American Diplomatic History

OBJECTIVE TROY by Scott Shane

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, American Political History, Middle Eastern History, Military History Leave a comment

(Anwar al-Awlaki taken from his online magazine Inspire)

Scott Shane is a New York Times national security reporter whose new book OBJECTIVE TROY explores the evolution of the American use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) as its main weapon to counter Islamic terrorism.  After invading Afghanistan and Iraq and having both incursions turn out poorly the Obama administration came into office with the fervent belief to avoid further use of “boots on the ground” in any large number in the Middle East.  Events in the region did not necessarily cooperate with President Obama’s vision and threats from the region necessitated a shift in strategy.  The choice was rather simple; let the jihadists have their way and do nothing or reassert American troop strength.  A middle road emerged, that of applying drones to the shifting balance of power in the Middle East and Southwest Asia to decapitate the leadership of groups that threatened the United States in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen.  The implementation of the drone strategy successfully decimated al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, but the United States was confronted with a new enemy in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  One of the ramifications of this new geo-political threat was the emergence of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen educated in the United States and Yemen, who headed three separate mosques in America emerging as a radicalized jihadist who would be killed by a drone attack in 2011.

The book centers on whether the U.S. government has the constitutional right to assassinate an American citizen if it deems them a threat to its national security.  Shane explores the rise of al-Awlaki as a person who opposed the 9/11 attacks in 2001, seeing himself as a bridge between Islam and America.  However, by 2005, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. support for Yemeni dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, and his stay in London where his students were much more radical than those in the United States, al-Awlaki grew increasingly radicalized and became a jihadi spokesperson who by 2007 was calling for attacks against the United States as he concluded that his religious beliefs and the ummah (community of believers in Islam) took precedence over his loyalty to his country.  After fleeing the United States because the FBI had learned he was not following his own moral code by engaging his sexual appetites he grew increasingly strident in calling for jihad against America.  Once he was linked to Nidal Hasan’s attack at Fort Hood, TX, and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad’s attempt to blow up an airplane with 289 passengers as it approached Detroit’s Metro Airport at Christmas in 2009, the Obama White House realized what a threat he had become.  Further examination brought the realization in the Justice Department that it seemed no matter what the incident, be it 9/11, or other operations, Anwar al-Awlaki’s name seem to come up.  The question for President Obama was how to counter act the growing threat.

Shane explores the evolution of Obama’s thought process and the Justice Department’s reasoning as to the legality of killing an American citizen and the morality of killing by remote control.  He discusses Obama’s comments as a law professor, state senator, and United States Senator to formulate how to deal with extremism.  He approved of the attacks on al-Qaeda and the Taliban after 9/11, but was against President Bush’s detention, rendition, and interrogation program which he immediately eliminated upon assuming the presidency.  However he did not do away with the drone program.  Obama was not an ideologue as some on the right have painted him, but a ruthless pragmatist when it came to the use of drones.  Obama’s Justice Department’s finding concluded that al-Awlaki could be targeted because he posed “a continued and imminent threat” to American national security.

In 2008 al-Awlaki set up a web site that markedly expanded his exposure “as his Islamic teaching was kindling volatile emotions across the English speaking world.” (177)  His lectures appeared on You Tube and the Internet reaching everyone interested in his message, a message that was successful because of American actions in Iraq and Pakistan.  His further success was due to his command of English and his knowledge of Arabic sacred texts, along with his disarming informal way of speaking.  He employed the motivating power of religion with the universal quest of the young for identity as he created an attractive message for disaffected Muslims who saw him as their spokesperson, and many were willing to answer his call for jihad.

(Nidal Hassan, convicted FT. Hood,TX killer)

Perhaps al-Awlaki’s most successful propaganda tool was his creation of Inspire, an online magazine that was written in a breezy style to promote suicide bombings and other terror tactics.  Shane discusses its slick presentation and internet appeal providing instructions on how to make a bomb and calling for attacks against the west.  Shane goes on to discuss the effect Inspire had on jihadi recruitment, future attacks, and how the western intelligence community tried to figure out how to respond.

(Anwar al-Awlaki, killed by an American drone in 2011)

Shane does an exceptional job summarizing the constitutional arguments for and against the use of drones.  He also discusses the legal arguments that were pursued by Anwar’s father, Nasser al-Awlaki who went to federal court to try and get his son removed from the drone “kill list.”  Shane is very effective in discussing the legal nuances and reasoning whenever he brings up the constitutionality of whether an American citizen could become an assassination target by its government.

By 2010 AQAP was a greater threat to the United States than al-Qaeda.  With the links between the Detroit bomber and Fort Hood killings it was just a matter of time before the United States would kill al-Awlaki.  In the end al-Awlaki has probably had a greater impact on the Jihadi world in death than when he was alive.  His life, writings, and speeches continue to carry a great deal of influence on the web where he has an achieved a “prophetic martyrdom.”  All you have to do is point to the Boston Marathon bombers-the Tsarnaev brothers who learned how to make a bomb from a pressure cooker on al-Awlaki’s website.

(US drone firing a missile over Yemen)

Shane has written a very useful book that provides a great deal of insight into Obama and al-Awlaki and their approach to dealing with events in the Middle East.  Further, he has provided a strong narrative for the reader to understand the future legal implications of what Obama has done by targeting the Muslim preacher.  If there is a major criticism I can offer concerning the book it would be the illogical chronological approach that Shane presents.  Approaching al-Awlaki’s life by offering his middle years first, leads to repetition as he discusses the other stages of his development.  A straight chronology would have greatly benefited the reader in understanding the main subject of the book.  Apart from that, I recommend Objective Troy to anyone who wants to understand the constitutional, social media, and world political issues that confront the United States in a region that brought us the “Arab spring,” but continues to fall into chaos.

ONE MAN AGAINST THE WORLD: THE TRAGEDY OF RICHARD NIXON by Tim Weiner

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, American Political History, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Biography Leave a comment

In 1972, Bruce Mazlish wrote a psychohistorical inquiry into the life of Richard Nixon, entitled, IN SEARCH OF NIXON.  Mazlish analyzed Nixon and concluded that “he project[ed] unacceptable impulses onto others.  He identified his personal interest with the national interest.  He exalt[ed] strength and fears of passivity.” (143)  These conclusions were based on a detailed exploration of Nixon’s upbringing, relationship with his parents, and his actions as an adult.  The book was written before the emergence of Watergate, and was prescient as Mazlish concluded that Nixon’s self-destructive nature would come to the fore, but he was not sure how that would manifest itself.  Historians have concluded that Richard Nixon was probably one of the most complex political figures in American history and his career has produced a myriad of books, some praiseworthy, particularly dealing with his opening with China, and detente with the Soviet Union in 1972.  However, the majority have been mostly negative in the light of events surrounding his election to the House of Representatives and the Senate, his pursuit of Alger Hiss, and the actions that brought down his presidency.  Following Nixon’s resignation from the presidency he devoted his time to resurrect his personal legacy presenting himself as a foreign policy sage and authoring a number of books on American foreign policy.  As time has receded, some revisionist accounts of his policies have been written arguing that domestically he pursued a liberal social agenda and that his foreign policy was expertly conducted.  As a result, his reputation seemed to be on the upswing.  Recently, however, a number of books have appeared reevaluating this trend, and the “old Nixon” has reemerged.  One of the books in this genre is Tim Weiner’s ONE MAN AGAINST THE WORLD: THE TRAGEDY OF RICHARD NIXON.

Weiner’s book is not a comprehensive biography but a history of Nixon’s anguished presidency that “concentrates on the intertwined issues of war and national security.”  The author’s approach to his narrative is best summarized as he writes from the outset in referring to his subject that “his gravest decisions undermined allies abroad.  His grandest delusions armed his enemies at home.” “I gave them a sword,” he said after his downfall, “and they stuck it in.”  According to Weiner his book is based mostly on recently declassified documents that were released between 2007 and 2014. Though that may be true there is very little that is new in what is presented as the author provides the reader the usual litany of crimes and near crimes that Nixon engaged in almost on a daily basis.  Weiner is selective in his coverage of the Nixon administration as he is most concerned with the abuses of power and crimes related to the war in Vietnam, and the domestic espionage conducted against what Nixon perceived to be his political enemies that culminated in Watergate.

(Illegal bombing of Cambodia, 1973)

From the outset Weiner presents a man who is obsessed with being elected to the presidency in 1968.  Nixon firmly believed that the Kennedy machine had stolen the 1960 presidential election and he would not allow that to happen again.  As the 1968 campaign began to come to a close President Lyndon Johnson, concerned with his own legacy, announced a bombing halt for Vietnam.  From July, 1968 Nixon had communicated with President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam that whatever peace deal the Democrats were offering, South Vietnam would be better served if Nixon was in the White House.  As the campaign was coming to a close Johnson was aware of the Nixon campaign’s clandestine approaches to Thieu and how he was undermining any possible political deal.  Weiner presents irrefutable evidence that Nixon was involved in treasonous activity that has been available previously, and explores the reasons that Johnson did not go public with this information.  Weiner will spend a major part of his narrative exploring Nixon’s conduct of the war, detailing the illegal bombing of Cambodia from March, 1969 through August, 1973; the illegal wiretaps designed to stop the leaking of information from the National Security Council, Pentagon, and State Department all in the name of national security; covert operations against United States Senators who opposed his conduct of the war which would result in the passage of the War Powers Act in 1973; the machinations that led to the overthrow of the democratically elected president of Chile, Salvatore Allende; the incursion into Cambodia in April, 1970 that resulted in events at Kent State University; the creation of the “plumbers” to plug leaks that would lead to the break in of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office, and of course Watergate.

(The iconic photo of Mary Ann Vecchio leaning over a dead student at Kent State University after shootings by the National Guard, May 4, 1970)

The details of other abuses of power presented including the selling of ambassadorships, extorting funds from foreign governments in return for favorable American policy decisions, the employment of the IRS to deal with domestic enemies, and the use of the FBI and CIA to deal with political opposition.  Weiner covers it all, but, again nothing really new is presented.  Even in the case of Watergate the reader is exposed to familiar territory as we are taken into the White House as the plans for domestic espionage are laid out.  The familiar names of John Dean, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, John Mitchell, Charles Colson, Alexander Butterfield, Jeb Magruder, and on and on all make their appearance.  The reader is exposed to Henry Kissinger and his role in Vietnam policy formulation and domestic espionage.  The former Secretary of State is as complicit in many of the crimes propagated in the conduct of the war in Southeast Asia and domestic spying, but aside from a few lawsuits has gotten away scot free and today is seen by many as the eminence grist of American foreign policy.

(Construction workers from the World Trade Center accosting people as they march up Broadway on May 8, 1970)

On a personal level, in May, 1970 I witnessed one of Nixon’s plans to weaken the antiwar movement that was burgeoning in response to his actions in Vietnam and Cambodia.  On May 8, 1972, a few days after the shootings at Kent State, according to Weiner, Charles Colson, one of the Nixon officials in charge of “dirty tricks,” communicated with the New York City construction union council led by Peter J. Brennan to arrange a march up Broadway of construction workers, then building the World Trade Center.  As hundreds of these workers marched they assaulted anyone that seemed to be opposed to the war.  I was a student at Pace University on that day and was chased and attacked by two workers as New York City’s “finest” stood idly by.  Little did I know the culpability of the Nixon administration in these attacks.  The irony was that the next day, as a member of the United States Army Reserves I was activated to control student unrest at St. John’s University in Queens, NY.  Later, interestingly, Peter J. Brennan was appointed Secretary of Labor in the Nixon administration.

(Watergate Hotel)

To Weiner’s credit he has written a breezy and well written catalogue of Nixon’s crimes that summarizes a period of American history whose remnants of which we are still dealing with today.  In evaluating Nixon we must recognize the psychological flaws that lent themselves to limiting a self-destructive personality, who because of his abuse of power overshadowed remarkable accomplishments in diplomacy in negotiating with China and the Soviet Union.  But, as Bruce Mazlish predicted in 1972, his presidency would not end well.

ALLY: MY JOURNEY ACROSS THE AMERICAN-ISRAELI DIVIDE

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, Middle Eastern History Leave a comment

(March 5, 2015, the smiles between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Obama can be deceiving)

The deadline for a nuclear agreement with Iran passed on June 30th and the odds of eventually coming to an accommodation remain up in the air.  The American realpolitik to reach a consensus dates back to the election of Barack Obama who has stressed the diplomatic card in dealing with Iran since his inauguration, and at the same time offered that “all options were on the table.”  Iran’s nuclear development in addition to the correct approach in dealing with the Palestinians form the major disagreements between the United States and Israel as is related in Michael Oren, who served as former Israeli ambassador to the United States from 2009 to 2013 new memoir ALLY: MY JOURNEY ACROSS THE AMERICAN-ISRAELI DIVIDE.  Oren’s main goal is to impart to the reader his struggle to maintain the “special relationship” between the two countries, and the difficulties he encountered in trying to do so.  The key was to keep the “day light” between the positions of the two allies to a minimum.  As Oren relates this proved to be very difficult with a new President who had his own agenda for the Middle East.  For Barack Obama, diplomacy and economic sanctions were effective tools in dealing with the ayatollahs in Teheran.  Opposing Israeli settlement expansion and alluding to the pre-1967 borders for a Palestinian state became his mantra.  Throughout his memoir, Oren repeatedly argues why these positions were untenable from an Israeli security perspective and how he went about dealing with an administration that seemed to alternate between pressuring Israel, at times ignoring her needs, and then supporting Tel Aviv when the need arose.  The book also explores in depth the relationship between Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a relationship that was fraught with land mines.

(Prime Minister Netanyau, President Obama, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas-their faces tell the story)

ALLY is more than a justification for Israeli policies and trying to get along with an American administration that was difficult to trust.  Oren delves into his own background of being born an American and the dual nature of his outlook.  Seeing himself as part American and part Israeli, Oren is conflicted at times as he tries to reconcile the differences between the two countries that form his dual persona.  Oren’s description of growing up in New Jersey, attending Columbia, and finally making aliya (emigration) to Israel is often clouded by a vision of becoming his own version of an Israeli sabra (Israeli born national).  His idealism as it pertains to Israel and Jewish history strongly reeks of a Leon Uris novel.  Every harsh event or training he undergoes, be it as a paratrooper or as private citizen is seen in the context of Jewish history in which he places himself.  I realize this is a memoir, but this approach can be tiresome.  While studying at Princeton in 1983 Oren realized the community of fate that existed between the United States and Israel and the need for a close alliance between the two.  It was at this time that Oren was exposed to the toxicity of leftist’s historians and politicians who saw Israel as a bridgehead of western imperialism in the Middle East.  It seemed to have made a deep impression on Oren and would be a major theme in his memoir – the hypocritical nature of excoriating Israel and treating the Arabs paternalistically.  Oren’s anger is clear as his distress in dealing with the revisionist writings of Israeli historians who question the mythology associated with the 1948 and 1967 wars.

(Israeali Ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, 2009-2013)

While touring the United States for the Israeli government in 2008, Oren wrote an article where he predicted that should Obama be elected president problems would arise between Tel Aviv and Washington.  Obama had revealed his opposition to Israeli settlement building and his support for Palestinian rights as Oren writes that “Obama might be expected to show deeper sympathy for the Palestinian demand for a capital in Jerusalem…and greater flexibility in including Hamas in negotiations,” he further stated that Obama would call for “less saber-rattling and more direct diplomacy and pledged to engage with Syria and Iran.” (44)  As Oren details in his memoir these fears came to fruition as soon as Obama was inaugurated.  Once ensconced in the oval office according to Oren the appointment of George Mitchell, the former Maine Senator as America’s top Middle East negotiator did not bode well for Israel as in the past he had exonerated Yasir Arafat from any involvement in the Second Intifada.  Further, Obama appointed Jim Jones as his National Security Advisor who had been very critical of Israel when he was the Department of State enjoy to the region in 2007.  In addition, Obama’s first presidential interview was with Al Arabiya, where he emphasized his Moslem family connections and the desire to restore relations in the region to “where they were twenty or thirty years ago.” (49)  In dealing with Iran as the IAEA reported they had produced enough low-enriched uranium to produce one nuclear weapon, but instead the United States concentrated on Israel to suspend all settlement construction and endorse a two state solution at the same time Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, turned down Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s offer for Palestinian statehood.  It seemed to Oren that Obama’s mind was preset no matter what circumstances might hold.  In 2009, Oren was chosen Israeli ambassador to the United States and many labeled him as “Bibi’s mouthpiece” in Washington.  As any ambassador, Oren presented the position of his government as best he could.  Portraying himself as somewhat of a referee between Obama and Netanyahu the reader is presented with a window into the Israeli Prime Minister’s background and belief system, and how he went about bridging the gap between these two diverse men.

Oren offers numerous examples of disagreements, anger, and outright hostility between Israel and the United States during his ambassadorship.  Condemnation of Israeli actions in Gaza, but none against Assad’s murderous policy in Syria or Iran’s crackdown on the Green Revolution was viewed from Tel Aviv as hypocritical.  The overriding issue for Obama was to obtain a settlement freeze to bring Abbas to the negotiating table.  For Oren, Obama was doing Abbas’s dirty work because the President would pressure Israel, but the Palestinian leader would offer nothing in return.  Obama rarely addressed Israeli sensitivities and seemed to always criticize Israeli actions, be it in Gaza or elsewhere, but he never mentioned Hamas rockets that were landing in Israel.  Overall, for Oren, Obama, either did not care to learn, or just chose to ignore the nuances needed in dealing with conflict in the Middle East.  An excellent example would be the Obama administration’s response to the Arab spring.  For the president events in Tunisia and Egypt were a call for democratic government, living in the region, Israel saw events through a different lens as they felt the Arab reaction was due to humiliation and a loss of dignity.  The resulting elevation of the Moslem Brotherhood, a ”political cousin” to Hamas, and American comments supporting the new Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi who immediately began supplying weapons to Hamas was unacceptable to Israel.  Further, Obama stated on May 18, 2011 that “We believe the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps,” raising the question in Israel as to why the Palestinian Authority was being rewarded when they had stonewalled negotiations for two years.

(Ambassador Oren, a reserve officer in the Israeli Defense Force)

Perhaps Oren’s best chapter is entitled, “the Years of Affliction.”  The year 2011 had been rife with crisis.  The flotilla incident with Turkey as Islamic jihadists had joined a supply flotilla designed to arm and supply Hamas forces in Gaza resulted in the death of Turkish nationals when Israeli forces tried to board a ship and were met with gunfire.  A year later, to assuage Obama, Netanyahu agreed to apologize to Turkish Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan.  When all seemed under control and the apology was issued, the Turkish president responded by bragging how he humiliated Israel and would break the blockade of Gaza by force.  The Iranian nuclear controversy grew more and more heated throughout the year and Obama pressed for a diplomatic solution employing sanctions and the Israelis worried that there window to stop Iran was fast closing.  More and more Israel felt its “Qualitative Military Edge” over its enemies was narrowing, while Washington, who historically was committed to its maintenance disagreed.  On the Israeli domestic side, the Carmel forest fire was a threat to Haifa and was finally controlled, this time with American aid.  For the United States, its funding of the Iron Dome weapons system to protect Israel from Hamas rockets was enough support, and it refused to condemn Hamas even when it used human shields to protect its launch sites.

Oren’s chapter dealing with Israel’s portrayal in the American media is very interesting.  He sees this as a matter of Israeli national security and spends a great deal of time parsing how Israel is presented.  He is concerned there is an anti-Israel bias that has become so pervasive that even the New York Times, Washington Post, and 60 Minutes seem to be purveyors of an image of Israel that their enemies have created.  He points to a 60 Minutes feature that accuses Israel of persecuting Christians.  The details Oren provides are explicit and argues against the myth that Jews control the American media as even reporters like Thomas Friedman have been inadvertently coopted into this cabal.  If in fact this is true, Oren might be on to something or perhaps Israel has become a victim of the new digital world, and the recent media sophistication of its enemies.

The question as to whether the Obama administration would defend Israel against an Iranian nuclear attack is a major theme in the book and encompasses Netanyahu’s frustration with the president.  This carries over to Obama’s second term when he replaced what Oren viewed as a fairly pro-Israeli group headed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta with Chuck Hagel, who refused to label Hezbollah as a terrorist group, and John Kerry who Oren believes has a soft spot for the Palestinians.  Whether Oren’s observations are true or not is beside the point, this is an Israeli perception that affects the relationship with the only democratically elected government in the Middle East.  It is obvious that it is very difficult to work with Benjamin Netanyahu at times, as highlighted by his reelection campaign, but the American-Israeli relationship is extremely important in terms of the national security interests of both countries.  At times it seems that Oren goes overboard and is a bit polemical, but that can be the nature of a memoir.  Perhaps Oren should stick to narrative history as his books; JUNE, 1967 and POWER, FAITH, AND FANTASY: AMERICA IN THE MIDDLE EAST are excellent.  Overall, this a provocative “kiss and tell” memoir, and is important in understanding how Israel thinks of their plight living in the midst of a hostile neighborhood.

ISIS: INSIDE THE ARMY OF TERROR by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, Middle Eastern History, Military History Leave a comment

ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror

Each evening the nightly news seems to zero in on another story that relates to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  We are bombarded with border crossings into Syria from Turkey, the state of the effort by Iraqi forces to retake Tikrit, fears concerning Iran’s role in Iraq should ISIS finally be defeated, the capture of a former American Air Force veteran seized at the Turkish border and extradited to the United States, and yesterday’s brutal attack in Tunisia.  This nightly visual obsession has produced a number of new books on the rise of ISIS and suggestions on how we should deal with them.  One of the better or perhaps the best of this new genre, explaining ISIS, is Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan’s ISIS: INSIDE THE ARMY OF TERROR.  The book is written in a very straight forward historical narrative that tries to explain how we have arrived where we are today in trying to understand current events and how they relate to the last decade of American foreign policy in the Middle East.

The narrative traces the evolution of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) into the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) under the leadership of Abu Musa al-Zarqawi until his death in 2006 by an American air strike.  It continues its discussion by zeroing in on the schism that develops between al-Qaeda and the emergence of ISI over strategy in the sectarian civil war in Iraq, and integrates events in Syria that will culminate in the movement to overthrow Bashir al-Assad.  What stands out in Weiss and Hassan’s effort is their analysis of how the current situations in Iraq and Syria came to be, and what role the United States and Iran played.  The rise of ISI is directly linked to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and American support for the Shi’a politician, Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister.  The authors repeatedly point out that Iraqi Sunnis hoped to be treated fairly by the government in Baghdad.  After the United States invaded Iraq, American decision makers fired Sunni bureaucrats, dismissed the Sunni dominated Ba’athist Party, and disbanded the Iraqi military, leaving Sunnis unemployed, and when Shi’a politicians, like Maliki did not deliver on their promises, very bitter.  As Iran’s influence in Baghdad increased many Sunnis, particularly former policeman and military officers under Saddam Hussein turned to ISI.  The authors provide details how Maliki became Prime Minister and his negative impact on creating a unified Iraq.  The authors also delve into the rise of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the supreme leader of ISIS and his split with al-Qaeda, a major schism for the jihadi universe.

The authors provide an depth analysis of the civil war that broke out in Syria in February, 2011.  Weiss and Hassan make a number of important points that allows the reader to understand the complex political situation that exists and how it came about.  Once the revolution gained a foothold it seems Assad’s strategy was to terrorize Syrian Sunnis so they would become radicalized and join the forces that sought to overthrow him.  He wanted to create a situation where Alawites (Shi’a sect that Assad belongs to that made up 8-15% of the country’s population) and Christians felt endangered.   By so doing he hoped to show the world that he was a victim of terrorists who wanted to overthrow his government.  The groups that opposed Assad believed that his blatant use of chemical weapons, rape, and bombing of civilians would be enough to gain substantial support from the west, but this was not to be.  The result was that the only means of support came from Iran.  In fact, the authors argue that “Syria is occupied by the Iranian regime.”  Assad doesn’t run the country, Qassem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds force is in charge. (140)  It is Iran that is opposing ISIS (ISI became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in 2011 once the Syrian civil war began) in Iraq and Syria and policy makers in Washington must wonder what will happen once ISIS is defeated with the Quds Force in Syria, and Iranian Shi’a militias in Iraq.  It seems that the Iran-Iraq of the 1980s is now being refought.

What separates Weiss and Hassan’s work from ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR by Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger another useful monograph that has also been recently published is that within its narrative it analyzes the role of the tribal networks in Iraq and Syria.  They compare how Saddam and Assad dealt with Iraqi and Syrian tribal structure and organization, and how ISIS manipulated tribal influence in order to gain support.  Stern and Berger take a different approach as they provide a narrative history of ISIS’ terrorist methods, and the organization of civil society.  Further, they devote a great deal of space to ISIS’ use of technology in order to gain support and attract foreign fighters, but spend much less time on the rise of key personalities, jihadi organizations, and the interests of nation states.  Weiss and Hassan touch on the role of psychology and technology, but not in as much detail as they concentrate on the political paradigm that has brought together the common interests of Iran and the United States in opposing ISIS, and at the same time an alliance between Assad and Teheran also exists.  Weiss and Hassan offer useful explanations for how this obtuse situation was created.  One of which seems somewhat convoluted but accurate.  According to Weiss and Hassan the closer ISIS gets to conquer an area, the less religion plays a part in gaining public confidence.  For most people joining ISIS is a political decision as Sunni Muslims feel they have nowhere else to turn.  They see the world as one between a Sunni and Iranian coalition.  They believe that extreme violence is needed to counter the coming Shi’a hegemony.  They feel under assault from Assad, Khamenei (Supreme leader of Iran), and Maliki (who was finally ousted six months ago) and are left with few options other than supporting al-Baghdadi’s new Caliphate.  In their epilogue Weiss and Hassan paint a sobering picture of what the future holds.   They examine the massive US bombing campaign that seems to have offered mixed results, and Sunni anger over what appears to be an American administration that is indirectly supporting Assad’s reign of terror from Damascus.  They conclude that more than eleven years after the United States invaded Iraq, a deadly insurgency adept at multiple forms of warfare has proved resilient, adaptable, and resolved to carry on fighting.” (242)  ISIS appears to have tremendous staying power and the sources of revenue to maintain their quest, not a very optimistic picture.

(Tikrit University, the site of fighting between Iraqi forces and ISIS)

If you enjoy well written narrative history based on numerous interviews including Iraqi, Syrian, American, and Iranian politicians; as well as military observers, foreign fighters and other jihadis then you cannot go wrong with Weiss and Hassan’s new book.  If you want less of a historical narrative and are interested in more of a socio-psychological study you might find Stern and Berger’s work be more satisfying.  The bottom line is that you cannot go wrong with either work.

ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR by Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, Middle Eastern History, Military History Leave a comment

ISIS: The State of Terror

At a time when we see images of Iraqi forces backed by Iranian supported Shi’a militias trying to retake Saddam Hussein’s home of Tikrit from the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and we witness young girls leaving their homes in London and make their way through Turkey to join the jihad in Syria, it raises enumerable questions for politicians and the public worldwide.  Foremost, is how did we arrive at this point with ISIS, ISIL, IS or whatever their name is at the moment.  In addition, how culpable is the United States for the situation that it finds itself in today; returning troops to Iraq, engaging in a major bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria, spending millions, if not billions of dollars on an Iraqi army that when confronted with ISIS soldiers months ago fled in fear and left behind enough weaponry and equipment to enhance ISIS’ already burgeoning military machine.  The answers to these questions can be found in Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger’s new book, ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR, one of the first books that seriously attempts to analyze the rise of ISIS; concentrating on the fallout from the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, its evolution under al-Qaeda and its eviction from that organization, to its announcement  of the new Islamic caliphate, and its employment of technology and advanced propaganda strategies to attract foreigners to fight and organize their new state.

Beginning with the horrific beheading of journalist James Foley on August 19, 2014 the authors begin to unravel the rise of ISIS and why the United States did not see the latest jihadi organization coming.  The origin of ISIS emerged from the mind of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, a Jordanian who joined the insurgency against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as it was drawing to a close in 1989.  Partially radicalized by Sheik Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, the architect of jihadi Salafism, Zarqawi would spend the greater part of the 1990s in a Jordanian prison where he was further drawn to Islamic extremism.  Zarqawi brought a sectarian approach to his understanding of jihad, and the United States gave his beliefs a purpose when they invaded Iraq in 2003.  Zarqawi was able to develop al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) because of American policy errors.  When Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi military and fired all of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party members from civil service positions there were few trained people left to maintain government services, and it produced thousands of angry Sunnis who had military and civil training.  The result has been the development of an insurgency that the US was unprepared for.  The authors correctly argue that the US created the environment for Zarqawi’s brutal tactics and rabid sectarianism.  The second major error the US committed was throwing its support behind Nuri al-Maliki, a supposedly moderate Shi’a Muslim to be Prime Minister in 2006.  Maliki would prove to be a very divisive figure with strong ties to Iran.  His policies turned Sunni Iraqis against his government as promises of political power and integration into the military never came to fruition.  By 2006 a full scale sectarian war had broken out resulting in the death of Zarqawi by an American air strike, and months later a coalition of jihadi insurgents announcing the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under the leadership of Abu Omar al Baghdadi.  As Maliki cracked down on Sunni leadership and purged them from positions of power.  Sunnis, fearful of their government and Shia militias had no place to turn to, hence they looked to ISI.

Once the authors explained the origins of ISIS they move on to provide a detailed description of how ISI expanded and eventually moved into Syria, changing their name to the Islamic State if Iraq and Syria.  The authors review ISIS’ relationship with al-Qaeda and Osama Bib-Laden, exploring their differences in strategy, organization, and interpretation of the Qur’an.  ISIS took advantage of events in Syria and expanded their violent millenarian view of Islam and by February, 2014 Ayman al Zawahiri, who had taken over leadership of al-Qaeda after Bin-laden was killed, disassociated his organization from ISIS over their extreme tactics and their presence in Syria.  With Maliki’s partisan Shia approach to governance more and more Sunnis joined ISIS, many of which were Saddam’s generals.  The result was that by June 2014, ISIS had captured Fallujah, Mosul, and Tikrit.  On June 29, 2014, ISIS declared the Islamic Caliphate, an action designed to subsume all jihadi organizations, including al-Qaeda under their leadership.  ISIS abhorrent approach to human life continued, but their sophisticated messaging now included a vision of the type of society it wanted to create.

About half way through the book the authors switch their approach from a historical narrative supported by many keen insights to a sociological-psychological dimension.  Chapters dealing with the importance of how ISIS employs technology and social messaging, including how twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other social media are used to  recruit foreigners to join the new Caliphate, and spread their influence throughout the Middle East and beyond.  The authors explore how ISIS presents a strange dichotomy of ultra-violence and civil disorder as it streamed its propaganda and vision of society that went beyond the violence of jihadism, i.e, governing and social services.  The sophistication of ISIS’ approach to the media and the digital film world are detailed.  ISIS professionalization of film making and messaging are designed to attract fighters, but also “middle management.”  In effect what ISIS is engaged in is “cyber jihad” with electronic brigades that allow them to create new opportunities to expand their “brand.”  The authors examine the new psychology of terrorism and how it is used to influence their enemies and maintain control of other jihadi organizations world-wide.  The main problem they export is “disproportionate dread,” and the manipulation of perception that the west has yet to counter.

According to Stern and Berger ISIS’ message differed from the approach that was offered by al-Qaeda whom they saw as defeatist because they never believed that the Caliphate would be achieved in their lifetime.  Their message is one of extremism itself, but purified.  They offer no rationalizations of self-defense against the west, just revenge.  No longer will there be subtle assumptions of weakness, just aggression and shocking violence and strength.  No more talking about a generational conflict, the Caliphate had been proclaimed.  Their “combination of successful strategy, aggressive messaging, and an appeal to strength over weakness has proven unequally powerful and energized at least tens of thousands of ardent supporters.” (197)

The latter part of the book explores the current state of ISIS as of early January, 2015 and the authors are fully cognizant that things may have changed since the book went to press.  Stein and Becker offer advice as to how to deal with ISIS and suggest that a different approach than has been used in the past should be implemented.  Military action to decapitate the leadership of a country does not always prove successful.  Once the leadership is gone we are then faced with situations that have existed in Iraq since 2004, and more recently in Libya after the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi.  President Obama may call for the defeat and destruction of ISIS, but what we must accept is that this has become a generational problem as the authors point to the indoctrination of children by ISIS, so that once the current leadership has passed a new generation will take over.  The book also includes a detailed appendix dealing with Islamic thought and history that nicely supplements the main text.  Explaining the differences between Shi’a and Sunni Islam, Salafism and Wahhabism, and the different interpretations of jihad are important to understanding what has occurred and where we go from here.  The book is based on interviews and secondary sources and at this point, is one of the two best monographs on the topic.  The other, ISIS: INSIDE THE ARMY OF TERROR by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan will be presented in my next review.

COLONEL HOUSE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WOODROW WILSON’S SILENT PARTNER by Charles E. Neu

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, American Political History, Biography, World War I Leave a comment

(President Woodrow Wilson and Colonel Edward House, campaigning in 1912)

One of the most tragic endings to any presidency in American history is that of Woodrow Wilson.  Elected twice the former president of Princeton University and Governor of New Jersey continued progressive reform that had marked the earlier administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and Howard Taft.  In addition, Wilson guided the United States through the Great War and developed a plan to make it “the war to end all wars.”  However, Wilson suffered a stroke while trying to sell his postwar plan to the American people as he battled to overcome partisan congressional opposition to the League of Nations and never regained the emotional balance to compromise with his detractors.  In the end Wilson became a bitter man and the fight over the League of Nations overshadowed the positive impact his presidency had on American history.  During Wilson’s administration a “counselor” emerged who had no official title or rank but has often been labeled as Wilson’s “silent partner.”  This individual helped shepherd through Wilson’s domestic agenda through congress, but he remained in the background throughout that process.  It was in the arena of foreign affairs that he became known to the general public.  The man, Edward House was a wealthy Texas politician and businessman who was fascinated by the organizational side of politics, rather than the achievement political power in of itself.  Nicknamed the “Colonel” based on an honorary National Guard rank the governor of Texas bestowed upon him, Colonel House became one of the most powerful and controversial presidential advisers in history.  Until now the literature on House lacked a comprehensive and masterful biography, with the publication of Charles E. Neu’s COLONEL HOUSE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WOODROW WILSON’S SILENT PARTNER that void has been filled.

Neu has written a biography that should remain the definitive source on Colonel House for years to come.  The book is based on assiduous research that includes the leading secondary works on all aspects of American history that House was a part of.  It took Neu years to research and write and it is reflected in the primary materials he examined, particularly the over 3000 page diary that House prepared on a daily basis until 1921 when the Versailles Conference ended.  Neu points out that throughout his life that House was most interested in the “process rather than the substance of politics, fascinated with tactics and personalities.” (11)  As he worked his way through Texas politics he created what he referred to as “our crowd,” a group of advisors and sycophants who would remain with him throughout his career.  In his relationship with Wilson he took on many tasks that the President found distasteful.  Wilson, whom was not a warm individual saw in House an individual that possessed the capacity for human relations that he lacked and relied upon his “counselor” to smooth the way for legislation as well as diplomatic relationships.  One would think that Wilson and House would have spent a great deal of time together during the course of their friendship, but Neu reveals that most of their communication was by letter and telephone.  Fortunately House’s diaries have provided historians a record of their warm feelings for each other that today might be categorized as a “bromance!”

(President Wilson and his cabinet)

Neu correctly develops the theme that House’s greatest contribution to his relationship with the president was his assessment of European events as he repeatedly traveled to Europe between 1913 and 1917 as the United States tried to navigate a policy of neutrality during World War I.  House became the key to American mediation efforts, though his judgment was often clouded by his enamourment with England and its Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey and the policies of Lloyd George.  Wilson relied on House as his “personal emissary” but at times House missed the larger historical forces that shaped the policies of the European powers as the war continued.  House’s relationship began with Wilson in 1911 as he grew tired of the policies offered by the Republican Party.  For a number of years through the prism of Texas and national politics he searched for a progressive Democrat who was electable.  The search brought him in contact with Governor Wilson of New Jersey and their relationship blossomed.  With the disarray in the Republican Party in 1912 whoever secured the Democratic nomination was likely to be elected president.  Neu provides a detailed summary of the 1912 election and correctly concludes that it was “one of the most intense campaigns on both a personal and intellectual level that has ever occurred in American political history.” (66)  After the election House had to reinvent himself from the Texas politician who focused on the acquisition of power, relying on personal loyalty, patronage and the manipulation of the system to an advisor dealing with a progressive agenda.  House made the conversion easily and his relationship with Wilson would continue to blossom until the president’s first wife passed away.

 (President Woodrow Wilson, his second wife, Edith Bolling Galt, and Colonel Edward House)

Wilson’s relationship and remarriage to Edith Bolling Galt in 1915 altered Wilson’s relationship with House.  What amazed me was the intimate relationship the two men shared until Wilson remarried.  Neu includes numerous excerpts from letters the two sent to each other in the narrative and the sincerity and emotional nature of their correspondence reflects how dependent they were on each other, i.e., on Christmas day, 1914 Wilson and House exchanged telegrams.  “I wish, I could see brought into your life some happiness and blessing equal to those you have brought into mine by your wonderful friendship.  You have kept faith and strength in me.”  House replied, “Your message has made the day a happy one for me.  May God’s blessings fall upon you and yours abundantly during the coming years.” (164)   Once Edith Galt, a controlling woman entered the picture the relationship between the two men would suffer.  Neu conjectures that despite Wilson’s efforts, Galt was not inclined to share her love for him with another person and her attitude from the start toward House was negative, as she told the president that “I know I am wrong but I can’t help feeling he is not a very strong character….he does look like a weak vessel and I think that he writes like one very often.” (201)   Galt’s relationship with House would be glossed over by her husband but it would never be the same.  Neu does a remarkable job cataloguing the relationship throughout the war and the peace process and concludes that once Wilson suffered a stroke in 1919 her influence on the president was detrimental to the country as she reinforced his negativity that was in part caused by his illness.

Neu does an exceptional job describing the diplomatic and military events dealing with World War I.  He deftly examines the major political and military characters involved and makes numerous insightful comments.  He integrates House’s role in mediation efforts and policy decisions nicely and correctly concludes that in most situations House had an overblown sense of his own importance and influence that at times led to inaccurate reports back to Washington.  This inflated estimate of himself, in part was the fault of Wilson who had a habit of dispatching House on his European missions with only vague instructions and carelessly monitored his negotiations.   Neu has an excellent command over the details of House’s ventures overseas be it to mediate the war before US entrance or managing the allied coalition once the US became a combatant.  A case in point was House’s mediation effort after Wilson was reelected in 1916.  Neu’s analysis of London and Berlin seem very credible and he seems to have mastered the military and political nuances in each capital.  In Berlin, Generals Ludendorff and von Hindenburg views on strategy and implementation of U-boat warfare and the declining influence of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg are accurately presented by the author.  Neu goes on to state that House’s evaluation of Lloyd George and Arthur Balfour led him to believe that he understood the war better than the president.  House also believed that Wilson was not preparing the country for war, which he believed was inevitable, also setting him apart from the president.  Despite these differences it appears that House had Wilson’s full support as he had him prepare for a post war peace conference which would take place after Germany’s defeat

(Colonel Edward House, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, President Woodrow Wilson)

Neu’s knowledge of war events is especially useful as he places the Wilson-House relationship in the context of events overseas.  Whether discussing the diplomacy dealing with Germany’s U-boat policy, events in Russia as the Czarist regime collapses, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or the policy of unconditional surrender the author’s narrative is impeccable.  Once the war ends Neu spends a great deal of time on the evolution of the negotiations in Paris and points out the errors that were made.  First, having the conference in Versailles instead of a neutral site like Geneva; having Wilson as the head of the American delegation, and not bringing a prominent Republican as a member of the American commission.  All these errors that House relayed to Wilson are discussed and their negative effect on the final outcome embodied in the Treaty of Versailles are examined.  Wilson’s stubbornness and inflexibility are ever present, but so is House’s inability to convey an accurate portrayal of what was to be expected before negotiations began.  The relationship between the two men would not survive the conference as House was not given a prominent role in the day to day diplomacy as Wilson put him in charge of writing a constitution for the future League of Nations.  However, when Wilson returned to the United States to deal with Republican opposition to the League, House’s role in territorial negotiations is enhanced.  However once Wilson returned to Paris he felt that while he was away that House overly accommodated the French and Italians violating the principle of self-determination.  This heightened their disagreements over policy and House’s illusions about his own effectiveness resulted in his failure to carry out some of Wilson’s wishes embodied in the Fourteen Points, “succumbing to Clemenceau’s flattery and his own conviction that he was the master of the negotiating process.” (422)

Apart from the sections on diplomacy and war, Neu examines many important relationships and personal views of the major historical figures that House dealt with.  House’s relationship to other key administration figures is explored especially Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, who both Wilson and House lacked respect for and his replacement, Robert Lansing who was seen as weak and whose opinions were repeatedly bypassed.  Both the President and House had little use for US ambassador to England, Walter Hines Page and the feelings were mutual.  House’s use of the term “love” in describing his opinion of French President Georges Clemenceau and English Foreign Secretary Edward Grey reflects a lack of objectivity that is very bothersome.  In addition, House’s views of Jews comes across as very anti-Semitic as he speaks about Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and Bernard Baruch, who skills Wilson employed in organizing the United States domestically for war.  Military figures such as General John J. Pershing, Sir Alexander Haig, and General Joseph Joffre are all explored.  American politicians like Henry Cabot Lodge, Warren G. Harding, John W. Davis and many others are also painted by Neu’s historical brush as the politics of peace and presidential campaigns are rendered in detail.

(President Woodrow Wilson visiting London in February, 1918)

Once the issues of the war are settled, Neu describes House’s career and retirement in the last section of the book.  What is most interesting is House’s obsession with his place in history and he how he established a warm working relationship with Yale University historian Charles Seymour who would edit his private papers into four volumes.  As House grew older he repeatedly reexamined the break with Wilson, accepting no responsibility he blamed it on Edith Galt and her coterie of advisors that surrounded the stricken president.  The book may come across as encyclopedic to some readers, but Neu’s ability to turn a phrase and write clear and concise sentences will allow the novice historian to enjoy the results of years of the author’s work in creating a superb biography of one of the most important figures in 20th century American political history.  The key to Neu’s success is that he lets House’s record as a private advisor and diplomat tell its own story and the reader can judge for themselves how important House may have been to the era in which he lived.

ACT OF WAR by Jack Cheevers

szfreiberger Afghanistan, American Diplomatic History, Cold War Leave a comment

(The USS Pueblo in January, 1968)

Recent events between the United States and North Korea cast a long shadow over relations between these countries.  The “supposed” computer hacking of Sony pictures by North Korea, the disagreement over North Korean attempts to develop nuclear weapons, and a host of other issues like North Korean attacks against South Korean ships makes the appearance of Jack Cheevers’ ACT OF WAR rather timely.  Cheevers, a former political reporter for the Los Angeles Times presents a comprehensive study of the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo, an American spy ship trolling international waters in January, 1968.  Today we worry about North Korean threats to South Korea and Japan, but in the 1960s the United States was in the midst of the Cold War and only a decade out from the end of the Korean War.  Embroiled in Vietnam, the United States continued to spy on the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea throughout the period.  One might wonder why the North Koreans would seize an American ship at that time.  The answer probably rests with North Korean dictator, Kim Il-Sung’s hatred for the United States, and when presented an opportunity to give Washington a “black eye,” Kim could not resist, especially with the United States caught up in the quagmire of Vietnam.

According to Cheevers, American loses while spying in the region were not uncommon before the Pueblo was seized.  Between 1950 and 1956, seven American reconnaissance aircraft were shot down over the Sea of Japan or near Siberia, resulting in the loss of forty-six US airmen, with another sixteen lost to a typhoon. (2)  The Pueblo was part of a top secret Navy program to pack refurbished US freighters with advanced electronics to keep tabs on the Soviet Union’s expanding Pacific and Mediterranean fleets.  The program called for seventy ships, but only three were built, one of which was the Pueblo.  The loss of the ship with its sophisticated surveillance gear, code machines, and documents was one of the worst intelligence debacles in American history.  Subsequent congressional and naval investigations revealed “appalling complacency and short sightedness in the planning and execution of the Pueblo mission.” (3)  The goal was to determine how much of a threat existed for South Korea, since North Korea’s Stalinist leaders were committed to unifying the peninsula, an area were 55,000 American troops stood in the way of a possible invasion.  This book is important as we continue to unleash covert operations worldwide, as it shows what can happen when things do not proceed as planned.

(Capt. Loyd Bucher and his crew seized by North Korea in January, 1968)

Cheevers offers a detailed description of the planning of the mission and what emerges is that Captain Lloyd Bucher was given command of a ship that was not in the best condition and was overloaded with top secret documents, many of which were not needed for the mission.  A full description of the seizure of the ship, the incarceration of the crew, their torture and interrogation, their final release, and the Naval and Congressional investigations that’s followed are presented.  The ship was supposedly conducting “oceanic research,” and many of the crew were not fully cognizant of the Pueblo’s spy mission.  What separates Cheevers’ work from previous books on the subject is his access to new documentation, particularly those of the Soviet Union, and American naval archives.  Further, he was able to interview a large number of the Pueblo’s original crew.  This leads to a narrative that at times reads like a transcript or movie script of many important scenes, particularly the North Korean seizure of the ship, the interactions of the crew during their imprisonment, and the Navy Court of Inquiry which was formed to determine if Capt. Bucher and his crew had conducted themselves appropriately.

The first surprising aspect of the book is the lack of training the crew experienced, and how they should respond if attacked.  Bucher was told by naval officials not to worry because he would always remain in international waters beyond the twelve mile limit the North Koreans claimed.  Further, Bucher was not given the appropriate equipment to destroy sensitive documents and equipment, even though he requested it.  In addition, the two linguists assigned to the mission hadn’t spoken Korean in a few years and confessed that they needed dictionaries to translate radio intercepts or documents, and in addition, the overall crew was very inexperienced.  The bottom line is that there was no real contingency plan to assist the Pueblo should North Korea become a problem.  It was clear no naval assistance would be forthcoming in the event of an attack, and Bucher would be on his own.  Once the attack occurred it appears Bucher did his best, knowing the United States would not entertain a rescue operation.

(The Pueblo crew in captivity)

The seizure of the ship compounded problems for the Johnson administration.  The Tet offensive was a few weeks away, the Marine fire base at Ke Sanh was isolated, the anti-war movement in the United States was growing, and the South Korean President, Park Chung Hee wanted to use the situation to launch an attack on North Korea.  Cheevers reviews the mindset of the American government as well as the public’s reaction to the seizure and accurately describes President Johnson’s reluctance to take military action.  The United States did deploy battle groups to the Sea of Japan as a show of force, but with no plan to use it, it was a hollow gesture.  A far bigger problem was reigning in President Park, whose palace was almost breached by North Korean commandos shortly before the Pueblo was seized.  Cheevers’ dialogue between Cyrus Vance, Johnson’s emissary and Park is eye opening as was the meeting between Johnson and Park later in the crisis.  If Park could not gain American acquiescence for a military response, he requested hundreds of millions of dollars of military hardware instead.  There were 30,000 South Korean troops fighting in Vietnam, and Park had promised another 11,000, and Johnson wanted to make sure that Park did not renege on his commitment.  Cheevers does a commendable job always placing the Pueblo crisis in the context of the war raging in Southeast Asia.

Cheevers’ absorbing description of how the Americans were treated in captivity is largely based on interviews of the crew.  The brutality of their treatment and the psychological games their captures subjected Bucher and his crew was unconscionable.  The beatings, outright torture, lack of hygiene and malnutrition the crew suffered through are catalogued in detail.  The pressure on the Johnson administration domestically increased throughout the incarceration until a deal was finally reached.  The issue revolved around the North Korean demand of an apology which was finally papered over by a convoluted strategy that produced a US admission of spying at the same time they offered a strong denial.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is Cheevers’ coverage of the hero’s welcome Bucher and his crew received and how the Navy investigated who was to blame for the ship’s seizure.  The fact that Bucher surrendered his ship without a fight to save his crew did not sit well with naval history purists.  For the Navy, the men were expendable, but the intelligence equipment and documents were not.  The details of the Naval Court of Inquiry headed by five career admirals, three of which had commanded destroyers during World War II and the Korean War concluded that Bucher should be court-martialed, but were overruled because of public opinion.  The questions and answers from the trial reflect how difficult a task it was to investigate the seizure and find a scapegoat for the Navy.  Throughout, Bucher never lost the respect of his crew and his leadership allowed his men to bond, which in large part is responsible for their survival.

Cheevers should be commended for his approach to the crisis, the important questions he raises, and the reconstruction of testimony both Naval and Congressional.  ACT OF WAR seems to me the definitive account of the seizure of the Pueblo and its ramifications for the Navy, the intelligence community, and politicians.  It is an excellent historical narrative that reads like a novel in sections of the book.  It is a great read and a superb work of investigative reporting.

NO GOOD MEN AMONG THE LIVING by Anand Gopal

szfreiberger Afghanistan, American Diplomatic History Leave a comment

(Kandahar Air Base, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan-American Air Base)

As we approach the “supposed” end of the American presence in Afghanistan it is useful to examine what might have been had the United States followed a somewhat different path.  How did the war in Afghanistan go so terribly wrong?  After a promising beginning with progress on Afghani infrastructure and some democratic improvements it has become a “Potemkin country” whereby health and educational improvements touted by the government are a sham.  President Obama has promised that American troops would exit the Afghani Theater completely; however based on events in Iraq and the performance of Iraqi forces against ISIS (the Islamic State) the Pentagon is now going to leave a residual force of about 13,000 troops in Afghanistan.  Based on the current situation on the ground Anand Gopal’s book, No Good Men among the Living is a timely reevaluation of the American mission to Afghanistan, and what is important about the book is that it tries to examine what seems to have gone wrong through Afghani eyes.

It is generally accepted that the first major error the United States made in Afghanistan was taking our eyes off our mission and redeploying American forces for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  An invasion that resulted in the removal of Saddam Hussein, but little else, based on the current plight of that country.  Had the United States not turned away from Afghanistan and devoted its resources and talents to that country it is possible the situation we face today, the fear that once we withdraw the Taliban will continue its war on the Kabul government and eventually replace it might be different.  As 2014 comes to a close the Taliban has resurrected itself in the south and it seems that only Kabul is under government control.  Did events have to evolve as they have, perhaps not, as Gopal suggests.

(Former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai)

Anand Gopal, a journalist who has covered Afghanistan, Egypt and Syria for a number of important newspapers, and other news outlets attempts to explain what has gone wrong by following three people; a Taliban commander, an American supported warlord, and a village housewife who tries to remain neutral.  By pursuing this approach Gopal provides the reader unique perspectives from which they can discern what the truth is concerning America’s attempt at nation building in Afghanistan.  Gopal provides a brief history of Afghanistan dating back to 1972.  He jumps to the Soviet invasion and summarizes the war conducted by the mujahedeen against Soviet troops.  Gopal continues with greater depth in confronting events as the United States ignored the emerging civil war that took place between 1992 and 1996 and turned away from Afghanistan to pursue other interests.  Gopal’s discussion of the Taliban’s refusal to turn over Osama Bin-Laden after 9/11 receives detailed treatment as does the American invasion and the evolution of the war in Afghanistan through 2013.  Gopal’s historical treatment is insightful on its own, but what separates his approach from others is his concentration on the indigenous perspective.

The first individual we meet is Mullah Cable, whose real name is Akbar Gul, a Taliban disciplinarian before 9/11 who fought against the Northern Alliance.  Gopal asks how such a person declared war against the United States.  He goes on to say that “in his tale I found a history of America’s war on terror itself…a glimpse of how he and thousands like him came to…become our enemy.” (9-10) Gul witnessed the excesses of the Taliban and turned away from its leader Mullah Omar.  He also witnessed the power of American air strikes and the devastation they caused.  Unsure of what to do he would escape to Karachi, Pakistan.  The second character Gopal concentrates on is Jan Muhammad who was imprisoned and beaten by the Taliban for over a year.  A former mujahedeen commander against the Soviet Union, he emerged as the governor of Uruzgam province after the American invasion.  He befriended Hamid Karzai and eventually grew to be a powerful war lord and ally of the United States.  The third character, Heela, is perhaps the most important of Gopal’s choices.  A woman who faced Taliban extremism, the murder of her husband, maintained her dignity throughout a tumultuous period and emerges as a member of the Afghani Senate in 2011.  All three provide a different perspective that is integrated throughout the narrative as Gopal discusses events in a non-chronological fashion, and how they might have been different had the United States pursued a more enlightened policy.

(The author)

Gopal’s central argument is very simple.  American officials believed that jihadi terrorism could be defeated through the military occupation.  In the wake of 9/11 that seemed feasible.  But when one traveled through the southern Afghani countryside a different interpretation emerges.  The contradiction is embodied in the sprawling jumble of what was Kandahar Airfield, the home of Burger King, barbed wire, and internment cages.  It was the nerve center of American operations in southern Afghanistan.  Gopal points out that “a military base in a country like Afghanistan is also a web of relationships, a hub for the local economy, and a key player in the political ecosystem.” (107)  The US developed relationships with warlords throughout the region and began relying on them for intelligence.  These were mostly the same warlords who were responsible for the atrocities during the 1990s.  The problem emerged that these warlords cared more about their own power as it related to other warlords so they provided intelligence designed to get rid of their own enemies, not intelligence that would effective against the Taliban.  What repeatedly occurred was that individuals and villages that were anti-Taliban and pro-American were arrested and bombed by the Americans.  The internment cages and resulting torture that ensued resulted in little intelligence and at times the release of those individuals by the Americans with a slight apology.  Instead of building relationship that could foster confidence, in the end the US and its allies drove people into the arms of the Taliban.  A good example is Jan Muhammad, who used the United States to settle scores with tribal enemies and enrich himself and secure his own power by feeding the US false intelligence.  The US would kill, arrest, torture Muhammad’s enemies, in a sense doing his dirty work, and as long as he was loyal he could carry on under the auspices of the United States. The US conducted raids against anyone it understood to have been remotely connected to the previous Taliban regime, even after they had put down their weapons and gone home.

(Afghani refugees outside Kabul)

Gopal describes in detail the American justice and prison system developed at the Kandahar and Bagram air bases, and how they were linked to Guantanamo.  Interrogators made little attempt to reconcile existing intelligence with any fresh information that was obtained.  If you entered this system your jailers became further and further removed from the battlefield as you would be taken from place to place.  Some of the charges bordered on the absurd, i.e., being accused of supporting the Northern Alliance, an American ally.  Poor intelligence, poor coordination between different commands, and basic bureaucratic incompetence plagued American administration of the region.  This was exacerbated by being manipulated by certain “warlord types” resulting in the arrest, torture, and imprisonment of many who were actually pro-American and working for the Karzai government.  It was no wonder that by 2005 the Taliban experienced resurgence as the American presence was seen as an occupation and the Karzai government, a venal and vicious puppet of Washington.

By 2007 the United Nations “estimated that the Taliban had reclaimed control of more than half of rural Pashtun territory countrywide.  By year’s end, officials had logged more than five thousand security incidents-roadside bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, ambushes.” (207)  As we approached 2009, following his election, President Obama launched a mini-surge that was somewhat effective, but as we approach the end of the American commitment we must ask was it worth it.   For years we have known that the Karzai government was extremely corrupt and a road block for our mission, even though as we have seen, American patronage was ultimately responsible for the mess.  Gopal finds that we are repeating our errors as we try and circumvent the central government “and deal with local power brokers, unwittingly cultivating a new generation of strongmen,” who have their own agendas. (274)  By 2013 there were roughly 60-80,000 armed private security employees in the country, “almost all of them working for Afghan strongmen.  Add to this 135,000 Afghan army soldiers, 110,000 police, and tens of thousands of private militiamen working for the Afghan government, the US Special Forces, or the CIA, and you have more than 300,000 armed Afghan men all depending on US patronage.  You can’t help but wonder:  What happens when the troops leave, the bases close, and the money dries up?” (276)  You should also ask:  What would have happened had the US understood the provincial culture of the Afghan countryside better and made different decisions?

The major criticisms of Gopal’s book do not take away from its overall importance.  He spends little time on the role of Pakistan and ISI, its intelligence service that fostered Taliban terror as it pursued its own agenda in Afghanistan, while at the same time publicly supporting its ally, the United States.  The recent Taliban massacre of the school house in Peshawar shows that their double game can often bite them.  Next, the Taliban, at times comes across as a virtuous movement of oppressed ethnic Pashtuns, who are fighting a just cause against a corrupt government and an invading force.  As Kim Barker points out in her New York Times review of the book on April 25, 2014, “the sole serious Taliban massacre comes nearly three-quarters of the way through, in an account of how Talibs slaughtered a busload of Afghans on their way to find work in Iran.”

You may not agree with all of Gopal’s findings and analysis, however he presents a unique approach to his research and is well worth a read for those still trying to figure out what went wrong, and what the future of Afghanistan might be.

A WORLD ON FIRE: BRITAIN’S CRUCIAL ROLE IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR by Amanda Foreman

szfreiberger American Civil War, American Diplomatic History, American Political History Leave a comment

A WORLD ON FIRE: BRITAIN’S CRUCIAL ROLE IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR by Amanda Foreman is an amazing book.  The breadth of knowledge and research in a narrative that encompasses over 800 pages of text and 100 pages of footnotes is to be praised and warmly received.  There are numerous books written about the Civil War, but few that focus solely on the role the British played in the conflict.  The story treats the diplomacy of the war in depth ranging from the interplay between Secretary of State William Henry Seward to British Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell and British Prime Minister Henry John Temple Palmerston.  Included, are lesser figures in each country’s foreign policy establishment, the most important being Charles Francis Adams, the American Minister in London, and Richard Bickerton Pemell, Lord Lyons, the head of the British legation in Washington.  Apart from the diplomacy of the war the role of propaganda in the United Kingdom is dealt with in detail and the major characters involved who worked assiduously to try and gain British recognition of the new Confederate government on the one hand, and opponents who tried to lower the temperature between the Lincoln administration and Palmerston government.  Other important components of the book are the role of British volunteers in both Union and Confederate militaries, and the forced conscription of British citizens.  Foreman’s sources are enhanced by her use of letters and diaries from Britons who were involved in key battles and discussions during the war and it offers a different flavor that many books on the conflict seem to miss.  Forman’s work is impeccable, however at times it can be a bit drawn out and one gets the feeling that every piece of minutiae involving the British has to be included in the text.

(Union forces shelling the port city of Charleston, SC, in 1863.  Frank Vizetelly illustrator)

The author integrates all major components of the war into her narrative, but what separates her approach is her reliance on the personal stories of men like Francis Dawson, a British volunteer who joined the Confederate navy, and later army who was also present Gettysburg, and the Wilderness campaigns and was wounded during the last month of the war; Frank Vizetelly, an artist and reporter for the Illustrated London News, whose drawings permeate the entire book and was present at almost every important occurrence during the conflict.  Others whose letters and diaries proved to be wonderful source material include; Francis Charles Lawley, the pro-Confederate reporter for the London Times, Dr. Charles Mayo, a British surgeon who traveled to the United States to gain further surgical experience and wound up at Vicksburg and other major battles and whose reports reflect the death and mutilation that resulted from the intensity of the fighting.  Two other soldiers stand out in Foreman’s narrative, Sir Percy Wyndham, an English soldier of fortune who had served with Garibaldi in Italy, joined McClellan’s staff during the Peninsula campaign and later was involved in other major actions; second was Major John Fitzroy De Courcy, a former British magistrate and Crimean War veteran who Seward promoted to Colonel and fought with the 16th Ohio Volunteers.

The driving force behind the books preparation was Foreman’s goal to ascertain why progressive classes in the United Kingdom, journalists, university students, actors, social reformers and clergy felt that the Confederacy had the moral advantage over the Union during the Civil War.  Lord Palmerston summed up British opinion of the United States nicely in an 1857 comment to Lord Clarendon, “The Yankees are most disagreeable Fellows to have to do anything about any American Question….They are on the Spot, strong….totally unscrupulous and dishonest and determined somehow or other to carry their point.” (19)  Foreman’s greatest strength is her descriptive prose that captivates the reader.  She is able to ply historical details and integrate her stories into the narrative at a marvelous rate as each page has portrayed on it another wonderful vignette.  She is able to tell a story that has been told in parts by previous books, but she is able to synthesize her information in creating an immensely readable account that is very fluid and keeps the reader engaged despite the book’s length.

The first few chapters form a review of Anglo-American relations from the conclusion of the War of 1812 through the election of Abraham Lincoln.  Figures as diverse as Charles Dickens, Fanny Trollope, Harriet Beecher Stowe; and numerous politicians such as Charles Sumner and John Bright make their appearance.  Each provides their opinion of Britain or the United States and the tension that existed between the two countries.  What clearly emerges is that most Americans despised the British who they saw as an empire in decline.  From the British perspective, they looked down upon their former countrymen and what seemed to drive British opinion before the war and during its conduct was its hatred of slavery.  British hypocrisy is fully evident since their importation of cotton fueled the profitability of the south’s “peculiar institution.”

(by Frank Vizetelly)

It is clear throughout the book despite certain episodes that Palmerston’s cabinet was united and felt it was imperative for Britain to stay out of the conflict in America once Lincoln was elected.  The Palmerston government had to fight off intense pressure from southern lobbyists and certain British business men and members of Parliament to retain neutrality during the war.  British shipping interests built a number of ships for the south, including the CSS Alabama that in two years “captured or destroyed a total of sixty five U.S. ships, causing more than $5 million worth of losses to the Northern merchant marine trade.” (624)  Throughout the war the British government had to try and prevent blockade runners and ramming ships that were sold to the south from leaving British ports to be turned over to the Confederate navy.  British shipping and Union blockading of the south formed two issues that frustrated all sides and on occasion almost brought England into the conflict or at the very least recognition of the Confederacy.  The Union seizure of two southern diplomats from a British vessel in the Trent Affair was another episode that breeded great distrust between Washington and London.  Once both sides, as in most cases, realized that a working relationship between the Union and the British was much more conducive to the success of their economies accommodations were reached.

Plots abound in Foreman’s presentation.  Smuggling of ships, weapons, food, and supplies from English ports involved numerous characters ranging from the work of James Bulloch, the Chief Confederate secret service agent in England and the architect of Confederate plans to fulfill the needs of the Confederacy to Jacob Thompson, a Colonel in the Confederate army, and the head of clandestine operations in Canada.  Thompson largest operation came in November, 1864 when he wanted to purchase a steamer and convert it into a warship in Guelph, Ontario.  John Yates Beall who conducted terror raids against the north earlier in the war, would captain the ship, renamed the CSS Georgia and would try and sink the USS Michigan and create havoc along Lake Erie against undefended cities from Buffalo to Detroit. The plot failed when Lord Monck, the British Governor-General of Canada had the ship seized and a number of conspirators arrested.  Not to be considered defeated, Thompson when on with another operation this time to set fire to New York City in retaliation for Union army’s torching of buildings in the south.  The operation did set fire to a few hotels and created some panic, but overall it must be categorized as a failure.  Propaganda played a major role in the conflict and the Confederacy supplied millions of dollars to Henry Hotze, sent to London in 1862 and became the editor of the pro-Southern Index to convince the British people and government to recognize and supply the Confederacy.  He was able to befriend William Gladstone, a member of Palmerston’s cabinet and leader of the British opposition to the Tory government as well as the future Prime Minister, who became the Confederate voice for recognition within the British cabinet.  Foreman has a number of detailed descriptions of the spy operations that existed, particularly from the southern point of view.  This material is interesting and entertaining and reflects a different aspect of the war that most do not think about.

(Southern refugees encamped outside Vicksburg, July 1863, by Frank Vizetelly)

Foreman describes all the major battles and their political implications between the states, as well as how they affected British policy toward the war.  Much of this has been told in other monographs, but Foreman’s use of British citizens and their involvement in these battles presents a new and interesting perspective.  Examples include the battlefield and naval illustrations of Frank Vizetelly of Charleston’s harbor channel as Confederates deployed torpedoes, or his illustration of the fall of Fort Fisher as Wilmington fell to union forces, in addition to the many Punch cartoons that are interspersed in the narrative; as well as the opinions offered by William Howard Russell of The Times as he described the southern mindset as one of delusion and naiveté as they dealt with their prospects of victory.  Dr. Charles Mayo’s descriptions of the injuries sustained at Antietam and Gettysburg provide further insights into the concept of total and technological warfare that did not exist before 1861.  On April 2, 1863, Francis Lawley unburdened himself to in a letter to a British MP concerning the bread riots in Richmond.  “The Confederate capital was a microcosm of the many hardships being endured in the south; hunger, and disease were spreading.  Smallpox had invaded the poorer neighborhoods as more refugees arrived…” (424) Lawley further stated after a brief visit to Charleston after the battle of Wilmington, “that the empty streets reminded him of Boccaccio’s description of Florence after the Black Death.” (726)

Federal troops retreating at the first battle of Bull Run, 1861, by Frank Vizetelly)

Foreman delves into the thought processes and analysis of the major characters in the conflict.  She spends a great deal of time trying to explain the actions of Secretary of State Seward as he seemed to alternate between bellicosity and conciliation on a daily basis in dealing with the British.  Less time is spent on Lincoln than in most studies and there is little that is new here, but her portrayal of Jefferson Davis is intriguing as she delves into his personal life and fears as realized by the Spring of 1864 that his policies that were based on achieving British recognition, the pressure from British labor who were suffering because of lost jobs due to a lack of cotton, and the expectation that Robert E. Lee would deliver military victories that would result in independence had all fallen by the wayside.  Foreman has an excellent chapter dealing with Davis’ support for changing northern opinion by raids from Canada that would also provoke a war between the Union and England.  This did not pan out as Palmerston withstood pressure from Parliament to at least mediate the war that would have allowed the south to maintain slavery.  But, it was the slavery issue that the south could never overcome, though Davis, desperate after Sherman had ravaged Savannah and Wilmington was about to collapse on December 27, 1864 sent an emissary to London to offer to abolish slavery in return for recognition of the South.  In reality, the offer was moot once the U.S. House of representatives ratified the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery on all American soil on January 21, 1865.

Foreman brings her narrative to a successful conclusion by providing an update on the lives her main characters following the Civil War.  Further, she goes on to discuss the outstanding issues that remained between the United States and Great Britain.  The negotiations between the two nations were at times contentious but because of the work of Charles Francis Adams and his cohorts settlements were reached.  First, the Treaty of Washington, signed on February 24, 1871  “established two tribunals, one to arbitrate the claims of private individuals against the United States for actions committed during the Civil War, the other to rule on the Alabama claims.” (802)  On September 14, 1872 the tribunal ruled that Britain owed $15.5 million plus interest for the damage caused by Confederate cruisers built and facilitated by the British.   According to Foreman, A WORLD ON FIRE was an attempt “to balance the vast body of work on Anglo-American history in the 1860s with the equally vast material left behind by witnesses and participants in the war—to depict the world as it was seen by Britons in America, Americans in Britain, during a defining moment not just in U.S. history but in the relations between the two countries,” (806)  it is quite obvious that the author has achieved her goal.

LINCOLN IN THE WORLD: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN AND THE DAWN OF AMERICAN POWER by Kevin Peraino

szfreiberger American Civil War, American Diplomatic History, Biography Leave a comment

The opening narrative of Kevin Peraino’s new book, LINCOLN IN THE WORLD: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN AND THE DAWN OF AMERICAN POWER finds the Lincolns at Ford’s theater with Mary Todd Lincoln resting her hand on her husband’s knee.  The author points out that this type of “tender” behavior was not the norm as Mrs. Lincoln was prone to spells of anger where she exhibited rather obnoxious and nasty behavior toward her husband which at times belittled him verbally for not having the wealth to take her to Europe.  She would, at times, further taunt him that her next husband would have the means to allow her to travel abroad.  In reality, Lincoln wanted to spend time “moving and traveling” overseas once his term in office was complete.  Lincoln had always wanted to visit Britain and fervently believed that the Civil War had tremendous global implications as the “Union effort was to prove to the world that popular government is not an absurdity.”  Lincoln further believed that the United States was a great empire and stood “at once the wonder and admiration of the whole world.”(1-2)

When one contemplates Lincoln’s presidency we usually point to his role in leading the North to victory on the battlefield, not any expertise or having a major impact on foreign affairs.  Peraino challenges that perception by arguing that despite the fact that his diplomatic team was frowned upon at best in European circles, Lincoln himself gave credence to that view by saying to a European diplomat at a state dinner that, “I don’t know anything about diplomacy….I will be very apt to make blunders.”  Lincoln’s State Department was able to avoid “European intervention on behalf of the Confederacy, which well have led to a Southern victory.”(5)  For all that has been written about Lincoln little has been put to paper about his conduct of diplomatic affairs.  Perhaps the best study appeared in 2010 with Howard Jones’ BLUE AND GRAY DIPLOMACY: A HISTORY OF UNION AND CONFEDERATE DIPLOMACY which is n in depth monograph encompassing most aspects of Civil War diplomacy.  Peraino’s study focuses almost exclusively on Lincoln’s role in world affairs and despite some organizational issues and awkward attempts to connect him to a number of world events and people the book is a useful addition to any Lincoln library.

Peraino conveys a great deal of interesting and informative details concerning Lincoln’s diplomatic escapades and sprinkles his narrative with some pointed analysis.  The book is thoroughly researched and posses an impressive bibliography.  Further the endnotes that are provided are exceptional resources for materials and information that are not present in the main narrative.  However, the author’s approach contain a number of drawbacks principally the way the chapters are sectioned.  The chapters are divided by pitting Lincoln against a different subject, be it English Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State William Seward, Karl Marx, Louis Napoleon III, and Lincoln himself.  The book makes no attempt at presenting itself as a comprehensive history of Civil War diplomacy as it focuses totally on Lincoln, but the detailed mini-biographies of each of the president’s “opponents” shifts attention away from the president and the author also has an annoying technique of trying to link each “oppositional” relationship by providing a ‘tease’ in the last paragraph of each chapter.

I agree with Peraino that the Mexican War was a turning point in Lincoln’s maturity as a diplomatic thinker and in a larger sense America’s place in the world.  Nothing in Lincoln’s background prepared him for the “donnybrook” that developed over his war views.  The election of 1844 was a referendum on American expansionism and a foreign policy awakening for Lincoln who would later favor the war effort when he later ran for Congress.  The major changes in technology preceding this period proved to be the” facilitator of American nationalism and continental ambition” that seemed to dominate the political discourse throughout the 1840s.(35)  Lincoln found himself in a quandary as he did not want to upset the sectional balance that existed between the free and slave states, but he could not ignore the war’s popularity.  Upon his election Lincoln joined the congressional opposition to the war.  He believed that the Mexicans had not done anything to provoke war and that President James Polk’s actions were unconstitutional as the power to declare war rested with the legislative branch.  Lincoln introduced his controversial “Spot Resolution” to determine exactly where the incident that launched the war was located, strongly suggesting that the war was caused by an American provocation.  For Lincoln the war resulted in a major problem, the addition of new territory that the south could claim for slavery thus undoing the balance of free and slave states, and the continued heated debate that over slavery that preceded the Civil War.  By the time Lincoln left Congress after one term he had learned a series of lessons.  He realized he needed a more nuanced approach to foreign affairs because territorial expansion would continue thus fostering the need to constantly rebalance the ratio of free and slave states.  Further, Lincoln believed that Polk had overstepped the bounds of executive authority in going to war.  It would take the Civil War for Lincoln to realize that in extraordinary circumstances the president must employ a strong hand.

When Lincoln assumed office European foreign ministers held a very low opinion of the new American president.  In fact the Russian envoy to the United States, Eduard de Stoeckl’s view of Lincoln was quite representative of his colleagues when he said, “Mr. Lincoln does not seem to posses the talent and energy that his party attributed to him when it named him its candidate for the presidency….Even his supporters admit that he is a man of unimpeachable integrity but of a poor capacity.”(103)  Opinions of Lincoln did not change his approach to foreign affairs as he was immediately faced with the issue of foreign intervention or recognition once the Confederacy was launched. The southern cotton trade was a delicate issue since Britain was so dependent on southern cotton for its mills.  Lincoln chose to blockade the southern coast and do nothing to aggravate any European power as a means of promoting their neutrality.

(Lincoln’s Secretary of State, William Henry Seward)

Lincoln’s Secretary of State William Seward agreed with this policy though Lincoln tended to have to reign in his remarks at times.  Peraino’s depiction of the Lincoln-Seward relationship does not really add anything new to the history of the period.  When Lincoln assumed office he needed Seward for the State Department as he viewed the office as critical for his cabinet to have legitimacy.  At the outset Seward believed that he should have been elected president and he was superior to Lincoln in experience and that he would make policy through the president.  With so many issues to confront almost immediately, i.e., instituting a blockade of the south, pursuing neutrality with Spain over Santo Domingo, reigning in abolitionists in order not to cause the border states to secede, the president and Secretary of State’s views began to converge and in a relatively short period of time Seward grew to respect Lincoln, and Lincoln’s trust in Seward increased markedly.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book involves Lincoln’s relationship with Lord Palmerston.  Lincoln believed that swift military success would block any British attempt at interference in American affairs.  However, this was not to be and Lincoln’s fallback position was to develop a strong navy and institute a firm blockade to send a message to the British Prime Minister.  Peraino provides a brief biography of Palmerston and elaborates on his low opinion of Americans and Lincoln in particular.  The situation was exacerbated when an American ship stopped the HMS Trent in Caribbean waters and seized two Confederate diplomats, John Slidell and James Mason.  Lincoln’s approach was to calm the situation by drawing it out and letting the British let off steam.  This episode is presented in detail and both sides came to the realization that a war between the two would prove disasterous to both nations.  Lincoln had decided to release the two men, but took his time to prepare those in the United States who wanted to stand up to the British no matter the consequences.  Peraino’s analysis is dead on in quoting Oxford scholar, Jay Sexton in that “the creditor-debtor relationship of Britain and the United States bonded the two nations together and gave them the common interest of avoiding war.  Succumbing to momentary passions or old grudges would prove counterproductive.”(127)

(British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston)

Peraino correctly credits Lincoln with a number of innovations that contributed to the Union victory.  With the North facing bleak finances by the second year of the war and with European banks refusing to grant credit, Lincoln and his cabinet decided to issue a national paper currency, that Congress eventually approved by passing the Legal tender Act.  Further a national income tax was implemented easing monetary issues as well as the creation of a new National Bank in 1863.  “These sweeping modernizations of the nation’s financial system were critical prerequisites to America’s rise to world power.”(163)  The other major innovation was the building of the Monitor, the first iron clad naval vessel that the United States launched causing “the London Times [to worry] that the innovation had made Britain’s fleet of 149 ‘first class warships’ obsolete.”(165)

The chapter dealing with Karl Marx is really a stretch since the two never interacted directly.  Lincoln may have read some of Marx’s articles in the New York Herald Tribune for whom he wrote opinion pieces but it was not necessary to bring in a mini-Marx biography and integrate his views on slavery and revolution into the narrative.  At the outset of the war Lincoln was concerned with keeping border states neutral.  This concern also helped formulate his views on free labor and American commerce.  Comparing Marx’s views to Lincoln does not enhance the narrative nor do events that lead up to the Emancipation Proclamation.  Marx had no influence on Lincoln’s decision making leading up to the issuing of the document.  The “pseudo” Union success at Antietam as a vehicle to exhibit Northern military prowess for Britain to keep her neutral was much more important.  Lincoln came to view the Emancipation Proclamation as a vehicle to gain the support of British workers who believed that they worked for slave wages.  Lincoln went so far as sending funds to help organize British worker rallies in support of the northern cause.  Any fears that the proclamation might provoke intervention were really offset by events in Europe as Prussia invaded the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein,  Austria and Italy were in the midst of a major conflict, and Polish revolutionaries were active with the support of the French against Russian rule, but this does not stop Peraino from insisting that the proclamation led Louis Napoleon III to intervene in Mexico in 1863.  Linking the proclamation and the French Emperor’s actions is another connection that does not measure up to sound historical analysis.

(French Emperor, Louis Napoleon III)

Peraino’s chapter that deals with Louis Napoleon III’s unfortunate attempt to revisit French holdings in the new world by placing Austrian Arch Duke Maximlian on a Mexican throne has little if any relationship to Lincoln’s issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation.  The author’s discussion of Louis’s ego and delusions concerning French power is spot on though there is an over reliance on Jasper Ridley’s dual biography of Louis and his wife, Eugenie in cataloguing his life before he seized power.*  Louis never believed that the North could force the South to return to the federal union so he decided to take advantage of the Mexican debt situation to rekindle his long held goal of reestablishing French colonies in the new world.  What is most interesting is that Louis’ actions fostered a movement to bring the Confederacy back into the fold through a joint expedition to evict the French from Mexico.  This actually led to a meeting between Lincoln, Seward, and Alexander Stephens, the Confederate Vice President on February 2, 1865 that came to naught.  These types of details make Peraino’s narrative exciting, but overall his linkage to Lincoln’s emancipation announcement on January 1, 1863 does little to foster historical accuracy.  The key for Lincoln and the Union was success on the battlefield, which Sherman’s March through Georgia provided, leading to Lincoln’s reelection which forced Louis’ to reduce his support for his Mexican venture.  In fact, by this time Louis had almost totally abandoned Maximilian as he began to withdraw French troops, and ultimately the Austrian Arch Duke was captured and shot by Mexican forces.

(Lincoln and his secretary and confidante, John Hay)

Peraino’s final chapter is a misnomer, Lincoln v. Lincoln is a summary of Lincoln’s legacy through the post Civil War career of John Hay.  The chapter examines John Hay’s career in some detail and concludes with Hay’s belief that the roots of American power lay in a healthy economy and a brisk trade,” an idea that was consistently held by Henry Clay, Abraham Lincoln, and of course William McKinley’s Secretary of State.  My one suggestion for Mr. Peraino would be to consult the latest biography of Hay written by John Taliaferro, ALL THE GREAT PRIZES: THE LIFE OF JOHN HAY FROM LINCOLN T0 ROOSEVELT  for the latest analysis  concerning Hay’s growth as a diplomat and foreign policy thinker.

Lincoln’s handling of the Mexican fiasco reflects his command of the diplomatic game.  Peraino’s analysis is accurate as he points out that there was a natural tension in “Lincolnian foreign policy.  On the one hand, Lincoln’s moral vision represented American idealism” as he realized that slavery diminished American prestige abroad.  But at the same time he instituted a patient and cautious approach, a middle ground in his pursuit of diplomatic advantages.  Lincoln was a diplomat who knew when to threaten and then soften his pronouncements.  He knew when to be magnanimous, but at the same time putting his foot down and letting his opponent know what he would not continence as in his dealing with Louis Napoleon III.  Lincoln was the consummate balancer, effectively controlling domestic interference in the conduct of his foreign policy by members of his own party and the copperheads who sought to make peace with the south enabling them to maintain slavery.  Lincoln did an excellent job taking the measure of and preparing the American public for changes that were about to take place in administration actions, i.e., dealing with Palmerston over the Trent Affair or dealing with the French incursion into Mexico.  Lincoln should be a role model for future presidents to study how to deal with domestic and foreign policy crises and to Peraino’s credit he provides a narrative that would allow our politicians to study and learn from.

*Peraino also relies heavily on Jasper Ridley’s LORD PALMERSTON for background on the English Prime Minister.