
(An illustration of the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava during the Crimean War. (Photo by Time Life Pictures/Mansell/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images)
In his consummate diplomatic history, THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY OF EUROPE 1848-1918, A.J.P. Taylor describes the Crimean War as a largely pointless conflict driven by miscalculation and misplaced ego on the part of the leaders of Britain, France and Russia. As many historians have described the war originated because of a series of careless decisions on the part of all involved in events leading up to the conflict which ended the post-Napoleonic War period. According to Taylor the war was fought for imprudent reasons as its outbreak was due supposedly because of England and France’s desire to protect Christian interests in the Ottoman Empire, but that was a smokescreen for the European powers to weaken the Turkish domain and assert their dominance.
Taylor stresses the role of domestic political pressure and the need to maintain national prestige pushing the powers toward war making it difficult to pull back and secure the peace. An accurate phrase that encapsulates the outbreak of war can be summed as “a war that didn’t boil” which reflects how a minor incident escalated into a major confrontation because of the inability of politicians to deescalate. The Treaty of Paris (1856) ended the fighting, and its results were rather inconsequential as it was designed to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and neutralize the Black Sea. However, decisions which originated at Paris in the years following the war would in the end prove to be very consequential.

(William Howard Russell, ca. 1854)
In his new book, CRIMEAN QUAGMIRE: TOLSTOY, RUSSELL, AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN WARFARE Russian specialist Gregory Carelton argues that the Crimean War transformed how we understand war, eradicating 19th century Romanticism which followed the Napoleonic War. Focusing on two young writers; Russian officer Lev Tolstoy, and The Times journalist William Howard Russell, Carelton relates how these men exposed government misinformation and coverups as their countries engaged in what military historians describe as the first modern war. Both men would pay dearly for exposing the actions of their governments, but their legacy certainly outlived them.
Carelton correctly argues that the war developed major aspects of modern warfare introducing a number of technological achievements. First, the destructive power of the rifle; others include long-range artillery, the railroads and telegraphs, photography, improved medical treatment, iron-clad steam powered ships, explosive shells, and land mines, all contributing to the carnage of warfare.
Carleton’s thesis continues as he argues that what also made the war significant were the ways in which we understand war and how we inform the public as for the first time the domestic audience learned of the true horrors of war that took place on the battlefield. The Crimean War was the first whereby public opinion helped push combatants to the negotiating table.
In Carleton’s narrative it was Tolstoy and Russell who deserve the credit for introducing the public to the images of war it had rarely, if ever, had witnessed before as they offered graphic scenes from the conflict. What enhanced their dispatches was the rise in literacy rates, particularly among soldiers in the British army who could then inform their families and the public in general with their experiences through letters, diaries, and memoirs. For the first time in history warfare technology allowed the public immediate insights as to what was occurring on the battlefield.

(Leo Tolstoy)
As to the direct causes of the war that threatened the post-Napoleonic settlement balance of power, Russia was deemed most culpable. The Tsarist autocracy would soon replace Napoleonic France as the main threat to British influence and power as it continued to expand across the Caucasus and Central Asia along with its domination of Eastern Europe. Few diplomats, politicians or generals trusted Russia which did accept any threat to the European order and was always willing to dispatch troops to put down any revolutionary threat as occurred in Hungary during the Revolutions of 1848. This fact was highlighted by the century-long conflict with the Ottoman Empire throughout Southeast Europe, across the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Another useful argument is represented by the Crystal Palace and Great Exhibition of 1851 in England which focused the world on the technological and intellectual achievements and potential of the British Empire as compared to the backwardness of Russia who saw innovation and change as a threat to its rule and power. For an in depth analysis encompassing the immediate causes, the outbreak, and the course of the war consult Orlando Figes’ excellent study THE CRIMEAN WAR: A HISTORY, Trevor Royle’s CRIMEA: THE GREAT CRIMEAN WAR 1854-1856, and Robert Edgerton’s DEATH OF GLORY: THE LEGACY OF THE CRIMEAN WAR.
To quote Richard Haas whose excellent book, WAR OF NECESSITY, WAR OF CHOICE his views on the war in Iraq are very pertinent as the Crimean War was a war of choice initiated by empires infatuated with their own exceptionalism which were guilty of causing a stalemate on the battlefield, produced contradictory arguments and lies to justify their actions leaving both sides embittered with intense domestic blowback, all of which produced a quagmire as, it did in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and currently in Ukraine. Carelton argues that the effect of quagmires lasts long past the conclusion of the fighting. The results can break nations, bring down governments or lead to different types of revolution.

A key chapter in Carleton’s monograph is a comparison of the impact of Tolstoy’s and Russell’s socialization. Tolstoy on the one hand developed intellectually in a backward autocratic state with an 80% peasant population which was mostly illiterate. Russell, on the other hand, was impacted by a country that praised democratic principles, conducted elections, and had a mostly literate population. The impact of these writers was also different as Russell focused more on the tragedy as governments tried to cover up and deny the brutality of their war and the incompetence of the leaders who directed it. Tolstoy as a junior artillery officer focused on his direct experiences commenting on trench warfare, the siege of Sevastopol, and other examples of devastation in his short stories and later novels, WAR AND PEACE and ANNA KARENINA. As Carleton repeatedly points out, both men “laid the groundwork for veterans of World War I and later conflicts to try and understand and cope with their own experiences.”
The war itself would result in changing the governments of England and Russia. Russell wrote that Prime Minister Lord Aberdeen’s government was an aristocratic den, “aloof, out of touch, inept, and so it seemed uncaring.” He further pointed out that “the finest army that ever left these shores will soon cease to exist.” By the end of January 1855, Aberdeen’s government fell and was replaced by the former Home Secretary, Lord Palmerston. In Russia, Nicholas passed away and was replaced by Alexander II as Tsar who immediately wrote that the war was “a bottomless pit.”

(Cossack Bay, Balaklava)
Carleton does an excellent job integrating Russell and Tolstoy’s dispatches and stories describing the course of the war and the carnage they witnessed. The fact that both men were embedded with their armies gives further credence to support their views and how the public interpreted their ideas. Excerpts of their descriptions of the siege of Sevastopol provide the reader with many insights as to how the war was fought, the incompetence of the bureaucracies that hindered supplies, the brutal weather that soldiers endured, the lack of infrastructure limiting efforts to provide soldiers with what they needed, and the impact of the social class system that affected both armies. The end result was that the siege would soon devolve into a Somme-like catastrophe, albeit on a smaller scale.
Carleton’s use of letters, diaries, and memoirs by combatants in addition to the writing of Russell and Tolstoy add a high degree of authenticity in understanding the horrible conditions in which the war was fought and the incompetent leadership at home and on the battlefield. Carleton has produced a concisely written and tight monograph that provides numerous insights concerning the war, how it was fought, the results, and the implications for future wars. The author argues further that the war changed war writing forever and by breaking down different examples of Russell and Tolstoy’s works, i.e., “Sevastopol in September,” and “Sevastopol in May” Tolstoy has crossed the threshold, leaving behind Homeric expectations of glory with the truth about how a peasant army was being slaughtered. In Russell’s case his commentary on “the Charge of the Light Brigade” pulls no punches as it was not only a defeat, and its results had no consequences for the war. For Russell, the age of cavalry had passed as he described the siege as a “quagmire-like stalemate.”
The author spends an entire chapter tracing the myths associated with the “Charge of the Light Brigade” which would be immortalized by Alfred Lord Tennyson. The poet’s interest was piqued by Russell’s dispatches resulting in a remarkable poem in which Carleton beaks down stanza by stanza.

(British mortar batteries)
The writing of our subjects reflects the evolution of the transition from the Age of Romanticism to the Age of Realism leading to a revolution in war writing. Carleton makes the important point that Russell’s writing angered a public that grew tired of government obfuscation, and it became the major source of information for people to follow the war and understand it. Russell’s writings created a furor in government circles, and they put pressure on The Times’ editor, John Delane who refused to back down and would allow commentary such as the governments “incompetency, lethargy, aristocratic hauteur, official indifference, favor, routine, perverseness, and stupidity reign….the noblest army ever sent out from these shores has been sacrificed to the grossest mismanagement.” Russell went on to describe the soldiers as “victims” and for the first time newspapers began to publish lists of soldiers who had died. For Tolstoy, his wartime experiences convinced him to resign his military commission and pursue a writing career.
Carleton is clear as he reiterates how Russell and Tolstoy remapped how death should be understood on the battlefield and off, perhaps their most important contribution to understanding modern warfare. For both it came down to three principles: who died, how they died, and more importantly, why they died. In all areas they broke all previous conventions in their writing be it anyone could be a victim of war with no relation to rank, societal status or nationality. Further, they explored the true conditions on the battlefield. Lastly, they argued that Crimea does not fit the longtime view accepted of why wars are fought. The Crimean War, in short, had no precedent in the European mindset as it was the first to be recognized as a quagmire – literally where opposing armies struggled to take a few yards in deepening mud, trenches, disease, and resulting despair as an estimated 700,000 perished, three-quarters of which were Russian. The concept of a quagmire developed in the Crimea can easily be applied to today’s fighting in Ukraine.

(Camp of the 4th Dragoons, English and French)
The author’s short volume is loaded with examples to support each of his points and is an exceptional synthesis of the available material, primary and secondary. It looks at the war from a different perspective as Carleton argues it established truth as the aim of war reporting and understanding the power of words/lies to create war, death, and destruction. It helped establish a script with which to understand “quagmire conflict.”
As to the lessons learned from the war Donald Rayfield’s review published in History Today Volume 74 Issue 10 October 2024 is spot on as he writes: “The heritage of the Crimean War is mixed. Both sides realized that doctors and nurses, not generals and sergeants, were needed. In Britain and Russia, there was energetic medical progress: chloroform was now offered not only to officers and gentlemen. Sanitation, nutrition and nursing were given the same priorities as shells and fortifications. In Russia a military-medical academy started training thousands of doctors, including women, so that in the next Balkan war, 20 years later, Russia could boast of having women doctors serving at the front.
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(Alfred Lord Tennyson, poet)
Military lessons were learnt, too: Alexander II’s generals turned to the conquest of Central Asia and the Far East. As the world gradually conceded the Russians the freedom of the Black Sea, Alexander, the so-called liberator, began a genocidal deportation of hundreds of thousands of indigenous Caucasians and Crimean Tatars to Anatolia. The Crimean War, however, did initiate Russia’s most progressive era: serfs were freed, the arts flourished, a national health service was created. In Britain complacent aristocrats such as Lord Aberdeen yielded to energetic radicals such as Disraeli and Gladstone. Russians and Britons, but, alas, not the Ottomans, emerged wiser from their quagmire.”
According to Carleton the lessons to be learned are clear. “Quagmires become veritable graveyards of exceptionalism.” Need proof, look at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the American war in Vietnam. Each resulted in the collapse of government and major policy implications for the future. As these wars were fought the calling cards of quagmires emerge – atrocities and war crimes. To cover this up the key link of 20th and 21st century quagmires is the “foundational lie,” as in any quagmire truth is the first casualty.

(Old engraved illustration of the Siege of Sevastopol during the Crimean War. (Picture by GettyImages)





















(The General Elżbieta Foundation, ToruńZo, as seen on her student pass, graduated from Poznań University with a higher degree in mathematics)
(The General Elżbieta Foundation, ToruńZawacka (centre) took the nom-de-guerre Zo after being sworn into the Polish resistance)
(Getty ImagesThe Warsaw Uprising was the largest organised act of defiance against Nazi Germany during World War Two)
(Clare Mulley/A mural depicting Zawacka has been painted on the side of the communist-era apartment block where she lived in Toruń)
(The General Elżbieta Foundation, ToruńElżbieta Zawacka crossed international borders more than 100 times as she smuggled military intelligence to the Allies)





































