employ his moral responsibility and authority against Hitler and his minions. In the weeks that followed Taylor conveyed further evidence of Nazi plans to the White House.

(Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary) in 1942

The Papacy’s response was much less than could be hoped for. Monsignor Dell’Acqua warned the Pope that any negative commentary concerning Nazi actions could be quite detrimental to the church, ultimately producing a Papal reaction that it was impossible to confirm Nazi actions, and the Vatican had no “practical suggestions to make,” apparently believing that only military action, not moral condemnation could end Nazi atrocities. It would take until 2020 for the Vatican to open records of Pius XII’s tenure to outside researchers.

Breitman states his goal in preparing his monograph was to discern what “Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin knew about the Holocaust to what they said about it in their most important statements on the subject.” The author’s approach rests on two key avenues of research and analysis. First, the extent to which allied leaders sought to create and mobilize the international community based on a common morality. Second, how allied leaders understood the relationship between the Holocaust and the war itself during different stages of the conflict. Breitman’s account relies on thorough research based on years of archival work, in addition to correspondence among allied leaders, numerous biographies and secondary works on the subject.

Despite the release of most allied documents pertaining to the war, except for Russia which has become more forthcoming since the fall of the Soviet Union there is a paucity of material relating to allied leaders. Further, there is little, if any record of allied leaders themselves addressing the Holocaust in any of their private conversations, though Stalin’s public commentary does allude to Nazi atrocities more so than Roosevelt and Churchill.

It is clear from Breitman’s account that with Hitler’s January 30, 1939, speech to the Reichstag that the Fuhrer was bent on the total annihilation of the Jews, not just pressuring them to leave Germany and immigrate elsewhere. It is also clear that Churchill and Roosevelt were fully aware of the threat Hitler posed to the international order, but were limited in their public reaction to the sensitive issue that a war against Germany to save Jews was not politically acceptable, particularly as it related to communism at a time when anti-Semitism was pervasive worldwide. Fearing Nazi propaganda responses, allied leaders generalized the threat of Nazi atrocities, thereby subsuming Nazi policies to exterminate Jews among a broader range of barbaric behaviors, thereby limiting explicit attacks on the growing Holocaust.

Breckinridge Long (1881–1958). Long was an Assistant Secretary in the US State Department during World War II, from 1940-1944.

(Breckinridge Long, anti-Semitic State Department official did his best to block Jewish immigration to the United States during the Holocaust)

The author is correct in arguing that had allied leaders spoken out and confronted Nazi behavior earlier it might have galvanized more Jews to flee and go into hiding and perhaps encourage gentiles to take serious steps to assist Jews. No matter what the result it would have confirmed the rumors and stories concerning Nazi “resettlement in the east,” and possibly encouraged neutral governments to speak out and do more.

Breitman’s overall thesis is correct pertaining to why allied leaders did not speak out publicly about the Holocaust, though they did comment on the barbarity of the Nazis. The reasons have been presented by many historians that Roosevelt was very concerned about providing the Nazis a propaganda tool because any comments would be used to reinforce the view that the Roosevelt administration was controlled by Jews and it would anger anti-Semites, particularly those in his own State Department, and isolationists in Congress. FDR reasoned the best way to approach the Holocaust was not to single out Jews and concentrate on the larger issue of winning the war. The faster victory could be achieved, the more Jews that could be saved. This opinion was similar to Winston Churchill’s beliefs.

The author spends the first third of the book focusing on the “Big Three,” and their early views as to what policies the Nazis were implementing in Eastern Europe. Breitman will focus on four examples of public commentary which he analyzes in detail. On August 24, 1941, Winston Churchill made a speech denouncing Nazi executions in the east. He singled out what the Germans were doing to the Russians on Soviet soil, with no mention of the Jews as victims. However, his last sentence read; “we are in the presence of a crime without a name.” Was Churchill referring to the Holocaust? Was he trying to satisfy Stalin? It is difficult to discern, but British intelligence released in the 1990s and early 2000s provide an important picture of what the SS and police units were doing behind battle lines in the Soviet Union in July and August 1941 – mass executions of Jews, Bolsheviks, and other civilian targets. Churchill’s rationale for maintaining public silence regarding the Holocaust was his fear that the Luftwaffe’s Enigma codes that had been broken by cartographers at Bletchley Park would be compromised should he make statements based on British intelligence. It is interesting according to Breitman that after August 1941, Churchill no longer favored receiving “execution numbers” from MI6, fearing that the information could become public. Churchill’s overriding goal was to strengthen ties with the US and USSR and would worry about moral questions later.

In Stalin’s case he made a speech on November 6, 1941, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 at the Mayakovsky Metro Station. According to Alexander Werth, a British journalist who was present it was “a strange mixture of black gloom and complete confidence.” Aware of Nazi mass murder of Jews, Stalin mentioned the subject directly only once, saying the Germans were carrying out medieval pogroms just as eagerly as the Tsarist regime had done. In a follow up speech the next day, Stalin said nothing about the killing of Jews. Stalin generalized the threat of extermination so all Soviet people would feel the threat facing their country, but at least he mentioned it signaling that subject could now be openly discussed, but Stalin’s overriding concern was to focus on the Nazi threat to the state and people of the USSR and believed that references to the Nazi war against the Jews could only distract from that. After his November remarks he made no further public comments about the killing of Jews for the rest of the war.

(Jan Karski (born Jan Kozielewski, 24 June 1914^[a] – 13 July 2000) was a Polish soldier, resistance-fighter, and diplomat during World War II. He is known for having acted as a courier in 1940–1943 to the Polish government-in-exile and to Poland’s Western Allies about the situation in German-occupied Poland. He reported about the state of Poland, its many competing resistance factions, and also about Germany’s destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto and its operation of extermination camps on Polish soil that were murdering Jews, Poles, and others)

FDR’s approach was to prepare for war and his comments were designed to do so and not say anything that could rile up anti-New Dealers who opposed war preparation. At press conferences on July 31 and February 1, 1941, FDR did not raise the subject of Hitler’s threat to annihilate the Jews of Europe and was not questioned about it. Roosevelt feared any publicity surrounding saving Jews would create greater opposition to aiding the democracies of Europe to fight the Nazis. It took Roosevelt until August 21, 1942, for the president to denounce barbaric crimes against innocent civilians in Europe and Asia and threatened those responsible with trials after the war. He would reaffirm these comments in a statement on October 7, 1942, but in both instances he was unwilling to denounce the Nazi war against the Jews. However, if we fast forward to FDR’s March 24, 1944, press conference, shortly after the Nazis occupied Hungary, the president called attention to Hungarian Jews as part of the Nazi campaign to destroy the Jews of Europe, accusing the Nazis of the “wholesale systematic murder of the Jews in Europe.” Articles written by the White House press corps and government broadcasts were disseminated to a large audience in the United States and abroad.

Nazi camps in occupied Poland, 1939-1945 [LCID: pol72110]

Breitman dissects a fourth speech given on January 30, 1939, where Adolf Hitler lays out his plans in front of the Reichstag. The speech recounted the usual Nazi accusations against the west, praise for Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, virulent comments and threat against the Jews, and fear of the Bolshevik menace. He was careful not to attack Roosevelt as he wanted to limit American aid. According to Chief AP correspondent Louis Lochner who was present at the speech Hitler reserved his most poisonous verbiage for the Jews as he would welcome the complete annihilation of European Jewry.

The title of the book, A CALCULATED RESTRAINT is somewhat misleading as Breitman focuses a great deal on events and personalities that may tendentiously conform to the title, but do not zero in exactly on that subject matter. The author details the negotiations leading up to the Nazi-Soviet Pact and its implications for Poland and Eastern Europe in General. Further, he comments on the American and British about faces in dealing with communism. Breitman focuses on the “Palestine question” and its role in Nazi strategy and how the British sought to protect its Arab “possessions,” – oil! Operation Torch, as a substitute for a second in Europe is discussed; the battle of El Alamein and the role of General Erwin Rommel. Other prominent individuals are covered including Reinhard Heydrich who chaired the Wannsee Conference outlining the Holocaust and the Lidice massacre after he was assassinated. Breitman does deal with the Holocaust, not commentary by the “Big Three” as he introduces Gerhart M. Riegner, a representative of the World Jewish Congress and Polish diplomat Jan Karski, who met with Roosevelt, and Peter Bergson who did his best to publicize the Holocaust and convince the leaders to focus more on containing it through his Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe. Another important American official that Breitman spends a great deal of time on is Oscar Cox, general counsel of the Foreign Economic Administration, which included the Lend-Lease Administration who tried to enlist others in the battle against anti-Semites, like Breckinridge Long inside the State Department. Both men played an integral role in making the Holocaust public and trying to convince Churchill and Roosevelt to be more forthcoming about educating the public about the annihilation of the Jews. This would lead to the Bermuda Conference and the War Refugee Board in the United States, neither of which greatly impacted the plight of the Jews. Breitman also includes a well thought out and incisive analysis of the murder of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews at Auschwitz toward the end of the war.

SS chief Heinrich Himmler (right) during a visit to the Auschwitz camp. [LCID: 50742]

(SS chief Heinrich Himmler (right) during a visit to the Auschwitz camp. Poland, July 18, 1942)

Perhaps, Breitman’s best chapter is entitled, “The Allied Declaration” in which he points out that by the second half of 1942 there was enough credible information that reached allied governments and media that affirmed the genocide of the Jews. However, as Breitman argues, the atmosphere surrounding this period and the risks of going public were too much for allied leaders.

It is clear the book overly focuses on the course of the war, rather than on its stated title. The non-Holocaust material has mostly been mined by other historians, and in many cases Breitman reviews material he has presented in his previous books. Much of the sourcing is based on secondary materials, but a wide variety of documentary evidence is consulted. In a sense if one follows the end notes it provides an excellent bibliography, but the stated purpose of the book does not receive the coverage that is warranted.

In summary, Breitman’s book is a concise and incisive look at his subject and sheds some new light on the topic. We must accept the conclusion that the allied leader’s responses and why they chose what to say about the Holocaust must be understood in light of the political and military demands that existed in the war and drove their decision making. I agree with historian Richard Overy that Breitman spends much more time discussing what was known about the murder of Jews, how it was communicated and its effect on lower-level officials and ministers, rather than discussing the response of the Allied big three, which again reveals a generally ambivalent, even skeptical response to the claims of people who presented evidence as to what was occurring.

(Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill at the Tehran Conference, November, 1943)

AGENT ZO: THE UNTOLD STORY OF A FEARLESS WORLD WAR II RESISTANCE FIGHTER ELZBIETA ZAWACKA by Clare Mulley

February 20, 2025szfreiberger World War II Leave a comment

(The General Elżbieta Foundation, ToruńZo, as seen on her student pass, graduated from Poznań University with a higher degree in mathematics)

During World War II Poland witnessed many individuals engaging in serious heroic actions. The list is long and includes people like Witold Pilecki, an intelligence agent and resistance leader who volunteered to enter Auschwitz to gather intelligence and then escaped; Arena Sendler, head of the children’s division of the Zegota Council for the aid of the Jews which smuggled 2500 children out of the Warsaw Ghetto; Jan Karski, a Polish soldier, resistance fighter, and diplomat who provided evidence of the Holocaust to western leaders, and acted as a courier for the Polish government in exile to western allies; Mordechai Anielewicz, led the Jewish Combat Brigade (ZOB) during the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, and numerous others. However, none are more remarkable than Elzbieta Zawacka, aka “Agent Zo,” the only female member of the Polish Elite Force during the war and took a leading role in many areas including the Polish uprising in Warsaw in August 1944. Her actions, and the actions of many of her compatriots in the Polish resistance during the war and after are accurately chronicled in Clare Mulley’s latest book, AGENT ZO: THE UNTOLD STORY OF A FEARLESS WORLD WAR II RESISTANCE FIGHTER ELZBIETA ZAWACKA.

Mulley presents a series of themes in her monograph, but none is more fascinating then how women were viewed by Polish and English authorities during World War II. Mulley correctly argues that thousands of Polish women rushed to defend their country in response to the twin invasions led by Germany in the west, and the Soviet Union in the East in September 1939. Eventually over 40,000 Polish women were sworn in as members of the Polish Home Army, 10% of which were soldiers, none more important than Agent Zo who was a member of the Cichociemni or “Silent Unseen” made up of Polish Special Forces paratroopers. The other 90% of women engaged in a myriad of activities ranging from acting as couriers, medical technicians, clerks, bomb makers, and gathering intelligence. Agent Zo and her partners passionately argued that women could fight as well as men and should be declared part of a “legitimate” military force to be covered by the Geneva Convention, which when finally recognized by Polish and British bureaucrats in London would save many lives. This theme pervades the narrative and provides great insight into the misogyny experienced by women in dealing with military and diplomatic decision makers during the war. For example, Colin Gubbins, head of the British Special Operations Executive which engaged in sabotage against the Nazis throughout Europe, upon learning of Zo’s exceptional bravery and accomplishments referred to her a “grand gal.”

(The General Elżbieta Foundation, ToruńZawacka (centre) took the nom-de-guerre Zo after being sworn into the Polish resistance)

Agent Zo’s remarkable life is examined in detail. After explaining her familial roots Mulley examines Agent Zo’s rise from a senior instructor with the Polish “Woman’s Military Training Force (PKW)” to her varied assignments during the war as she craved serious military service once Nazi Germany had violated her country. Mulley does a remarkable job recounting Agent Zo’s various relationships with both men and women. All were Polish patriots with the same goals of working to keep the allies informed about Nazi atrocities, troop movements, and any intelligence they could gather. The author explains Agent Zo’s many relationships, who influenced her the most, and who she relied upon and trusted. A few stand out like Marianna Zaodzinska, a literary person and poet who was tactical instructor who would wind up as a commander during the Warsaw uprising. General Stefan Rowecki who worked to unite all Polish resistance groups and create the Home Army who was also Zo’s commander. Maria Witteck, Zo’s close friend and Commander of the Women’s Auxiliary Services. Emelia Malessa, Zo’s superior who oversaw the Farmstead, the Polish overseas communication team. Zofia Franio, supplied weapons to Jews fighting in the Warsaw Ghetto. Sue Ryder, who volunteered at the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY), lying about her age, further as part of the SOE she transported agents for the ”Silent Unseen.” Kazimierz Bilski, known as “Rum,” a member of the “Silent Unseen” and the Polish Sixth Bureau in London; and General Tadeusz Komorowski, “Bor,” Rowecki’s former deputy who succeeded him as head of the Home Army.

The role of female couriers was of major importance in the war. Their harrowing experiences crossing Europe to provide intelligence hidden on microfilm to London from Warsaw are fully explored. Zo and her fellow resistance fighters experienced numerous run-ins with the Nazis as they carried out their assignments. Their fears of arrest, torture, and death were constant, but they did not let their anxieties interfere with completing their missions. They provided evidence of Nazi atrocities, the Holocaust, technical information concerning Hitler’s miracle weapons – VI and V2 rockets, German troops positions, the needs of the Home Army, etc. These brave women accomplished remarkable things and were willing to sacrifice their lives for their country. A few examples include how Zo leaped from a moving train when Nazi soldiers entered and asked for identification on a trip in Silesia, or her parachute training which she had never done before the war leading her to jump behind Nazi lines.

Getty Images Black and white photo of Polish troops with guns surrounded by rubble in Warsaw (Getty ImagesThe Warsaw Uprising was the largest organised act of defiance against Nazi Germany during World War Two)

From the outset of the war Zo argued for a Woman’s Auxiliary Officer Corps, which would eventually be ratified into law. British and Polish “higher ups” described Zo as “an insane feminist and pioneer of the liberation movement and equality of women….a hysterical women.” It took until October 1943 for a decree on “Women’s Voluntary Service,” providing women between 18 and 45 the same rights and duties as men in the armed forces. The result – thousands of Polish women came forward to volunteer.

Mulley’s research is impeccable, and she devotes a great deal of time to the political and diplomatic components of the war. A few stand out. It became clear to Zo that by the Fall of 1943 Polish influence and/or importance to the British government was waning, especially when there were no Polish diplomats present at the Tehran Conference. As the Soviet Union broke through in the east, Stalin’s plans for a post war Poland began to become clear. The Russian dictator planned to seize areas in eastern Poland, and shift Poland’s border westward in return. Stalin denied that Russian soldiers committed the Katyn massacre which took place in the spring 1940 which was a series of mass executions of nearly 22,000 Polish military and police officers, border guards, and intelligentsia prisoners of war carried out by the Soviet Union, specifically the NKVD, at Joseph Stalin’s orders. Stalin would not recognize the Polish government in exile and appointed his own government in Lublin, Poland toward the end of the war. Another egregious action or non-action by Stalin was his refusal to allow any military assistance, be it bombers, supplies, men, the use of Russian airfields in order to assist Polish resistance fighters as they rose up against the Nazis in Warsaw in August 1943. Stalin’s goal was clear – to wipe out any Polish opposition to Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe after the war. Franklin Roosevelt felt the need to appease the Russian dictator, in part, because the Soviet military had done the bulk of the fighting against the Nazis. Churchill had little choice but to go along.

The Nazis finally identified Zo, resulting in a price on her head in March 1944 as the Nazis b targeted all women in their thirties as a means of finding her. Mulley describes her clandestine life and travels in detail as she was ordered to remain in a convent to escape the Nazi dragnet. Finally, she emerges to play a key role in the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, but not as a fighter which was against her wishes. With her experience and knowledge of the city, its sewers, basements, and neighborhoods in general she was put in charge of organizing women to deliver supplies, make incendiary bombs, deliver medical supplies, organize ambulances, and use couriers as a means of getting the truth out to the world. In the end 18,000 resisters, and 200,000 civilians were killed in the uprising. Once the city succumbed, Zo escaped and spent her time trying to reorganize the Farmstead.

Clare Mulley Two images of a tall communist-era apartment block with a mural featuring several paintings of Zo on the side of it (Clare Mulley/A mural depicting Zawacka has been painted on the side of the communist-era apartment block where she lived in Toruń)

Once the war ended Zo’s personal battle for Polish independence did not end as the new communist regime imposed by Stalin began to show interest in her just as they wanted to destroy any remnant of the Home Army that may have remained. Stalin’s henchmen rounded up any Home Army veterans who they saw as part of a possible anti-communist resistance. For Zo, the peace she fought so long and hard for instead “she felt that her country’s occupation by one hostile foreign power had now been replaced by another, and Poland was still not free.” As Marissa Moss points out in her December 11, 2024, review in The New York Journal of Books; “Zo herself was sent to prison, arrested for being part of a network spying on the communist government. She wasn’t part of any such group but looked guilty simply because of her past. Like many of her compatriots in the Home Army, her real crime lay in telling the story of Poland’s resistance, a story that contradicted the official Soviet version.” She was tortured and imprisoned and finally freed after Stalin died in March 1953, but she was not allowed to teach because of her “criminal record” and her refusal to join the communist party. It was not until the arrival of the Solidarity movement and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 that she could be sure that her secret archive detailing the Home Army would be secure, as she was determined to collect even more stories of the Home Army, especially the part played by women.

Zo was the recipient of many awards and medals for her bravery and devotion to her country, but to her what really mattered was the history through which she had lived. She created a vast archive, hoping to educate a new generation about their country’s history. This book serves her mission well.

(The General Elżbieta Foundation, ToruńElżbieta Zawacka crossed international borders more than 100 times as she smuggled military intelligence to the Allies)

AFTERMATH: LIFE IN THE FALLOUT OF THE THIRD REICH 1945-1955 by Harald Jahner

October 20, 2024October 20, 2024szfreiberger German History, Nazi Germany, World War II Leave a comment

The area extending north beyond the Brandenburg Gate was later controlled by Soviets for almost 40 year. Note the portrait of Stalin in the center.

(Berlin at the end of World War II)

Today Germany finds itself as the strongest economic power in Europe, in addition to possessing major military influence due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Its influence in Europe is strong and many of the goals of the Nazi regime during World War II have been achieved peacefully since unification following the collapse of the Soviet Union. If one thinks back to 1945 Germany was devastated as it suffered from pervasive allied bombing be it Dresden, Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, and other German cities. Living in one of these cities in the summer of 1945 and to imagine Germany’s dominant position in Europe today as a member of the European Union would be unthinkable. The question is how did Germans face up to their Nazi past and how did they move on, for most with no sense of responsibility or guilt for the Holocaust and other atrocities committed by the Hitlerite regime domestically and across Europe? Harald Jahner a German cultural journalist and former editor of the Berliner Zeitung focuses on the immediate postwar period in trying to determine why this happened in his book AFTERMATH: LIFE IN THE FALLOUT OF THE THIRD REICH 1945-1955.

Jahner immediately asks a series of questions which he hopes to convey the answers to. For the nine million Germans who were bombed out of their homes and evacuees, the fourteen million refugees and exiles, the ten million released from forced labor and imprisonment, and the countless millions of returning prisoners of war the question was clear; “How was this horde of ragged, displaced, impoverished and leftover people broken up and reassembled? And how did former national comrades (Volksgenossen), as German nationals were known under Nazism, gradually become ordinary citizens again?” This process would lay the foundation of the “German economic miracle” of the postwar period and as a result is an important aspect of western history for historians to explore.

(The Nuremburg Trials)

Interestingly, the Holocaust had a negligible impact on the consciousness of most Germans during the period. Many were aware of the crimes that took place in the name of Aryan unity and lebensraum (living space in the east) and perhaps guilt about causing the war, but there was little guilt concerning the death of six million Jews. In fact, the whitewashing of the existence of the extermination camps was common even as the allies tried to confront the German people with evidence of Nazi crimes. This coverup in part was due to the prevalent view of many Germans that they were now the victims. As Jahner writes; “the survival instinct shuts out feelings of guilt.”

The postwar period was riddled with instances of imprisonments during the war for minor offenses who remained imprisoned after the war, some for years. Disturbingly, at the same time former Nazi elites, scientists, and spies emerged in the bureaucracy of the new Federal Republic and cooperated with former allies as the Cold War approached. At the same time ordinary people starved, lost their shelter, and tried to survive with the absence of authority.

Jahner begins his narrative by describing the plight of the German people. Examples abound during the early months of the postwar period of suffering of the survivors of the war, and the author concludes as far as any guilt was concerned; “forgetting was the utopia of the moment.” As a cultural historian Jahner’s main focus is how German culture evolved after the war as a tool to denazify the German people. The author’s focus is broadly encapsulating a broad realm of cultural issues including film, music, art, newspapers, literature, furniture design, clothing, architecture, etc. Jahner delves into the acceptance and rejection of certain cultural avenues following the war. In film, comedies rather than dramatizations were seen as more acceptable. The cultural leaders were concerned about the general public’s taste and understanding of art. The Third Reich had conditioned people in terms of aesthetic judgement, now they needed to break the intellectual chains of the past, i.e.; accepting modern abstract art which was seen as positive as it represented the denazification of culture.

(German soldiers returned home after WWII)

In an interesting comparison between the American and Soviet view of how to denazify and integrate the German people after the war, Jahner focuses on how the United States relied on art as a vehicle to promote democracy. Employing the CIA as a vehicle to transfer funds to promote western culture, US intelligence services funneled money to particular cultural leaders as a means of obtaining their ends. The Americans however were less likely to offer the Germans the chance of rehabilitation so soon after the war as the Soviets did. Americans had no communist theory of history that would have enabled them to view Germans as victims of Hitler. On the contrary Americans saw the average German as “a militaristic, authoritarian, hard hearted character for whom the Fuhrer’s state was the most representative form of government.” The Russian approach was simpler, purging who they felt threatened by, offering what became known as East Germans an off ramp to acceptability, and a culture that was much more digestible like “Socialist Realism.”

Jahner offers a window into how the German people coped economically on a daily basis exploring rationing, the black market, crime, exploitation, and the lack of housing which he argues would eventually lead to a market economy. He explores topics like sex, love, the plight of orphans, returning POWs, forced laborers, demobilized soldiers, and other wandering human beings who had been displaced by war. However, the most important insights he offers centers around the belief by Germans that the Nazis had humiliated them and the argument that they too were victims of Hitler. This rationalization made it easy to avoid discussion of the Holocaust after the war and any German responsibility. Hitler worshipers were “duped” rather than guilty for the events that led to war and what transpired during the war. The positive is Jahner’s belief that what he terms as “intolerable insolence” is the belief that to establish democracy in post war Germany this denialism was a necessary prerequisite because it created the foundation of a new beginning. The victim narrative reached its apex in April 1945 when the Germans were in fact liberated.

Jahners concludes that the majority of surviving Germans were so preoccupied with their own suffering that the dominant mood was one of self-pity. Since they were victims they “had the dubious good fortune of not having to think about the real ones.” As grim as Jahner’s discussion is concerning the amount of rubble that was left for the Germans to clear and live with, for many it is just punishment for a sophisticated people who succumbed so easily to the Nazi regime. The eventual robust economic recovery of the East and West was a boon, according to Jahner, “but such good fortune had nothing to do with historical justice.”

Excellent aerial view showing devastation and bombed out buildings over wide area.

(Berlin at the end of World War II)

NIGHT OF THE ASSASSINS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HITLER’S PLOT TO KILL FDR, CHURCHILL, AND STALIN by Howard Blum

September 21, 2024September 21, 2024szfreiberger Nazi Germany, World War II Leave a comment

Many believe that the most important World War II conference between Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Franklin D. Roosevelt took place at Yalta. For those who despise Roosevelt it was at Yalta that the president was duped by the Soviet leader which would lead directly to the Cold War following the president’s death. Obviously, Yalta was of prime importance when one examines the post-war period, but in fact according to historian Keith Eubanks in his landmark study, SUMMIT AT TEHRAN, the agreements reached at Yalta and much of the postwar settlement were fashioned by the Tehran discussions.

Since Teheran was the first meeting of the “Big Three” coming at a time when it was becoming increasingly clear that the Germans were going to lose the war, anything the Nazis could do to prevent the allied leaders from developing plans to bring the war to a conclusion and what the post-war world would look like was imperative. For Adolf Hitler, if his commandos could disrupt the conference of perhaps kill allied leadership, new heads of state might be willing to develop more reasonable policies toward Germany other than the goal of “unconditional surrender” announced by Roosevelt at the Casablanca Conference on January 24, 1943. In Howard Blum’s NIGHT OF THE ASSASSINS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HITLER’S PLOT TO KILL FDR, CHURCHILL, AND STALIN the author explores events and decision making surrounding the Nazi plan to assassinate allied leaders – code named Operation Long Jump. Blum’s effort is not a work of counterfactual history discussing what might have occurred had the Nazi plan been carried out, but an interesting historical monograph that unwraps how close the Nazis came to success.

(Walter Schellenberg as an SS-Oberführer in 1943)

Blum’s work reads like an engrossing spy thriller, when in fact it is a true story. It reads like a well written novel, but in reality it is a narrative history at its best. The monograph itself is presented on parallel lines. First is the competition between SS General Walter Schellenberg who headed Section 6 of the Reich Security Office (RSHA), and Michael Reilly, the Secret Service agent who was the head of President Roosevelt’s security detail. The author, having examined the pertinent documentation, delves into the mindset of both figures and the strategies they developed in order to achieve their goals. For Schellenberg it was to decapitate allied leadership, and for Reilly to thwart any assassination attempts and keep the “Big Three” safe. The second thread that Blum catalogues are the measures taken to protect Roosevelt and his allied compatriots and Nazi covert plans over a two year period to offset the fact that the war seemed lost by killing the “Big Three” and hoping that replacement leaders would be more amenable. Third, are the character studies of each of the important personages in the story. From Schellenberg and his commando operatives, allied and Nazi spies, to Reilly.

Blum’s commitment to detail is the highlight of the narrative. For example, the removal of tons of seized opium from smugglers stored in the basement of the Treasury building in Washington to create a safe space for Roosevelt after December 7, 1941, or the use of Al Capone’s automobile that was outfitted with amazing safety features for the time to protect the president. Other examples include Churchill’s capacity to ingest brandy and scotch and his lax approach for his own security. Blum delves deeply into the spy craft that was employed highlighting agents, double agents, recruitment of commandos, training for the assassination missions and other aspects of intelligence dexterity.

The author does a useful job discussing the competition within the Nazi bureaucracy exemplified by the relationship between General Schellenberg head of Section 6 of SS intelligence, and the head of Abwehr, the military espionage branch of the Wehrmacht, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. Another example of this competition is highlighted by the Abwehr commando training program centered at Lake Quenz headed by Major Rudolph von Holten-Pflug produced jealousy on the part of Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS who ordered Captain Otto Skorzeny to create an SS version of Lake Quenz. It would be Skorzeny who had rescued Benito Mussolini from Allied control who would train the commandos and lead them into Teheran to assassinate their targets. Other key players include Franz Mayr and Roman Gamotha, German spies who had been dropped into Iran in 1940, one of which turned out to be a double agent; Julius Berthold Schilze-Holthus, a Nazi diplomat stationed in Teheran; Nasr Khan who led the Qashqai Tribe’s military arm who allied with the Germans; Lili Sanjari, Roman Gamotha’s secretary and Franz Mayr’s mistress among many other characters.

(Michael Reilly and FDR)

At various times it appears that Schellenberg’s plot would be successful. By November 1943, all the pieces he put into place had come together. Abwehr and SD agents had successfully gone undercover in Iran early in the war. Two agents remained active, one in Teheran, and the other in the tribal hill country. In previous operations commandos had parachuted into Iran and established the procedures for aerial insertion missions with the necessary equipment to carry out the plot. Further, the alliance with Nasr Khan remained firm. Lastly, Hitler had complete confidence that Otto Skorzeny, the very tactician who had supervised the training and execution for previous missions into Iran, could carry out a successful assassination mission.

It is interesting to explore how Reilly and the American secret service tried to keep the President and his entourage safe. Reilly had to deal with a stubborn president who enjoyed certain peccadillos of life that he was wanting to give up. Further, plans seemed to change almost on a dime especially as negotiations with Stalin to choose the site of the meeting constantly ran into roadblocks. Other aspects of the trip to Tehran after it was finally chosen were that Roosevelt, Churchill, and Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-Shek would first meet in Cairo which created more headaches for Reilly and company.

(Otto Skorzeny in 1943)

The role played by the Russians is consequential for a country that was occupied by both the Soviet Union and the United States. During the war, Iran became a major transshipment route for American Lend-Lease aid to the Soviets, and thousands of American, British, and Russian troops controlled the major cities and ports, particularly Tehran. Blum shows the ruthless nature of the Soviet precautions as Soviet intelligence and secret police agents of the NKVD, the forerunner of the infamous KGB, began a massive sweep of Tehran to arrest any German national or potential sympathizer when the first hint of a conspiracy is heard. For Reilly, the role of Soviet intelligence was concerning with their nest of secret agents and posers in Teheran, and how he could work with his Soviet counterparts to ensure the safety of the “Big Three.” Reilly’s concerns were also evident when Stalin offered to have the American delegation moved to the Soviet compound in the city. The rationale was clear, the American embassy was just outside the city and would require a short car ride each day for the president creating an interesting target. A move to the Soviet compound would include Russian eavesdropping devices placed throughout where the American delegation would be staying – certainly, a dilemma for the Americans. Interestingly, Roosevelt was not keen staying at the British compound located near the Russians either.

Blum uses Russian archival sources only made public in the last twenty years along with an ample collection of other primary and secondary sources as he weaves a fast-paced story of how Nazi intelligence services and special commando units tried to infiltrate an assassination team into Iran. It is a story that would make Ken Follett, Robert Ludlum, and Ian Fleming proud. In the end the Germans would come closer to a successful suicide mission that is generally believed. Except for the usual difficulties of controlling foreign intelligence operatives-greed, stupidity, and bad luck, the Nazis might have gotten their commandos within lethal proximity to the “Big Three” and conducted a successful war altering mission.

If you would like to read an updated version of the story see Brad Meltzer and Josh Mensch’s THE NAZI CONSPIRACY: THE SECRET PLOT TO KILL ROOSEVELT, STALIN, AND CHURCHILL.

SKIES OF THUNDER: THE DEADLY WORLD WAR II MISSION OVER THE ROOF OF THE WORLD by Caroline Alexander

July 23, 2024July 23, 2024szfreiberger World War II Leave a comment

(Flying “the Hump” in World War II. The Curtiss C-46 Commando was a mainstay for those operations, conducted over the Himalayan foothills where there was no emergency landing strip.)

The term “Over the Hump” is a concept that seems lost to history. When applied properly it embodies the American effort to supply the Nationalist Chinese weapons and supplies to combat the Japanese army which by 1942 invaded Burma and captured and cut off the only ground route into China. The only way to offset Japanese progress was to supply the Nationalist Chinese by air flying over the Himalayas from India.

In her latest book, Caroline Alexander the bestselling author of THE ENDURANCE: SHACKELTON’S LEGENDARY ATLANTIC EXPEDITION and THE BOUNTY: THE TRUE STORY OF THE MUTINY ON THE BOUNTY among other works has written an exceptionally detailed narrative and analysis of the American effort to thwart the Japanese describing the dangerous flights by inexperienced pilots over the Himalayas, discussing the diplomatic agenda of the United States, England, and China, along with insightful personality studies of men like General “Vinegar” Joe Stilwell, the American officer in charge of aid to China, General Chiang Kai-Shek the leader of Nationalist China, and Claire Lee Chennault, the American officer who commanded the “Flying Tigers.” The book entitled, SKIES OF THUNDER: THE DEADLY WORLD WAR II MISSION OVER THE ROOF OF THE WORLD focuses on the newly created infrastructure for the mission, training of pilots, and the hazardous flights they engaged in. Further, Alexander delves into the allied strategy of the China-Burma Theater (C.B.I.) which was complicated by the conflicting political and military interests of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and their unreliable ally, Chiang Kai-Shek.

(Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell (1883-1946) eating field rations on Christmas morning, 1943)

For Alexander, the C.B.I. was the war’s “most complicated theater” and was driven by competing interests and contradictions that exposed the fault line between the allies. For many, C.B.I. translated to “confusion, beyond imagination.”

Alexander’s riveting new work begins with the allied defeat in Burma in April 1942 sealing off the ground corridor linking India and China. This would an “ariel Burma road” to supply Chiang’s troops and allied forces. According to Alexander’s research some 600 planes and 1700 American airmen would be lost flying over Burmese jungles and mountains.

Although the supply effort was deemed a military operation, its primary goal was political, not military, a result of President Roosevelt’s desire to retain the support and boost the moral of Chiang Kai-Shek and his government and ensure a close relationship between the United States and China as Washington wanted the Nationalists to become a major player in the post-war world. The British as Alexander develops throughout the monograph were not as supportive of FDR’s raison detre and actively worked to undermine the American approach. The tension “between the practical and symbolic purpose of the Hump operation was to persist throughout the war” – a dominant theme of Alexander’s work.

(Stilwell with Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang’s wife, Soong Mei-ling, in 1942)

Early on Alexander introduces her argument that a united front to defeat Japan would be difficult to achieve. First, Chiang hated the Chinese Communist Party because they were the only group he was unable “to buy off, absorb, liquidate, or suppress…” Second, they were the only party that was gaining popular support. Third, Chiang believed the Chinese people were incapable of governing themselves. Lastly, and most importantly the Chinese army’s military strength was not applied against Japan despite American aid and encouragement and was held back due to Chiang’s belief of the coming civil war against the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Zedong. In all areas, negotiation, his relationship with Stilwell, and his belief in his own destiny Chiang was the major impediment to try and defeat Japan.

Alexander’s book is well sourced and researched. She carefully explains the Japanese seizure of Burma entering Rangoon in March 1942. The chaos that resulted was due to British General Archibald Wavell’s belief that the Japanese would never invade Burma through Rangoon. Alexander carefully recounts the horrors Burmese refugees suffered trying to escape the Japanese invasion through monsoons that fostered torrential rains and muddy roads.

A strength of the author is her focus on the major players in the conflict, exploring the pilot’s experiences, and the results of American efforts. Prominent figures like General “Vinegar Joe” Stillwell are examined carefully. His relationship with Chiang Kai-Shek was terrible which impacted US policy, Stilwell’s relationship with General George C. Marshall, and President Roosevelt are keys to Alexander’s analysis. In the end Stilwell’s off-putting personality, ego, and strong beliefs would lead to his recall from China in 1944 due to Chiang’s request. Marshall’s description of Stilwell as being “his own worst enemy….his pathological tactlessness and rudeness was a major factor in the troubles he had in China.” The role of Claire Lee Chennault is also vital to the story of who would contribute to the conflict and the confusion that vexed the C.B.I. theater. Over the course of the war, Chennault’s own propaganda machine increased his reputation and the air assets he commanded. He would gain great notoriety in the United States, but in the end according to the author his contribution to the success of the Burma theater is debatable. Alexander’s criticism of Roosevelt is warranted as his view of Chiang was unrealistic. His belief in his own powers of persuasion were misguided as was his evaluation and ignorance of the key logistical facts of supplying Chiang’s forces. His approach would be very detrimental to the men who built the facilities and the pilots who carried out the Burma mission. Roosevelt’s belief and promises in the amount of tonnage of supplies that could be delivered were impracticable.

(Claire Lee Chennault)

Other prominent figures that are discussed include Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the British commander in Burma who did not get along with Stilwell and also demanded his replacement. General Henery “Hap” Arnold, the commander of the US Air Force, British General Orde Charles Wingate, 1^st Air Commander Philip Cochran, General William Slim, General Frank Merrill, among others who receive extensive coverage.

To Alexander’s credit her focus is not only on influential figures. Her descriptions of the many pilots and the weather, topography, equipment failures are exceptional. Descriptions of the environmental hazards faced by pilots are fully warranted. Weather was the most onerous aspect of flying over the Himalayas. Monsoons, ice formations, thunderstorms, jungles, mountain peaks, deserts, sandstorms all had to be overcome. Further, training could be spotty. Many pilots lacked the experience needed to confront and overcome all of the obstacles in flying and delivering their cargo. With Chiang threatening to leave the war many pilots were rushed into situations for which they were unprepared. Many of the pilots lacked any combat experience and were psychologically and mentally ill equipped to deal with the dangers they faced. The result was misreading instrument failures, the situation they found themselves confronted with, the performance of their aircraft etc. resulting in bailing out when not necessary, crashing their planes when conditions did not fully explain what had occurred. Alexander’s account puts the reader in the cockpit with pilots as they had to cope with balancing their own survival and completing their missions.

To sum up Alexander does a wonderful job telling the story of the men who risked their lives dealing with brutal terrain and horrific weather conditions to keep China in World War II. While Alexander devotes a great deal of time explaining strategic and political issues, her interest lies primarily on the variations of individual human personalities. The author tells, through clear and engaging narrative, the story of the pilots in the planes to the level of campaign overview, sometimes really from 30,000 feet.

(Aerial reconnaissance photograph of the Sittang Bridge in southern Burma, which was destroyed in the face of the advancing Japanese on 23 February 1942)

Perhaps historian Elizabth D. Samet describes Alexander’s effort the best; “Ultimately, and rightly, the pilots — intrepid as “sailors of old” crossing “unknown oceans” — are the core of the book. Demeaned as “Hump drivers,” ostensible noncombatants at the bottom of the aviation hierarchy, they flew an inadequately charted route over baffling terrain, its surreality intensified by their frequent refusal to wear oxygen masks.

Alexander adroitly explicates technical concepts — flight mechanics, de-icing, night vision — but is at her best rendering pilots’ fear. Besides terrain, its sources included weather, enemy aircraft, insufficient training, night missions and “short rations of fuel” on the return leg. At least a pilot could depend on his plane, the beloved Douglas C-47 Skytrain, until the introduction of unreliable or unsound higher-capacity models turned the machines themselves into another source of terror.

Readers thrilled by sagas of flight will marvel at the logistics required to transport a stunning 650,000 tons of cargo by air, the audacity required to fly the Hump, the search-and-rescue operations necessitated by its hazards and the experimental use of aviation involved in the Allied recapture of Burma in 1944.

A Chindit column crossing a river in Burma, 1943.

(A Chindit unit forging a Burmese River, 1943)

They will also have to reckon with Alexander’s hard-nosed conclusions about the C.B.I. Others who have chronicled its history concentrated on the strategic merits of this deeply imperfect theater or celebrated its pioneering use of air power.

The image that dominates the end of Alexander’s epic is “the aluminum trail” of wreckage — “the hundreds of crashed aircraft that still lie undiscovered in the jungles, valleys and fractured ranges beneath the Hump’s old route.”*

*Elisabeth D. Samet. ”The Scrappy World War II Pilots Who Took Flight for a Perilous Mission.” New York Times, May 14, 2024.

Photo Credit: PhotoQuest / Getty Images (Colorized by Palette.fm)

COLD CREMATORIUM: REPORTING FROM THE LAND OF AUSCHWITZ by Josef Debreczeni

February 4, 2024szfreiberger Holocaust, World War II Leave a comment

(Rail line leading into Auschwitz)

At a time when anti-Semitism is on the rise worldwide, supposedly due to the war in Gaza, which is erroneous as the phenomenon was increasing long before Hamas’ brutal attack on October 7^th. At the same time, we recognize Holocaust Remembrance day which commemorates the annihilation of Jews during World War II. It is fitting that at this time Josef Debreczeni’s memoir of his time in “the land of Auschwitz,” COLD CREMATORIUM: REPORTING FROM THE LAND OF AUSCHWITZ has been rereleased.

Originally published in 1950 it was never translated because of the rise of McCarthyism which rejected any pro-Soviet literature; Cold War hostilities as Stalinists refused to accept the Jews as “victims of fascism” singled out for extinction; and the rise of anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe. However, its appearance has made an important contribution to the great works of Holocaust literature as its author points out many things that have either been forgotten or overlooked.

Jonathan Freedland writes in the Forward to the book, referring to Debreczeni as a “witness, survivor, victim, and also an analyst, offering ruminations on some of the enduring questions raised by the Holocaust among them the puzzle of how arguably the most cultured nation in Europe could have led the continent’s descent into the most brutal savagery.” Other vital insights provided by Debreczeni include a reminder that the victims of Nazi brutality did not know their imminent fate, a crucial fact in trying to comprehend how the Final Solution was possible, and that so many others certainly did. Debreczeni reminds us that the Holocaust may have been developed in Berlin, it relied on accomplices throughout Europe – from liberal France to anti-Semitic Poland. Many of these individuals may have suffered from “willful blindness,” as they would later deny seeing or participating in atrocities. The author’s account of the actions perpetrated by Kapos, many of which were Jews is disturbing and for most beyond the capacity to imagine. In a diabolical Nazi system “the best slave driver is a slave accorded a privileged position” is an accurate and scary proposition.

(They came with the things most valuable to them unaware that everything would be taken including many of their lives)

For Debreczeni many chroniclers of the Shoah do not emphasize the economic function of Auschwitz enough. The author describes the German corporations involved to the point that many victims would have company names printed on their striped pajama type uniforms. The brutal conditions that victims faced were laid bare. The illicit trade between prisoners, kitchen workers, guards is ever prevalent – a life for people denied the fundamentals needed for survival – to eat, drink, bathe are all missing with disease and lice everywhere caused by a total lack of sanitation. People were treated like animals, and for a chance at survival the same people morphed into animalistic behavior as they completely lost their identity, self-respect, and will to love. The end result is a slow descent into madness and suicide for many who Debreczeni comes in contact with. For those who deny the Holocaust this memoir is a stark response.

Debreczeni has written a haunting memoir, conveyed in the precise and unsentimental style of a professional journalist whose eyewitness account is of unmatched literary quality. The author’s writing is evocative, employing irony, sarcasm, and an acerbic humor as he prods the reader into the “the Land of Auschwitz,” a place that is intellectually incomprehensible. What sets the book apart is the reporting that the German guards were largely absent or stayed in the background. Instead, it is the prisoners themselves who rule over each other depending on their status which forms a window into the complex organization of the camps.

The memoir begins in January 1944 with a prisoner transport where victims are oblivious as to their location and what the immediate future might bring, ending with liberation by Soviet forces in early May 1945. Debreczeni provides precise details of who certain prisoners were and what they experienced. For example, Mr. Mandel, a carpenter who always had a cigarette in his hand, but once they were taken away he still raises his empty fingers to his lips – he will be the first to die on the transport or the TB riddled Frenchman, a lower level Kapo in Auschwitz who developed a semblance of humanity as he warned prisoners as to what was about to happen to them. Debreczeni holds nothing back in describing how people of varying backgrounds cooperated with the Nazis, including Jews. A prime example is Weisz, a low brow salesclerk from Hungary, “a low-life Jew” who wielded a truncheon. He was “power crazed, malicious, a wild beast,” who was the epitome of the Nazi system that “the best slave driver is a slave accorded a privileged position.” Most of these types of slave drivers came from the “lower rungs” of Jewish society before the war. Those who came from the highest levels of Jewish society were found to be helpless in the Nazi camp hierarchy. Another is Herman, an SS guard who had been a bartender before the war and was one of the few guards who exhibited a degree of empathy as opposed to his murderous compatriots as he would drop a half smoked cigarette to the ground for a prisoner to find. A typical power hungry individual was Sanyi Roth, a room commander for tent #28, a notorious repeat offender, serial burglar who was put in charge of the worst tent which housed murderers, robbers, and other “creatures.” Interestingly, after Debreczeni flatters him he begins to take him under his wing. Perhaps the most despicable person was Moric, the foremost Kapo of all camps, whose nickname was the Fuhrer of the death camps – the sole Jew who held as much power as Nazi officials. Another individual who stands out, but in a positive fashion is Dr. Farkas, a Jewish physician who was forced to cooperate with the SS. But at the same time was able to display compassion and medical knowledge to treat many inmates. In fact, without his care Debreczeni would not have survived.

(The bunks at Auschwitz II-Birkenau)

The author provides an understanding of the evil the Nazis perpetrated aside from annihilation. He describes the genius of those who developed the Final Solution. To achieve mass death a killing infrastructure needed to be created. A key aspect of which was the hierarchy of power which the Nazis implemented providing certain prisoners a key role in the genocide. The Germans kept themselves invisible behind the barbed wire as “the allocation of food, the discipline, the direct supervision of work, and the first degree of terror – in sum, executive power – were in fact entrusted to slave drivers chosen randomly from among the deportees.” For their hideous work they received certain benefits including more food, clothing, the opportunity to steal, and power over their fellow prisoners – power over life and death, which for many was intoxicating. They all played a role in the vertical structure that resembled a military command where each person from the highest to the lowest Kapo knew their job and what would happen to them if they didn’t carry it out. This structure also was apparent in camp hospitals like Dornhau where Doctors, medics, nurses, and other workers had specific roles in the Nazi hierarchy.

Debreczeni offers an exceptional description of the “Land of Auschwitz” which consisted of many sub-camps in addition to the more famous areas like Birkenau or lesser labor camps like Furstenstein which the author experienced personally which was typical of other work camps who held the same characteristics. This area consisted of a castle complex which the Nazis destroyed in order to create an underground complex for a new headquarters for Hitler, should retreat be necessary and an arms factory on the site.

German corporations do not escape Debreczeni’s withering description as they paid the Nazi regime to rent slave labor and profited immensely. Many books have been written about this subject. For a complete list one can be found at https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/german-firms-that-used-slave-labor-during-nazi-era#google_vignette. In Debreczeni’s case it was Sanger and Laninger who enslaved him as a tunnel digger.

There are many other elements that the author describes from the use of cigarettes as a medium of exchange which became its own underground industry. Another medium of exchange was extracted gold crowns which many inmates did themselves to trade for food – the going rate was one crown for a weeks’ worth of soup. The concept of the “will to live” is explored in detail with harrowing examples. For the author, the will grew and like others he was willing to steal, fake jobs, and other strategies as a means of survival. Debreczeni’s commentary concerning prisoner roundups is very disconcerting as prisoners were asked to volunteer for certain jobs and transport. Many prisoners were willing to play Russian roulette to survive, most who did died, but a few would escape.

Each chapter seems more disturbing than the next and ranking the most horrifying material presented is very difficult. Perhaps the chapters that stand out are those involving the Dornhau camp hospital which describes the Nazi approach to medical care and its sadistic treatment techniques carried out by most medical professionals. It is this hospital that the term “cold crematorium” refers to. Debreczeni’s recounting of the plight of his bunkmates is indescribable especially as typhus became rampant.

As Menachem Kaiser writes in his New York Times review, “How To Talk About Auschwitz,” “Debreczeni recounts his deportation to Auschwitz, and from there to a series of camps. This isn’t the sort of book you can get a sense of from a plot outline. Debreczeni suffers; he survives (or, more accurately, he does not die); he observes. His powers of observation are extraordinary. Everything he encounters in what he calls the Land of Auschwitz — the work sites, the barracks, the bodies, the corpses, the hunger, the roll call, the labor, the insanity, the fear, the despair, the strangeness, the hope, the cruelty — is captured in terrifyingly sharp detail.”

In conclusion, Debreczeni has written haunting conformation of the terror of that was the Holocaust, and the will to survive.

(Entrance to Auschwitz I)

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