American Diplomatic History

THIRTEEN DAYS IN SEPTEMBER by Lawrence Wright

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, Middle Eastern History Leave a comment

(Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, President Jimmy Carter, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David Summit in September, 1978)

On November 19, 1977 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made a momentous journey when he visited Jerusalem.  First, it led to the Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel, effectively removing Israel’s strongest enemy from the battlefield.  Second, it cost the Egyptian leader his life as he was assassinated by Islamic extremists on October 6, 1981.  Sadat’s removal from the diplomatic scene was a blow to the peace process from that point on.  Motivated by the needs of the Egyptian economy, poverty, and the condition of his military, Sadat, known for bold moves sought peace as a solution to his nation’s ills.   Because he chose peace at Camp David it precluded another round of war between Egypt, Syria, and Israel.  Not since William B. Quandt’s CAMP DAVID: PEACEMAKING AND POLITICS has the reading public been exposed to what happened over the two week period in the fall of 1978 when an Arab country finally made peace with Israel.  Lawrence Wright, a Pulitzer prize winning author for his work the LOOMING TOWER, has just completed THIRTEEN DAYS IN SEPTEMBER: CARTER, BEGIN, AND SADAT AT CAMP DAVID, a work of historical synthesis that tries to explain the origins and course of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and how the Camp David Accords fit into the diplomatic equation.  Wright is a marvelous purveyor of narrative history.  He has an excellent knack for integrating past history, be it, dealing with Biblical myths or recent political and military conflicts into his narrative.  The book is quite readable and he tries to untangle the web of inconclusive negotiations and wars between Israel and the Arab states dating back to World War II.  In so doing, he explores the Camp David process on a daily basis examining the personalities involved, the political landscape that each participant risked, the diplomatic minutia that Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat engaged in, and the effect that failure or success might have on the summits results.

The book ostensibly is the story of three flawed men who came together at the 140 acre presidential retreat that lies inside Maryland’s heavily wooded Catoctin Mountain Park sixty miles north of the White House.  Jimmy Carter “was fueled by his religious belief that God had put him in office in part to bring peace to the Holy Land,” and unlike previous American presidents he was willing to risk the prestige of his office to pursue his goal. (285) Carter had been warned by his former campaign manager, Hamilton Jordan of the domestic political consequences, particularly among American Jews, should it be perceived that he pressured Israel into making a settlement, but Carter was determined to make the effort.  Anwar Sadat realized how weak Egypt was becoming due to the state of their economy and his goal was to try and “supplant Israel as America’s best friend in the region”.  Peace was a highly desirable outcome as it would bring with it American economic assistance and European investment, but more importantly if the summit failed because of Israeli intransigence, it would boost Egypt’s standing with the United States.  Begin agreed to attend believing it was a necessity because of Carter’s personal invitation.  He believed it would only last a few days, and that nothing of substance would be accomplished other than the promise of future talks.  Begin’s main goal was to avoid being blamed for the summits failure, but as Wright accurately describes, the only way that could be achieved was making sure it succeeded.

Wright does an exceptional job locating information that was heretofore not commonly known.  An interesting example is the CIA’s profiles of Begin and Sadat that were requested by Carter as he prepared for the summit.  Based on Wright’s narrative of the tense and at times vitriolic negotiations, the CIA’s analysis of each was quite accurate.  Sadat “saw himself as a grand strategic thinker blazing like a comet through the skies.”  The CIA noted his penchant for publicity, terming it the “Barbara Walters Syndrome,” by the time the summit began; it was upgraded to Sadat’s “‘Noble Peace Prize Complex.”  Begin was seen as “secretive, legalistic, and leery of radical change.  History, for Begin, was a box full of tragedy; one shouldn’t expect to open it without remorse.”(9)  When under pressure Sadat resorted to generalities, Begin to minutiae, creating a situation Carter did not anticipate.  Carter had hoped to avoid interjecting an American proposal to discussions, and allow Begin and Sadat to talk face to face, expecting they would reach an agreement with American nudging.  This strategy was a failure, as Carter could not leave them alone in the same room.  What became clear by the sixth day of the conference was that the Begin-Sadat relationship, was at best “prickly,” and their interchanges were overly charged in dealing with things like who won the 1973 War and the amount of oil Israel was pumping from the Sinai.  If they argued bitterly over minor issues what would happen when territorial problems were discussed, the status of Jerusalem, and the Palestinian problem.  As Ezer Weitzmann, the Israeli Minister of Defense has related, “Anyone observing the two men could not have overlooked their profound divergence in their attitudes.  Both desired peace.  But whereas Sadat wanted to take it by storm….Begin preferred to creep forward inch by inch.  He took the dream of peace and ground it into the fine, dry powder of details, legal clauses, and quotes from international law.”(98)  After taking his guests for a visit to the Gettysburg National Battlefield, Carter shifted his approach from a facilitator to a catalyst in conducting the talks.  This change along with Carter’s doggedness and commitment are in large part responsible for the final success of the summit.

Wright provides the reader with brief biographies of each of the participants.  Based on Carter’s engineering mindset and the skills he had developed over the years he was able to parse the language of written documents and make them mostly acceptable.  His religious background drove him until he could achieve his goals.  Begin was a prisoner of his past, be it his imprisonment in Siberia, the Holocaust, fighting the British after World War II as the leader of the Irgun, as all played into his narrow world view.  From childhood onward, Sadat believed he was special and history had a place for him to accomplish great things, as he was open to all challenges whether allying with the Nazis during World War II, his own imprisonment, or unlikely political rise.  Wright separates his narrative by employing chapters for each day of the conference.  As he explains the daily events he integrates background history so the reader can understand the importance of each issue.  If the contemporary history is not enough, Wright then goes on to discuss the Biblical stories and explanations that pertain to each issue.  Wright also enjoys tackling different myths associated with the conflict, i.e.; he argues that Israel actually was not outnumbered by the Arab armies during the 1948 War; he also argues that David Ben-Gurion and the Haganah were involved with the bombing of the King David Hotel in 1947 killing 81 people and that Begin agreed to place the blame for the attack on the Irgun.

Egyptian soldiers firing on Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat in 1981.

Makaram Gad Alkareem  /  AFP – Getty Images, file

(Assassins posing as Egyptian soldiers fire on President Anwar Al-Sadat in Cairo on Oct. 6, 1981.)

Wright tells his story and makes his arguments in a very concise manner and the narrative is very readable and provides the basis for understanding a great deal about issues that remain unresolved today.  If there are areas that Wright could improve upon I would suggest he integrate greater use of primary sources into his work.  He relies overly on secondary sources.  I commend his command of these sources but at times he draws conclusions from the monographs he uses that are incorrect.   In discussing the Suez Crisis of 1956 he leaves out important points, i.e.; when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal he makes it sound as if it came out of the blue, and there is no mention of the fact that he was reacting to the withdrawal of the American loan to build the Aswan Dam.  Further, I feel that at times the author gets bogged down in his repeated rendering of Biblical stories.  I would rather have had him delve further into the negotiations and provide his analysis which was for the most part excellent.

Overall, Wright’s contribution to the literature of the Arab-Israeli conflict is to be applauded.  The analysis he presents in his Epilogue is dead on as the summit papered over the Palestinian problem and it can be argued that this failure contributed greatly to recent events in Gaza.  What is also important as Wright points out is that Camp David took Egypt out of the equation and “without a powerful Arab champion, Palestine became a mascot for Islamists and radical factions who could only do further damage to the prospects of a peaceful and just response to the misery of an abandoned people.”(288)

JAPAN, 1941 by Eri Hotta

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, World War II Leave a comment

(December 7, 1941, Japanese attack Pearl Harbor)

The last half of 19th century was a period when European nationalism flourished and began to spread its influence eastward.  The lessons of nationalism were absorbed in Asia, and Japan became an excellent pupil of western industrialization and expansion.  Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan slowly remade itself by emulating the west.  Unlike China, Japan had no difficulty in assimilating western institutions in order to develop into what they perceived to be a great power.  By the 1890s Japan was able to defeat China in the Sino-Japanese War, and in the following decade she surprised Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, the first time a non-white power defeated a Caucasian power.  Japan continued its program of making Asia safe for Asians and projecting themselves as a power on par with the west.  During World War I it asserted its rights to expansion with its Twenty-One Demands to gain suzerainty over parts of China, and in 1931 it invaded Manchuria and set up the “puppet state” of Manchukuo. Japan continued its attempts to dominate China in 1937 by precipitating an attack that justified an invasion.  From 1937-1941 Japan fought to defeat the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-Shek, but despite repeated military victories it was unable to gain total control as Chiang’s army retreated into the interior.  The war in China used tremendous resources and brought Japan into conflict with the United States.  At a time when the long drawn out war in China was reaching a stalemate, why would Japan contemplate a war against the United States?  In her new book, JAPAN, 1941, Eri Hotta seeks to answer that question.

Hotta’s work is a marvelous work of historical synthesis that seeks to explain how the Japanese government reached the decision to attack the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.  Many are familiar with the works of Gordon Prange, Robert Stinnet, Walter Lord, Herbert Feis, and Roberta Wohlstetter.  The story has been told by many; whether from the American diplomatic viewpoint, the intelligence breakthroughs, the military story, and conspiracy theories concerning Franklin D. Roosevelt.  However, no one has attempted to mine the Japanese sources extensively and try and understand how the Japanese bureaucracy and government officials reached decisions that would ultimately result in the destruction of their country by 1945.  This is the task that Hotta takes on and with excellent command of the primary materials and the internal working of the Japanese government from 1931 onward reaches the conclusion that Japanese “leaders, after numerous official conferences, made a conscious and collaborative decision to go to war with the West.  Having talked themselves into believing that they were victims of circumstances rather than aggressors, they discarded less heroic but more rational options and hesitantly yet defiantly propelled the country on a war course.” (15)  Hotta’s conclusion is presented in a thoughtful narrative, and supported by a well reasoned thesis.

Hotta’s approach is an interesting one.  Though she devotes most of her time to discussing the bureaucratic machinations of Japanese diplomatic and military politics by integrating the major figures involved, ranging from Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro; Tojo Hideki, who served as army minister in Konoe’s cabinet and later Prime Minister; Matsuoka Yosuke, Konoe’s Foreign Minister; Kido Koichi, Emperor Hirohito’s closest advisor; Shimada Shigetaro, navy minister; Yamamoto Isoroku, who planned the attack on Pearl Harbor; and Emperor Hirohito among many government and military officials.  The author also discusses the role of Japanese citizens outside of government service.  For example, the integration of the thoughts of the novelist Nagai Kofu, who represented, in part the anti-militarist sentiment in segments of Japanese society, providing insights into the private thoughts of Japanese citizens who were afraid to make their feelings known publicly.  The work of Richard Sorge, a German journalist based in Tokyo, who was also a Russian spy and was good friends with the German ambassador to Japan is also fascinating.  In addition, the mini-biography of Soldier U, who in 1941 in his late thirties was recalled to military service and sent to China, and later to Indo China has a story that could be a separate book in of itself.  These individuals and others present a well rounded picture of all aspects of Japanese society, as their government was privately was planning on expanding their war for control of Asia.

What separates Hotta’s work from others is that aside from presenting the Japanese viewpoint, she also includes intimate details of the rifts that existed on personal and diplomatic levels between the major players in the Japanese government, i.e.; Prime Minister Konoe and Foreign Minister Matsuoka.  The reader is given a snapshot into the decision making process as Hotta relies heavily on liaison meetings of the Japanese government throughout the book.  These meetings included the most important senior officials, both civilian and military.  She singles out the most influential figures and allows the reader to understand the reasoning behind the decision-making process of each person as debate evolved throughout 1941 as to whether war was the only option, or should diplomatic avenues have been explored further. The positions of men like Konoe, Tojo, Nagano and the bakuryo  officers, (mid-level bureaucrats who prepared most of the positions taken) are analyzed and one can witness how difficult it was to achieve any consensus on policy in this environment.  However, once a consensus was reached, no matter how convoluted the decision making process and delusionary some of the ideas of policy makers were it was almost impossible to alter or change the course toward war.  Hotta proves without a shadow of a doubt that the Japanese leadership suffered from self-delusion as they constantly came up with arguments to buttress themselves against the sound reasoning that a war against the United States was futile.  In large part, Japanese pride and belief in their own superiority led them to take such a huge national gamble.

Hotta makes many astute observations as she points out the Japanese goal of creating a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity sphere under Tokyo’s leadership was very similar to how the United States approached the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere.  For Japanese policy makers what was the difference between theirs and the American approach to expansion.  Further, Hotta spends a great deal of time discussing Japanese perceptions of their own inferiority visa vie the west.  They saw it through the lens of racial discrimination that clouded their judgment when making decisions.  As Alfred Adler pointed out in his studies of the inferiority complex; that people (and nations?) who perceive themselves to be inferior; to overcome that self-perception must strive to be superior.  A case in point is the reaction to a note from American Secretary of State Cordell Hull on November 27, 1941.  It was seen by Japanese leaders as a provocation and a disgrace as they felt they were being bullied and humiliated.  The note itself was taken as an ultimatum, which it was not.

(Japanese Emperor Hirohito)

Hotta is able to review the history of Japanese modernization and expansion that led to World War II very nicely, but she does it  in such a way that she able to dissect the all too human characteristics of Japanese leaders that were torn by doubt in the months preceding Pearl Harbor, but could not overcome their own need to save face, and finally pushed Japan into a war because of their own incompetence and lack of political will.  The reader should gain a great deal from reading Hotta’s narrative which is enhanced by her integration of the words of the characters she employs.  JAPAN, 1941, as of now is the best work dealing with the Japanese viewpoint and decision making process leading to war with the United States, and should remain so for a long time to come.

HARD CHOICES by Hillary Rodham Clinton

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(Hillary Clinton testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Benghazi)

When Hillary Clinton launched her recent book tour promoting her memoir of her State Department tenure the political pundits concluded that this was the launch of her 2016 presidential campaign.  While that may be accurate the book, HARD CHOICES should be evaluated as to whether it provides greater understanding of American foreign policy during the first Obama administration.  The answer lies somewhere in the middle.  The book has many components.  It is Clinton’s attempt to justify the course of action taken during her years as Secretary of State, provide explanations to counter the myriad Republican criticisms that seem to emerge no matter what the issue or situation at that time, project a softer image for the American public, offer advice as to what tools American diplomacy should employ during the “digital age,” and discuss non-traditional topics that normally do not take up a great deal of space in political memoirs, i.e.; environmental and economic policy.  For Clinton the conduct of foreign policy seeks a balance of “smart” and the hard power of projecting military might.  For the former Secretary “smart power” needs to be “integrated with the traditional tools of foreign policy—diplomacy, developmental assistance, and military force—while tapping the energy and ideas of the private sector and empowering citizens, especially the activists, organizers, and problem solvers we call civil society, to meet their own challenges and shape their own futures.”  (pp. x-xi)  In doing so America’s strengths can be employed to develop more partners and fewer adversaries by sharing responsibility and becoming involved in fewer conflicts.  This includes reaching out to the people of whatever country policy is being developed, promoting jobs and less poverty, and expanding the middle class to lift people up with less damage to the environment.

At a time when President Obama’s foreign policy decision making is under attack, especially over events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Ukraine, Clinton’s memoir is a useful tool to see how decisions were reached, particularly the background considerations.  The “pivot” toward Asia was pronounced as soon as Clinton entered the State Department and currently it is seen by opponents as a failure because of the unrest in the Middle East.  The other major pronouncement was a “reset” with Russia that has fallen under scrutiny as Vladimir Putin has used events in the Ukraine to seize the Crimea and threaten the eastern part of the former Soviet republic.  Clinton spends a great deal of time providing the rational for these policy changes and makes the case that the results have not been perfect but were worth the effort.  In the case of the “pivot” toward Asia, Clinton called for broadening our relationship with China.  To accomplish this a sophisticated strategy was needed to encourage China to be “a responsible member of the international community, while [we] stood firm in defense of our values and interests.” (42)  At the same time the United States needed to strengthen our treaty alliances in the region to provide a counterbalance to China’s growing power.  A third goal was to “elevate and harmonize the alphabet soup of regional multilateral organizations” and use these venues “for all nations of the region to work together on shared challenges, resolve disagreements, establish rules and standards of behavior, reward responsible countries with legitimacy and respect, and help hold accountable those who violated the rules.” (44)  Clinton admits that the jury is still out as to whether this emphasis on Asia was a success, but with the growing influence the region has on the world economy, demand for energy, and the many disagreements on trade, human rights, boundaries, and the environment, the effort was well worth it and in the long run should yield positive results.  In the case of the reset with Russia the jury remains out.  When Putin left office and was replaced by Dmitry Medvedev as Russian Prime Minister in 2009 the world witnessed greater cooperation between Moscow and Washington.  The “reset” produced a strategic arms agreement, use of Russian soil to supply American forces in Afghanistan, Russian support for a no-fly zone in Libya, bringing Russia into the World Trade Organization, the expansion of counterterrorism cooperation, and Russian support for economic sanctions against Iran and North Korea.  This was in contrast to the intransigence of US-Russian relations under Putin that returned when the former KGB officer returned to his role as Prime Minster after Medvedev served his term.  Putin believes in restoring Russia to its preeminent role in world politics that it experienced before the collapse of the Soviet Union.  He is a Slavic nationalist who does not believe in the concept of “smart power,” for him it is a reflection of weakness.  Further, he blames the United States for the economic crisis begun in 2008 and believes the United States hood winked Moscow in gaining support for a UN resolution in dealing with Libya and then turned into strong military action that resulted in the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi.  Many of President Obama’s critics blame him for events in the Ukraine and the Russian seizure of the Crimea, but based on Putin’s belief system and ambitions there was little that could have been done to deter him.  The question remains what should the United States do in response and Clinton is clear that economic sanctions can work as they did with Iran, but for those who want immediate gratification the time it takes to have an impact will not be satisfied.

 

 

(Vladimir Putin contemplates the next step for the Ukraine)

Clinton organizes her memoir around specific issues and problems rather than a chronological approach to her term as Secretary of State.  She does an effective job of providing the background history of the subjects she chooses to address and to her credit she continues to explain her viewpoint pertaining to those issues during the period after she resigned. The most interesting chapters deal with events in Afghanistan, the ongoing crisis in Syria, the difficulties dealing with Pakistan, the inability to achieve any progress in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the effects of the Arab spring, relations with Iran, and of course Benghazi. It was fascinating to read about the internal discussions in the Obama administration in deciding whether to launch a “surge” in Afghanistan the way President Bush had done in Iraq.  Vice President Biden was against the “surge,” and Richard Holbrooke who was in charge of the Afghanistan-Pakistan portfolio in the State Department was very skeptical that a surge could prove effective.  Clinton supported President Obama’s decision to send another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan believing that if nothing was done the Taliban would continue to seize more of the country, making it harder for the United States to conduct counterterrorism operations.

The Obama administration has been very careful in dealing with Syrian rebels who oppose the Assad regime and has drawn a great deal of criticism.  The fear has always been if weapons were supplied how we could guarantee that they would reach the moderate elements in the fractious grouping of rebels who were fighting Damascus and eventually would be used against the United States as occurred in Afghanistan.  I disagree with the pronouncement of “red lines” that once crossed would produce American military action, if none was intended. However, the United States has provided a tremendous amount of non-military aide, and it is obvious from polling that the American people do not want to intervene with “boots on the ground.”

Pakistan also presents a difficult problem and an obstacle to peace.  Clinton supports the conclusions of Carlotta Gall in her recent book, THE WRONG ENEMY that the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) which has had a long running relationship with the Taliban is one of the major obstacles for peace.  They have provided safe haven for insurgents inside Pakistan and worked behind the scenes to prevent President Karzai from making a separate peace with the Taliban.  Clinton is right on the mark when she argues that the Pakistanis need to become invested in the future of Afghanistan and that they have more to gain from peace than a continuation of the current military conflict.  Pakistan has its own national security fears in dealing with India and events and its attitude toward Afghanistan must be seen from that perspective.  As in all cases Clinton provides comments about the individuals she is dealing with especially Afghani President Hamid Karzai who she describes as a proud man who believed that the Taliban was not his primary opponent, it was Pakistan and he was reluctant to use his own forces against the Taliban.  He believed the United States and coalition forces should conduct the “lion’s share of the fighting against Pakistan, while he negotiated with his fellow Pashtuns in the Taliban. (145)

(Clinton and Netanyahu in Israel)

In dealing with the Middle East Clinton provides a detailed history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and her relationships with the main players, particularly Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barack in Israel and Mahmoud Abbas the leader of the Palestinian Authority.  Since the memoir appears to be the launching of a presidential campaign the reader will witness the obligatory support for Israel that is a necessity for any Democratic candidate.  Clinton chooses her words very carefully in supporting a two-state solution for the conflict and her opposition to Hamas and the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon in dealing with Israeli security needs.  I commend Clinton’s attempt to mediate a solution to the conflict but from the outset it was apparent that the odds of success were remote.  With Netanyahu’s support for the continued construction of settlements on the West Bank, being hamstrung by the religious right of his own governing coalition, success was doubtful.  Clinton’s advice to Netanyahu concerning the burgeoning Palestinian birth rate as being the greatest threat to Israeli security in the future was also very timely.

As soon as excerpts of the book were released in advance of publication the pundit world jumped on the Benghazi episode.  There is really nothing new presented here that has not come out in the numerous congressional hearings dealing with the crisis.  Clinton correctly points out that “the total elimination of risk is a non-starter for U.S. diplomacy, given the need for the U.S. government to be present in places where stability and security are often most profoundly lacking and host government support is sometimes minimal to non-existent.” (385)  The criticism dealing whether the attack was incited by a disrespectful video dealing with Mohammad should not be the center piece of what might have gone wrong.  State Department and Congressional investigations have shown that the mob was provoked by the video and terrorists took advantage of the situation to launch its attack.  Another criticism of Clinton centers around her leaving her office the night of the crisis and going home, a home that was outfitted with the same intelligence and communication equipment as her State Department office.  Clinton took responsibility for events before a Senate committee; perhaps others who have created many of the issues in the region today might do the same.

Clinton is at her best when she is describing the reality of the diplomatic process.  The machinations behind the scene are ever present and some of her details are fascinating.  A good example was the attempt to create a coalition of NATO and Arab League members to thwart Qaddafi’s troops as they marched on Benghazi.  Maintaining relations with the United Arab Emirates after Bahrain was criticized for using Saudi troops to help crush domestic descent, Franco-Turkish relations were sour because French President Sarkozy had opposed Turkey’s membership in NATO, Italian-French competition to lead the coalition against Libya, gaining Russian and Chinese support for a UN resolution, and President Obama’s goal of having the US take a more limited role in any action all had to be balanced.  Opponents called this “leading from behind,” Clinton answers her critics by stating, “That’s a silly phrase.  It took a great deal of leading from the front, side, and every other direction, to authorize and accomplish the mission and to prevent what might have been the loss of tens of thousands of lives.” (375)

Clinton concentrates a great deal on her experiences in Africa and Latin America.  She details crises in Kenya and Somalia in Africa, and crises in Honduras and El Salvador in Latin America.  Her discussion of the future role of Brazil is important as is her poignant chapter dealing with the earthquake in Haiti that took place on January 12, 2010.  Her coverage of poverty sets her memoir apart from others.  She devotes a significant part of her book to the role of American foreign aid as a vehicle to assist those countries in need.  She debunks the view that foreign aid is a significant part of the federal budget, some believing it is as high as 25%, when in reality it is less than 1%.  Clinton’s emphasis on assisting countries through economic aid, education, human rights, and medical assistance is part of her goal of using what she terms as “soft power” to improve the lives of those in need and uplifting America’s image in the world.

Apart from the traditional discussion of policy and planning, Clinton lets the reader see her softer side.  Whether it is to improve her image as a presidential candidate or not her she is able to integrate personal moments into her narrative.  Her emotions related to her daughter Chelsea’s marriage and her moniker “M.O.T.B,” short for mother of the bride while negotiating with the Chinese is revealing.  Her feelings dealing with Chelsea’s pregnancy and her new role as a grandmother are very heartening.  She talks about her own honeymoon a number of times and refers to her husband as her best friend. Her emphasis on the role of woman in diplomacy is important as she argues that women pursue a different approach than men and are less likely to employ the military in solving crises.  Clinton has an excellent chapter on the role of the environment and its relation to current economic issues and the health of future generations is well put.  Pundits search for differences with President Obama, but in large part they agreed on policy and when disagreements took place her views were aired and any issues going back to the 2008 presidential campaign were easily overcome.  If she strongly disagreed with policy she had no difficulty in saying so, i.e.; when asked to attack Sarah Palin during the 2008 campaign she refused arguing she would not criticize a woman for trying to attract women voters.  Clinton, unlike other politicians admitted her vote to support the war in Iraq was wrong and she realizes how that war has hurt the United States, particularly with events in Iraq as of this writing.

(Chelsea Clinton’s wedding Photo!)

If one reads HARD CHOICES you should come to the conclusion that Clinton has wide-ranging experience on national security and foreign policy issues, however, if one followed the news carefully during her time at the State Department there is very little that is new in the book.  If you are interested in a female perspective on world events during her tenure as Secretary of State, the book will come across as fascinating and informative and will provide you with the background for events, explain why certain policies were pursued, and suggest what might occur in the future.

EMPEROR OF LIBERTY: THOMAS JEFFERSON’S FOREIGN POLICY by Francis D. Cogliano

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, American Political History Leave a comment

As a retired educator I enjoyed having students debate whether Thomas Jefferson was a realist or an idealist when discussing his foreign policy.  Many believed he was an ideologue who rarely strayed from his principles that usually pitted him against Alexander Hamilton.  In EMPEROR OF LIBERTY, Francis D. Cogliano revisits this debate and concludes that Jefferson consistently implemented a pragmatic approach to foreign affairs no matter the situation.  The book is a concise recapitulation of Jefferson’s diplomatic decision making tracing his raison d’être from his service as Governor of Virginia during the American Revolution, American Minister to France following the revolution, Secretary of State during George Washington’s first administration, and as President of the United States.  The issues he faced included a number of bouts with the Barbary pirates, Algiers, Tripoli, and Morocco; a series of issues with the British, including impressment and commercial interests among many; policy toward the French Revolution; the purchase of Louisiana; and finally his effort to remain neutral during the Napoleonic War.  In all cases Cogliano employs precise language and command of the relevant secondary and primary source material.  But as a historian I must ask, is there anything that has not been written before?

In each instance Cogliano presents the views of those historians who argue that Jefferson’s actions must be explained from the ideological perspective.  For the author Jefferson’s motivations are clear from the time he was Governor of Virginia that his vision for the United States was an empire of liberty that would be brought about primarily through peaceful expansion.  Jefferson favored an agrarian republic that rested on the ability of Americans to trade freely in the world.  For Jefferson, a threat to commerce was a threat to the republic.  He was not totally against the use of force as many maintain.  Once he perceived that American commercial interests were threatened he would employ the navy as he did against the Barbary pirates to achieve his goals.  He could also use the “veiled fist” as he did with Spain before the United States acquired the Louisiana territory.  That acquisition which married commerce to an avenue to the Atlantic Ocean was Jefferson’s greatest triumph.  Jefferson had always favored westward expansion as a vehicle of spreading republican principles going back to when he was Governor of Virginia when he dispatched George Rogers Clark to explore the territory.  Jefferson’s vision for the American empire was quite simple.  If the republic was to succeed it would have to expand to absorb its growing population.  For liberty to survive the republic would need to be a nation of small farmers.  In order for the United States to flourish they would have to export their produce requiring unfettered access to international markets.  “The United States would be an empire of liberty because liberty could not thrive without expansion.  If liberty were extinguished in the United States, the republican experiment would fail.  In Jefferson’s mind the growth of the ‘empire of liberty’ and the success of the American republic were one and the same thing.  As president, Jefferson sought to realize this vision of an expansionist American republic.” (5)

(map circa 1800, Barbary States)

Throughout his diplomatic career Jefferson made careful note of strategies that were effective and mirrored his beliefs.  As governor of Virginia he felt that the state’s decentralized constitutional arrangement hampered his ability to deal with the constant threat of British encroachment.  From this experience he realized a strong executive was needed to conduct an effective foreign policy even if it meant exceeding constitutional limits as long as he received legislative approval after the policy was implemented.  Employing the case study approach Cogliano does not present a comprehensive study of Jeffersonian foreign policy, but he chooses the most salient examples.  Jefferson had to deal with the issue of the seizure of American ships and imprisoning American sailors on a number of occasions during his career.  Whether it was as Secretary of State or President, Jefferson believed that the Barbary corsairs threatened American trade, therefore liberty.  Jefferson was fully aware that the United States projected weakness to foreign powers, which is why the Barbary States targeted American shipping.  Until a navy could be developed Jefferson employed diplomatic threats, support for overthrown leaders, and the creation of alliances to achieve his goals.  In 1791 the US would wind up paying tribute, but by 1802, the American navy taught Tripoli a lesson.  For Jefferson, diplomacy was the first resort, but force at times was proven necessary.  Jefferson’s greatest diplomatic accomplishment was the purchase of Louisiana from Napoleon.  Some argue this came about due to the defeat of the French in Saint Domingue and her inability to protect Louisiana as the Peace of Amiens in Europe broke down.  Whatever the case the purchase was made by exceeding his constitutional powers and Jefferson obtained the western territory, control of the Mississippi, and New Orleans at the same time.  Following precedent, Jefferson obtained Congressional approval after the fact.  I agree with Cogliano’s premise that Jefferson was a pragmatist when it came to foreign relations as all his examples seem to reflect.

In dealing with England Jefferson was at a disadvantage since commercial interests were his prime concern and his position was weak. Cogliano lays out the different scenarios that Jefferson could employ; war, embargo, or be patient and hope things would calm down.  A great deal of attention is focused on the issue of impressment and British Orders in Council that hindered American commercial interests.  After the Chesapeake-Leopard affair it appeared that the United States would declare war against England, but fearing the repercussions of war Jefferson chose an embargo. In Jefferson’s eyes the embargo was the best option that he had.   According to Cogliano the policy was not defective; it was its implementation as Jefferson did not rally the American people to support the embargo, resulting in smuggling and other strategies to undermine its effectiveness.  The policy was an economic disaster for the US and was the greatest failure of Jefferson’s presidency.

Overall, the book has a great deal of interesting sidelights, i.e., the fact that the British were so desperate in its war against Napoleonic France it bombed Copenhagen when the Danes refused to turn over its navy to them. Also, Cogliano begins the book with a discussion of autocracy and Jefferson’s positive views of the new Russian Tsar, Alexander, a discussion I found interesting and somewhat surprising.  If you are looking for a readable study of Jeffersonian foreign policy then Cogliano’s work fits the bill, however, if you are well versed in the subject the narrative will qualify as an excellent review of information and events.

THE WRONG ENEMY: AMERICA IN AFGHANISTAN 2001-2014 by Carlotta Gall

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, Military History, United States Foreign Policy 1 Comment

 

As presidential election results in Afghanistan are being counted one must ask the question; how much better off is Afghanistan today, as compared to the period before the American invasion following 9/11?  Further one must ask; what is the future outlook for Afghanistan as the United States and its NATO allies are about to withdraw by the end of the year?  Carlotta Gall, a New York Times reporter who has worked in Afghanistan and Pakistan for more than ten years attempts to answer these questions and many others in her new book, THE WRONG ENEMY, AMERICA IN AFGHANISTAN 2001-2014.  A number of  books have been written about America’s role in Afghanistan and its relationship with Pakistan the best of which are Steven Coll’s GHOST WARS, Ahmed Rashid’s DESCENT INTO CHAOS, and Barnet R. Rubin’s AFGHANISTAN FROM THE COLD WAR THROUGH THE WAR ON TERROR, but what sets Gall’s apart is her knowledge of the region and her ability to coax interviews with villagers, mujahideen, Taliban fighters, government officials, intelligence sources, and major decision makers involved on both sides of this never ending war.  Gall takes the reader inside councils held by the Taliban, government meetings in Kabul, decision making within Pakistan’s chief spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, and discussions among village elders as they try to cope with the threats they face on a daily basis.  Gall’s premise is that the United States has failed to confront the real enemy in its Afghani war, Pakistan.  Gall argues that the Pakistani governments, including its presidents over a period of time and the ISI have pursued a duplicitous policy by publicly claiming to be an ally in the war on terror with the United States, but privately creating and supporting the Taliban as a means of manipulating events in Afghanistan and controlling its government in Kabul.  These conclusions are sound, well argued, and supported by abundant research and sources that only she has had access to.

From the outset Gall writes from the perspective of the victims and does not claim to be objective.  She argues persuasively that the ISI is the real power in Pakistan and controls its press and media.  By December, 2001 after the Taliban’s leadership misjudged the strength of the American attack, and their standing with the Afghani people, thereby forcing them to flee to the safety of Peshawar across the Pakistani border.  Soon after, Taliban commanders convened a council of war which included Afghan Taliban commanders, their Pakistani allies from the Pashtun border areas, and Pakistani militant and religious leaders to discuss how they should respond to the American attack.  Watching from the sidelines, but present at these meetings were representatives from the ISI and Pakistani Special Forces who had been involved with the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.  Also in attendance was the son of the powerful Taliban commander and minister, Jalaluddin Haqqani, a stalwart against the Soviet Union and a favorite of Pakistani intelligence and Arab donors.  The goal of the Taliban was to create an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan would now be continued as a guerilla war against the United States and its western allies.  The goal for Pakistan was to continue to employ “proxy forces, Afghan mijahideen, Taliban in Afghanistan, and Kashmiri militants against India to project its influence beyond its border.”(21) As Seth Jones, the author of IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES: AMERICA’S WAR IN AFGHANISTAN wrote in the New York Times on April 10, 2014, “Islamabad’s rationale for supporting Afghan insurgents is straightforward and, in many ways, understandable.  Hemmed in by its archenemy, India, to the east, Pakistan wants an ally in the west.  It doesn’t have one at the moment.  Instead, New Delhi has a close relationship with the Afghan government.  Feeling strategically encircled by India, Islamabad has resorted to proxy warfare to replace the current Afghan government with a friendlier regime.”

Gall follows the war as the United States pursued its neocon agenda of the Bush administration and shifted important resources from Afghanistan to support its ill conceived invasion of Iraq in 2003.  This left open the door for the Taliban to try and recapture its position in Afghanistan.  Many have asked why the United States chose Hamid Karzai to head the government in Kabul.  Gall concludes that he was a compromise candidate as he was Pashtun and acceptable in the northern part of the country.  Gall accurately concludes further that Karzai was the problem from the outset.  For the next thirteen years Karzai would oversee the most corrupt country in the world as stated in the “Transparency International Scale”, as  it was tied with Myanmar,” with only Somalia lower. (216)  the key to the Taliban resurgence would be their “friends and supporters in power in Pakistan’s border provinces.” This would allow Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader to emerge in February 2003 and publicly call on all Afghans to wage holy war against American forces. (67)

Galls details the Taliban resurgence and Pakistan’s role in their successes and points out the flaw in American policy towards Afghanistan.  According to Bruce Riedel, a former CIA official who wrote a strategic review on Afghanistan for the incoming Obama administration in 2009, the Bush administration considered the Taliban irrelevant once they were defeated.  In addition, the Bush White House never gave instructions to its intelligence officials in Pakistan to follow the Taliban and CIA officials in Pakistan saw the Taliban as a “spent force.” (75)  The road was open for the Taliban to succeed especially when the ISI forced many Taliban exiles that fled to Pakistan to join the insurgency.  Gall describes the situations in northern and southern Waziristan were foreign militants were sheltered in tribal areas and foreign journalists were banned by the Pakistani government from traveling.  Gall explores the role of President Pervez Musharraf and his double dealing with the United States.  He would feign being an ally and turn over a few Taliban wanted by Washington, but in reality was training, supplying, and encouraging the insurgency to the detriment of Afghanistan who he needed to control because of his fears of India.

Gall correctly argues that America’s approach in dealing with counter terrorism through the use of massive bombing was self defeating.  It alienated the Afghan villagers and turned the Afghan people further against what they viewed as their corrupt government in Kabul that was allied with the United States.  In 2004 the United States supported the reelection of Karzai, but despite his reelection his policies under the heavy handedness of his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who was in charge of the southern part of the country further alienated the Afghan people and did little to counter the onslaught of the Taliban.  With the economy in dire straits and little hope for improvement, “young unemployed men were going to Pakistan in search of work and being recruited by the Taliban….who paid $175 a month to join and fight.” (133)

Gall makes many important observations in her narrative.  It was clear that America’s NATO allies were not very successful.  With only 2000 Canadian troops in the south the task for the Taliban to seize control of the Kandahar region was made easier.  The U.S. asked its allies for further troop commitments, but they refused.  Exacerbating the problem was the increase in suicide bombings in 2006, many of which were in the south.  Gall accurately describes the voyage of young men to madrassas to receive suicide bombing indoctrination and the final committing of the act.  Most were traced back to Pakistan were Islamic cells functioned quite freely.  Afghan intelligence would share information with NATO allies, who would forward the information to the ISI, which was like warning the suicide cells and resulted in the torture and death of Afghan informers.  The nexus of Pakistani support for the Taliban was Quetta and other border areas.  “The madrassas are a cover, a camouflage,” a Pashtun legislator told the author, “behind the curtain, hidden in the shadows, lurked the ISI.” (159)  From Gall’s extensive interviews in the border region her contention that the ISI played the major role in the Taliban success is well founded.

Some of Gall’s most interesting chapters deal with militant blow back in Pakistan as the ISI periodically would lose some control and then recover, a cycle that went on for years; how close the Taliban came to conquering the south as they reached the outskirts of Kandahar; and the role of Ahmed Karzai.  Many Americans have grown tired of Karzai’s act over the years believing he was ungrateful for the sacrifices and support given by the United States.  However, despite his antics Karzai’s point of view is important in understanding the events of the last thirteen years.  Gall does a remarkable job presenting Karzai’s perspective and making sense out of his statements and actions.  Granted his government was corrupt and appointments were based on tribal membership or political faction, but the United States was aware of the political culture around him from the outset.  But as Gall correctly points out that when a society functions “on patronage, a duty to help your relatives and clans comb[ined] with Karzai’s poor management and the influx of vast sums of assistance, often poorly administered by donors, [it] created the most corrupt regime Afghans had ever seen.” (216)  By 2010, $900 million in loans disappeared implicating Karzai’s family.  The problem is that Karzai is not personally corrupt, yet he has tolerated and benefited from it.  Karzai would brush off complaints “as a necessary way of doing business in cash strapped country.” (217)

By 2009, after the United States mistakenly bombed a wedding party in eastern Afghanistan and Washington’s failure to deal with Pakistan, Karzai became convinced that the US was not going to defeat the Taliban. As Pakistan continued to ignore American requests to reign in the Taliban, Karzai’s bitterness increased and he decided the only way forward that made sense was to negotiate peace with the Taliban and Pakistan.  Richard C. Holbrooke, the US Special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan began back channel contacts with the Taliban.  Holbrooke realized the difficulty Karzai faced and realized further that peace with Pakistan was the key; as he summed up the situation in 2010, “we may be fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country.” (222)

In 2009 the Obama administration also announced a “surge” of 30,000 troops in the south as Kandahar was in danger of falling to the Taliban.  The joint operation with Afghan and Canadian troops lifted the Taliban siege and Gall’s description of the fighting as she went on patrol with US troops brought the reader to the battlefield.   The IEDs, the mines, the booby traps, the rigged houses provide insight into Taliban tactics and what American and Afghan troops faced and have to undo.  However, the Taliban hold in the south was broken.  Over the next three years the Taliban would be kept at bay, but a new crisis developed with Pakistan over the capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden.  Gall has an excellent chapter on the raid and Pakistan’s culpability in having Bin Laden seized from under its nose.  From Gall’s interviews it is clear that Pakistani officials were involved with Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad.  Whether it was military or ISI involvement is not totally clear, but it’s beyond the pale to imagine that the Pakistani government was not involved.

Gall closes her book with a somewhat optimistic chapter about the future of Afghanistan, however the threat from Pakistan remains constant and they must be reined in.  At the outset of this review I asked whether Afghanistan was in a better position since the pre-9/11 period.  One thing is clear the United States has brought modernity, rebuilding and bright educated graduates in every government office, but “the fundamentals of Afghanistan’s predicament remain the same: a weak state, prey to ambitions of its neighbors and extremist Islamists.” (286)  2014 is a perfect storm for Afghanistan, NATO and US forces are withdrawing, the election of a new president and the appointment of a new government, and the handover of security to Afghan forces in the middle of the summer fighting season.  What will the future hold?  I would be naive to think that once the US withdraws the security situation will not collapse, but we will see.  For those who are interested in reaching an educated guess about Afghanistan’s future I would read Carlotta Gall’s powerful new book.

THE TWILIGHT WAR by David Crist

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, Middle Eastern History Leave a comment

I have followed US-Iranian relations for over forty years and David Crist’s work is the best that I have come across. It is a maticuously researched book that explores most diplomatic and military aspects of the American-Iranian relationship since the decline of the Shah and his overthrow in 1979. Crist explores the role of all the major players during the period and he raises important questions as to whether the deterioration of Washington’s relationship with Teheran could have been avoided are at least lessened significantly. The importance of this book can not be measured as Christ provides insight as to why Teheran has been the real victor resulting from the American invasion of Iraq. the twilight war may someday evolve into a “hot” war and policy makers and the general public should read this book very carefully. It is written in such a manner that the general public and the academic can benefit from. Based on current events Crist lays out some scary possibilities whether it pertains to the past or the future.

THE SECRETARY: A JOURNAL WITH HILLARY CLINTON FROM BEIRUT TO THE HEART OF AMERICAN POWER by Kim Ghattas

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At a time when the rumors surrounding the candidacy of Hillary Clinton for president in 2016 seems to permeate every news cycle Kim Ghattas presents the public with a marvelous book that describes not only her personal journey from the civil war in Lebanon in the 1980s to the present, but allows the reader to enter the decision making process of the State Department. THE SECRETARY: A JOURNAL WITH HILLARY CLINTON FROM BEIRUT TO THE HEART OF AMERICAN POWER provides a unique perspective as the author, the BBC State Department correspondent shares with the reader her world- wide travels over hundreds of thousands of miles with Secretary of State Clinton. What emerges is an understanding of the motivations and the limitations of American power. Entering office the Obama administration set as one of its major goals a corrective foreign policy designed to repair the damage caused to America’s reputation abroad that resulted from Bush administration policies. In the book Ghattas described Clinton’s strategy, which at times differed from President Obama, in trying to restore trust in the United States among allies, and improve relations with those countries that were skeptical about working with Washington. Interwoven in this journey are the author’s memories and emotions related to her upbringing in war torn BeIRUT and how she relates her personal observations and emotions to American actions be they in Libya, Syria, dealing with China, or a myriad of other topics. The conclusion that Ghattas has reached is that Clinton has been successful in laying the foundation for the reorientation of American policy where “working with the United States is once again desirable” (333) It is no longer “you are with us or against us,” the mantra of the previous administration. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the intricacies of the development of American “smart power,” and the implementation of Hillary Clinton’s style of personal diplomacy.

THE BROTHERS: JOHN FOSTER DULLES,. ALLEN DULLES AND THEIR SECRET WORLD WAR by Stephen Kinzer

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Having written or co-authored books on the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh, ALL THE SHAH’S MEN, Jacobo Arbenz, BITTER FRUIT, and a general compendium of American coups in OVERTHROW it seems inevitable that Stephen Kinzer, an award winning foreign correspondent for the New York Times would proceed to publish a work on the two men whose goal centered on maintaining American corporate interests abroad and were obsessed with the concept that indigenous nationalism was another term for communism.  Kinzer has accomplished his mission in his new dual biography of John Foster and Allen Welsh Dulles who served respectfully as Secretary of State and Director of the CIA during the Eisenhower administration.  In THE BROTHERS: JOHN FOSTER DULLES, ALLEN DULLES AND THEIR SECRET WORLD WAR Kinzer presents an in depth study of Foster and Allen (as he refers to them in the book) as they implement American foreign policy during the Cold War.  The author goes beyond the analysis of the individual decisions that they made as he places events within the context of American foreign policy today.  As a result he reaches the conclusion that both men were active proponents of what has been termed “American Exceptionalism,” which many of our leaders still affirm, and their actions help explain many of the foreign policy problems the United States currently faces.  Since the work of the Dulles brothers still rings true today, “understanding what they did, and why they did it, is a step toward understanding why the United States acts as it does in the world.” (328)  If that was what Kinzer was trying to achieve in his latest work, he has been remarkably successful.

Kinzer minces no words as he traces the early years of the brothers.  The reader sees that foreign policy and government overthrow were in their DNA as their grandfather; John Watson Foster was Secretary of State in 1893 when he helped direct the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy.  Keeping with tradition, Eleanor Dulles, Foster and Allen’s sister married Robert Lansing, who became Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson.  For the brothers many doors were opened by these family connections including  positions at the Wall Street law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell.  It was early in Foster’s legal career during W.W.I.  under the auspices of “Uncle Bert,” (Robert Lansing’s nickname) that he participated in his first foreign intervention as Sullivan and Cromwell clients’ interests were threatened in Cuba in 1917.  Foster and Uncle Bert agreed to send American destroyers to Cuba along with marines to protect American corporate clients.  As Kinzer correctly points out it showed Foster “how easy it can be for a rich and powerful country, guided by the wishes of its wealthiest corporations, to impose its will on a poor and weak one.” (25)

Foster became the managing partner at Sullivan and Cromwell at the age of thirty-eight at a time when the United States went from a debtor nation to a creditor nation for the first time.  New York would replace London as the world’s financial capital and wealthy Americans spread their money and financial interests around the world, and those wealthy Americans “clamored for Sullivan and Cromwell’s services.  “The list of those Foster represented reads like a guide to the upper reaches of American commerce, manufacturing, and finance.” (37-38) It was from this perch that Foster and Allen, who joined the firm in 1926, would develop their unquestioned belief in “liberal internationalism,” the idea “that trouble in the world came from misunderstanding among ruling elites, not from social or political injustices, and that commerce could reduce or eliminate this trouble.  This was a refined version of the ‘open door’ policy the United States had embraced for decades… [a policy] aimed at forcing other countries to accept trade agreements favorable to American interests.  At its core was the reassuring belief that whatever benefited American business would ultimately benefit everyone.” (55-56)  According to Kinzer it was this firm belief held by the brothers that guided them through their careers whether it was support for Hitler and the Nazis before Pearl Harbor or the myriad coups they arranged to protect American corporate interests in the 1950s.

World War II found Allen’s career in espionage take off as a member of William Donavan’s inner circle at the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), first as a station chief in New York then moving to Bern, Switzerland to develop American spy capabilities in Europe.  He was able to create a web of spies that allowed the United States to learn what was happening behind enemy lines and inside Nazi Germany itself.  Following the war Allen’s career took a hit as President Truman abolished the OSS.  During the war Foster emerged as one of the top two foreign policy spokespersons for the Republican party (Arthur Vandenberg was the other) as an advisor to Thomas Dewey who ran for President in 1944 and 1948.  It was during this period that Foster honed his view of communism that began in the 1920s as the Soviet Union struggled to survive.  By the end of WWII Foster was warning that the Soviet Union was bent on “eradicating the non-Soviet type of society and that if the United States did not strike back, an alien faith will isolate us and press in on us to a point where we shall have be faced with surrender or with a new war.” (83)

The shift in American foreign policy in 1950 was embodied in NSC-68, a document that redefined the communist threat and by arguing “that the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.”  As a result Truman now facing the North Korean invasion of the south immediately asked Congress for $10 billion to expand the army.  After the North Korean attack Walter Bedell Smith became head of the CIA and named Allen as Deputy Director of Operations.  By 1952 with the election of Dwight Eisenhower as President, Smith became Undersecretary of State, allowing Allen to replace him as head of the CIA, and Foster became Secretary of State.  Now all was in place for the brothers.  As Kinzer points out, never in history did two siblings hold such powerful offices together and their missionary zeal, belief in American exceptionalism, years of defending corporate interests, and a view of themselves as instruments of destiny would now be put to the test.

When one reads THE BROTHERS, the author’s command of his material as he synthesizes the most important works on Foster and Allen is readily apparent.  This is true as he explores how the brothers  overthrew of Mohammad Mossedegh in Iran, removed Jacobo Arbenz from power in Guatemala, tried to deal with Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, sought to win Gamal Abdul Nasser to the western point of view, failed to replace President Sukarno in Indonesia, participated in the murder of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, and failed to cope with Fidel Castro leading to failure at the Bay of Pigs.  In all instances the brothers refused to accept the concept of indigenous nationalism and argued that it was nothing more than an excuse for communism.  They made no attempt at understanding Third World nationalism and its roots.  Once independence was gained many former colonies  joined a “neutralist” movement highlighted by the Bandung Conference in 1955. The brothers saw neutral nations as nothing more than communist puppets.  They refused to engage “the aspirations of hundreds of millions of people who were emerging from colonialism and looking for their place in a tumultuous world.” (313)

When one thinks about all the covert operations attempted in the 1950s one must ask were the brothers totally responsible and what role did President Eisenhower play.  For many years historians assumed that John Foster Dulles set the agenda and Eisenhower allowed him to carry it out.  During the last twenty years as further and further documentation emerged the reverse is now believed.  One of the first to argue this view was Richard Immerman in his HIDDEN HAND DIPLOMACY and I found in my own research for DAWN OVER SUEZ that Eisenhower held the levers of power and he used them.  According to Kinzer it was Ike who ordered the death of Patrice Lumumba, it was Ike who was the guiding hand behind the Bay of Pigs operation.  In these and other “coups” the only thing that mattered to Eisenhower was that they be successful and could not be traced back to the United States.  According to Blanche Wesson Cooke in her study DECLASSIFIED EISENHOWER there were more coups attempted during the Eisenhower administration than any other in American history.  As Richard Bissell, the CIA operative in charge of the Bay of Pigs recalled, “Eisenhower was a tough man behind that smile.” (293)

Kinzer discussion of the overthrow of Mohammad Mossedegh in 1953 was a recapitulation of material he presented in his previous works.  Operation AJAX was fully approved by Eisenhower and Foster’s law firm Sullivan and Cromwell had the most to lose once Mossedegh came to power as one of Allen’s most important clients, “the J. Henry Shroder Banking Corporation served as the financial agent for Anglo-Iranian Oil Company… It also jolted Foster who was then seeking business in Iran for another Sullivan and Cromwell client, the Chase Manhattan Bank.” (123)  Mossedegh’s attempt at having the Iranian people benefit from its country’s own resources was abhorrent to the Dulles brothers because of self-interest which was couched in virulent anti-communism.  After the overthrow of Mossedegh the next target was Jacobo Arbenz the president of Guatemala who wanted to institute land reform.  His proposal was simple, it required large landowners to sell the uncultivated part of their holdings to the government for redistribution to peasant families.  The problem was that the United Fruit Company, a Dulles client of which Foster held stock in controlled 85% of Guatemala’s uncultivated land.  As Kinzer pointed out in a previous book he co-authored on the Guatemalan coup, BITTER FRUIT, the United Fruit Company was the power and the Guatemalan government was the subsidiary.  Arbenz was overthrown and Brother’s policy in Central America was clear, “they embraced the regions dictators while working to undermine its few democracies.” (159)  The next target for the brothers was Ho Chi Minh who had written President Truman and asked him to support Vietnamese independence and not allow the French to return after WWII.  The rationale was simple, “they singled him out not simply because who he was, but where he was.  Europe had settled into its Cold War pattern, and although Foster and Allen still considered it the center of the world, they believed the front line had moved to East Asia.  They mistakenly saw China as a pawn of the Soviet Union, and Ho, also mistakenly, as a puppet of both.” (176)  Following the defeat of the French at Dienbienphu, the Geneva Conference in April, 1954 decided to divide Vietnam at the 17th parallel, Ho receiving the north, and the new western mandarin, Ngo Dinh Diem as the leader of the south.  In addition within two years elections would be held to unify the country.  Edward Landsdale was the CIA operative in charge of dealing with coup. His instructions were clear, to recreate his earlier success in the Philippines when he installed Ramon Magsaysay to national leadership and crushed a guerilla insurgency.  Landsdale could not repeat history and by early 1956 it was clear Ho might garner 85% of the vote.  Landsdale’s major success was organizing the mass movement of one million Catholics from the north to the south by employing psy-ops and other propaganda means.  Since Diem was a catholic (in a country that was 90% Buddhist) he thought it could help solidify Diem’s reign after the United States refused to allow an election to take place.  For the United States the Vietnam War had begun.

The only area that I have reservations about Kinzer’s analysis is the Middle East.    As mentioned earlier the Dulles brothers abhorred the concept of neutralism and the neutral bloc that emerged from the Bandung Conference in 1955.  One of its leaders was Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser.  Kinzer skirts over all American policy in dealing with Nasser up until the United States reneged on a deal in July 1956 to build the Aswan Dam.  He fails to discuss secret project ALPHA which was designed to try and bring about peace between Israel and Egypt and then use Nasser as sort of a pied piper in leading the other Arab states into a Middle East Defense Pact.  Nasser played the United States along until a peace mission led by former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson finally failed.  The result was a shift in US policy.  At a National Security Council meeting on March 28, 1956 Eisenhower and his Secretary of State implemented Operation OMEGA designed to replace Nasser as the preferred Arab leader with King Saud of Saudi Arabia and the withdrawal of food and other financial aid that was designated for Egypt.  A March 28 Dulles memo concluded that “planning should be undertaken at once with a view to possibly more drastic action in the event the above courses of action do not have the desired effect.” (Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, March 28, 1956, Eisenhower Library, Ann Whitman File)  Kinzer further skirts Foster disingenuousness after Nasser seized the Suez Canal in July, 1956 and fails to mention that on October 29, 1956 the same day that Israel invaded the Sinai as part of its conspiracy with England and France that led to the Suez War, an American-sponsored coup was scheduled to take place in Syria, which because of the invasion was rescinded. (DAWN OVER SUEZ, 188) Kinzer correctly points to the issuance of the Eisenhower Doctrine in January, 1957 as another attempt to control communism in the Middle East, but Dulles’ policy in the region would be a failure especially with the overthrow of the pro-western Nuri al-Said and King Feisal II in Iraq in 1958 by the military, and the continued machinations by Nasser throughout the region as he emerged from the Suez War as an Arab hero.  Kinzer quotes historian Ray Takeyh who believes that Suez was “a sideshow that disrupted Eisenhower’s policy of covertly undermining Nasser and his radical allies.” (224).  I would respectfully disagree as events in France under DeGaulle, Foster’s move to get closer to Israel, and the complete failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine have shown.

As the 1950s was drawing to a close the Dulles brothers continued to pursue foreign policy by coup despite the fact that their record was not as stellar as they believed.  When President Sukarno became a major proponent of neutralism in Indonesia and accepted $100 million dollar loan from the Soviet Union in 1957, the brothers began planning a military coup with disgruntled officers.  In the end, Operation ARCHIPELAGO’s attempt to foment a civil war by providing weapons, planes and other logistics was concluded in failure. By May, 1958 the coup was called off as The Director of the CIA called the Secretary of State and told him “We’re pulling the plug.” (241)  After Foster died in 1959, Allen was left to deal with the next target on the American “hit list,” Patrice Lumumba, the newly elected president of an independent Congo.  Both the United States and Belgium, the former colonial overlord of the Congo, opposed Lumumba because the southeastern province of Katanga was “an invaluable source for industrial diamonds, and strategic metals like copper, manganese, zinc, cobalt and chromium.” (260)  Once Lumumba began speaking out against the colonialism that dominated the Congo’s past he had to disappear.  Working with Belgium, President Eisenhower order Lumumba’s murder, and for the first time an American president ordered the death of a foreign leader.  The United States and Belgium fostered the secession of the Katanga province under the leadership of Joseph Mobutu, a Congolese military officer, who had Lumumba captured, tortured, and then murdered. Not what Allen Dulles had expected.  The last failure of the Dulles reign of coups was the Bay of Pigs.  So much has been written about this catastrophe, but Kinzer brings up a number of interesting points.  First, Allen Dulles did not direct the operation, he put it in the hands of Richard Bissell.  Dulles’ hand off approach would cost him a great deal in the end to his reputation and it eventually cost him his job.  Secondly, Eisenhower was directly involved at all stages of planning and was able to convince John F. Kennedy to continue the operation once the senator from Massachusetts was elected president.  Kennedy would fire Dulles and because of the Bay of Pigs fiasco developed an aversion to accepting advice from the CIA and the Pentagon at face value.

The Brothers policy of replacing governments was mostly a failure if one takes into account the long range implications of what they tried to accomplish.   Allen emerges “not the brilliant spymaster many believed him to be.  Nearly every one of his major covert operations failed or nearly failed.  Foster’s diplomatic planning and Allen’s operational failures spread all across the globe: Berlin, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, Tibet, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Cuba, and beyond.” (319)  In the end Foster and Allen could not have attempted what they had without the complete support of President Eisenhower.  In the final analysis, “Foster and Allen were born into privilege and steeped in the ethos of pioneers and missionaries.  They spent decades promoting the business and strategic interests of the United States.  More than any two figures of their age, they were the vessels of American history.  No other secretary of state or director of central intelligence could have done what they did.  Only brothers could have achieved it—and only these two.” (319)  As Kinzer correctly points out, we are still reaping the “lack of benefits” from what they sowed—this is why this book is an important read.

JOHN HAY: GENTLEMAN AS DIPLOMAT by Kenton J. Clymer

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The book seems to be an outgrowth of the author’s graduate school Ph.D dissertation. Clymer reviews Hay’s ideological development and comes to the conclusion he was typical of his age as he held strong racial and cultural views that sought to expand Anglo-Saxon influence in the world. In discussing Hay’s career outside of diplomacy the reader is presented with a hard nosed business type who vehemently disliked labor unions, in part because he did not trust the Irish and was an extreme Anglophile. Hay’s role in the diplomatic issues of the period are presented in detail and are somewhat dated as the book was published in 1975. Issues such as Panama, the open door to China, boundary disputes with Canada and others are seen from Hay’s prism and other figures of the period. One of the more interesting chapters deals with Hay’s relationship with Teddy Roosevelt. The author concludes that Hay had one foot in the 19th century and one foot in the 20th, but he tried not to be totally drawn into the bombastic nationalism that afflicted the United States after the Spanish-American War. Since the book is somewhat dated he would direct anyone interested in reading about John Hay to a new biography due out around May 20, 2013 by John Taliaffero.

DIRTY WARS by Jeremy Scahill

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The reemergence of the Benghazi attack as a partisan political issue, the popularity of the film “Zero Dark Thirty” and the recent bombing in Boston have refocused Americans on the issue of terror and its threat. Did the FBI and CIA miss intelligence in dealing with the Tsarnaev brothers and other questions regarding the devastation at the Boston marathon have been discussed repeatedly during our twenty four hour news cycle and the question must be asked are we doing enough in terms of protecting the Homeland. The appearance of Jeremy Scahill’s new book, Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield is very timely as it posits the argument that after 9/11 the Bush administration implemented numerous policies that aborted many civil rights that Americans cherish and created a new world view that assassinations would be a central part of our national security and the secret operations infrastructure to carry out that mission. According to the author this had tremendous consequences for the United States as our policy decisions created the opposite results in countries like Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, Iraq and ostensibly world wide as our counter terrorism decisions allowed our enemies to recruit more followers and became an even greater danger than they were before. Offshoots from the original al-Qaeda in Afghanistan emerged in Yemen under the banner, al-Qaeda Arab Peninsula (AQAP), al-Shabab in Somalia and others. It fostered new spokespersons, even American citizens like Anwar Awlaki. In 2008 when President Obama was campaigning he argued against the tactics that were developed by Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, but as Scahill lays out his case, the President not only did not change any of the policies of the Bush administration that argued that “the world is a battlefield,” but the Obama administration has gone even further in implementing an enhanced version of counter terrorism that relies on targeted killing and drone strikes worldwide.
The key domestic political component in the implementation of enhanced interrogation techniques, renditions, black sites, assassinations etc. was to make sure that there would be no Congressional oversight for these policies. This was the goal of the Cheney-Rumsfeld partnership after 9/11 that was accomplished with the creation of a separate counter terror infrastructure in the Pentagon and away from the CIA. Scahill does an excellent job detailing how this was accomplished as Cheney and Rumsfeld were victorious in their “turf battles” within the Bush administration after 9/11. The result was that the Bush administration “asserted the right under US law to kill people it designated as terrorists in any country even if they were US citizens.” (78) Scahill reviews the lead up to the invasion of Iraq that has been detailed in books such as The Dark Side by Janet Mayer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq by George Packer, and Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq by Thomas Ricks and the author reaches the same conclusions concerning Bush administration deception, lies, and a lack of strategy in all areas. The development of “enhanced interrogation” techniques to obtain information is argued pro and con, but what is important is how the Bush Justice Department developed the legal rationale for such techniques. As the separate infrastructure for counter terrorism was developed with the attendant lack of oversight the United States ignored its own laws and the Geneva Convention resulting in what the author describes as a “prophetic backlash” that would cost us dearly.
Scahill provides intricate details of events in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. The reader is brought into US decision-making and the missions that resulted. We see the development of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) as a separate tool apart from the CIA and how it was led, funded, and carried out its killing operations. In fact the “JSOC was free to act as a spy agency and a kill/capture force rolled into one.” (171) Important figures involved in this process are presented from General Stanley McCrystal, Vice Admiral William McRaven and others who implemented counterterrorist policy, to the pseudo allies in foreign countries like General Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, the Ethiopian military, warlords in Somalia, among many others. The victims of American policy are delineated in detail be it the massacre at Gardez in Afghanistan, al Majalah in Yemen, to targeting and killing the likes of Anwar Awlaki, and the persecution of journalist Abdulelah Haider Shaye. These policies and negative outcomes did not only take place on the Bush administration watch, but were continued at a new level under the Obama administration.
According to Scahill the Obama National Security team is as guilty as the previous administration no matter how much former Vice President Cheney has “chirped” over the years how weak Obama has been in the war on terror. While Obama was receiving his Nobel Peace Prize the US was targeting AQAP in Yemen and al Shabab in Somalia. The basic difference between the two administrations is that the Obama people wanted to make the war on terror more efficient. All one has do is to look at Obama’s national security team to see that it was not going to change policy. Obama did take more responsibility than President Bush by approving certain operations, but that did not alter the overarching policy goals.
Other topics of importance that Scahill discusses include the outsourcing of the war on terror including an in depth look at the role of Blackwater (which the author has presented in his previous book, Blackwater: the Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army), the strange case of Raymond Davis, the killing of Osama Bin Laden and many others. What is unique in this work has been Scahill’s access to many of the characters he presents, the impeccable research, and the ability to put forth material in a logical and cohesive manner. From my own readings what is presented in Dirty Wars is historically accurate and his conclusions are extremely scary as we continue the war on terror in the future. I recommend this amazing narrative of the history of “targeted killing” and other policies of our government to those who are concerned about America’s reputation in the world and what kind of nation we would like to be in the years to come.