(Reproduction of a handbill advertising a slave auction in Charleston, British Province of South Carolina)

As the current administration guts the Department of Education, coerces universities to adhere to what they think should be taught in classes, and pressures public schools to rewrite their curriculum to reflect its view of history it is important to examine books that tell the truth about history as opposed to a fantasy that makes certain elements in our society feel better.  Banning books, censorship, and curtailing funding is no way to examine our past – something from which we should learn!  Just because someone write or says something that is critical of American history does not mean it did not happen or is a threat in our current environment.  Remembering our past is a precursor to the present and is a necessity and must be carefully examined as we should learn not to repeat previous errors.  It is in this context that Siddharth Kara’s latest book, THE ZORG: A TALE OF GREED AND MURDER THAT INSPIRED THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY must be explored.

Kara’s narrative history portrays his subject with compassion, and accuracy based on exceptional research depicting the harsh realities of the 18^th century slave trade involving Africa, the Caribbean, and the American colonies providing lessons we should never ignore.  This may come across to some as “wok,” but history is something that should never be dismissed or degraded.

(The Slave Ship (1840), J. M. W. Turner‘s representation of the mass killing of enslaved people, inspired by the Zong killings)

The narrative that Kara presents reads as a work of fiction, but it is not.  It is a work that is based on fact and presents an accurate picture of the events he describes.  Each chapter ends with a hint of what is to come next.  Each important observation is related to what will take place in the future and how it will affect his storyline.  Kara provides a very detailed history of the Zorg and its ill-fated voyage, describing in mesmerizing detail the story’s evolution as it embarked on a violent Atlantic crossing.  A British privateer captured the Zorg during the Anglo-Dutch War in early 1781, and the ship would sail from the Gold Coast of Africa to Kingston, Jamaica, with its ‘etween deck’ loaded with 442 slaves, including women and children, and a small crew which was not sufficient to care for them.  Even the Captain was problematical, a former slave ship surgeon, who had little navigational experience, hired by a rich Liverpool slave merchant.

There are a number of important characters that garner the author’s attention.  First, Luke Collingwood, Captain of the Zorg and a former slave ship physician who must have been considered competent since his mortality rate for the crew and slaves was considered below average, however he was not trained in navigation and would become a disastrous choice.  William Gregson, underwrote the cost of the Zorg and was considered one of Liverpool’s most prominent slave merchants.  James Kelsall, was second in command to Collingwood on the Zorg, and was the only knowledgeable navigator apart from the captain.  Robert Stubbs, one of the British governors for the Company of Merchants Trading for Africa (CMTA) was a scoundrel who sold slaves, pocketed the profit, and made decisions out of avarice that would end up in disaster.  He was eventually fired but wound up on the Zorg as it made its way to Jamaica.  William Llewellin, the captain of the British privateer, Alert, who captured the Zorg, which at the time had 120 slaves.  He would capture the Dutch slaving ship, Eendracht, and would add its 124 slaves to the Zorg.  Richard Hanley, one of the leading slave captains in Liverpool.  John Roberts, another CMTA governor who clashed with Stubbs.  Amoonay Coomah, the Ashante King who sold his people into slavery.  Olaudah Equiano, captured by slave traders at age eleven, he survived the two Middle Passages having been shipped to shipped to Virginia, served as an officer’s slave on British battle ships.  In 1766 he would buy his freedom and later would play an important role in trying to free slaves.  Lastly, Granville Sharp who early in career witnessed a scene were a black teenager was beaten, sold, and kidnapped and was outraged.  Sharp would work to gain the teenager’s freedom and spend his remaining career as an abolitionist developing arguments against slavery.  In addition, Kara introduces a series of English abolitionists who assiduously to end the slave trade in the late 18^th and early 19^th century.

(The Zorg, a replica)

Kara provides excellent background for the reader to gain a true understanding of what life was like on a slave ship.  He points to the difficulties in staffing a ship’s crew.  It was a daunting task since men new that Guinea voyages had high mortality rates, offered poor wages, required to complete unpleasant tasks, including guarding and feeding hundreds of captive slaves.  Many of the crew hired were impressed or had to work off debts acquired while they were drunk.  Most crews that were hired were not experienced enough for a successful voyage.

Kara offers a useful description of the British slave infrastructure in Africa, i.e., forts, factories, supply networks, the dungeons slaves were kept in, and the personalities or governors who were in charge.  It is eye opening because the of the horrors the Africans faced even before they were forced to board the slave ships.  He makes a series of insightful observations.  One of the most important is that once Africans were forced into a dungeon or on to a slave ship they had no concept of what was about to happen to them.  The dungeon the British built was indicative of the horrors that awaited the Africans.  It was built below the Cape Coast Castle designed to house over 1,000 Africans at a time.  Kara introduces Ottobah Cugoano who has written a biographical account of his experience in the dungeon, and his Atlantic crossing on a slave ship.  Years later, after obtaining his freedom he would become an important voice in England’s abolitionist movement.

The chapter entitled “Coffles” is an important one as it describes the process by which Africans were either seized by Europeans or sold by Ashante tribal leaders into the slave trade from the interior of the Gold Coast.  The inhuman treatment was abhorrent as they marched over 150 miles to the coast with little food and water.  Once again they did not know where they were going and what awaited them.  To highlight this experience Kara develops the name, Kojo to replicate what an African experienced.  Kojo would march for six months as part of this process.  Later, he would be forced onto the Zorg and along with the other 442 slaves who would be branded to show ownership. 

As Kara writes, “it is impossible to know what emotions the Africans experienced as they passed through the ‘door of no return.’  Was it anxiety, dread, anger, bitterness, hopelessness…perhaps even relief to be out of the dungeon?  Most Africans from the inland regions had never seen the ocean before.  What impact might first sight of the infinite blue have had on them?  Many surely feared they were heading for their doom.

Once Collingswood, Stubbs, and Kelsall overstuffed the Zorg with 442 slaves it was a disaster waiting to happen because the ship’s capacity was around 250.  The expected two month “Middle Passage” with a crew of 17 was clearly insufficient to care for their cargo.  In addition, supplies would not cover their needs.  Once the ship departed for Jamaica on September 7, 1781, a nightmare of dysentery would permeate the ‘etween deck’, the crew  would also suffer from scurvy, measles, typhus, measles, and malaria in steerage, as did the captain in his cabin.  Kara places the blame clearly; poor planning, a lack of organization and administration led to a shortage of supplies, particularly water, and to exacerbate the situation those in charge of the voyage made numerous navigational errors.  The key event occurred when Collingwood became so ill he could not continue in command.  He appointed his friend Stubbs, who had experience navigating slave ships, but had not done so in sixteen years, instead of the first mate Mr. Kelsall, who probably would have made better decisions and saved a significant number of lives.

Desperation set in as scurvy became rampant.   Kara describes the step by step physical and mental deterioration of the crew and cargo on a ship commanded by Stubbs, who was considered a passenger, in addition to the myriad of poor decisions which would result in disaster.  To solve the problem of disease and overcrowding a consensus was reached to throw away large numbers of slaves overboard.  By November 29, 1781, 122 individuals were tossed off the ship. Mostly women and children providing sharks with a culinary treat as they were shoved out of a window in the captain’s cabin.  Kara is correct that this action was a result of hoping to save enough slaves to recoup as much of a profit as possible once they reached Jamaica,  Another possibility was to collect insurance payments for the lost freight!  When the Zorg arrived in Jamaica on December 22, 1781, only 208 slaves remained, after roughly 224 slaves were thrown overboard.  A year later William Gregsonn would file an insurance claim of 30 pounds per head lost, arguing an ominous situation left the crew with no choice but to throw Africans overboard.

(Diagram of a slave ship from the Atlantic slave trade. From an Abstract of Evidence delivered before a select committee of the House of Commons in 1790 and 1791)

Kara describes the legal battle once the insurers refused to pay as Gregson sued the insurance company in February 1783.  The court found for the ship owner resulting in an appeal with England’s Chief Justice believing that the deaths were caused by the crews incompetence, Gregson would withdraw the suit.  Finally, Granville Sharpe would publicize the case as a means of forcing the government to abolish the slave trade.

The Zorg reflects a remarkable work of history despite the lack of sources.  The author does his best poring over what is available at the Royal African Company’s materials and has reproduced some key documents that highlight his narrative.  The most historically important one is an anonymous letter sent to the Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser which Kara reprints in full which would light a fire under abolitionist efforts in England that would not be extinguished until all slaves were free. The author should also be commended for integrating the 1783 court transcripts into the narrative which went along way to present the true facts pertaining to the events on the Zorg.   Kara’s contribution to the historical record concerning anti-slave movement cannot be denied as he has written a sophisticated account reflecting his moral compass.

(Enslaved Africans in chains marched to the East coast of Africa by Arab slavers)

(Confederate President Jefferson Davis and President Abraham Lincoln)

One might ask if we need another book about the Civil War.  What angle might an author take that would appear new and consequential?  It appears that presidential historian  Nigel Hamilton, the author of a trilogy focusing on the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, another on Bill Clinton, and finally one on John F. Kennedy has done so.  Further, Hamilton has also written a monumental multi-volume biography of British General Bernard “Monty” Montogomery and seems to have found his Civil War niche.  Hamilton’s latest effort entitled THE WAR OF PRESIDENTS: LINCOLN VS. DAVIS focuses on presenting a comparative biography of Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis zeroing in on the first two years of the war and their viewpoints and actions.  Hamilton’s goal as he states in the preface is “to get into their warring minds and hearts – hopefully supplying enough context, meanwhile : to judge their actions and decisions, both at the time and in retrospect.” 

From the outset Hamilton raises an important question; how did the “rail-splitter” from Illinois grow into his critical role as Commander-in-Chief, and manage to outwit his formidable opponent, Jefferson Davis who was a trained soldier and Mexican War hero, while Lincoln, a country lawyer had served only briefly in the militia?  The answer  to this question is fully addressed by the author as he reaches a number of important conclusions, none more important than Lincoln’s refusal to name slavery as a cause and goal for the war in order to maintain border state loyalty and encourage a reunion with the Confederacy.  This was Lincoln’s mindset for two years as Hamilton relates his personal moral equation in dealing with slavery as he ultimately will change his policy and issue the Emancipation Proclamation in January 1863 freeing 3.5 million slaves without which the south could not fund their armed insurrection.  Once Lincoln made it clear the war was being fought over slavery European support for the south and diplomatic recognition necessary for the survival of the Confederacy would not be forthcoming – sealing the defeat of the south and the failure of Davis’s presidency.

(Secretary of State William Henry Seward)

Hamilton’s methodology is to alternate chapters following the lives of both men.  From Davis’s arrival in the first Confederate capital in Montgomery, Alabama to Lincoln’s tortuous voyage avoiding assassination plots as he arrived in Washington, DC.  The key topics that Hamilton explores include a comparison of each president’s personality, and his political and moral beliefs including events, strategies, and individuals who played a significant role leading up to and the seizure of Fort Sumter.  These figures encompass role of Major Robert Anderson who commanded the fort and General Winfield Scott, who headed northern forces, the role of Lincoln’s cabinet particularly Secretary of State William H. Seward, who was seen by some as committing treason for his actions, Postmaster General Montogomery Blair who was against the war, and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton.  Hamilton goes on to lay out the catastrophe that was General George McClellan and his paranoia and refusal to take advantage of his overwhelming military resources and his incompetent “Peninsula Campaign.”

Hamilton does a wonderful job digging into the personalities of the major historical figures and how their actions influenced Lincoln and Davis and the course of the war.  The roles of McClellan, Fremont, Scott have been mentioned but the author also delves into the mindset of important military leaders such as Generals Joe Johnston, Pierre Beauregard, Stonewall Jackson, Irvin McDowell, and others.  Further, Hamilton also introduces a number of important sources that other historians have not mined as carefully.  For example, the diaries of State Department translator Count Adam Gorowski, a Polish aristocrat whose negative opinions of Lincoln are striking as it seemed Lincoln was unable to enforce the powers of his office and lack of military competence would have drastic consequences.  London Times war correspondent William Howard Russell’s opinions are explored in detail, in an addition to Elizabeth Keckley, a formerly enslaved woman who first served as a seamstress to Davis’s wife Varina, and later to Mary Todd Lincoln, and John Beauchamp Jones, a War Department clerk from Maryland who supported the Confederacy.

(Commander of Northern forces, General George Brinton McClellan)

Hamilton’s view of Lincoln is rather negative for the first two years of the war as he writes, Lincoln, “had really no idea what he must do to win the war – or how to reconstruct a civil society in the slaveholding south, so dependent upon cotton, if he ever did.”  Interestingly, Davis wanted a defensive war to protect the deep south, he never favored a full blown civil war with the seizure of Washington, but was forced into it when more states seceded, he was called upon to protect them as they moved the Confederate capital to Richmond, Va.  Davis’ strategy was to bluff Lincoln until it was clear that McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign was foolish, then he went on the offensive. 

What sets Hamilton’s work apart from others is his writing style.  His narrative prose flows evenly and makes for a comfortable read.  His sourcing is excellent adding the latest documents and secondary sources available.   His integration of letters, diary excerpts, and other materials creates an atmosphere where the reader is party to conversations and actions between the main characters, i.e., Lincoln-McClellan interaction in person and in writing among many others.  Hamilton’s approach provides for subtle analysis, but he does not hold back, particularly in providing evidence for Lincoln’s mediocre performance as a military leader, who is overly worried about political issues.  This is evident in his approach to McClellan’s Peninsula campaign when the overland option driving south toward Richmond made much more sense than a complex amphibious strategy designed to go ashore in southern Virginia and drive north toward the Confederate capital.  By 1861 Hamilton argues that Lincoln seemed out of his depth as a military commander and appeared reluctant to make military decisions.  His reaction to John C. Fremont’s Emancipation Proclamation in Missouri is a case in point as he forced the General to rescind the order which was consistent with his refusal to have the issue of slavery affect the fighting.

(John C. Fremont- “The Pathfinder”)

Davis’ strategy was a simple one.  Fight a defensive war and gain European recognition for the Confederacy.  His problem was slavery was viewed negatively in European diplomatic circles.  Davis hoped that the need for cotton, necessitating England and France breaking through the northern blockade, would become more important than moral stances related to the enslavement of three and half million people.

Lincoln had difficulty accepting the fact it was slavery that allowed the Confederacy to fight as cotton provided the wealth to purchase weapons, slaves provided food to survive, and the overall manpower to run plantations when southern whites went off to fight.  Davis was fully aware of Confederate weaknesses; southern planters were against taxation, European recognition was not forthcoming, 5.5 million v. 23 million people, the extra expense and manpower to defend Kentucky and Virginia spreading his lines thinner and thinner until McClellan’s refusal to engage with superior forces provided Davis with a solution.

Perhaps Hamilton’s most important theme is “Lincoln’s eventual recognition in extremis, of his blunder would compel him, belatedly, to change his mind and agree to make the Confederacy’s use of millions of enslaved Black people – almost half the Southern population – a war issue.”  By doing so Lincoln poked holes through Davis’s southern fiction that the Confederacy had “a legal justification for mounting armed insurrection: defense of soil and family.”

(General Robert E. Lee, pictured here in 1863, never wore the Confederate uniform in this house. Three days after his resignation from the US Army, he was appointed commander in chief of Virginia’s military)

Hamilton argues that Davis did not defeat Lincoln because of hubris in the person of General Robert E. Lee who took Confederate troops north in 1862, and Davis’s failure to stop him.  Once the southern argument of self-defense was lost, Lincoln could finally pivot to his strongest position – emancipation.  Once the war became a conflict to end slavery, accepted by enough of the north, the south would lose hope of diplomatic recognition by European powers hungry for cotton.  The book will conclude on January 1, 1863, with the announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation.

Historian Louis P. Masur October 31, 2024, Washington Post book review of Hamilton’s work hits the nail right on the head as he writes: “Lincoln too would dramatically transform his side’s military strategy. Much to the dismay of abolitionists, and biographer Hamilton as well, Lincoln initially refused to take direct action to emancipate the enslaved in the Confederacy. Radical Republicans were especially enraged when, in September 1861, Lincoln forced Gen. John C. Frémont to rescind Frémont’s unauthorized order declaring martial law and freeing the enslaved in Missouri. Lincoln offered the legal and political argument that the order stood outside military necessity and served only to alienate the four slave states remaining in the Union, of which Missouri was one. Within a year, though, he decided on an Emancipation Proclamation that would liberate most of the enslaved people in the Confederacy; the multifaceted story of how he changed his mind, pieces of which are told in Hamilton’s book, is one of the most absorbing in all of Lincoln scholarship.

(Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton)

“In truth,” Hamilton writes, “Lincoln had really no idea what he must do to win the war.” But “Davis had had no idea how to win the war, either.” These thoughts capture a truism — much of what we think about the past comes from understanding it backward. Neither Lincoln nor Davis, in the moment, knew what might work or what needed to be done or how to do it. This is why counterfactuals are so prominent in considerations of war. What if Lincoln had fired McClellan earlier? What if Davis had stopped Lee from invading Maryland? What if Lincoln had acted sooner against slavery? Hamilton is keenly attuned to the way hindsight can both enlighten and obscure, and he peppers the narrative with questions and retrospective speculations, sometimes excessively so.

There have been scores of books on Lincoln and Davis, but few that examine them jointly. Hamilton’s uncommon approach helps illuminate an observation once made by the historian David Potter, who suggested that “if the Union and the Confederacy had changed presidents with one another, the Confederacy might have won its independence.” The statement invites us to identify the qualities that distinguished Lincoln from Davis. There are many, but none more instructive than this: Over the course of four years, Lincoln grew into the job of president and commander in chief, whereas Davis remained set in his ways. This sweeping dual biography succeeds in dramatizing the reasons one triumphed and the other failed.”

(Mary Todd Lincoln and Varina Davis)

It is clear from Hamiliton’s monograph that the turning point in the Civil War did not take place on the battlefield per se.  Hamilton developed the Confederate strategy that in the end resulted in an invasion of the north through Maryland and an obnoxious Proclamation on the part of General Robert E. Lee.  Expecting Marylanders and Kentuckians to rally around the Confederacy, Lee and Davis were surprised when that did not come to fruition.  Once the south invaded the north, the rationale that the Confederacy was a victim of northern oppression was no longer valid and acceptable to European diplomats.  With the invasion of Maryland, Lincoln was driven into a corner and finally was willing to do something about slavery being the foundation for the Confederacy’s economy and military strength. Lincoln “bit the bullet” by employing the issue of millions of enslaved people as a military and moral issue.

His strategy was clear, the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing 3.5 million slaves as of January 1, 1863.  This would result in Europeans refusing to recognize the Confederacy with the war now being fought over slavery.  For Davis, it appeared the war would eventually be lost.  But it would be his decision to allow Lee to invade Maryland that drove Lincoln to the war of attrition.

 Hamilton has completed a remarkable work of narrative history with a unique approach which should be welcome to historians and Civil War buffs alike.

(The scene around the U.S. Marine Corps base near Beirut, Lebanon, following a massive bomb blast that destroyed the base on Oct. 23, 1983)

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched an unspeakable terrorist attack on Israel killing over 1200 men, women, and children, and seizing over 200 hostages.  The Israeli response was a brutal attack of retribution that has led to the death of tens of thousands of Palestinians and the evisceration of a significant part of the Gaza Strip.  Acting as an ally of Hamas and an Iranian puppet, Hezbollah launched a campaign of rocket attacks against northern Israel which led to over 60,000 Israelis abandoning their homes in support of their ally.  Recently Israel assassinated Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and a number of other officials who were set to take his place.  Once Nasrallah passed from the scene Israel launched an invasion of southern Lebanon and bombed any area of Lebanon which it deemed a stronghold of Hezbollah, including Beirut. 

These events remind one of the 1982 Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon as history once again repeats itself fostering the creation of Hezbollah due to Israeli military and diplomatic errors.  The introduction of Hezbollah to the world scene caused by the Israeli invasion would lead to the terrorist attack against the American barracks and headquarters in Beirut which resulted in the death of 241 Marines.  The full story as to how and why this occurred and its impact on American foreign policy and the Middle East region and its effect on the families of the Marines who served  is the subject of a  new book by Jack Carr, a former US Navy Seal sniper and author, and historian James M. Scott entitled; TARGETED BEIRUT: THE 1983 MARINE BARRACKS BOMBING AND THE UNTOLD ORIGIN STORY OF THE WAR ON TERROR.

(Marines searching for bodies after the attack)

The approach the authors pursue in relating their subject is somewhat bifurcated.  The narrative is broken down into three parts.  First, half and the most important part of the monograph seeks to relate the background for the attack on the Marine barracks on October 23, 1983,  beginning with the attack on the American embassy on April 18, 1983, and the evolution of Washington’s “peacekeeping mission” in Lebanon designed to curtail the factional warfare between Christian and Islamic forces centered on Beirut.  The authors expand their focus on American decision making, the dangers Marines confronted as they carried out their mission, and the debate as to how the United states should respond to the plethora of sniper attacks, suicide bombings, and artillery shells that landed on the Beirut airport, the location of the Marine barracks.

In the next section, Carr and Scott describe the truck bomb attack in detail that resulted in the death of 241 Marines and another 158 wounded.  They focus on rescue and recovery reflecting on the horror and other emotions displayed by Marines and others who charged into the debris to try and locate survivors.  The concluding section of the narrative brings into clarity the response of the Reagan administration to the calamity unfolding in Beirut and the decision making that led to the American response to the crisis.  In addition, the authors describe the agony faced by families and a final evaluation of the errors perpetrated by the Reagan administration.

All in all, the book is a useful retelling of events and the response of participants, but apart from exploring the private lives of numerous Marines and their families the book does not present any new detail.  The main criticism of the book is at times it rests on secondary sources to present its story.  The book relies heavily on journalistic sources, particularly that of Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, and Robert Fisk, of the Times of London, among others.  Once the authors move on to Reagan administration decision making and later the emotional trauma faced by surviving family members, Carr and Scott primary sourcing improves as they rely on interviews with survivors and families who for many will not get over the tragedy.

(The Marine barracks after the attack)

The key event that would lead to the massacre of the Marines was the Israeli decision to launch “Operation Peace for the Galilee,” which was supposed to remove Palestinian Liberation Organization forces from southern Lebanon and push them twenty five miles north to the Litani River.  Many events altered the Israel strategy as they moved beyond the river into West Beirut.  Exacerbating the situation was the assassination of Lebanese president Bashir Gemayel, a Maronite Christian from Syria and his replacement by his incompetent brother Amin.  Israeli actions fostered the further radicalization of Islamic Jihad and Islamic Amal with the assistance of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.  Originally greeted as saviors from the PLO, the Shiites in southern Lebanon grew increasingly angry against Israeli occupation leading to constant violence as Maronite Christians under the guise of the Phalangists fought various Islamic factions, in addition to an ethnoreligious group, the Druze. As the horrors of war evolved an international peacekeeping force made up of Americans, French, and Italians arrived on August 25, 1982, which eventually would lead to disaster.

The authors spend a great deal of time explaining the debate in Washington as to the mission of American forces.  The United States wanted to be seen as a neutral entity to try and win over certain factions to try and create a government of reconciliation.  However, as the United States armed the Lebanese army, it became the victim of numerous mortar and sniper attacks placing Washington in a quandary – if it retaliated it would no longer appear neutral – if they did nothing the Marines would become “sitting ducks.”  Carr and Scott delve deeply into the debate within the Reagan administration with Assistant National Security advisor Robert McFarlane and Secretary of State George Schultz advocating a forceful response after diplomatic attempts to convince Syrian president Hafez El-Assad to withdraw his forces from the Bekaa Valley failed.  Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and Vice President George Bush opposed the use of force, and Lebanese policy became hostage to the interpersonal rivalries within the Reagan administration.  Reagan and his advisors had difficulty making the tough decisions that were called for as the situation deteriorated.  Historians are handicapped even after four decades as some critical meeting minutes and documentary details remain classified.

(Reagans Viewing Bombing Victims’ Coffins)

Perhaps the best sources employed by the authors are the letters written by Marines to their families in the United States.  The fears and hopes of the soldiers are on full display and it lends itself to a very personal examination of the crisis.  Carr and Scott try to humanize their subjects as they describe family reactions, funerals, phone calls from President Reagan, but the bottom line is the family members, members of Congress, and certain elements within the Reagan administration could not fathom how American policy in Lebanon served any purpose. 

The authors delve into the lives of many individual soldiers in their narrative.  Among those who stand out are Colonel Timothy Geraghty who took command of Marine operations in Beirut on May 30, 1983, who opposed changing the rules of engagement even after the American embassy bombing and the increase in factional warfare.  Lieutenant John Hudson who headed medical operations with fifty naval corpsmen.  Drs. Gilbert Bigelow and James Ware, dentists who would take care of the local Lebanese and did yeoman work after the attack on the Marine barracks.  Rabbi Arnold Resnicoff, Father George Pucciarelli, and Chaplain Danny Wheeler did their best to maintain the spirits of the soldiers under their command and bring solace and comfort after the debacle and other situations.  Hussein al-Mosur who headed Islamic Amal and Imad Mughniyeh who headed Islamic Jihad.  The two organizations would unite and form Hezbollah, “the Party of God” who perpetrated the attack on the Marine compound with the assistance of Iran.  Many other portraits are offered particularly after attacks and the ultimate explosion at the Marine barracks.

The authors do an excellent job conveying the angst that troops felt as they were sequestered in bunkers as rocket fire against their positions was almost constant.  The anxiety is conveyed in their letters home as their compatriots were killed or wounded.  An insightful example is a letter from Dr. John Hudson to his wife that reflected his anger, fears, and honesty evaluating what he experienced as useless sacrifices.  Hudson believed the Marines were “sitting ducks,” particularly when the rules of engagement would not allow them to return fire.  There are many other letter excerpts that reflect the untenable position the Reagan administration placed their soldiers in.

Carr and Scott alternate chapters between events on the ground in Beirut with that of decision making in Washington.  The problem that comes to the fore is the lack of continuity between the two. To their credit the authors are successful in capturing the harsh reality of life in Lebanon during the period presenting heart rendering vignettes describing the lives of the Lebanese people.  In the end there was to be no large-scale US military operation targeting those responsible for the bombing.

The book is an important one because of the lessons learned and those that should be learned today.  The War on Terror did not begin until after September 11, 2001, however it was the 1983 bombing that was the precursor to a broader general global strategy to deal with terrorism.  The attack highlighted vulnerabilities in dealing with terrorist threats and greatly influenced the evolution of Washington’s counterterrorism goals.  In addition, the Israelis seem to be on the verge of repeating the errors of the early 1980s.  The Netanyahu government’s actions in southern Lebanon and Beirut may seem like victory, but since there does not seem to be an end game (as is the case in Gaza), Israel will foster the next generation of Hezbollah/Hamas types that will emerge. It seems every decade or so Israel plays Whack a mole which in the real world is not a substitute for concrete policy to achieve long lasting change or at a minimum a reduction of tension.

SIGN UP NOWSections

(The scene around the U.S. Marine Corps base near Beirut, Lebanon, following a massive bomb blast that destroyed the base on Oct. 23, 1983)

(August 1945 Trial of Marshal Petain)

In 1969, the two-part documentary film, “The Sorrow and the Pity” directed by Marcel Ophuls depicting collaboration between the French Vichy government and Nazi Germany during World War II was released.  Controversial from the outset, the film explored the reasons behind the collaboration, including anti-Semitism, Anglophobia, fear of Bolshevism and Soviet invasion, and the desire to acquire and maintain power during the German occupation.  By the end of the war, the entire Vichy experience fostered a deep fissures in French society and no one depicted this state of affairs more than Marshal Philippe Petain, the great World War One hero at the Battle of Verdun who led the Vichy government and after the war became the lightning rod dealing with French collective guilt and retribution.

Petain is the focal point in British historian Julian Jackson’s latest work dealing with France during World War II entitled, FRANCE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF MARSHAL PETAIN.  In his comprehensive monograph Jackson zeroes in on Petain’s three week trial after France was liberated examining the central crisis of French history in the 20^th century – the collapse of France within six weeks after the Nazi invasion in April 1940; the signing of an armistice with Germany; and Vichy’s policy of collaboration.

(Pierre Laval)

Jackson begins his narrative providing a photograph of a picture of Petain and German Chancellor Adolf Hitler shaking hands on October 24, 1940, and describes the symbolic importance of that act- a propagandas coup for the Nazis and a shock for the French public. The result of that meeting meant that France was no longer a combatant in the war and was now considered neutral, though the French public assumed that the hero of Verdun must be working behind the scenes with the British or the French resistance led by General Charles de Gaulle.  As Petain’s trial would show, he was not working behind the scenes with anyone and was collaborating with the Nazis no matter what his defense attorneys would argue.  The word “collaboration” became controversial when used in a speech on October 11, 1945, no matter how many times Petain denied that characterization of his government, it is part of the historical record.

Jackson describes the trial which opened in Paris on July 23 and ended on August 15, 1945, in minute detail.  He offers unique portraits of the major characters ranging from Petain; his lawyers, Jacques Isorni and Fernard Payen who despised each other, the prosecution led by Public Prosecutor Andre Mornet and Pierre Bouchardon; to Charles de Gaulle, Pierre Laval, and numerous other personages which include collaborators, members of the wartime resistance, and the role of past and future politicians like Paul Reynaud, Leon Blum,  and Francois Mitterand.  Jackson relies on trial transcripts, archival research, and most importantly to convey the mood of France during the trial and after, contemporary journalistic accounts.

(Paul Reynaud)

One of the key themes of the book was to decide whether Petain was a hero or a traitor.  Each side in the debate had its own agenda.  Some wanted to protect their reputations as many served the Vichy government, others wanted to maintain Petain’s reputation as the epitome of a French hero who had given his life in service to the French people.  Taking place after Liberation, the trial witnessed the return of many French persons returning from deportation and forced labor and the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps.  Many call this period as the “Epuration,” or purge of the French body politick as so many had worked with and for the Germans. 

Jackson draws a number of important conclusions drawn from interrogations of Petain.  First, his answers reflected “a mixture of evasiveness or forgetfulness, self-delusion, blame shifting or mendacity, and self-pity….,” with some believing what else could be expected from an eighty-eight year old man.  Since he was quiet at the trial, witness interrogation offered a glimpse as to what his real views were.  Third, Petain’s hatred for Charles de Gaulle is readily apparent, though their earlier careers saw them working together.  Fourth, his lawyers were at a disadvantage as Petain provided little to create a more positive narrative for the events between 1940 and 1944.  Defense attorney Isorni had to invent the Petain that he needed as he had little to work with.  Fifth, rivalries among former Vich courtiers remained intense, and lastly, when evidence emerged against Petain, blame would be shifted to Pierre Laval.

The Acte d”accusation zeroed in on Petain’s responsibility for signing the armistice on June 22, 1940, and three constitutional acts promulgated on July 11, 1940, which went beyond the powers that he had previously been given which lent credence to the idea that he was involved in a plot against the Republic before the war.  The second charge dealt with tracing Petain’s treason after July 1940; for example, contributing to the German war machine, allowing the Germans to use French airfields in Syria, and firing on allied troops in North Africa in November 1942.  Lastly, he was charged with being fully behind the “abominable racial laws” and creation of a special section to enforce them.  All in all, he was guilty of attacking the internal security of the state and colluding with the Nazis to favor his own ambition which correlated with those of the enemy.

(Charles de Gaulle)

Jackson describes Petain’s demeanor during the trial which mostly appeared to be one of indifference, impassivity, as if he were in another world, though there were a few short outbursts defending himself.  Petain’s defense argued that by collaborating Petain “cunningly outwitted the Germans while allowing the subordinates to pursue a secret resistance .”  Further it was argued that Petain did not join the allies in North Africa after November 1942 because he believed his mission was to stay with his people.  Petain was therefore a “sacrificial martyr who supposedly had secret contact with the British and secretly supported the allied landing in North Africa in November 1942.  Lastly, Petain was not a “free agent,” he was answerable to Laval.  In the end this defense was not effective.

As far as the fate of the Jews is concerned, very little was mentioned at trial.  But, it is clear from the work of American historian Robert Paxton proves that under Vichy Jews were excluded from the civil service and other professions, the internment of Jews in the Unoccupied Zone, and the French carried out the arrest of Jews at the behest of the Germans.  Interestingly, Jackson points out as occurred in other countries when Jews returned to their homes after the war the atmosphere became poisonous as they tried to reclaim their property.   In fact, the Vichy Commissioner for Jewish Affairs, Louis Darquier (who Petain referred to as “the torturer), and the head of the French police during occupation, Rene Bousquet had no regrets concerning their role in sending Jews to Auschwitz and other camps.

An area of controversy discussed involves the United States which hoped to woo Vichy away from the Germans.  The US had diplomatic relations with Vichy and during the trial Washington was afraid that old wounds would be brought out, particularly French distrust for the United States.  Historian William Langer tried to whitewash the American relationship with Vichy, but Jackson, Paxton and others reported the truth of American complicity with Vichy.

Apart from the trial itself, Jackson vividly portrays the anguish of retribution as those who had collaborated with the Nazis found themselves spit upon, physically attacked, had their heads shaved, and criminally charged for their actions.  The period following the trial makes up a quarter of the book whereby the author describes how Petain’s supporters continued to fight to resurrect his reputation and place in history, even after he died and is buried on the French island of Il’ Yeu. 

(Francois Mitterand)

After the trial ended and Petain was imprisoned on the island the physical trial may have ended for Petain, but not for France.  Petainists and anti-Petainists continued the arguments presented at trial through various organizations, publications, and the personal agendas of many.  One of the more interesting characters was Charles De Gaulle who seemed to want the support of both sides.  Isorni continued the fight trying to exhume Petain’s body and have it moved to the national cemetery at Douaumont to be buried with other heroes of Verdun and petitioning for a new trial to overturn Petain’s conviction.  Petain remained a “political football” for decades after his death forcing politicians to make decisions which remained problematic as many French persons refused to let his actions go undefended.

It is clear that what is referred to as France’s “darkest hours” according to Agnes Poirier in her The Guardian, review of June 11, 2023, was one of cowardice, bad faith, dishonor and moral ambivalence.”  I agree with her further characterization that “what is chilling in Jackson’s beautifully researched and meticulous account of the trial is the hopeless mediocrity of almost all people involved in it: from judges and jurors (résistants and parliamentarians) to lawyers’ prosecutors and witnesses. Everybody seemed animated by petty or self-serving feelings; they were either out of their depth or spineless, but above all most were morally ambivalent. Before it began, De Gaulle had presciently talked of Pétain’s trial as a ‘lamentable but inevitable’ event.”  If you have an interest in exploring France’s greatest moral downfall in its modern history then Jackson’s comprehensive efforts should satisfy. 

“As Jackson explains: “De Gaulle knew he was on thin ice when claiming that Vichy was illegal. For that reason, he generally preferred to talk about legitimacy.” In the end, the difference between Petain and De Gaulle, between Vichy and the Free French, was their idea of honor. France’s duty had been to fight on whatever the risks, whatever the sacrifices. De Gaulle and his army of resistance saved France’s honor by the skin of their teeth. And as far as this French citizen is concerned, Petain and his clique can rot in hell for eternity.”

(August 1945 Trial of Marshal Petain)

I will be teaching a mini-course dealing with the above title. If anyone is interested I have posted this course description and brief bibliography.

Steven Z. Freiberger, Ph.D

www.docs-book.com

George Santayana has stated: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,” it is as true today as it has been at any time in our history. Catastrophic warfare, plague, racism, anti-immigration, political divisions bordering on violence are all present today, but it is not an aberration in American history. The purpose of this class is to explore a unique comparison between our current situation and a similar one that existed roughly a century ago. Subjects such as World War I, the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, anti-immigration attitudes resulting in violence, lynchings, political repression involving over 1000 arrests, people accused of treason etc., sound familiar? All will be compared to our contemporary life and how America emerged from this cataclysm a hundred years ago, and hopefully how can be reengaged and overcome what we face today. While lecture-based, the course will rely on a great deal of class discussion.

Classes:

April 19, 2023      1917-1921: Woodrow Wilson’s administration, World War I and its Aftermath,           

                               and the Rise of Intolerance in American Politics and Society.

April 26, 2023      2017-2021: Donald Trump’s administration, the Bifurcation of America, and its             

                               Impact for the Future.

May 10, 2023      Psychological Profile of Donald Trump

BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Abutaleb, Yasmeen; Paletta, Damian. NIGHMARE SCENARIO: INSIDE THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC THAT CHANGED HISTORY

Akerman, Kenneth D. THE YOUNG J. EDGAR HOOVER, THE RED SCARE, AND THE ASSAULT ON CIVILIBERTIES

Alexander, Dan. WHITE HOUSE, INC.: HOW DONALD TRUMP TURNED THE PRESIDENCY INTO A BUSINESS

Avrich, Paul. SACCO AND VANZETTI: THE ANARCHIST BACKGROUND

Avrich, Paul and Karen. SASHA AND EMMA

Baker, Peter; Glasser, Susan. THE DIVIDER: TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE 2017-2021

Barnes, Harper. NEVER BEEN A TIME: THE 1917 RACE RIOT THAT SPARKED THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Berg, Scott. WILSON.

Brands, H.W. WOODROW WILSON

Coben, Stanley. A. MITCHELL PALMER: POLITICIAN

Cooper, John Milton, Jr. WOODROW WILSON

Davis, Julie Hirschfeld; Shear, Michael D. BANNED: INSIDE TRUMP’S ASSAULT ON IMMIGRATION

Draper, Robert. WEAONS OF MASS DELUSION: WHEN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY LOST ITS MIND

Fleming, Thomas. THE ILLUSION OF VICTORY: AMERICA IN WORLD WAR I

Ginger, Ray. THE BENDING CROSS: A BIOGRAPHY OF EUGENE VICTOR DEBS

Guerrero, Jean. HATEMONGER: STEPHEN MILLER, DONALD TRUMP AND THE WHITE NATIONALIST AGENDA

Haberman, Maggie. CONFIDENCE MAN: THE MAKING OF DONALD TRUMP AND THE BREAKING                    OF AMERICA.

Heckshear, August. WOODROW WILSON: A BIOGRAPHY

Hochschild, Adam. AMERICAN MIDNIGHT: THE GREAT WAR, A VIOLENT PEACE, AND DEMOCRACY’S FORGOTTEN CRISIS

House Judiciary Committee. THE JANUARY 6^TH REPORT

Isikoff, Michael; Corn, David. RUSSIAN ROULETTE: THE INSIDE STORY OF PUTIN’S WAR ON AMERICA AND THE ELECTION OF DONALD TRUMP

Johnston, David Cay. THE MAKING OF DONALD TRUMP

Krehbiel, Randy, TULSA 1921

Lee, Brandy, M.D. THE DANGEROUS CASE OF DONALD TRUMP

Lee, Phyllis Lee. EDITH AND WOODROW: THE WILSON WHOTE HOUSE

Lemire, Jonathan. THE BIG LIE: ELECTION CHAOS, POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM, AND THE STATE OF AMERICAN POLITICS AFTER 2020

Leonnig, Carol; Rucker. I ALONE CAN FIX IT: DONALD J. TRUMP’S CATASTROPHIC FINAL YEAR

Madigan, Tim. THE BURNING: MASSACRE, DESTRUCTION, AND THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921

MacMillan, Margaret. PARIS 1919: THE SIX MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD

McAdams, Dan P. THE STRANGE CASE OF DONALD J. TRUMP: A PSYCHOLOGICAL RECKONING

McLaughlin, Malcom. POWER, COMMUNITY AND RACIAL KILLING IN EAST ST. LOUIS

Miller, Nathan. NEW WORLD COMING: THE 1920S AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA.

Murray, Robert K. THE RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920

Okrent, Daniel. THE GUARDED GATE: BIGOTRY, EUGENICS AND THE LAW THAT KEPT TWO GENERATIONS OF JEWS, ITALIANS, AND OTHER EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS OUT OF AMERICA

O’Brien, Tim. TRUMP NATION: THE ART OF BEING THE DONALD

O’Toole, Patricia. WOODROW WILSON AND THE WORLD HE MADE. 

Schier, Steven. THE TRUMP EFFECT: DISRUPTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR US POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT                                                      

Schmidt, Michael. DONALD TRUMP: THE UNITED STATES: INSIDE THE STRUGGLE TO STOP A PRESIDENT

Stelter, Brian. HOAX: FOX NEWS AND THE DANGEROUS DISTORTION OF TRUTH

Unger, Craig. THE HOUSE OF TRUMP THE HOUSE OF PUTIN

Washington Post. THE MUELLER REPORT

Weissmann, Andrew. WHERE LAW ENDS: INSIDE THE MUELLER INVESTIGATION

Woodward, Bob, Costa, Robert. PERIL

This Fall I will be teaching a course for OLLIE, part of the University of New Hampshire extension program.  The class will deal with the current war in Ukraine and will explore the Collapse of the Soviet Union; Vladimir Putin: A Profile; the Expansion of NATO; and the current war in Ukraine.  I am preparing a bibliography and I am posting it in case anyone might be interested.

Applebaum, Anne RED FAMINE: STALIN’S WAR ON UKRAINE

Aron, Leon YELTSIN: A REVOLUTIONARY LIFE

Ben-Ghiat, Ruth STRONGMEN: MUSSOLINI TO THE PRESENT

Belton, Catherine PUTIN’S PEOPLE: HOW THE KGB TOOK BACK RUSSIA AND THEN TOOK ON THE WEST

Browder, Bill FREEZING ORDER: A TRUE STORY OF MONEY LAUNDERING, MURDER, AND SURVIVING VLADIMIR PUTIN’S WRATH

__________. RED NOTICE: A TRUE STORY OF HIGH FINANCE, MURDER AND ONE MAN’S FIGHT FOR JUSTICE

Burgis, Tom KLEPTOPIA

Colton, Timothy J. YELTSIN: A LIFE

Dawisha, Karen PUTIN’S KLEPTOCRACY

Clover, Charles BLACK WIND, WHITE SNOW: THE RISE OF RUSSIA’S NEW NATIONALSIM

D’ Anieri, Paul UKRAINE AND RUSSIA: FROM CIVILIZED DIVORCE TO UNCIVIL WAR

Feifer Gregory THE GREAT GAMBLE: THE SOVIET WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

Freeland, Chrystia THE SALE OF THE CENTURY: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Gessen, Masha THE MAN WITHOUT A FACE: THE UNLIKLEY RISE OF VLADIMIR PUTIN

____________. THE FUTURE IS HISTORY: HOW TOTALITARIANISM CLAIMED RUSSIA

____________. SURVIVING AUTOCRACY

Goldman, Marshall L. PETROSTATE: PUTIN, POWER, AND THE NEW RUSSIA

Gorbachev, Mikhail MEMOIRS

Hill, Fiona THERE IS NOTHING FOR YOU HERE: FINDING OPPORTUNITIES IN THE                          21^ST CENTURY.

Hill, Fiona; Gaddy, Clifford G. MR. PUTIN: OPERATIVE IN THE KREMLIN

Judah, Ben FRAGILE EMPIRE: HOW RUSSIA FELL IN AND OUT OF LOVE WITH VLADIMIR PUTIN

Knight, Amy ORDERS TO KILL: THE PUTIN REGIME AND POLITICAL MURDER

Koffler, Rebekah PUTIN’S PLAYBOOK: RUSSIA’S SECRET PLAN TO DEFEAT AMERICA

Myers, Steven L. THE NEW TSAR: THE RISE AND REIGN OF VLADIMIR PUTIN

Plokhy, Serhii THE GATES OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

___________.­­­THE LAST EMPIRE: THE FINAL DAYS OF THE SOVIET UNION

Pomerantsev, Peter NOTHING IS TRUE AND EVERYTHING IS POSSIBLE

Sarotte, M. E. NOT ONE INCH: AMERICA, RUSSIA, AND THE MAKING OF THE POST-WAR STALEMATE

Service, Robert KREMLIN WINTER: RUSSIA AND THE SECOND COMING OF VLADIMIR PUTIN

Stent, Angela PUTIN’S WORLD: RUSSIA AGAINST THE WEST AND WITH THE REST

Short, Philip PUTIN* (to be published July 26, 2022)

Stent, Angela PUTIN

Snyder, Tim BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN

____________. THE ROAD TO UNFREEDOM: RUSSIA, EUROPE, AMERICA

____________. ON TYRANNY

Taubman, William GORBACHEV: HIS LIFE AND TIMES

Yaffaf, Joshua BETWEEN TWO FIRES: TRUTH, AMBITION, AND COMPROMISE IN

PUTIN’S RUSSIA

Volkogonov, Dmitri AUTOPSY FOR AN EMPRE: THE SEVEN LEADERS WHO BUILT THE SOVIET REGIME

Vindman, Alexander HERE, RIGHT MATTERS: AN AMERICAN STORY

Yovanovitch, Marie LESSONS FROM THE EDGE: A MEMOIR

Zhadan, Serhiy MESOPOTAMIA

_____________.  THE ORPHANAGE

Zubok, Vladisslav M. A FAILED EMPIRE: THE SOVIET UNION IN THE COLD WAR FROM STALIN TO GORBACHEV_____________. COLLAPSE: THE FALL OF THE