THE GAME by Peter King

(Gino Marchetti – the Colts’ powerful defensive lineman #89 played a huge role in the ‘Greatest game ever played,’ 1958 NFL Championship Game)

One of the first football games I ever watched on television was the 1958 NFL Championship game between the Baltimore Colts and the New York Giants which ended when Baltimore fullback Alan Ameche crossed the goal line in overtime, a game that up until that time was considered the greatest in NFL history.  I watched the game on my grandparents’ 16 inch black and white television  set in their apartment in Lakewood, New Jersey.  On the drive home back to Brooklyn with my parents I recounted the game in my mind over and over and from that time I was hooked on football.  I have watched the New York Giants almost religiously for the last 68 years and would become addicted to writers like Paul Zimmerman, Frank Deford, and Dan Jenkins as Sports Illustrated became my Bible.

By the 1980s I discovered a new writer, Peter King, who captured the essence of the game and had the ability to take fans to places where most media types did not go.  I have followed and read Mr. King’s work for close to 40 years, and I was pleased to learn about his new memoir/history entitled THE GAME which tells the story of the modern NFL from 1984 through 2023.  The book is a blend of personal reporting anecdotes, tactical and play calling insights, player profiles, a crossword puzzle, and King’s personal “Mount Rushmore of Pro Football,” which contains many individuals that most would be surprised made the list.

Lawrence Taylor & Bill Parcells New York Giants Autographed 16" x 20" Photograph with Multiple Hall of Fame Inscriptions

When King began his career covering the NFL, baseball was still hanging on as our national pastime, but the NFL’s popularity would soon explode providing King with a wonderful starting point for his work.  King’s writing would draw back the curtain on professional football and allow his readers the inside story on how the NFL reached the heights it has today.  King explores the massive television and cable deals, along with streaming services, and satellite television that took a one day a week product and turned it into an almost everyday event that has spread beyond the United States as this season games will take place in Melbourne (Australia), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), London (U.K.), Paris (France), Madrid (Spain), Munich (Germany) and Mexico City (Mexico).

From the outset of the book King delves into the careers of Commissioners, team executives and owners, players, and others who have greatly influenced the game of football and contributed to the sport’s phenomenal growth.  Beginning in 1984 with his early career as a beat reporter for The Cincinnati Enquirer covering the college draft and the choices made by the Cincinnati Bengals, King’s avocation was launched.  King immediately turns to the importance of Bengal’s new coach, a “brainy” and innovative young man named Sam Wyche and his relationship to his newly drafted quarterback Boomer Esiason, the cheapness of Bengal owner Paul Brown, and the offensive advances made by Wyche and his coaching staff.  In his opening chapter King sets the pattern for the entire book by integrating wonderful stories about the people he dealt with and how these people impacted football on the field and off.

King does a tremendous job uncovering the minutiae associated with the most interesting characters in the game.  One that stands out for me is Bill Parcells who once hit two homeruns off Al Downing in American Legion ball, the same pitcher who gave up Henry Aaron’s 715th.  Parcells is the central focus of a chapter dealing with the New York Giants on their road to the Super Bowl in 1986.  It is personal for me because the Giants used to hold their training camp at Fairleigh Dickinson University in Madison, NJ.  At the same time, I taught at the College of Saint Elizabeth a few hundred yards down the road.  I used to take my son Josh to observe the practices, but I had to cover his ears because of the verbal interplay between Parcells, Lawrence Taylor, Harry Carson, Phil Simms and others.  King develops how the Giants were built into a championship team after many down years, and later he explores in detail how Bill Belicheck and Scott Pioli used the Parcell/George Young way to build the New England Patriots.

Bill Walsh and Joe Montana, looking supremely cool

(Bill Walsh and Joe Montana)

King zeroes in on the egos involved on all levels of the NFL.  Character studies of Bill Walsh who turned the San Francisco 49ers into a dynasty and Deon Sanders, the all-pro cornerback for the Dallas Cowboys are exceptional.  King has a way of providing fascinating details as he has access to individuals that most writers did not have and is able to take his subjects and make them appear human.  This is especially important in perhaps one of the most fascinating chapters dealing with John Madden.   Madden did not like airplanes and did most of his traveling on a bus that was outfitted as a pseudo motorhome for him during the NFL broadcast season.  King was able to convince Madden to let him ride along as the bus left his home in California on the way to the New Jersey Meadowlands.  During the trip King had to follow the “Madden rules” for bus etiquette.  Madden, who was a championship coach who retired from the sidelines at age 42 was more famous and became richer than most players and coaches.  During the trip Madden served as a tour guide and philosopher and showed why he was beloved by football fans all over the country.  I agree with King’s assessment that he was one of the most significant figures in NFL history.

Jimmy Johnson (left) and Jerry Jones had a talk that thawed their relationship and opened the way for Johnson to go in the Dallas Ring of Honor.
(Jimmy Johnson (left) and Jerry Jones had a talk that thawed their relationship and opened the way for Johnson to go in the Dallas Ring of Honor. (Tony Gutierrez, AP)

One of the players King explores is an aberration, a man without an ego.  King uses Reggie White, an ordained Baptist minister who became the most important figure in the battle for free agency.  Throughout the 1980s conservative NFL owners did not want to enter the modern world after three players’ strikes.   It would take court decisions to encourage a settlement with the players and create a modicum of labor peace.  Once free agency was granted, a number of teams wanted White and King to trace his recruitment and the negotiating process that led to his signing with the Green Bay Packers, a team that was not on White’s radar.  White was somewhat fatalistic when it appeared his choice of the San Francisco 49ers would not pan out as he stated that he would leave his choice “in the hands of God.”  White was an amazing athlete in addition to being a moral and empathetic individual who told everyone that one of his major criteria was to set up a ministry wherever he settled.  King’s astuteness is clear as he points out that the free agent process contributed to making the NFL a year round commodity as it extended interest in the off season.   In addition, the NFL would make the draft an extravaganza which would further extend the season, as would the Super Bowl almost to the opening baseball spring training in February.

Individual relationships form an important component to King’s work.  His description of the Jerry Jones-Jimmy Johnson connection is incisive and explains how the Dallas Cowboys became a dynasty in the 1990s.  Interestingly, Johnson would walk away from his coaching position when he was on the top of his game.  King delves into a number of important aspects of decision making within the Cowboys organization to explain their success.  The key assessment was trading Herschel Walker to the Minnesota Vikings for numerous draft choices which would result in choosing players who became the foundation of the Cowboys domination and making them “America’s Team.”  The conversations King quotes support everything he writes about which makes for an exceptional read especially the interplay between Jones and Johnson, who for the life of me I cannot figure out whose ego was larger.  Another amazing  coach quarterback relationship is that of Andy Reid and Patrick Mahommes, one which King raises to the level of the best that has ever existed in the NFL.  King delves into their professional and personal relationship where respect is paramount and a deep appreciation and caring for each other that does not usually exist in any coach-player relationship.

Photo by Chris Arjoon/Icon Sportswire via Getty Images

(Patrick Mahommes and Andy Reid)

The role of league Commissioners is carefully examined from the reign of Pete Rozelle to Roger Goodell.  Rozelle was a pioneer who was able to overcome the opposition of conservative owners as he tried to bring them into the modern world of sport to try and keep them out of the courts.  He was able to negotiate the first meaningful television deals, created Monday Night Football, brought Dallas and Minnesota into the league through expansion, and pushed the Washington Redskins to integrate.  Next in line was Paul Tagliabue who went from the NFL’s lead counsel to commissioner.  He oversaw the most consequential labor agreement in league history in 1993 which introduced the salary cap and free agency.  Twenty new stadiums were built under his auspices and paved the way for games to be played overseas.  Tagliabue also realized that it was important to make football a year round sport for its fans introducing a draft gala, free agency period, mini-camps all designed to keep fans attuned to their teams.   If there was a negative to his reign it was his inability to recognize the harm of head trauma to players which his goal of adding an 18th game to the schedule would further exacerbate.  Lastly, Roger Goodell who does not come across as well in King’s presentation.  Goodell is all about money and profit even in the area of head trauma or CTE.  Another avenue that Goodell is responsible for is the explosion of sports betting on football.  Publicly he decries the social issue leading to people becoming addicted to gambling, but in terms of policy it is all about the money.

Peter King

(Nov 3, 2023; Frankfurt, Germany; American sportswriter Peter King at Kansas City Chiefs press conference at DFB Campus)

King introduces what may appear to be esoteric components to NFL success, but in reality without the work of these individuals the game itself would not have reached the heights that it has.  A prime example is the work of Steve Sabol whose father was the founder of NFL films.  According to King he “more than any other person is responsible for revealing the violent and oft-inspirational ballet of the sport.”  It began when Sabol was able to convince Pete Rozelle and others to allow cameras in previously sacrosanct areas; i.e., the coverage of Vince Lombardi and Jerry Kramer during the 1967 NFL Championship game referred to as “the Ice Bowl.”  Sabols work turned players into legends and elevated the game in the eyes of its followers.  Another important area that comes under this heading is King’s description of the public and private work of NFL officials and how difficult their lives can be.  Using one of his techniques – imbedding himself with his subjects, in this case Gene Steratore’s life for a week preparing for a Sunday clash and the evaluation process that follows is eye opening.  Lastly, the impact of David Hill, a British transplant hired by Rupert Murdoch to force networks to do football on television differently as head of the FOX startup for the 1994 season.  This would result in FOX innovations that would enhance the viewers experience and eventually make the NFL exceedingly more profitable.

There is so much to unpack in King’s book and there does not seem to be an aspect of the NFL upon which he does not touch.  The role of Dawn Aponte, who was the NFL’s Chief Administrator, the night that Buffalo Bills cornerback Damar Hamlin’s heart stopped after tackling an opposing player and how she took charge of the situation is a case in point.  King uses Aponte’s career to introduce how the role of women has expanded on all levels of the NFL.  The push to hire women is in part due to the fact that 41% of NFL fans are female!  This along with the King’s exploration of the impact of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) on players and other aspects of the player’s health these topics are extremely important to the future of professional football.

I have read many books on football over the years and apart from George Plimpton’s PAPER LION and Jerry Kramer’s INSTANT REPLAY I cannot think of another that I have enjoyed as much.  It will bring back memories for football fans of any age and create new ones for things of which you were not aware. 

Buffalo Bills wide receiver Cole Beasley (11) after a catch against the Tampa Bay Buccaneers during the second half of an NFL football game Sunday, Dec. 12, 2021, in Tampa, Fla. (AP Photo/Mark LoMoglio)

(Out of the game grew these larger-than-life figures. The game featured 17 future members of the Pro Football Hall of Fame. For the Giants: Gifford, Roosevelt Brown, Sam Huff, Tom Landry (asst. coach), Vince Lombardi (asst. coach), Tim Mara (Owner), Wellington Mara (Vice President and Secretary), Don Maynard, Andy Robustelli, and Emlen Tunnell. For the Colts: Raymond Berry, Art Donovan, Weeb Ewbank (coach), Gino Marchetti, Lenny Moore, Jim Parker and, of course, Unitas. 1958 NFL Championship Game)

BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO FREE THE OCTOBER 7TH HOSTAGES by Brett McGurk

Aftermath of a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen in Kibbutz Beeri

(Children’s toys and personal items lie on the bloodstained floor of a child’s bedroom, following a deadly infiltration by Hamas gunmen, in Kibbutz Beeri in southern Israel, October 17)

The role of the Gaza War which began with the Hamas massacres of October 7, 2023, plays an important role in our current political climate.  The role of the Israeli response to Hamas’ barbarism has been referred to as genocide against the Palestinian people by elements in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party and their supporters.  This has sparked  a major debate into what should have been the American response to Israeli policy and military action in Gaza as the United States has funneled untold billions in aid and military weapons to the Tel Aviv government.  Israel has become a pariah in the world community due to its destruction in the region and many countries have opposed the Biden administration’s response.

On the domestic political front in the United States as the 2026 Congressional elections approach the current state in Gaza has bifurcated the Democratic Party and created major disagreements among candidates running for office.  Since margins for victory in House and Senate elections are so close, especially in a state like Michigan the issue may swing the election to one political party or another for the control of the two houses of Congress.   In the 2024 presidential election, Vice President Kamala Harris lost Michigan to Donald Trump by roughly 1.5% of the vote in large part because of the significant Arab-American vote in that state.  Today, the Democratic candidate for the Senate, Abdul al-Sayed has alienated a significant part of the Jewish community over his comments concerning Israel and Iran, in addition to his association with Hassan Piker and his supporters who have been accused of anti-Sematic positions on Israel.  With so many “toss-up” states so close to the election an issue like Gaza can have a tremendous impact.

Smoke and flames billow after Israeli forces struck a high-rise tower in Gaza City

(Smoke and flames billow after Israeli forces struck a high-rise tower in Gaza City, October 7)

In this political environment Brett McGurk’s new book, BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO FREE THE OCTOBER 7TH HOSTAGES is important  as it takes the reader inside negotiations transversing power centers in Washington and the Middle East, and inside a crisis that has reshaped the world, with consequences that we are still dealing with today.  McGurk, who served in four presidential administrations, most recently as Assistant for National Security to President Biden where he coordinated policy for the Middle East and Africa was thrust into a situation where he tried bringing about the release of the 251 hostages seized by Hamas on October 7th.  The task was extremely daunting and frustrating due to Hamas’ extreme positions and Israel’s goal of forcing the terrorist organization from its governing position in Gaza as well as disarming it.  It would take fifteen months to reach an agreement to release the hostages, dead or alive making BRINK an important account of the negotiations that took place among President Biden, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and other leaders and diplomats in the region.

McGurk does more than take the reader inside the negotiations that finally led to the release of all hostages, the final twenty on October 13, 2025.  The author delves into the minutiae of the talks, the strategies pursued by all sides, and the human physical and emotional cost to negotiators and the victims of Hamas’ brutal incursion into Israel.  McGurk begins with the awkward relationship between President Joe Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman who was responsible for the murder of Washington Post columnist and Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi on October 2, 2018, inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, by a team of Saudi government agents.  During the 2024 presidential campaign Biden had made a number of unflattering remarks regarding bin Salman making for a rather awkward relationship.  Using Biden’s visit to Riyadh and other diplomatic interactions McGurk explains the complexity of the Saudi-American relationship that continues today. 

The Saudi component in evaluating the Hamas attack is interesting.  Before October 7th, the idea of an Israeli-Saudi reproachment added to the Abraham Accords of the first Trump administration gave credence that the diplomatic balance in the Middle East was changing.  Perhaps Hamas launched the attack in part to block this reorientation, a subject that the author does not address.  If one looks at motive McGurk is clear that Hamas wanted to launch a regional war that would destroy Israel and reap whatever benefit this would produce in the region.

Aftermath of Israeli strikes in Gaza

(People carry the body of a Palestinian killed in Israeli strikes, in Jabalia refugee camp, in the northern Gaza Strip, October 9)

The goals of the Israeli response was clear – remove Hamas from power in Gaza and destroy its military capability.  Secondly, free the hostages.  McGurk does not delve into Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netayahu’s legal problems and its impact on his policy decisions.  For Netanyahu, who was under indictment, war in Gaza would keep him in power and this along with keeping the right wing of his cabinet happy as not to cause the collapse of his government must factor into his obstinacy in negotiations.  By exploring this component of the Israeli political situation, the reader would have greater understanding of Netanyahu’s “Reale politic.”

Apart from these issues McGurk’s memoir/summary of the crisis is well thought out, deeply analyzed, and an important contribution in the understanding of the crisis and its implications for the region.  After describing the attack/massacre McGurk delves into empathetic portraits of the victims, including the murder of approximately 1,195 to 1,219 people, and over 3,400 wounded including Israelis, foreign nationals, and Americans of which 49 were killed.  The author describes his personal relationships with some of the victims as well as their families and the bonds he developed.

The Biden administration was immediately placed in a sensitive position as the humanitarian crisis developed with the Israeli movement into Gaza.  At the outset Israel was accused of killing hundreds in an attack on a hospital which turned out to be due to a missile fired inside Gaza not by the Israeli Defense Force.  Throughout the crisis the Biden administration stressed caution, but a traumatized nation did not want to hear it particularly an Israeli coalition government which depended on extreme right wing politicians like Itamar Ben-Gavit, the Minister of National Security, and Bezalei Smotrich, the Finance Minister to remain in power.  It was soon clear that the United States might delay, try, and shape Israel’s response at the margins, but it could not prevent it.  As the Israeli invasion proceeded, Biden on the one hand was appalled by the rape and murder that Hamas perpetrated but was also faced with domestic opposition to the depth of the Israeli response.  Many of Biden’s decisions had to balance these opposing forces but as he tried to satisfy each he would indirectly give Hamas what it wanted.  A case in point, when it emerged that the Biden administration was threatening to cut off certain military sales to Israel or held up delivery of certain weapons it reinforced Hamas’ belief that the longer it stretched out the crisis the United States would force Israel into granting greater concessions.

Aftermath of Israeli strikes

(A rescuer reacts as he works with others to remove Palestinian casualties from under the rubble of a house destroyed in Israeli strikes, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, October 9)

Concessions are a dominant theme in McGurk’s account as the negotiations were tortuous.  Many times, it appeared agreements were reached when Hamas would go silent or increase its demands.  The key issues revolved around the names of hostages to be released, dead or alive and how it related to a ceasefire and the lines Israeli troops would withdraw to.  Agreement was reached early on, but Hamas ‘ strategy was to drag out talks as long as possible to force Israel to increase the number of Palestinian prisoners they would release and the type of prisoner they would release – convicted terrorists.  Perhaps Yahya Sinwar’s evaluation led him to conclude that seizing individuals ranging from a 9-month old baby to an 85 year old woman would give Hamas the power to make major demands and protection from Israeli revenge as Israel was known to never leave a dead body behind, i.e., the Gilad Shalit case.  This error in judgement was incalculable but based on Hamas’ actions bringing death was their only goal for which they would pay an incalculable price. 

(Brett McGurk)

As excruciating maneuvering evolved McGurk lays out how talks are preceded by including the positions and impact of the negotiators.   Some of the key players were Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thai the Prime Minister of Qatar, a country that hoisted Hamas leadership in Doha; Egyptian Major-General Ahmed Abdel Khalek who shaped Cairo’s policy toward Gaza for decades; and David Barnea, the Chief of the Mossad (Israel’s foreign intelligence agency), who served as the lead negotiator, and Gal Hirsch, a retired IDF Brigadier General appointed by Netanyahu as the official Coordinator for Captives and Missing Persons.  There are many others including Jake Sullivan, Biden’s National Security Advisor, and Steve Witkoff whose role became important after Trump defeated Biden in the 2024 Presidential election.

A number of important conclusions can be drawn from McGurk’s memoir.  First, no matter how close Israel came to accepting Hamas’ demands it was quite clear that Hamas’ leadership did not care about the plight of Gazans. Hamas’ leadership was also a major issue.  If one examines the beliefs of Yahya Sinwar, who oversaw the planning and implementation of the massacre;  his brother Mohammad Sinwar; and Ismail  Haniyeh, Hamas political leader, along with key Hamas negotiating leaders and officials such as Khalil al-Hayya and Khaled Mashal who were centered in Doha negotiations would be a tortuous exercise.  The structure of negotiations was part of the problem.  Talks would take place in Doha and if agreement were reached it also had to be accepted by Sinwar and Haniyeh in Gaz.  This allowed Hamas to fritter away any time component to an agreement.  It took the deaths of  senior Hamas leadership through Israeli assassinations to finally reach a final agreement after Trump took office.

McGurk graciously gives Steve Wytkoff credit for bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion after Trump’s real estate compatriot got involved.  It is interesting that it was a combination of Biden’s team and Witkoff who got the talks across the finish line, but Trump gave his usual public evaluation stating, “This EPIC ceasefire agreement could have only happened as a result of our Historic Victory in November, as it signaled to the entire World that my Administration would seek Peace and negotiate deals to ensure the safety of all Americans, and out Allies.”

(Sinwar holding up a child dressed as a Hamas terrorist in the Gaza Strip on May 24, 2021. Sinwar holds up a child dressed as a Hamas terrorist in the Gaza Strip on May 24, 2021)

McGurk also includes the role of Iran and its proxies, the Houthis, Hezbollah, and groups in Syria and Iraq and their impact on the crisis and negotiations.  Once the Trump administration became involved and assumed the presidency this grouping became paramount as coordinated attacks with Israel in June 2025 and September 2026 are still playing out. 

Fintan O’Toole’s evaluation of McGurk’s memoir is spot on (New York Times, October 6, 2026, “What Went Wrong With the Effort to Free the October 7th Hostages?”) as he writes, “This reads as though the United States was merely a benign outsider, hoping for the best but powerless to prevent the worst. “Biden,” as McGurk concedes, “could not credibly explain how the war might end.” With no American vision of a decent solution, there is still no sense of an ending, just a pulverized population and an Israel whose international standing lies in the dust.

Biden’s own team was deeply divided. By the beginning of April 2024, according to McGurk, “Some advised him to simply tell Netanyahu the war was over. If Netanyahu refused, we’d cut Israel’s support.”

Joe Biden meets with Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv

(President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Tel Aviv on Oct. 18)

McGurk himself was opposed to this strategy, believing that it would merely embolden Hamas and Iran, and Biden vacillated. The chaos of the president’s abortive re-election campaign and his replacement by Vice President Kamala Harris at the top of the Democratic ticket added to the uncertainty. After Trump defeated Harris in November, the national security adviser Jake Sullivan told McGurk that he “suspected that Netanyahu planned to wait us out, preferring to do the deal with Trump.”

While the carnage continued, McGurk did nonetheless manage to facilitate a deal in which over 100 hostages were freed in November 2023 and — working with Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff — to secure the release of 33 more by February 2025.

He rightly takes pride in his contribution to the joyful return of a majority of the hostages to their families. Each life saved is a light in the unspeakable darkness. But if more and more innocent lives are not to be lost, there needs to be a much larger reckoning with America’s failures in the Middle East than McGurk feels able to provide.”

Israeli military officers organise dead bodies before relatives are called to identify them, following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip, in Ramla

(Israeli military officers stand by a container in which bodies of the dead are stored before their relatives are called to identify them, in Ramla, Israel, October 13)

EMPIRE OF ASHES: TRUMAN, HIROHITO, AND THE DESCENT INTO TOTAL WAR by James M. Scott

Enola Gay

Ever since the film, “Oppenheimer” was released a few years ago based on the book by Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin there has been an uptick in interest in the decision making in Washington and Tokyo that led to the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japanese cities and its impact on its victims.  Numerous books have been written on the topic ranging from Gar Alperovitz’s controversial revisionist history ATOMIC DIPLOMACY to Chris Wallace’s recent COUNTDOWN 1945 and Ian MacGregor’s THE HIROSHIMA MEN.  The latest entry into this genre is James M. Scott’s EMPIRE OF ASHES: TRUMAN, HIROHITO, AND THE DESCENT INTO TOTAL WAR.

Scott, a Pulitzer Prize finalist and the author of a series of monographs focusing on events and personalities in the Pacific Theater during World War II entitled BLACK SNOW zeroes in on the role of General Curtis LeMay and the firebombing of Tokyo, RAMPAGE which delves into MacArthur and Yamashita’s roles in the Battle of Manila, and TARGET TOKYO centering on the Doolittle Raid designed to avenge the attack on Pearl Harbor.  In his latest effort EMPIRE OF ASHES Scott explores the final months of World War II in the Pacific, from the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt to Harry Truman’s ascension to the Presidency, and the decision making and actual bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  What separates Scott’s work from previous books is his deep dive into the views of the Japanese leadership and his integration of Japanese survivors of the blasts along with employing traditional American sources.

Harry S. Truman

(President Harry S. Truman)

A key element in Scott’s rendering is his exploitation of the ethical and moral dilemma faced by those who had to decide whether to use the atomic bomb, and once they did, how it would be dropped and which cities would be targeted.  The book is fast paced and is told from both sides of the conflict focusing on the actions and beliefs of Harry S. Truman and Emperor Hirohito, in addition to ordinary civilians caught in the crossfire.

Scott begins his story with the sudden death of FDR and Truman’s awkward assumption of the presidency.  Truman, a political infighter who learned how to deal with bureaucratic infighting under the auspices of the Pendergast political machine in Missouri suffered from certain insecurities, but never over making important decisions.  Two weeks after entering the White House he would learn of the existence of the Manhattan Project which would lead to the greatest dilemma of his life.

Scott writes with an easy prose that allows major events and historical figures to flow across the page.  The reader might feel at times as if they are reading a novel, however the author has written an exemplary work of non-fiction based on impeccable research.  Scott’s chapters dealing with the first half of August 1945 are exemplary of the author’s approach as he lays out how the Japanese delayed and delayed accepting the end of the war and were willing to risk further American bombing.  Scott’s recreation of the bitter debate within the Japanese leadership is exceptional and reads like a thriller and reflects his approach to the presentation of history.

Hirohito

(Japanese Emperor Hirohito)

Truman was fully cognizant of FDR’s declining health, and he realized that he could soon replace him in the not too distant future.  FDR purposefully isolated his Vice President, even forgoing any briefing by the President or his Secretary of State Edward Settinius as to what was discussed and decided at the Yalta Conference.  Truman himself had doubts about becoming president and had little faith in Stettinius seeing him “as dumb as they come,” and soon replaced him with James Byrne who Truman beat out for the Democratic Vice Presidential nomination in 1944 but was probably the most qualified candidate for that office.

Scott effectively relates Truman’s own doubts about becoming president as well as the concerns exhibited by FDR’s cabinet, members of Congress, and the military leadership.  The most important topics for Truman to immerse himself with was centered around Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin and his plans for eastern Europe, particularly Poland.  If that were to come to pass there was no way the Senate would approve US membership in the United Nations, the focal point of FDR’s post war world.  Another key component of the US-USSR relationship was FDR’s desire for Soviet troops to enter the war against Japan once Germany was defeated.  For Truman, in all meetings with Soviet officials he wanted to make sure they honored their commitments.  This is exemplified by Truman’s confrontation with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov who responded to Truman’s desire that agreements with Russia would not be “the basis of a one-way street,” by stating “I have never been talked to like that in my life,” with Truman firing back, “carry out your agreements, and you won’t get talked to like that.”

General Leslie R. Groves

(General Leslie Groves)

Scott does an excellent job presenting biographical sketches of the most important figures of the period.  Apart from Truman and Hirohoto, the author introduces Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and General Leslie Groves who informed Truman of the existence of the Manhattan Project.  The scientific community responsible for the development of the bomb is presented on an individual basis.  Scientists like Leo Szilard, who opposed dropping the bomb, Robert J. Oppenhiemer, Enrico Fermi, Ernst Lawrence, and Glenn Seaborg are all discussed in the context of their contributions to the Manhattan Project.  Other important biographies center around the roles of General Curtis LeMay whose incineration of Japanese cities and advocacy of dropping the bomb and Colonel Charles Tibbetts who flew the B29 named the Enola Gay dropping the bomb on Hiroshima are deeply explored.  Scott presents the arguments, pro and con as to whether the bomb should be dropped in the first place and once it was what would be the criteria for choosing which cities would be struck.  The ethical and moral issues are explored deeply and the implications for the post war world where a nuclear arms race most probably would result.

After about a quarter of the book Scott finally delves into the military and political leadership in Japan.  Hirohito serves as the jumping off point and his role in Japanese society and culture.  For Hirohito domestic conflicts were more dangerous than an escalation toward war as the civilian leadership was increasingly afraid of assassination and the influence of the military on all aspects of Japanese society based on movements and events of the 1930s.  This was due to the Japanese army’s ability to curb dissent as it implemented its expansionist agenda.  Scott explored the individual concerns of the Japanese military which centered on launching a war against the United States without a plan for total victory amid much doubt by senior leadership that such a fight could even be won.  According to Admiral Osami Nagano, chief of the navy’s general staff, “We can fight effectively for two years, but no prediction can be made after that.”  According to Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, “in war a reasonable prospect of victory is enough…even if there is apprehension that we may be defeated, the nation should trust the military and move ahead.  Scott reiterates the Japanese plan for the US Navy and the Pacific that is recounted in numerous books, but he does an exceptional job delving into the meetings of the Cabinet Liaison Conference and Hirohito’s decision not to oppose the military leadership. 

Hiroshima after the atomic bomb

(Photograph of Hiroshima after the atomic bomb)

Later in the monograph Scott will explore the Japanese decision making process once it is clear that after Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa the United States was about to embark on an invasion of the home islands and that the war was lost.  Scott presents an Emperor who wanted to end the war before his kingdom was totally destroyed but did not have the fortitude to stand up to the extreme militarists who wanted to fight until the death.  Their rationale is clear that by inflicting a blood bath on the Americans they would obtain better terms in a diplomatic solution, totally rejecting the “unconditional surrender” that Washington offered.  Scott describes the Japanese homefront before the war which helps explain the extreme shortages that existed during the war. 

Relying on Japanese civilian diaries, the reader gets a clear picture of the shortages of commodities needed to survive and the impact of American bombing which became more and more deadly and intense as the war evolved.  As time went on Japanese citizens were in a state of disbelief when presented with government propaganda and more resentment emerged against the military leadership as they could not acquire what was needed to survive on a daily basis.  As the Japanese people were confronted by American bombing, frustration and fear became the dominant human emotion.

The Russian component in US strategy plays an important role for Washington and Tokyo.  Truman relied upon Stalin’s commitment of Russian troops in Manchuria to pin down the Imperial Army and not allow them to be transferred to the Home Islands.  At the same time Hirohito and Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō wanted Stalin to intervene diplomatically to bring about a conclusion to the war.  This did not prove successful and it was a bit naive as Stalin was offered a great deal of territory and military aid at Yalta to join the war so why would he give it up when Japan was already defeated.

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(Nagasaki after the atomic bomb)

Scott is clear that Truman took responsibility for dropping the atomic bombs, but Stimson and others did convince him to offer an ultimatum to end the war before the bombs would be dropped including a work around whereby the Emperorship would not be destroyed.  Scott is clear that is the key to any diplomatic solution was Hirohito’s fate: Should he remain emperor or be hanged as a war criminal?  This was an agonizing decision – the logic of preserving the throne, to pacify Japan, collided with American outrage over imperial atrocities, from Nanking in China to Bataan in the Philippines. Truman held doggedly to Roosevelt’s demand for unconditional surrender as the atomic bomb test lighted up New Mexico.  It is clear Truman and Hirohito were horrified over the slaughter to come. Truman knew American invaders might have to face over a million defenders and 10,000 kamikaze planes on the southern island of Kyushu alone. On Japan’s mainland, Hirohito watched helplessly as American bombers ran out of large cities to incinerate and began destroying smaller ones. Yet hardliners in Japan’s imperial cabinet would not end the war.

Jonathan W. Jordan, the author of a recent new book, IKE AND WINSTON: WORLD WAR, COLD WAR, AN EXTRAORDINARY FRIENDSHIP in his July 31, 2026, Wall Street Journal review concludes that “Mr. Scott describes the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with relentless pacing and harrowing detail. ‘The explosion carbonized people on the streets, leaving charred hands still wrapped around the hanging straps on trains,’ he writes of Hiroshima. ‘Organs evaporated, and birds vaporized in flight.’

Across five Pacific War volumes, Mr. Scott has established himself as a master of conveying the human cost of war. In EMPIRE OF ASHES he plumbs survivors’ heartbreaking accounts, bringing readers to the rubble of atomic ruins. He quotes the parting words of one Hiroshima mother, unable to free her 6-year-old daughter trapped beneath burning timbers: ‘Kazu,’ she pleaded, ‘I am a bad mother to you, but please forgive me. You don’t want to die either, I know. Mummy isn’t brave enough to stay here and die with you. I am afraid of the fire. Kazu, forgive me, forgive me.’

With the city’s immolation, Hirohito bowed to the inevitable.”

Boeing B-29 "Enola Gay" on Tinian in the Marianas Islands. (U.S. Air Force photo)

ALL THE PRESIDENT’S WARS: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE WAR ON TERROR by Peter Bergen

File photo of the second tower of the World Trade Center bursting into flames after being hit by an airplane in New York

The title of Peter Bergen’s latest book ALL THE PRESIDENT’S WARS: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE WAR ON TERROR is a misnomer.  The War on Terror did not begin on 9/11 as attacks against American interests took place long before planes flew into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996; or the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 all come to mind.  It seems that the United States has been involved in preventing terrorist attacks for decades before 9/11 and will continue to be involved in counter-terrorism for years to come.  This being the case Peter Bergen’s book is important as it lays the foundation of what took place in the recent past, errors and successes, and what we can learn to be more effective in counteracting terrorism today as recently as last week when a possible attack against a military base in England that housed American bombers was thwarted, in addition to dealing with asymmetric warfare, an outgrowth of President Trump’s invasion of Iran.

In reviewing that past four administration’s policies toward Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran Bergen immediately cuts to the crux of the problem – decision makers needed to frame, “what kind of war are we embarking on” in response to the attacks on 9/11.  Each administration would answer the question quite differently with varying degrees of success.  The Bush administration would come up with the vague term, “the War on Terror,” and it came to mean that the war would be fought globally and for decades into the future.  This created a series of consequences that we are still dealing with today.

FILE PHOTO OF WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF CARD TELLING BUSH ABOUT SECOND PLANE AT TRADE CENTER.

(President George W. Bush listens as White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card informs him of a second plane hitting the World Trade Center while Bush was conducting a reading seminar at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida)

The War on Terror precipitated great change in the Middle East, the sharp increase in sectarian violence between Shia and Sunnis and the rise of Iran as a critical player in the region.  Bergen is correct in arguing that by overthrowing Saddam Hussein after the invasion of Iraq Washington inverted the power structure in Iraq allowing the Shia to come  to power fostering a civil war that included the rise of ISIS and killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.  Further, the true winners of the war were the Shia and their Iranian ally who would emerge as the dominant force in the region in part because of Bush’s invasion of Iraq and currently because of Trump’s invasion of Iran. 

There have been some successes along the way, a surge of troops and a new counter-insurgency strategy after the invasion of Iraq fell apart, but in the end the Shia came to power.  Another short term success was the capture of Osama Bin-Laden and his death resulting in a weakening of Al-Qaeda, however, eventually it reconstituted itself though it did not form a strong alliance with ISIS.  Once Bin Laden was out of the picture President Obama shifted his focus away from Iraq to Afghanistan reinforcing his belief that the US should withdraw from that country as soon as possible.  This led to a number of decisions that would eventually lead to Trump’s signing a withdrawal agreement with the Taliban.

Bergen, a well-respected national security journalist and one of the leading authorities on his subject, has written a sobering, meticulously researched postmortem of U.S. foreign policy encompassing the 2001-2026 time frame.  It is clear that American administrations had policy choices over the last two and a half decades and Bergen, not surprisingly focuses more on the poor decisions as opposed to the positive ones.   He eviscerates the Bush administration, delving into the consequences for poor decisions leading up to the invasion of Iraq and its “occupation” of that country and setting the stage for the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The dilly dallying of the Obama administration decision making, and Trump’s negotiations with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan, and his invasion of Iran are all discussed.  These examples reflect the growing belief in foreign capitals that the United States had little idea as to what it wanted to accomplish or how to achieve it.  This would lead to a change in the global order as the United States has gone from the upholder of a rule based system, to being seen as a destabilizing force as it pursued what Richard Haass describes in his excellent work, WAR OF NECESSITY, WAR OF CHOICE.

Bergen provides many insightful observations throughout the monograph.  First, he points out that Al-Qaeda assassinated Ahmed Shah Masood, the leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, a mortal enemy of the Taliban, and a leader the United States was working with two days before 9/11.  Bin Ladin did so to to mollify the Taliban as he realized that the United States would soon retaliate against the theocratic organization very harshly.  In discussing the Arab Spring of 2011 Bergen interestingly describes it as “the Arab spring would soon turn into the Arab winter.”  Bergen supports this assessment by exploring the overthrow of Muhammar Gahdaffi and the resulting civil war; the rise of ISIS and its expansion to control 33% of Syrian and 40% of Iraq before its “Caliphate” was defeated;

Saddam statue fall of baghdad

(A US Marine watches a statue of Saddam Hussein being toppled in Firdaus Square in downtown Baghdad on April 9, 2003)

Bergen reviews many important events and personalities of the period under discussion that have been dealt with elsewhere from his previous books and the works of Steven Coll, Craig  Whitlock, Lawrence Wright, and the most recent monograph by Carter Malkasian, THE AMERICAN WAR IN AFGHANISTAN.  The run up to the invasion of Iraq and Donald Rumsfeld’s approach to war and his refusal to provide the necessary assets to capture Bin Laden at Tora Bora, the incompetence of Peter Bremer’s de-Bathization and disbanding the Iraqi army that allowed the Shia to come to power after Saddam Hussein was captured and killed reflecting the self-righteousness of the Bush administration.  The author examines the different approaches on fighting the war in Afghanistan focusing on the ideas of General Stanley McCrystal and Colonel H.R. McMaster and disagreements with President Obama in an excellent chapter entitled “We are out of Schlitz.”  The role of Pakistan in harboring the Taliban fearing US withdrawal from Afghanistan and whether they hid Osama Bin Laden (Bergen argues decisively they were not aware of his presence in Abbottabad) are examined as is the lack of competence in the Afghani and Iraqi militaries after years of American training cutting and running from the Taliban and ISIS.  Lastly,  Ahmid Karzai’s relationship with American diplomats and US distrust of the Afghan president.

The Obama administration does not fare very well in Bergen’s analysis.  He argues that Obama was obsessed with not getting into any more “stupid” wars.  However, his inability to make up his mind about how many troops to commit in Afghanistan, whether to go along with a surge, his refusal to enforce his own “red line” pertaining to Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria, his administrations framing the Afghan War as a Taliban insurgency that was supported by Pakistan when in reality it was a three tiered conflict: inter-tribal, inter-ethnic, and inter-state, and for not taking ISIS seriously enough referring to them as the “B” team of terrorists and moving too slowly in confronting the terrorist threat many American felt they presented.   Obama’s Vice-President Joe Biden is also criticized a great deal as he argued to withdraw US troops from Iraq even as the civil war exploded, he was a sceptic who believed little could be done to assist Afghanistan and opposed any surge and wanted to focus on Al-Qaeda, not the Taliban, and even went so far as claiming he supported the attack on Bin Laden’s compound resulting in his capture when in fact he argued against it.  Later  he would claim that the Pentagon did not counsel him to leave 2500 troops in Afghanistan as a means of blocking the Taliban and maintaining security as American troops withdrew.  Generals have argued that Biden was not telling the truth especially when the evacuation turned into a disaster.  All in all, it appears as if the administration was at times in disarray. 

Saddam Hussein capture

(A photo dated December 13, 2003 shows Hussein in what appear to be Flexi-cuffs after his arrest)

One policy that reflects Obama’s willingness to adapt to the new asymmetric warfare was his adoption of the use of drone warfare as a vehicle to avoid committing further US troops as he wanted to pivot American foreign policy toward Asia.  American drone attacks increased substantially under Obama particularly in the tribal regions of Pakistan where the Taliban had sanctuary and Yemen where Muslim extremists were protected.  The Obama administration even went after an American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki who was the brains behind the failed “underwear bomber” attack on a Northwest flight on Christmas day 2009.

Bergen is correct when he points out despite Donald Trump’s bragging about how he would defeat ISIS and disparaged Obama’s approach, he pursued a policy that was developed over a two year period before he became president.  Trump may have speeded up the process but they both deployed a relatively small number of American troops on the ground in Syria and Iraq who operated through local allies.  In Iraq the Counter Terrorism Service, and in Syria with Kurdish fighters.  The ultimate victory over ISIS was fostered by Iraqi and Kurdish troops.  Trump’s Afghan policy was rather disjointed, represented by negotiations to withdraw American troops before the 2020 election.  Bergen dissects negotiations to end the war and it is clear that all that Trump wanted was to get out and did not care about the carnage that would take place once the Americans left.  This would take place under Biden who similarly wanted out of Afghanistan leaving many locals to be victims of Taliban retribution despite their services to America over the years.

If one were to sum up American foreign policy toward the Middle East since 9/11it would center around the fact that Washington creates a plan to get involved be it the invasion of Iraq, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the overthrow of Muhammar Gahdafi, or the invasion of Iran.  All of these actions created unaccounted for consequences because the United States never seems to have a plan for “the day after.”  Today, we are dealing with the fallout from Trump’s invasion of Iran with higher gas and diesel prices causing an increase in inflation that has resulted in  incalculable damage for the American people.

People approach a wall surrounding a compound.

(Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, is shown here, May 4, 2011, two days after he was killed)

As Scott Anderson points out in his September 6, 2026, New York Times review entitled, “Why the War on terror is Still Haunting Us,”  “Quite early in “All the Presidents’ Wars,” the journalist Peter Bergen’s chronicle of the “war on terror,” the reader is likely to conclude that the groups of American officials who have presided over the past two and a half decades of conflict in the Middle East consist of idiots, fools or knaves. The further one progresses into this damning and meticulously researched book, the more this assessment seems confirmed.

In fairness, the war on terror hasn’t been an unmitigated catastrophe. The development of advanced weaponized drones facilitated the killing of Qaeda leaders at long range and with little risk. American military commanders also eventually adopted counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq that proved very effective, even if they failed to change the ultimate outcome of that conflict. And while it is difficult to get all hopped up over something that didn’t happen, the fact is that there hasn’t been a large-scale terrorist attack on American soil since Sept. 11.”

Still, at the cost of trillions of dollars, the lives of some 7,000 U.S. servicemen and women, as well as hundreds of thousands of Iraqi and Afghan civilians, and two failed war efforts — with a third in progress — one would hope for some more bright spots.

Military helicopters hover over a vessel, with the horizon in the background.

(U.S. forces carried out a maritime interdiction and right-of-visit boarding of the Davina, a sanctioned stateless oil tanker, in the Indian Ocean within the Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility, June 4, 2026. The U.S. continues global maritime enforcement to disrupt illicit networks and interdict vessels providing material support to Iran, wherever they operate.)

Anderson goes on to write; “One might wish that “All the Presidents’ Wars” was coming out a few months from now, in time for the full magnitude of the stupidity attending Trump’s war of choice against Iran to be realized. As it is, Bergen’s last words were penned in mid-March 2026, just a few weeks into this latest American misadventure.

As has been the case so many times over the past 25 years, this folly, too, was peddled as part of the war on terror, but undertaken with even less forethought than its predecessors. Incredibly, Trump seemed to take no notice of how the weaponized drone has enabled Ukraine to keep the vastly larger Russian Army at bay for over four years. Nor did he seem to consider how this innovation might factor into a conflict with Iran, one of the world’s pioneers in the manufacturing of cheap and sophisticated drones..

A major theme of Bergen’s book is the repeated failure of American leaders to plan for “the day after” a military action is taken, but in Iran, he makes clear, Trump didn’t even plan for “the day of.” As a result, it is now all but certain that the United States is headed for another major defeat in its war on terror. For the gory details on that, though, one will have to wait for Bergen’s next book.”

YEAREND PICTURES 2001.