(Smoke rises after an Israeli airstrike in Beirut in 2024)

Before the 1975-76 Lebanese Civil War, Beirut was considered by many as the Paris of the Middle East. During the next decade, the city was periodically under bombardment and by mid-June 1982 Israeli forces besieged West Beirut. Israel’s goal was the removal of more than 11,000 PLO fighters and their leader Yasser Arafat who had established a mini-state in Lebanon which was used to launch attacks against Israel . The removal of these forces took place in August and September 1982 as the PLO was relocated to Tunisia.

On September 14, 1982, Lebanon’s newly elected president, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated resulting in the Lebanese Phalangist militia, in an act of revenge, entering the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps and killing between 3000-3500 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians as Israeli forces stood by. International pressure on Israel resulted in an Israeli withdrawal from Beirut by late 1982. Three years later the Israelis would create a security zone in the southern part of the country and would remain until 2000 when they unilaterally withdrew.

This shattered history led to the radicalization of the local Shia population which fostered the creation and growth of Hezbollah, the Party of God, supported by Iran. As Hezbollah spread its influence throughout Lebanon civil war continued which brought about a multi-national peacekeeping force. However, on October 23, 1983, suicide bombers attacked the US Marine Barracks at their headquarters at the Beirut International Airport killing 241 Marines and wounding 100 more. The attack was carried out by Islamic Jihad, an organization linked to Iran and Hezbollah. By early 1984 the Marines, part of the multinational peacekeeping force, were withdrawn from Lebanon by the Reagan administration.

On January 18, 1984, as violence and terror continued to plague Lebanon, Malcom Kerr, the President of the American University of Beirut was assassinated by gunmen outside his office. The chaos in the city allowed for no investigation of the murder and the perpetrators were never caught leaving the Kerr family in the dark to this day.

(Ann and Malcom Kerr)

In her latest book Emmy award winning journalist Kim Ghattas, the author of BLACK WAVE which develops the forty year competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, has produced a marvelous work that seeks to uncover the truth about the Kerr assassination entitled THE BEST KIND OF AMERICAN. The title itself is somewhat misleading as the book presents as more of a history of Lebanon’s plight from the last quarter of the twentieth century to the present. The story of Malcom Kerr’s career and beliefs and his death are woven into the larger picture of Lebanese history as Ghattas seems to move on from the assassination about halfway through the monograph. The second half of the book brings into focus an insightful presentation and analysis of the second half of the 1980s through the present. This period was highlighted by the Iran-Contra scandal and Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Further, how Hafez al-Assad manipulated events in Lebanon including the intricacies of hostage taking and negotiations to bring about their release. Ghattas also explores how Syria and Iran came together, the creation of the Hamas-Hezbollah-IRGC axis that allowed Iran to penetrate the Palestinian issue, and control events in Lebanon. Throughout this period the incompetence of American Middle East policy would repeatedly manifest itself.  Finally, Ghattas delves into the Kerr family odyssey trying to ascertain who killed their father.

Ghattas explores Kerr and his wife Ann’s commitment to the Lebanese people. They gave up a wonderful career situation in the United States to return to Lebanon as President of the American University Beirut (AUB) in March 1982, for Kerr it was a dream come true. Both his parents had worked at the university, and he was born in Beirut, and met his wife Ann there. When he arrived on campus Beirut was still war torn, but the AUB campus seemed safe, and another Israeli-PLO ceasefire was holding. Kerr would find himself navigating treacherous terrain inside the university. AUB was a microcosm of Lebanon, its students and faculty reflected every political trend but also the country’s deep divisions from rural poor, arrogant Christians, downtrodden Shia, and far-left revolutionaries. Kerr also had to worry about being seen as a CIA operative by some or dealing with other suspicions from the Christians that he harbored sympathy for the Palestinian cause. According to Ghattas, Kerr’s perceptions of Lebanon were shaped by Ras Beirut, a culturally diverse upscale neighborhood in Beirut overlooking the Mediterranean, summers in Ainab, the mountain slopes above Beirut, and by the American Arabist tradition of being sympathetic to Arab nationalism. Kerr firmly believed in improving relations between the Arab world and the United States as he “was anchored in the region’s history going back decades and had become one with it.”

(Malcolm and Ann Kerr with their four children)

Kerr had a reputation of being very critical of American and Israeli policy toward the Palestinians and had a good relationship with Yassir Arafat, the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). But on June 6, 1982, Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon as part of Israeli General Ariel Sharon’s goal of installing a new friendly Christian-dominated government, cut Syria down to size, and most importantly send the PLO into exile which would facilitate Israel’s task of controlling the West Bank and remake the Middle East and create an era of Israeli supremacy. Sharon believed he had the support of the United States through Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who did not voice any opposition to the Israeli invasion. Sharon would achieve the exile of the PLO, but Lebanon would become Israel’s Vietnam because of its hubris which led to incalculable errors fostering the creation of Hezbollah.

Reading Ghattas’ work one can relive the horrors of the death and destruction that Lebanon has experienced for decades. She carefully recreates what I would call the ambiance of war through the eyes of Kerr family members and Lebanese civilians who had to navigate the obstacles that the violence created on a daily basis as if it were a type of normality – pop up checkpoints, snipers, kidnapping, shelling etc. She describes the complexities of the different Muslim and Christian political factions and militias and how they impacted the bloodshed that encompassed Lebanon. Ghattas also explores Israel’s disingenuous approach to the United States be it the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, its machinations dealing with Iran-Contra, or other examples that should include Benjamin Netanyahu’s influence of Donald Trump which led to the invasion of Iran seven months ago.

Ghattas delves into the positions of the major players in the region including Bashir Gemayel and his brother Amine, Ayatollah Khomeini, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Menachem Begin, Hafez al-Assad, Yasser Arafat, Philip Habib, Rafiq Hariri, members of the Reagan administration, and the leadership of the various political factions and militias active in Lebanon during this period. Ghattas carefully explains the goals of the major characters and tries to untangle the tortured web of Lebanon’s multi-ethnic and religious power structure. Important examples of the realpolitik pursued include Assad’s attempts to control events in Lebanon in creating his “Greater Syria,” by assassinating Bashir Gemayel, the Christian president of Lebanon, and the funding and training Islamic militants or Reagan’s emotional attachment to freeing hostages clouding his memory and judgement.

(President of Syria from 1971 to 2000)

Israel’s involvement in Lebanon has been a disaster, and it is still paying the price for its 1982 invasion. I agree with Ghattas that the invasion was a watershed moment for Israel and the region. It left an indelible mark on Israeli society shaping the psyche of its army and people. The vocabulary the Israelis developed for Lebanon would seep into the same way they talked about Gaza and the West Bank: “eradicating the enemy, destroying enemy infrastructure, cleanup operations,” and by 2024 they would be bombing entire cities in Gaza, leveling them to the ground.

The American approach to Lebanon has also been a disaster that resulted in the Marine barracks massacre in 1983 and the Reagan administration’s lack of a concrete policy as Marines were confused about their role in Lebanon and constantly complained they were “sitting ducks” and their military position was indefensible. This was due to the lack of knowledge of the intricacies of what was occurring in Lebanon. Reagan and company saw things through a Cold War lens and mostly ignored the end goals of the Islamic Republic. Its policy of keeping the Iran-Iraq War going would only increase alienation by both sides against Washington. The Cold War lens can also be seen in the Iran-Contra fiasco as Colonel Oliver North developed a plan to use the money obtained from shipping weapons to Iran through Israel to fund the Contras in their fight against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. In addition, much like the Israelis, the United States was unable or unwilling to understand the impact of the Iranian Revolution, especially its inroads with Lebanese Shias.

(Ayatollah Khomeini)

Ghattas is correct as she argues that the perceived divide between moderates and hardliners in Iran was the holy grail for American diplomacy for decades. Understanding this distinction and correctly acting upon it has proven almost impossible for Washington. All you need to look at are the goals of the Trump administration in invading Iran, decapitating its perceived hardline leadership, and replacing it with moderates. The result has been the opposite as the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameini has led to his replacement by his son Mojtaba who is in line with the radical policies and anti-Americanism of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Council.

Ghattas’ assessments are shrewd. She unmasks Assad as an opportunist who got into bed with Shia fundamentalists of Iran and an opportunist who was overwhelmed with gratitude from the Reagan administration when the TWA hostages were released, who at the same time were creatures of the Syrian state. She further argues that Israel’s decision to supply Iran with modest amounts of weapons throughout the 1980s is not as strange as it seems as many in Israel sought to reinstate Iran as a friend and strategic partner as it had been under the Shah.

In closing it is clear that Ghattas sees Kerr, his wife Ann, and Michel Seurat, a French Sociologist who was seized by Islamic Jihad in 1985 and later executed as heroes as Christopher de Bellaigue argues in his New York Times Book Review of October 12, 2026, “The Professor Who Knew Too Much. And Wound Up Dead” writes, they “rejected Iran’s doctrine of divinely ordained conflict as well as Edward Said’s celebrated skewering of Western scholars of the Middle East in his polemic ORIENTALISM. Like Kerr, Seurat was an “innocent” who sought to “close the gap between civilizations,” Ghattas writes, but while in some respects the gap has indeed narrowed since the 1980s, this has been brought about less by knowledge and integrity than by the exercise of economic and military might. If the best kind of American is one whose view of the Middle East is disinterested, benevolent and untainted by thoughts of commercial or strategic hegemony, Ghattas’s excellent book commemorates a breed that is all but extinct.

(Plumes of smoke rise after Israeli strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, March 11, 2026)