THE CRIME AND THE SILENCE: CONFRONTING THE MASSACRE OF JEWS IN WARTIME JEDWABNE by Anna Bikont

(Following the release of the film “Aftermath” in Poland in September, 2011, Polish deniers of the Jedwabne massacre of Jews during World War II strike once again)

My father was born a short distance from Krakow in 1913 when Poland was still part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and fortunately was able to immigrate to the United States in the mid-1930s, though many of our extended family would eventually perish in Auschwitz.  Growing up my father would tell me stories about what it was like to live among Polish Catholics in his village and the abuse that he endured.  Years later I read the book NEIGHBOR: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN JEDWABNE, POLAND by Jan Tomasz Gross in 2002 that described the pogrom committed by Polish Catholics against the Jews of Jedwabne on July 10, 1941 and was shocked, but not surprised.  The outcry against the book when it was published in Poland arguing that it was the Gestapo or other components of the German army that was responsible was to be expected.   With the publication of Anna Bikont’s haunting history, THE CRIME AND THE SILENCE: CONFRONTING THE MASSACRE OF JEWS IN WARTIME JEDWABNE in 2004, recently translated into English by Alissa Valles, the Polish people once again must face the historical reality of the actions of many of their co-religionists and not resort to the standard denials shifting blame to the Nazis.

Bikont a journalist for the Gazeta Wyborcza has written a book that is part history and part memoir as she assiduously gathered oral histories of events that took place in Poland during the war.  The narrative adds to Gross’ work and the reader learns immediately that Jedwabne was not the only pogrom that Polish Catholics engaged in.  In fact three days before the massacre at Jedwabne, in a village close by, the entire Jewish population of Radzilow was rounded up and burned, with no Germans present.  As we read on there are numerous examples of the liquidation of Jews with the assistance of the Poles, or were conducted solely by the Poles.

Bikont’s approach is to alternate chapters detailing her investigation through research in the Bialystok region, Canada, the United States, Israel, Argentina, and Europe or wherever her research took her, as she conducted interviews of individuals who lived in the area during the massacre with chapters dealing with the overall history of the area in the 1930s and 1940s.  The author does a good job chronicling the deterioration of the plight of the Jews in the 1930s, a period that began with Jews trying to be good Polish citizens despite the increasing level of anti-Semitism that would continue to manifest itself throughout the decade.  The arrival of Hitler in power in Germany in 1933, in part provided an opportunity for “the Camp for Greater Poland,” the National Party, and Catholic prelates to egg on the peasant population to perpetrate a pogrom in Radzilow in March of that year.  Marching to the slogan “We raise our plea before your alter/Lord, rid Poland of the Jews,” the peasant population that was suffering from the depression could focus its hostility on the Jews.  Throughout the 1930s the Catholic press did its best to instigate and heighten Polish hatred of Jews and encouraged acts of violence that by the summer of 1937, 65-70 acts of violence against Jews were reported monthly to the Interior Ministry.  This on top of parliamentary action against Jewish religious practices and education made Jews very wary of remaining in Poland.  As the Zionist movement expanded many families hoped to at the very least send some of their children to Palestine.  By September 1, 1939 with the Nazi invasion of Poland that avenue of escape was severed.

(Jedwabne, Poland synagogue, circa, 1913)

Bikont makes extensive use of archival material that support her thesis as to the role of the Poles in making the lives of Jews one of misery and death, during the prewar period and during the war itself.  Her use of the Jewish Historical  Institute and Jewish Historical Commission archives produces microfiche of Holocaust survivor testimony reflecting that not only were their pogroms in Radzilow on July 7, Jedwabne on July 10, but also in Wasosz on July 5.  For Szymon Datner, a renowned historian what happened at Wasosz rivaled the slaughter that took place in Kishinev in 1903 Czarist Russia.  Datner also documents the murder of Jews in 1945 as they came out of hiding by Polish peasants.  Bikont’s journal entries for the first six months of 2001 are especially important as the 60th anniversary of the Jedwabne murders approaches.  She is confronted with outright denial or refusal to speak with her by individuals who were present in 1941.  Further, even Jews who survived are apprehensive to speak with her because they have either hidden the fact that they are Jewish, even from family members, or are just afraid of the repercussions.  One of the dominant excuses that is offered is that once the Soviet Union invaded Poland the Jews collaborated with the NKVD and turned Polish citizen’s names over to Russian authorities causing them to be sent into exile in Siberia.  Another argument is that it is being raised now, if it actually happened, so the Jews could collect billions in reparations from the Polish government.  This line of thought is seen as justification for burning 1600 human beings in a barn, and shooting another 42 in the market place area.

One of the more interesting chapters concentrates on the three Laudanski brothers, two of which were convicted of murder for the events of July 7, 1941 and their rationale that they too suffered under Soviet and German occupation. The third Laudanski brother, Kazimierz claims to have not been in Jedwabne on the day of the massacre and arrived three days later, though there is some evidence he was actually present.  Of the ten men convicted in the 1949 trial for the murders in Jedwabne, Zygmunt and Jerzy Laudanski, as of the publication of Bikont’s book in 2004, were still alive.  From all accounts and by their own admission they forced hundreds of Jews into the market place and then led them to the barn were they were burned alive.  There is also testimony that they beat and killed Jews while coercing them to reach the market place.  For their crimes Zygmunt Laudanski was sentenced to twelve years in prison of which he served six, and his brother Jerzy was sentenced to fifteen years, and served eight. From her interviews with the brothers, Bikont points out that they blamed the deportation of the Poles, including their family members under Soviet occupation on Jewish communists.  Among their comments   Zygmunt Laudanski states, “there was nothing as horrible as all that.  People are making it up now in revenge.”  Kazimierz Laudanksi comments, “Like all of the Polish people, we suffered under the Soviets, under the Germans, and under People’s Poland…Our people organized the roundup of the Jews, but didn’t take part in the burning, they behaved as peaceful people.” The Poles kept saying, “It’s God’s punishment.  It was a diabolical stunt organized by the Germans.  The Germans directed it, and used the Poles like actors in the theater.  But Poles wanting to burn Jews, there was nothing like that.” (119)

(as per Jewish tradition, Rabbis place stones on top of the monument denoting the 60th anniversary of the Jedwabne, Poland massacre)

The remembrance monument for the massacre is another controversial issue for the people of Jedwabne.  The monument that commemorates the events of July 10, 1941 states, “Place of Execution of Jewish Population.  Gestapo and Hitler’s Police Buried 1600 People Alive July 10, 1941.”  Which of course is not accurate.  Bikont’s journal entries from 2001 reflect the animosity as the inscription is about to be changed as the 60th anniversary of the massacre approaches.  Jedwabne residents are upset that their town cannot escape the stigma of the massacre and resent journalists revisiting what they see as “ancient” history and the calls for a more accurate inscription.  These feelings are manifested by certain political and religious figures statements denigrating the monument and the impact it has on their lives.  One of the most distressing aspects of the book is Bikont’s exploration of the debate in the Jedwabne town council over the plans for the ceremony at the monument commemorating the massacre.  A majority of the council members refused to approve funding for the road that provided access to the Jewish cemetery for the ceremony.  What remains quite clear that Polish anti-Semitism remains very pervasive as of Bikont’s writing and many sections of the Polish population cannot overcome their hatred and view of history no matter what evidence is presented i.e., the creation of the “Committee to Defend the Good Name of Jedwabne,” dominated by the families of those convicted, and those who have taken over the homes of Jews in the town, or have seized Jewish property.  As Mayor Krzysztof Godlewski, later forced to resign because of his support of the new inscription and his assistance to Bikont during her research, tries to bring the council together he is met with repeated denial and virulent anti-Semitism.

The most important question that needs to be asked is why did the massacre take place?  For Bikont the immediate fuse that set off the events on July 10 was the Soviet occupation, which led to the charge of Jewish collaboration.  The Soviet occupation was equally difficult for Jews and Poles alike.  The Jewish social fabric and community life was destroyed by the Soviets, but the Jews did greet the Russians in a better frame of mind than the Poles.  The reason is obvious, the Poles with their virulent anti-Semitism and violence against Jews were now blocked by the occupation.  For the Poles it must have been humiliating to lose control of their own country and government and witness Jews having an element of freedom.  With the deportations of Poles as well as Jews it is much more convenient “to replace reality with a stereotype like ‘the Jews collaborated,’ all the more so if you know those who might have corrected this misconception had perished.” The new situation in which “the ‘kikes’ were given relative equality in civil law must have been a provocation to those neighbors raised on prewar anti-Semitism.” (179)  As far as the charge that Jews were involved in selecting who was to be deported, it is another Polish fantasy.  Bikont’s research points to three great deportations.  The first on February 9-10, 1940 resulted in taking away members of the Polish military, foresters, and other specific occupations.  The second wave in April, 1940 targeted families of those previously arrested: police officers, senior officials, political leaders and the local intelligentsia.  The third wave in June, 1940 involved “refugees” who fled the General Government, 80% of which were Jews.  The fourth wave that came in June, 1941 targeting the Polish underground partisan movement.  Since Jews were not generally accepted as partisans, to blame them is beyond the scope of reality.  Bikont, and Gross before her, clearly debunk the myth of Jewish denunciations as the cause of Polish deportation no matter how often Catholic prelates and Polish politicians repeat the charge. Once the Germans invaded the remainder of Poland on June 22, 1941 and continued on into the Soviet Union, the Poles responded with numerous pogroms against the remaining Jews, one of which was Jedwabne.

Bikont spends a great deal of time exploring the role of the Catholic Church in creating the environment for the massacre to take place, but also facilitating the pogroms that resulted.  She provides numerous examples of the statements and actions of Catholic prelates who disregarded the statements of the Vatican, particularly after the war.  The prelates continue the rationalization that the Jews deserved what they got because they denounced the Poles.  Bikont believed that the Church had reached a turning point in 1945 as it became the bastion against Sovietization of Polish society.  However those anti-Semitic feelings did not remain in the background for long as the deaconry in Jedwabne headed by Father Antoni Roszkowski continued spewing his hatred of the Jews.  Since 1988, Father Edward Orlowski held sway in Jedwabne and he carried on as if nothing had changed as far as Jewish guilt was concerned.  It is interesting to note that once the ceremony took place on July 10, 2001 no high level church representatives attended, though to their credit three priests do make an appearance.  For Jews, the fear of retribution was so high that only Awigdor Korchaw, the only Jewish witness who was in the market square the day of the massacre, had the courage to attend.

To Bikont’s credit as she tells the stories of the few Jewish survivors, she integrates their horrific accounts with those Poles who helped by hiding them or facilitating their escape.  Bikont follows her subjects around the globe in her quest to learn the truth and find out what happened to these people once the war ended.  Her description of the lives of Szmul Wasersztejn, the most important witness to events; Chaja Finkelsztejn, whose unpublished memoir of survival provides a window into the inhumanity of the people who committed the atrocities; Antonina Wyrzykowska, who hid seven Jews; and the author’s constant interaction with Radoslaw Ignatiew, the prosecutor of the Institute of National Remembrance leads one to accept Gross’s earlier finding that, the Poles were the instigators of the massacre and carried out the atrocities associated with it.  Her journal continues until July 10, 2004 and her final chapter has the fitting title, “Strictly speaking, Poles did it.”  One of the most heart rendering phrases in the book points to the post-war Polish generation when Bikont states, “the blood on the father’s hands burn the children,” which may explain why so many Poles today still have difficulty coming to terms with what happened almost 75 years ago in a country whose 2003 census listed 1100 Jews, out of a pre-World War II census of around 3.3 million.

(a man cleans the memorial to the Jews massacred in Jedwabne, Poland on July 10, 1941 defaced by Polish anti-Semites)

THE BLOOD TELEGRAM: NIXON, KISSINGER AND A FORGOTTEN GENOCIDE by Gary J. Bass

(the architects of American foreign policy from 1969-1974, Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger)

When one considers the foreign policy pursued by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger decisions related to Southeast Asia and relations with the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union come to mind.  In discussing Southeast Asia, the strategy pursued to end the war in Vietnam is front and center resulting in revisiting the “supposed” plan to end the war known as “Vietnamization” that emerged during the 1968 presidential campaign.  This promise to end the war was nothing more than the withdrawal of American troops and replacing them on the front lines with South Vietnamese soldiers and increasing American bombing.  As we know this policy also led to the illegal bombing of Cambodia and the “search” for North Vietnam’s headquarters in that war torn country.  The Nixon/Kissinger strategy resulted in prolonging the war in Vietnam and the facilitation of the rise of the murderous Pol Pot regime in Pnom Penh and the genocide of the Cambodian people.  Along with the foreign policy issues it resulted in domestic unrest symbolized by the deaths at Kent State, and illegal actions taken by Kissinger against his own staff to plug information leaks.  This was not the finest hour for American diplomacy, however once we turn to the 1971 opening with the People’s Republic of China and the Shanghai Communique of 1972, and the pursuit of linkage and Détente with the Soviet Union the Nixon/Kissinger realpolitik takes on a different hue.

When analyzing the Nixon/Kissinger approach to foreign affairs many seem to forget events in Southwest Asia, in particular, March 25, 1971 when the Pakistan army began its ruthless crackdown on Bengalis throughout East Pakistan in what today is called Bangladesh, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands and ten million refugees.  Some would argue that the Nixon administration were following their Cold War calculations in arming the Pakistani army as the president and his national security advisor held India, a Soviet ally at the time in great disdain.  With Pakistan’s military dictator, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan helping to set up the opening with China the Nixon administration was not about to criticize Pakistan’s crackdown in Dacca, East Pakistan.  What resulted was an onslaught that lasted months rivaling other genocides like Rwanda and Bosnia.  While the United States was not involved directly in these two examples, in East Pakistan American culpability was high as it was supporting the murderous Pakistani regime with weapons and equipment.  Estimates range up to 500,000 deaths and reflects the moral bankruptcy of the Nixon administration.  Fortunately, Gary Bass has written THE BLOOD TELEGRAM: NIXON, KISSINGER AND A FORGOTTEN GENOCIDE to remind us of what transpired.

Archer Blood was the United States’ counsel general in Dacca and he and his staff witnessed one of the worst atrocities of the Cold War and documented its horrific detail by informing the higher-ups at the State Department.  Despite the on the scene reporting of events, officials led by Nixon and Kissinger chose to ignore what was occurring and did little to ameliorate the situation.  What Bass has written is a detailed account of events and Archer Blood’s attempt to raise the consciousness of an administration that in many cases had none.  In his review of Bass’ book in The Wall Street Journal on September 20, 2013, a former chairman of Dow Jones and Company, Peter R. Kann argued that the atrocities that resulted from Pakistani actions in East Pakistan were unacceptable, but necessary because the Islamabad government headed by Agha Muhammad Yahya Kahn was the conduit between the United States and Communist China that would culminate in President Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing in 1972.  For Kann and his ilk, it seemed it was acceptable to sacrifice the Bengali people in the hundreds of thousands to proffer an agreement that theoretically helped extricate the United States from Vietnam, deal a diplomatic blow to the Soviet Union, and undo twenty two years of American non-recognition of Communist China.

(Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi)

After reading Gary Bass’ excellent account of events this is an analysis that is hard to accept.  Bass lays out the lack of ethnic and religious viability that resulted from the 1947 partition of India that created East and West Pakistan and their Muslim and Hindu populations.  He explores the events that led to the West Pakistani invasion of the East in March, 1971 as elections brought the victory of the Bengali Awami League under the leadership of Sheik Mujib-ur-Rahman, who incidentally were very favorable to the United States.  Since it appeared that Mujib, a Bengali Hindu might form a government and replace Yahya, the Pakistani military could not sit back.  When the Islamabad government backed away from the election results Bengali nationalists and the Awami League began to demonstrate and it appeared that East Bengal might secede from Pakistan.  Negotiations failed and on March 25, 1971, the Pakistani military under Yahya’s orders launched an attack against the 75,000,000 Pakistani citizens in the East.  The results were horrific.  By September over five million refugees poured into India and thousands of Hindus were killed, many were targeted and tortured and it appeared the disaster that resulted from the 1947 partition was repeating itself.

Bass’ narrative is an indictment of the conduct of foreign policy pursued by Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon.  Archer Blood and his cohorts in the American consulate in Dacca reported accurate description of the mass killings by West Pakistani troops in the east, particularly Hindus, who made up only 16-17% of the population, but were 90% of the refugees.  Blood’s “selective genocide” telegram spoke of the genocide against the Hindu population and recommended that the United States pressure Yahya’s forces to disengage from the killings and atrocities and use American economic aid and weapons as a wedge to gain compliance.  Blood and Scott Butcher his junior political officer couldn’t believe the “silence” that emanated from Washington to their reports.  For Kissinger and Nixon, Blood and Butcher represented the “bleeding heart liberals” who inhabited the State Department.  Bass describes in detail, using White House tapes and other documentation to provide the reader with a window into the Kissinger/Nixon mindset.  For Kissinger, Blood was a “maniac” who would destroy his plans to open relations with China.  Nixon refused to pressure Yahya since he was relaying correspondence between Chinese Premier Zhou En-Lai that would lead to an invitation for Nixon to visit China.  Archer’s continued correspondence and support within the State Department angered Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers and led to Archer’s departure from Dacca and the ruining of his diplomatic career.

(Pakistani President Agha Muhammad Yahya Kahn and President Richard M. Nixon)

The crux of the issue was that the United States was supplying the weaponry that the Pakistani government was using to crush any Bengali opposition in East Pakistan.  American F86 Sabre jet fighters, M-24 Chaffee tanks and jeeps mounted with machine guns were the weapons of choice for the Islamabad dictatorship.  In fact 50-80% of Pakistani military equipment was supplied by the United States.  The American response to the carnage was a resounding “no” to pressuring Yahya.  American intelligence and State Department analysis led by Harold Saunders and others predicted that there was no way that Yahya’s forces could prevent a Bengali victory in the emerging civil war and that the country would break apart in creating the new country of Bangladesh.  This evidence fell on deaf ears at the White House.

Bass does a commendable job exploring the role of India and its Prime Minister Indira Gandhi throughout the crisis which would eventually result in war.  Gandhi tried to couch events in terms of the humanitarian needs of the Bengali people.  However, Bass assiduous exploration of Indian documents reflects Indian plans for war against Pakistan early on in the crisis.  Bass quotes the leading figures in Gandhi’s national security establishment in reaching his conclusions.  Though India was the world’s largest democracy, Kissinger and Nixon despised Gandhi and held a marked antipathy toward India that bordered on racism.  They both held a high opinion of Yahya, so any rapprochement with Gandhi was a non-starter.  Gandhi’s opinion of Nixon was in kind and there meetings where stilted at best.

Bass’ descriptions of the atrocities committed by both sides is heart rendering.  His portraits of the leading historical figures and reporters provides background information that enhance the readers understanding of events.  Bass’ discussion of the split within the State Department is fascinating as the American Ambassador to Islamabad James Farland castigated Archer, while Kenneth Keating, the American Ambassador to India supported the American consul.  Everyone stationed in Dacca supported Archer, but those in Washington were pressured to toe the Kissinger line.

As Bass correctly points out the world’s response to events was also enlightening.  India, a country with its own issues of poverty and disease was ill equipped to deal with the influx of millions of refugees.  The outbreak of cholera killed 6000 people each day and the response of the United Nations and the world community was weak at best.  One must remember that events were occurring in the midst of the Cold War where the Soviet Union was a supporter of India, Communist China and the United States stood behind Pakistan, and India and Pakistan saw each other as the devil incarnate.  One must also remember that Pakistan and India had fought a war in 1965, and China and the Soviet Union had fought a nasty border skirmish in 1969.  Any diplomatic or military moves that might have been taken must be seen in this context.  In addition, India found itself supporting the secession of what would become Bangladesh from Pakistan, at the same time it was crushing its own Kashmiri secessionist movement in Kashmir.  History makes for some interesting dilemmas!  According to Bass, as the refugee crisis deepened by September, 1971 war between India and Pakistan became inevitable.

The Kissinger-Nixon strategy of denial of what was occurring in East Pakistan is a fantasy as a September, 1971 CIA report argued that over 200,000 had been killed and that an ongoing “ethnic campaign” showed that almost 90% of the almost 10 million refugees flooding into India were Hindus.  These figures were also verified by a Pakistani general so the administrations “supposed” ignorance was a fabrication.  As the situation became dire, Indira Gandhi had already decided on war, but postponed a final decision until winter arrived which would block any intervention by China.  Bass does an exceptional job describing the diplomatic maneuvering between the Soviet Union as it signed a Treaty of Friendship with India, the Nixon administrations belated attempts to get Yahya to control his military, and to its credit Nixon did increase economic aid for the refugees to the tune of almost $250 million.

The most fascinating aspect to the crisis as war approached was the dialogue between India and the United States.  Nixon was obsessed that a war between India and Pakistan could ruin his opening to China.  In fact, Kissinger suggested that the United States ask China to move troops to the Indian border to send a strong message not to attack Pakistan.  The meetings between Gandhi and Nixon in Washington in November, 1971 reflected the disdain the two leaders felt for each other.  The Nixon tapes highlight the President’s characterization of Gandhi as that “old bitch,” and the Indian Prime Minister’s view of the Nixon was reciprocated.

Bass describes the Pakistani attack on December 3, 1971 (India had planned to attack the next day), the conduct of the war, and the resulting diplomacy and what is clear from the book and its impeccable sources is that if the Nixon administration had handled Yahya differently, the crisis that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh might have evolved differently.  War may have ultimately ensued, but did 250-500,000 people have to die, along with the creation of over 10,000,000 refugees before full scale combat ensued?

This episode in American diplomacy seems to have been forgotten, but Gary Bass’ fine book brings it to light and forces one to question the cavalier attitude Kissinger and Nixon felt for the people of southwest Asia typified by the president’s characterization of Pakistan as “they’re just a bunch of brown goddamn Moslems.” (216)  The tactics employed by Kissinger and Nixon to try and bend India’s will to US interests during the war were appalling as Nixon gave the Soviet Union deadlines, encouraged the Chinese to scare India, and dispatching the USS Enterprise task force into the Gulf of Bengal.  When Pakistani forces suffered the loss of equipment in large quantities, Nixon answered Yahya’s request for arms by gaining the support of the Shah of Iran and King Hussein of Jordan to transfer US equipment to Pakistan.  With shades of the future Iran-Contra travesty over Nicaragua, the US promised to replace the equipment once the war ended despite the fact that it was illegal.  As the war was finally brought to a conclusion, the vindictive Nixon reemerged as he wanted to punish India, liberals domestically, and anyone who had opposed his policies during the previous ten months.  Once a ceasefire was a foregone conclusion, Nixon said, “I’d like to do it in a certain way that pisses on the Indians.” (319)  Bass’ book is based on exemplary primary research and should be considered the most complete work on the events in southwest Asia in 1971, and should attract anyone interested in a largely forgotten topic that has not gotten its due.

(Nixon and Kissinger in the Oval Office)

THE DEVIL’S PUNCHBOWL by Greg Iles

The Devil's Punchbowl (Penn Cage Series #3)

Greg Iles’ THE DEVIL’S PUNCHBOWL is the third installment of his Penn Cage novels.  The first two combined suspense, mystery, and insights into the human condition and the depravity of some.  Iles’ latest continues that trend as Cage, a former Houston prosecutor who returned home to Natchez, MS to raise his daughter Annie after his wife passed away from cancer.  Cage turned to writing and became a successful novelist, but local demands saw him become involved in a major civil rights case, a twisted drug case, and of course a murder investigation.  After witnessing how his hometown had deteriorated he decided to run for mayor and defeated his arch enemy Shad Johnson the sitting District Attorney.  Cage’s hope was to resurrect the city he loves, but after two years in his term he concluded that reforming education and municipal corruption was beyond his power.  His idealism faded as the political reality set in.  The novel opens as Cage meets with an old school friend, Tim Jessup, a recovering drug addict who was working at one of the floating casinos, the Magnolia Queen.  They meet late at night in the town cemetery where Jessup discloses that the casino operators are involved with a number of illegal activities ranging from dog fights, prostitution of underage girls, money laundering, and tax fraud.  This knowledge heightens Cage’s disgust and vows to resign his office.  However, when Jessup turns up dead and his house has been trashed he realizes that he is up against an organization that will kill anyone that gets in the way of their activities.

Cage knows he is up against something or someone that he has few resources of which to confront.  He is uncertain who on the Natchez city police or the county police he can trust.  He turns to his father, Dr. Tom Cage, and a group of paramilitary types led by Don Kelly, an ex-special forces operative in the Marines as well as his cohorts to save his family and pursue justice.  Dr. Cage also brings in Walt Garrity, a former soldier and Texas Ranger, that he had fought with during the Korean War to assist his son.  Cage also has worked with Danny Kelly, a former army special ops in Afghanistan who brings his Blackwater type organization with him to assist the mayor of Natchez since he cannot trust his own law enforcement apparatus.  The reader enters the casino world with its ancillary activities of money laundering, dog fighting, and political control, and if anyone threatens their agenda they seem to disappear if they stand in the way of what they are trying to achieve.  People like Seamus Quinn and his boss Jonathan Sanders are the epitome of ruthless operatives of which Cage must contend.  Included in this menagerie of criminals is Edward Po a Chinese corporate type who seems to be in charge, but is also a target of the Department of Homeland Security as represented by Special Agent William Hull.  Ile’s has strong opinions of the plight of the southern gulf coast and those individuals and groups, be it Asian or American who threaten to destroy his tranquil southern lifestyle.  Ile’s is also concerned about the educational bureaucracy that exists in his home state of Mississippi and its negative effects on the state’s future.   As Cage tries to deal with the situation characters from his previous books reemerge, i.e. Caitlin Masters the newspaper publisher and a woman he lived with for five years; Police Chief Don Logan, and the network of individuals that Cage worked with when he was a prosecutor in Houston.

One aspect that Iles’ introduces in his writing is the history of Natchez over the last century and how it impacts the current situation.  It gives the reader insights into southern culture and the accepted way of doing things.  For Penn Cage his frustration with the existing American legal system is something he is about to give up on.  The book also provides a window to international organized crime, particularly the Chinese variety and the strategies employed by the American justice system.  This is the third book in the Penn Cage series and is by far the best one.  Ile’s has the ability to grab the reader’s attention from the outset, and if you decide to read any of his work make sure you have set aside enough time for the task because once you become involved in the plot line it will be very difficult to put the book down.

TURNING ANGEL by Greg Iles

Turning Angel (Penn Cage Series #2)

Penn Cage returns in Greg Iles’ novel TURNING ANGEL.  Five years have passed since Cage solved a civil rights case that dated back to the 1970s and he has settled into his new life as an author in Natchez, MS.  Cage a former prosecutor in Houston is a widower and the father of a young girl.  Now a successful author he finds himself a pillar of the community serving on the St. Catherine’s School Board among other official duties.  The story begins at a School Board meeting when the school secretary informs the board that one of their students, Kate Townsend has been found dead where St. Catherine’s Creek washes into the Mississippi River.  Townsend, a 17 year old senior, valedictorian, and athlete had won a scholarship to Harvard and now is the center of a murder investigation that will rock the Natchez community.

Dr. Andrew Elliot is the leading physician in Natchez with a stellar reputation, and like his friend Cage very involved in the community.  After the body is found he asks his friend to be his lawyer.  It seems that Elliot, entrapped in a poor marriage was having an affair with Townsend and was being blackmailed as he wanted to keep that information quiet.  Further, it was Elliot who had found the body and had intimate relations with Townsend two days before the murder.  It turns out that Townsend was pregnant and that her mother knew about the affair and did not disapprove.  Penn takes on the case and is up against Shad Johnson, the black District Attorney who is no friend of Cage since he believed that five years earlier he had cost him election as Natchez’s mayor.  At this time, the current mayor has resigned and a new election must take place within forty five days.  Johnson sees the prosecution of a rich white physician as a way to reassert his bonifides with the black community and assure himself the mayor’s office.  From this point on the novel which has already engrossed the reader gathers further steam.

Many of Iles’ characters from his previous Penn Cage novel are major players in TURNING ANGEL, particularly Shad Johnson who has his own personal political agenda and is a thorn in Cage’s side.  A number of new ones emerge that are critical to the story.  One of which is Quentin Avery, an elderly lawyer who suffers from diabetes.  When Cage realizes that he is too close to his friend’s case he hires Avery who agrees to defend Elliot because of his disdain for Johnson and other personal reasons.  Employing Avery as his mouthpiece, Iles’ views on black civil rights leaders emerges.  He sees a crisis in black leadership and breaks down that leadership into a number of interesting categories.  In today’s climate of racial tension with Ferguson, Mo., Baltimore, MD, and events in New York, Iles’ comments are important. He points to a managerial type who pretend that race is not an issue.  These individuals want a large white constituency, but also want to keep blacks loyal to them.  They tend to be pragmatic and want blacks to join mainstream society.  Then you have the black protest leader that is loud and proud that want personal status and power, i.e., Louis Farrahkan and Al Sharpton.  They tap into an emotional appeal and can be dangerous.  The last category he terms the “prophetic leader” who relies on intellect, someone like President Obama.  The jury is still out whether any of these types can be successful, however, thus far their success rests on the pervasiveness of mass market culture and the failure of the black middle class.  Throughout the novel the plight of the black community in the south is ingrained in the plot and provides insights into all aspects of southern society.

Another theme that pervades the novel is the drug crisis in America’s schools.  Iles is a very competent chronicler of events as they relate to the use of heroin, pain killers and ecstasy.  By weaving the drug scenario throughout his story he is trying to educate his readers about this crisis and that something must be done to make our schools safe.  A lesser theme that Iles explores that emerges in detail toward the novel’s conclusion is that of the Yugoslavian civil war of the 1990s.  Though briefly presented its horror still lives on in Croatia, Serbia and throughout the Balkans.  Overall, Iles writes in exquisite detail that allows the reader to feel they are personally witnessing the action in the story.  This is my second Penn Cage novel and I look forward to reading the other three.  Iles is the type of writer that hooks his reader in the first few pages and does not let them go even after the book is completed.

(Mansion in Natchez, MS)

KILLING THE KING: THE ASSASSINATION OF YITZCHAK RABIN AND THE REMAKING OF ISRAEL by Dan Ephron

rabin

The past few weeks has witnessed an increase in violence between Palestinians and Israelis.  Palestinians have resorted to lone wolf knife attacks against innocent Israeli citizens and the Israeli response has been to kill the perpetrators on the spot.  The lack of any progress toward negotiations is part of the reason for the uptick in violence that has led to the current situation.  The current climate of violence and extremism in the region also has contributed to the lack of any progress between the two sides.  The failure of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians since the heady days of 1993 when the Oslo Accords were signed are long gone.  It was at that time under the leadership of Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin that the hope that the conflict might finally be settled was spreading among Israelis and Palestinians, but the assassination of Rabin on November 4, 1995 put an end to the process and led to a spiraling of events that bring us to the current impasse and violence.  Understanding the mindset that led to Rabin’s death is important in trying to make sense of the tragedy.  For the first time in Israeli history a political assassination occurred whereby an Israeli killed an Israeli.  Dan Ephron’s new book, KILLING THE KING: THE ASSASSINATION OF YITZCHAK RABIN AND THE REMAKING OF ISRAEL provides an intimate picture of the fissures that exist in Israeli society and politics.  The book would be considered a political thriller if it were fiction, the problem is that the narrative is true.

(The handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasir Arafat that sealed the Oslo Accords on September 13, 1993)

Ephron’s premise that the assassination of Rabin put an end to any realistic peace process following his death is accurate and shifted the Israeli approach to negotiations from the pragmatists like Shimon Peres and Rabin to the ideologues like Benjamin Netanyahu.  Critics of the peace process argue that Yasir Arafat would not have delivered on his promises after the signing of Oslo II that gave the Palestinians control of seven cities in the West Bank, including Hebron, in the same way he turned down the deal offered by Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in 2000.  It appeared that a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza was very possible in November, 1995, but because of the actions of Yigal Amir, a religious extremist and ideologue, who assassinated Rabin we will never know.  Ephron a Newsweek bureau chief in Jerusalem has written an important book that describes the two years that led up to Rabin’s death and the implications for the period that followed.  A period that saw the peace process stymied by violence and intransigence from both sides of the conflict.

Ephron describes in detail the right wing reaction in Israel to the secret negotiations that resulted in the Oslo Accords of 1993 between the Israeli government and the Palestinians.  He further describes the violence that was initiated by extremists on both sides whether Hamas suicide attacks and Israeli settler actions like that of Baruch Goldstein.  The treaty signing itself is evidence how difficult future negotiations would be as Rabin was very wary of Arafat and the agreement had numerous holes in it that had to be dealt with in future negotiations.  But as talks progressed the Israeli settler movement saw it as a threat to their future existence.  It would take a long time for the people around the Israeli Prime Minister to realize that he faced extreme danger because of his authorship of the peace process with the Palestinians, once they did Rabin himself did not want to cooperate with increased protection.  One thing is clear that as soon as Oslo was made public, Yigal Amir believed that Rabin’s actions were treason.

(Yigal Amir in October, 2010, seventeen years into his life sentence for assassinating Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin)

Amir whose family had immigrated to Israel from Yemen, grew up in an ultra-Orthodox Jewish home and attended strictly orthodox schools.  Upon graduating from high school he turned down a religious deferment and joined the Israeli Defense Force, spending his time in Gaza during the Intifada of 1988 were his belief that Arabs would kill Jews at every opportunity, was reaffirmed and that only ruthless reprisals would deter them.  Ephron does a nice job tracing the evolution of Amir’s beliefs.  He came to the conclusion in a broader theological doctrine, “one that empowered him to judge for himself – to “fathom God’s Will” – whether political leaders were honoring the Bible or violating it.” (39)  Amir believed that Jews had an obligation to settle the West Bank and Gaza rather than wait for God to secure their sovereignty over the territory and any politician who blocked this went against the will of God.  Amir would set up a group of students called, “Students for Security,” and actively worked to create a militia to defend the rights of settlers.  As rabbis began to preach that soldiers did not have to obey orders by the government to dismantle settlements arguing, “Even if the king orders you to violate the laws of the Torah, it is forbidden to obey,” fostered an already volatile situation.

Amir’s anger was also fueled by the social schisms that existed in Israeli society.  Ephron is quite accurate when he describes the resentments that existed between the Ashkenazi, Eastern European ethnicity of Israel’s ruling class up until 1977, of which Rabin was an example, with Sephardim, Jews who had emigrated from Arab countries when Israel was created who suffered many years of discrimination.  The fact that Amir’s family was from Yemen just exacerbated his feelings.  The core of Amir’s belief rests on the Talmudic argument that would justify his assassination of Rabin.  The Talmudic concept of “rodef” referred to a person who pursues another person with the intent to kill them, “rodef” means the pursuer.  “The law of   the pursuer, or “din rodef” permitted a bystander to kill the aggressor in order to save innocent victims.”  Amir rationalized that Rabin fit the definition of “rodef” as his policies were a threat to the safety of settlers in the West Bank and Gaza.  Amir also decided that Rabin “was a  ‘moser’, a person who handed Jews over to a hostile power, in this case the newly formed Palestinian Authority.” (94-5)  Amir argued that he had the right to kill Rabin on order to save the settlers.  This argument was already surfacing in the extreme religious press and among certain rabbis thereby reaffirming Amir’s beliefs.

Ephron presents a detailed narrative in how Amir stalked Rabin for three years and how he had missed at least three opportunities to kill him.  Ephron will take the reader inside the Israeli intelligence community as it belatedly came to realize the threat the religious right presented as they demonstrated and constantly referred to Rabin as a Nazi, a traitor, and murderer at rallies and sit in at his residence and the Knesset (Israeli parliament).  Ephron walks the reader through the murder in real time and once it takes place it is difficult for Israelis to accept the fact that one of their own killed the Prime Minister.  What is most disturbing about the assassination is Amir’s attitude after he is captured.  He is euphoric and proud of himself and firmly believes that he has saved Israel from its own government.  Amir details to interrogators his beliefs and exactly how he went about murdering Rabin and shows no remorse.  For Amir and his followers “Rabin had defied biblical injunctions and undermined the redemption process that messianists believed had been underway since 1967.” (161)  Following the assassination Ephron analyzes the investigations and recriminations that resulted from Rabin’s murder.  He also delves into the politics that pitted Peres against Netanyahu that saw the Likud candidate victorious in the next election thereby ending any possibility that peace talks would be successful in the future.

The book is very disturbing when one thinks about the future of peace in the region.  The current government of Benjamin Netanyahu is dependent upon the right wing settler movement for his coalition government, as was evidenced by his racial appeal during the last election.  Netanyahu was a leader of the Likud Party in 1995 and many argue assisted in stirring the pot against Rabin that resulted in his assassination.  I cannot imagine that the current Israeli government will take part in any meaningful negotiations, as if it does its coalition would likely collapse.  Ephron’s book may read like a political thriller, but it is a description of the reality of Israeli politics and society which seems split down the middle in its attitude toward peace.

(The aftermath of the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin on November 4, 1995)

1944: FDR AND THE YEAR THAT CHANGED HISTORY by Jay Winik

(The liberation of Dachau, April 29, 1945)

According to Jay Winik, the author of two bestselling works of history, APRIL, 1865 and THE GREAT UPHEAVAL, during World War II every three seconds someone died.  This should not be surprising based on the myriad of books that have been written about the war that fostered mass killing on a scale that had never been seen before.  The Nazis perpetuated the industrialization of death almost until they ran out of victims.  In the skies the combatants laid waste to civilian areas fostering terror and destruction unknown to mankind before the war.  It is with this backdrop that Winik tells the story of World War II focusing on the role of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision making and his inability or refusal to lift a finger to assist the victims of Hitler’s Final Solution until it was too late.  The book is entitled 1944: FDR AND THE YEAR THAT CHANGED HISTORY, but the title is misleading, because instead of focusing on the watershed year of 1944, the book seems to be a comprehensive synthesis of the wartime events that the author chooses to concentrate on.  Winik opens his narrative by describing the Teheran Conference of November, 1943 which most historians argue was the most important wartime conference as the major outline of post war decision making took place.  Here we meet Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, before Winik switches to the massive allied bombardment of Berlin that would shatter the faith of the German people in their government, as it could no longer protect them from the developing superiority of allied might.

(President Franklin D. Roosevelt who refused to pressure the State Department when he knew that they were blocking Jews from immigrating to the United States during WWII)

The author offers very little if anything that is new dealing with the war.  Its strength lies in its synthesis of the massive secondary literature that the war has produced.  Winik has mined a voluminous amount of material, but very little of it is primary and one must ask the question; what purpose does the book have if it adds little that is not already familiar for bibliophiles of the war?  I believe the author’s goal is to produce a general history of the conflict that allows the reader inside some of the most important decisions related to the war.  Winik writes in an engrossing manner that creates a narrative that is accurate with sound analysis of the major characters and events discussed.  The monograph is not presented in chronological order as the author organizes the book by concentrating on the period that surrounds the Teheran Conference of November, 1943 through D-Day and its immediate aftermath for the first 40% of the narrative, and then he shifts his focus on to the Final Solution that by D-Day was almost complete.  Most of the decisions involving major battles are discussed in depth ranging from D-Day, the invasions of North Africa and Sicily, to biographies of lesser known characters like, Rabbi Stephen Wise, a leader of the American Jewish community, but also a friend of FDR; Rudolph Vrba and Eduard Schulte who smuggled out evidence of the Holocaust as early as November 1942 and made their mission in life to notify the west what was transpiring in the concentration camps with the hope that it would prod the allies to take action to stop it, or at least, lessen its impact.

(Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long who did all he could to prevent Jews from immigrating to the United States during WWII)

Much of the narrative deals with the history of Auschwitz and its devastating impact on European Jewry, and Roosevelt’s refusal to take any concrete action to mitigate what was occurring, despite the evidence that he was presented.  Winik delves deep into the policies of the State Department, which carried an air of anti-Semitism throughout the war.  The attitude of the likes of Breckenridge Long are discussed and how they openly sought to prevent any Jewish immigration to the United States.  When the issue of possibly bombing Auschwitz is raised we meet John J. McCloy who at first was in charge of rounding up Japanese-Americans and routing them to “relocation centers” in the United States, and is in charge of American strategic bombing in Europe who refuses to consider any air missions over Auschwitz arguing it was not feasible, when in fact allied planes were bombing in the region and had accidentally hit the camp in late 1944.  Roosevelt was a political animal and refused to use any of his political capital, no matter how much pressure to assist the Jews.  FDR was fully aware of what was taking place in the camps and did create some window dressing toward the end of the war with the creation of the War Refugees Board that did save lives, but had it been implemented two years earlier might have saved hundreds of thousands of lives.

Much of Winik’s descriptions and analysis has been written before and he has the habit of discussing a particular topic with an overreliance on a particular secondary source.  A number of these works appear repeatedly, i.e.; Martin Gilbert’s Auschwitz and the Allies, David Wyman’s THE ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS, Richard Breitman and Alan J. Lichtman’s FDR AND THE JEWS, James MacGregor Burns’ SOLDIER OF FREEDOM, and Ian Kershaw’s two volume biography of Hitler.  There are a number of areas where Winik’s sources have been replaced by more recent monographs of which he should be familiar, i.e., when discussing Hitler’s invasion of Russia in June, 1941 the main source seems to be Kershaw, but David Murphy’s WHAT STALIN KNEW, Andrew Roberts’ STALIN’S WARS, and Evan Mawdsley’s THUNDER IN THE EAST would have enhanced the discussion.  In addition, there are many instances when endnotes were not available, leaving the reader to wonder what they have just read is based on.

(John J. McCloy, in charge of strategic bombing in Europe at the end of the war who refused to allow American planes to bomb Auschwitz)

To Winik’s credit his integration of the state of FDR’s health throughout the book is very important.  We see a Roosevelt who is clearly dying at a time when many momentous decisions must be made, but the president feels that he was in office when the war began, and he must complete his task.  The effect of FDR’s health on decision making and the carrying out of policy has tremendous implications for the history of the time period.  One of the more interesting aspects of Winik’s approach to his subject matter is how he repeatedly assimilates the plight of the Jews with other facets of the war.  It seems that no matter the situation the author finds a way to link the Holocaust to other unfolding decisions and events, particularly during 1944 and after.  The author also does a superb job describing the human element in his narrative.  The plight and fears of deportees to Auschwitz, the anxiety of soldiers as they prepare for Operation Overlord, the chain smoking General Eisenhower as he awaits news of battles, and the fears and hopes of FDR on the eve of D-Day are enlightening and provide the reader tremendous insights into historical moments.

To sum up, if Winik’s goal was to write a general history of the Second World War, centering on the role of Franklin Roosevelt he is very successful as the book is readable and in many areas captivating for the reader.  If his goal was to add an important new interpretation of the wartime decision making centering on FDR and 1944 as the turning point in the war, I believe he has failed.  Overall, this is an excellent book for the general reader, but for those who are quite knowledgeable about World War II you might be disappointed.

THE ENDS OF THE EARTH by Robert Goddard

The Ends of the Earth

The journey of James Maxted (Max) begun in the first volume of Robert Goddard’s World Wide Trilogy continues in the third volume, THE ENDS OF THE EARTH. The focus shifts to Japan as Max is determined to bring his investigation of his father’s death, Sir Henry Maxted, a British diplomat to a conclusion.  In the first two installments we learn that Max does not accept the verdict of the Parisian police that his father had committed suicide and he is bent on restoring his father’s reputation and finally learn the truth.  Max is certain his father was murdered and everything seems to center on a failed Japanese nationalist attempt to assassinate the Russian Tsarevitch upon his visit to Tokyo in 1891.  The “Dark Ocean” is a Japanese nationalist organization that hoped to prevent any improvement in Russo-Japanese relations, as they were focused on Japanese expansion in the Far East.

Many of the characters from the previous novels reappear in THE ENDS OF THE EARTH; Sam Twentyman, Max’s engineer from World War I; Malory Hollander, an assistant to Schools Morahan; Horace Appleby, a British secret agent, and they with their allies confront the xenophobic Count Iwazu Tomura, a nationalist leader with his own murderous agenda as they try to block the sale of Frederick Lemmer’s spy network to the Japanese government.  As in the two earlier novels, the book possesses numerous twists and turns one would expect from a Goddard story.  Goddard’s description of the historical period is very accurate.  The infighting in the Japanese government over expansion and honor is a major theme.  The difficulties between Russia and Japan over the Far East would culminate in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and continue thereafter is accurate.  Goddard also creates a number of documents and letters that keep the reader abreast of what took place in the previous novels that allows the current volume to make sense.

The plot is very suspenseful as Max’s quest continues, but as the story evolves Max is presented with a number of situations that blindside him.  At times in the novel it appears that things are about to settle down, but Goddard will then introduce a new character or bring back an old one from the previous volumes to twist the plot even further.  Goddard seems to have a low opinion of human nature as most of his characters seem to be seeking some sort of revenge. Max’s goal is to find the letter that Jack Farngold, an old friend whose sister is married to Tomura had sent his father in 1917. The purpose of the letter was to warn him about Tomura and Lemmer, which would explain Sir Henry’s death.  As he proceeds Max will learn things about his past that are shocking and will force him to confront Tomura as he tries to uncover the mystery of his own birth.

Throughout the novel Goddard constantly provides hints from the perspective of 1919 of what to expect from Japan in the future.  Goddard’s knowledge of Japanese history and geography is an asset as he sets his scenes and allows the reader insights into Japanese culture and politics between 1891 and 1919.  The novel is very fast paced and at times I found myself jotting down who some of the characters were because they came and then disappeared at a rapid rate.  Despite the numerous characters and shifting plot lines, the novel is surprisingly easy to follow if one pays attention.  Despite a storyline seems to bring closure at the book’s end, in true Goddard fashion there are hints that some of these characters may reappear once again in the future. If you enjoyed THE WAYS OF THE WORLD and THE CORNERS OF THE WORLD, Goddard’s final installment will not disappoint.

The Ends of the Earth

(Abu Mu’sab al-Zarqawi, the man who laid the foundation for ISIS)

If one were to read one book to gain an understanding of how the Islamic State (ISIS) was able to conquer a land mass that is as big as Israel and Lebanon, it should be Joby Warrick’s new monograph, BLACK FLAGS: THE RISE OF ISIS.  Warrick, a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter for the Washington Post writes in a clear style that allows the reader to gain insight and understanding of the many important points he makes.  What separates Warrick’s effort from the myriad of works on ISIS that have appeared in the last year is the perspective he brings.  A major part of the book presents the rise of ISIS from the Jordanian point of view.  Concentrating on King Abdullah II of Jordan, the reader is exposed to the inner workings of the Hashemite Kingdom as they try to cope with what is occurring on two sides of their border.  The book opens with attempts to negotiate the release of the downed Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasabeh with ISIS, and the plight of Sajida Rishawi, a convicted ISIS terrorist who is facing execution for trying to unleash a horrendous attack in Amman.  In the end al-Kasabeh is burned alive, creating revulsion throughout the Muslim world, and Rishawi is executed.

In addition to being led inside the Jordanian national security bureaucracy through the work of Abu Haytham, a senior officer in the Jordanian counterterrorism division; the author concentrates on the role of American Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford; and Mouazi Moustafa, a Syrian immigrant who became a veteran Capitol Hill staffer who lobbied hard to assist the Syrian people and arm moderate elements who were opposed to Syrian president, Bashir el-Assad in explaining events and policies that evolved before and after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Apart from discussing policy decisions as ISIS develops, Warrick spends the first two-thirds of the book presenting a biography of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi who is credited with creating the foundation of the Islamic State.  We meet an uneducated street thug who fought in Afghanistan and was eventually imprisoned in Jordan.  Warrick and others point to Zarqawi’s imprisonment as attending “Jihadi University” as many like-minded individuals came together and became radicalized.  Further, after the United States invaded Iraq it set up Camp Bucca which will become another branch of the “Jihadi University” as over 26,000 prisoners lived in communal tents according to their own sectarian identification.  The result is that the camp created the nucleus of the ISIS leadership as men like the future self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was also in residence.

(King Abdullah II of Jordan who personally led air stikes against ISIS)

The author explores the developing story that culminated in Vice President Dick Cheney’s charge that Zarqawi met with Saddam Hussein to discuss access to chemical weapons which was false, but was used as one of the excuses to invade Iraq.  Further, Warrick does an excellent job synthesizing the information that reflects the “head in the sand” approach taken by the Bush administration in dealing with post-invasion Iraq.  After declaring victory on the USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush faced a developing insurgency by the end of August, 2003 that his administration refused to face up to.  This lack of accepting the reality of events in Iraq left a vacuum that allowed Zarqawi to take advantage of and fill.  Warrick describes Zarqawi’s approach to the insurgency and his disagreements with Osama Bin-Ladin nicely, and what emerges is a ruthless individual who justifies his murderous action with the cover of his own Koranic interpretation.

(President Bush places a medal around the neck of Paul Bremer III….it could not have been for his actions taken in Iraq!)

Another important perspective that Warrick presents is the analysis offered by Nada Bakos, a CIA operative who became the agencies “targeter” whose function was to concentrate on Zarqawi until the United States killed him.  Bakos takes us inside the CIA as they try to develop a coherent strategy to deal with the “Sheik of Slaughterers” as he referred to himself.  Warrick also exposes one of the most disturbing aspects of American actions in Iraq.  Warrick describes the arrogance and incompetence of Paul Bremer III, the Bush appointed head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2004.  King Abdullah II had warned the U.S. repeatedly against the invasion of Iraq as well as deBathification of the army, intelligence, and government agencies which were in charge of the country’s infrastructure once the invasion took place.  After detailing Zarqawi’s massive plot to set off what would have been a “dirty bomb” in Amman in March, 2004, Abdullah II met with Bremer as Warrick reports, to appeal once again not to deBathize Iraq.  Bremer’s reply was brusque, “I know what I am doing.  There’s going to be some sort of compensation.”  I’ve got it all in hand, thank you very much.” (148)

 (US Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford)

The last third of the book is devoted to the disintegration of Syria and the opportunity those events presented for ISIS.  Warrick dissects Assad’s reaction to the Arab Spring of 2011 and how he hoped to manipulate the rebellion against him by releasing jihadis from Syrian prisons to enhance the revolution against him.  This was done to show the west that he was fighting an Islamic insurgency, rather than a civil war.  Warrick examines the approach taken by the Obama administration in dealing with Syria and the rise of ISIS.  His analysis is not very complementary as he discusses the schisms within the administration as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and CIA head David Petraeus tried to convince the president to provide more than humanitarian aid to moderate elements opposing Assad. Finally, when Assad employs chemical weapons against the rebels, Obama launches an air campaign that is ongoing.  The effectiveness of this campaign has been hotly debated and with the Russian entrance into the war to prop up its ally with cruise missiles and bombing runs the situation is growing more precarious each day.  Warrick does explain Obama’s thinking throughout the period as he is sorely limited in terms of options with Iran and Russia providing money and weapons to Assad, and the United Nations not an option because of Moscow’s opposition.

Warrick has written an important work as he synthesizes much of the material dealing with Zarqawi and how the Islamic State declared itself a Caliphate in July, 2014.  It is clearly written for the lay person and should enhance any reader’s understanding of what is probably the most dangerous situation American foreign policy has faced in decades.  After reading this book the reader will wonder what the United States could have done differently based on events, not the partisan harangues that emanate from Congress.  It is important for all to pay attention to what is occurring as people in the region wait for the next shoe to drop.  One can only feel trepidation for King Abdullah of Jordan as he tries to maneuver his way in a region that is a tinderbox.

(Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi)

(Caliph Ibrahim, or Abu Umar al-Bahgdadi, the leader of the Islamic State)

Since 2014 a number of interesting works have appeared that try to explain the background history of the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and why it has been successful to date.  William McCants, the Director of the Project on U.S. relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution has added his new book, THE ISIS APOCALYPSE: THE HISTORY, STRATEGY AND DOOMSDAY VISION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE to that genre.  What separates McCants monograph from the others is his emphasis on the role of Islamic messianism in the policies pursued by the Islamic State, and the differences between the Islamic State and Osama Bin-Laden’s al-Qaeda’s view of jihadism, and how and when to establish an Islamic caliphate.

In his introduction McCants presents himself with a challenge as he takes the reader on a tour of the Islamic State.  He tells the reader that they will be exposed to explanations concerning obscure allusions to Islamic history and theology, in addition the reader will be able “to appreciate how the Islamic State thinks of itself, and how its self-understanding has affected its political fortunes, and what will happen if those fortunes change again.” (2)  Having completed McCants’ tour, as a reader I believe he has accomplished his goals.  At the outset he does a nice job explaining the origins of ISIS by exploring the relationship and differences that existed between Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawri and Osama bin-Laden, and the creation and failure of ISIS by 2008.  McCants discusses the different historical figures and events that influenced ISIS as well as the current leadership in the different jihadi movements.

(An english speaking ISIS member leads a mass execution)

The most important aspect of the book is how McCants delves into the role of messianism in Islam and how it affected the rise of ISIS and the policies it pursues.  The prophecies of Islam play a major role for ISIS.  The concept of the Mahdi, “the rightly guided one,” is important because according to Islamic prophecy he would appear at the end of time to lead the final battle against the infidels.  The similarities between the Abbasid Dynasty and ISIS is treated carefully and presents an interesting dichotomy for the reader.  The popularity of the Dabiq prophecy attracted foreign fighters as the prophecy called for the conquering and cleansing of this small town near the Syrian-Turkish border before a caliphate flag could be raised.  Aspects of Islamic prophecy hold today that before the final apocalypse, sectarian conflict must precede it, as it took place following the death of Mohammad.  Each sect is trying to complete the task of killing the infidel, but first they must destroy each other to achieve the honor of doing so.  The apocalyptic message that ISIS employed along with the restoration of the caliphate that ended after World War I, and revolution are the core of its principles.  However, Osama Bin-Laden refused to accept this.  The al-Qaeda leader believed that the needs of the people must be taken care of first and the United States had to leave Iraq and Afghanistan before a caliphate could be declared, something he believed would not take place in his lifetime.

McCants is accurate in his explanation as to why ISIS was able to expand so easily and acquire the territory that would provide legitimacy to its restoration of the caliphate.  Bashir al-Assad’s policies in Syria facilitated ISIS’ task by funneling hundreds of jihadists into Iraq to fight the U.S., and releasing numerous prisoners to foster the chaos that allowed him to crack down on opposition to his rule.  Assad chose not to fight ISIS but concentrate on domestic opposition thus allowing ISIS to expand into eastern Syria, and with the issues attendant to Iraq they could easily capture western Iraq giving them a stronghold that encompassed Mosul to Aleppo.  McCants is also on firm ground as he detailed the rise of Abu Umar al-Bahgdadi within ISIS and the announcement of the restoration of the “caliphate in accordance with the prophetic method,” in addition to declaring himself caliph.  McCants explores the opposition by al-Qaeda and others to this move explaining that the trappings of a caliphate do not make it a caliphate.

(ISIS takes villagers hostage in Syria)

The book is a slim volume, but McCants certainly maximizes the space.  He explores events in Yemen and the rise of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as well as other al-Qaeda affiliates in North Africa and the Horn of Africa.  He points to their differences with ISIS, but also areas of support.  The influence of the Arab Spring is discussed in relation to ISIS ideology and its role in the apocalyptic narrative that ISIS spins.

Everyone seems to want to know why ISIS was so successful between 2013 and 2014 – it is a simple answer – they were pretty much left alone.  When Sunni rebels try to overthrow Assad, ISIS concentrated on setting up a state in the Syrian hinterland.  It filled its leadership with ex-Ba’athists from Saddam Hussein’s military and intelligence branches and attracted thousands of foreign fighters “by using a propaganda mix of apocalypticism, puritanism, sectarianism, ultraviolence, and promises of a caliphate.” (153)  all of these aspects of ISIS are fully explored by the author in creating an important addition in trying to understand the success of ISIS and where we go in the future.