Ever since the film, “Oppenheimer” was released a few years ago based on the book by Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin there has been an uptick in interest in the decision making in Washington and Tokyo that led to the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japanese cities and its impact on its victims. Numerous books have been written on the topic ranging from Gar Alperovitz’s controversial revisionist history ATOMIC DIPLOMACY to Chris Wallace’s recent COUNTDOWN 1945 and Ian MacGregor’s THE HIROSHIMA MEN. The latest entry into this genre is James M. Scott’s EMPIRE OF ASHES: TRUMAN, HIROHITO, AND THE DESCENT INTO TOTAL WAR.
Scott, a Pulitzer Prize finalist and the author of a series of monographs focusing on events and personalities in the Pacific Theater during World War II entitled BLACK SNOW zeroes in on the role of General Curtis LeMay and the firebombing of Tokyo, RAMPAGE which delves into MacArthur and Yamashita’s roles in the Battle of Manila, and TARGET TOKYO centering on the Doolittle Raid designed to avenge the attack on Pearl Harbor. In his latest effort EMPIRE OF ASHES Scott explores the final months of World War II in the Pacific, from the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt to Harry Truman’s ascension to the Presidency, and the decision making and actual bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. What separates Scott’s work from previous books is his deep dive into the views of the Japanese leadership and his integration of Japanese survivors of the blasts along with employing traditional American sources.
(President Harry S. Truman)
A key element in Scott’s rendering is his exploitation of the ethical and moral dilemma faced by those who had to decide whether to use the atomic bomb, and once they did, how it would be dropped and which cities would be targeted. The book is fast paced and is told from both sides of the conflict focusing on the actions and beliefs of Harry S. Truman and Emperor Hirohito, in addition to ordinary civilians caught in the crossfire.
Scott begins his story with the sudden death of FDR and Truman’s awkward assumption of the presidency. Truman, a political infighter who learned how to deal with bureaucratic infighting under the auspices of the Pendergast political machine in Missouri suffered from certain insecurities, but never over making important decisions. Two weeks after entering the White House he would learn of the existence of the Manhattan Project which would lead to the greatest dilemma of his life.
Scott writes with an easy prose that allows major events and historical figures to flow across the page. The reader might feel at times as if they are reading a novel, however the author has written an exemplary work of non-fiction based on impeccable research. Scott’s chapters dealing with the first half of August 1945 are exemplary of the author’s approach as he lays out how the Japanese delayed and delayed accepting the end of the war and were willing to risk further American bombing. Scott’s recreation of the bitter debate within the Japanese leadership is exceptional and reads like a thriller and reflects his approach to the presentation of history.
(Japanese Emperor Hirohito)
Truman was fully cognizant of FDR’s declining health, and he realized that he could soon replace him in the not too distant future. FDR purposefully isolated his Vice President, even forgoing any briefing by the President or his Secretary of State Edward Settinius as to what was discussed and decided at the Yalta Conference. Truman himself had doubts about becoming president and had little faith in Stettinius seeing him “as dumb as they come,” and soon replaced him with James Byrne who Truman beat out for the Democratic Vice Presidential nomination in 1944 but was probably the most qualified candidate for that office.
Scott effectively relates Truman’s own doubts about becoming president as well as the concerns exhibited by FDR’s cabinet, members of Congress, and the military leadership. The most important topics for Truman to immerse himself with was centered around Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin and his plans for eastern Europe, particularly Poland. If that were to come to pass there was no way the Senate would approve US membership in the United Nations, the focal point of FDR’s post war world. Another key component of the US-USSR relationship was FDR’s desire for Soviet troops to enter the war against Japan once Germany was defeated. For Truman, in all meetings with Soviet officials he wanted to make sure they honored their commitments. This is exemplified by Truman’s confrontation with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov who responded to Truman’s desire that agreements with Russia would not be “the basis of a one-way street,” by stating “I have never been talked to like that in my life,” with Truman firing back, “carry out your agreements, and you won’t get talked to like that.”
(General Leslie Groves)
Scott does an excellent job presenting biographical sketches of the most important figures of the period. Apart from Truman and Hirohoto, the author introduces Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and General Leslie Groves who informed Truman of the existence of the Manhattan Project. The scientific community responsible for the development of the bomb is presented on an individual basis. Scientists like Leo Szilard, who opposed dropping the bomb, Robert J. Oppenhiemer, Enrico Fermi, Ernst Lawrence, and Glenn Seaborg are all discussed in the context of their contributions to the Manhattan Project. Other important biographies center around the roles of General Curtis LeMay whose incineration of Japanese cities and advocacy of dropping the bomb and Colonel Charles Tibbetts who flew the B29 named the Enola Gay dropping the bomb on Hiroshima are deeply explored. Scott presents the arguments, pro and con as to whether the bomb should be dropped in the first place and once it was what would be the criteria for choosing which cities would be struck. The ethical and moral issues are explored deeply and the implications for the post war world where a nuclear arms race most probably would result.
After about a quarter of the book Scott finally delves into the military and political leadership in Japan. Hirohito serves as the jumping off point and his role in Japanese society and culture. For Hirohito domestic conflicts were more dangerous than an escalation toward war as the civilian leadership was increasingly afraid of assassination and the influence of the military on all aspects of Japanese society based on movements and events of the 1930s. This was due to the Japanese army’s ability to curb dissent as it implemented its expansionist agenda. Scott explored the individual concerns of the Japanese military which centered on launching a war against the United States without a plan for total victory amid much doubt by senior leadership that such a fight could even be won. According to Admiral Osami Nagano, chief of the navy’s general staff, “We can fight effectively for two years, but no prediction can be made after that.” According to Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, “in war a reasonable prospect of victory is enough…even if there is apprehension that we may be defeated, the nation should trust the military and move ahead. Scott reiterates the Japanese plan for the US Navy and the Pacific that is recounted in numerous books, but he does an exceptional job delving into the meetings of the Cabinet Liaison Conference and Hirohito’s decision not to oppose the military leadership.
(Photograph of Hiroshima after the atomic bomb)
Later in the monograph Scott will explore the Japanese decision making process once it is clear that after Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa the United States was about to embark on an invasion of the home islands and that the war was lost. Scott presents an Emperor who wanted to end the war before his kingdom was totally destroyed but did not have the fortitude to stand up to the extreme militarists who wanted to fight until the death. Their rationale is clear that by inflicting a blood bath on the Americans they would obtain better terms in a diplomatic solution, totally rejecting the “unconditional surrender” that Washington offered. Scott describes the Japanese homefront before the war which helps explain the extreme shortages that existed during the war.
Relying on Japanese civilian diaries, the reader gets a clear picture of the shortages of commodities needed to survive and the impact of American bombing which became more and more deadly and intense as the war evolved. As time went on Japanese citizens were in a state of disbelief when presented with government propaganda and more resentment emerged against the military leadership as they could not acquire what was needed to survive on a daily basis. As the Japanese people were confronted by American bombing, frustration and fear became the dominant human emotion.
The Russian component in US strategy plays an important role for Washington and Tokyo. Truman relied upon Stalin’s commitment of Russian troops in Manchuria to pin down the Imperial Army and not allow them to be transferred to the Home Islands. At the same time Hirohito and Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō wanted Stalin to intervene diplomatically to bring about a conclusion to the war. This did not prove successful and it was a bit naive as Stalin was offered a great deal of territory and military aid at Yalta to join the war so why would he give it up when Japan was already defeated.
(Nagasaki after the atomic bomb)
Scott is clear that Truman took responsibility for dropping the atomic bombs, but Stimson and others did convince him to offer an ultimatum to end the war before the bombs would be dropped including a work around whereby the Emperorship would not be destroyed. Scott is clear that is the key to any diplomatic solution was Hirohito’s fate: Should he remain emperor or be hanged as a war criminal? This was an agonizing decision – the logic of preserving the throne, to pacify Japan, collided with American outrage over imperial atrocities, from Nanking in China to Bataan in the Philippines. Truman held doggedly to Roosevelt’s demand for unconditional surrender as the atomic bomb test lighted up New Mexico. It is clear Truman and Hirohito were horrified over the slaughter to come. Truman knew American invaders might have to face over a million defenders and 10,000 kamikaze planes on the southern island of Kyushu alone. On Japan’s mainland, Hirohito watched helplessly as American bombers ran out of large cities to incinerate and began destroying smaller ones. Yet hardliners in Japan’s imperial cabinet would not end the war.
Jonathan W. Jordan, the author of a recent new book, IKE AND WINSTON: WORLD WAR, COLD WAR, AN EXTRAORDINARY FRIENDSHIP in his July 31, 2026, Wall Street Journal review concludes that “Mr. Scott describes the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with relentless pacing and harrowing detail. ‘The explosion carbonized people on the streets, leaving charred hands still wrapped around the hanging straps on trains,’ he writes of Hiroshima. ‘Organs evaporated, and birds vaporized in flight.’
Across five Pacific War volumes, Mr. Scott has established himself as a master of conveying the human cost of war. In EMPIRE OF ASHES he plumbs survivors’ heartbreaking accounts, bringing readers to the rubble of atomic ruins. He quotes the parting words of one Hiroshima mother, unable to free her 6-year-old daughter trapped beneath burning timbers: ‘Kazu,’ she pleaded, ‘I am a bad mother to you, but please forgive me. You don’t want to die either, I know. Mummy isn’t brave enough to stay here and die with you. I am afraid of the fire. Kazu, forgive me, forgive me.’
With the city’s immolation, Hirohito bowed to the inevitable.”
