American Political History

A WORLD ON FIRE: BRITAIN’S CRUCIAL ROLE IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR by Amanda Foreman

szfreiberger American Civil War, American Diplomatic History, American Political History Leave a comment

A WORLD ON FIRE: BRITAIN’S CRUCIAL ROLE IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR by Amanda Foreman is an amazing book.  The breadth of knowledge and research in a narrative that encompasses over 800 pages of text and 100 pages of footnotes is to be praised and warmly received.  There are numerous books written about the Civil War, but few that focus solely on the role the British played in the conflict.  The story treats the diplomacy of the war in depth ranging from the interplay between Secretary of State William Henry Seward to British Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell and British Prime Minister Henry John Temple Palmerston.  Included, are lesser figures in each country’s foreign policy establishment, the most important being Charles Francis Adams, the American Minister in London, and Richard Bickerton Pemell, Lord Lyons, the head of the British legation in Washington.  Apart from the diplomacy of the war the role of propaganda in the United Kingdom is dealt with in detail and the major characters involved who worked assiduously to try and gain British recognition of the new Confederate government on the one hand, and opponents who tried to lower the temperature between the Lincoln administration and Palmerston government.  Other important components of the book are the role of British volunteers in both Union and Confederate militaries, and the forced conscription of British citizens.  Foreman’s sources are enhanced by her use of letters and diaries from Britons who were involved in key battles and discussions during the war and it offers a different flavor that many books on the conflict seem to miss.  Forman’s work is impeccable, however at times it can be a bit drawn out and one gets the feeling that every piece of minutiae involving the British has to be included in the text.

(Union forces shelling the port city of Charleston, SC, in 1863.  Frank Vizetelly illustrator)

The author integrates all major components of the war into her narrative, but what separates her approach is her reliance on the personal stories of men like Francis Dawson, a British volunteer who joined the Confederate navy, and later army who was also present Gettysburg, and the Wilderness campaigns and was wounded during the last month of the war; Frank Vizetelly, an artist and reporter for the Illustrated London News, whose drawings permeate the entire book and was present at almost every important occurrence during the conflict.  Others whose letters and diaries proved to be wonderful source material include; Francis Charles Lawley, the pro-Confederate reporter for the London Times, Dr. Charles Mayo, a British surgeon who traveled to the United States to gain further surgical experience and wound up at Vicksburg and other major battles and whose reports reflect the death and mutilation that resulted from the intensity of the fighting.  Two other soldiers stand out in Foreman’s narrative, Sir Percy Wyndham, an English soldier of fortune who had served with Garibaldi in Italy, joined McClellan’s staff during the Peninsula campaign and later was involved in other major actions; second was Major John Fitzroy De Courcy, a former British magistrate and Crimean War veteran who Seward promoted to Colonel and fought with the 16th Ohio Volunteers.

The driving force behind the books preparation was Foreman’s goal to ascertain why progressive classes in the United Kingdom, journalists, university students, actors, social reformers and clergy felt that the Confederacy had the moral advantage over the Union during the Civil War.  Lord Palmerston summed up British opinion of the United States nicely in an 1857 comment to Lord Clarendon, “The Yankees are most disagreeable Fellows to have to do anything about any American Question….They are on the Spot, strong….totally unscrupulous and dishonest and determined somehow or other to carry their point.” (19)  Foreman’s greatest strength is her descriptive prose that captivates the reader.  She is able to ply historical details and integrate her stories into the narrative at a marvelous rate as each page has portrayed on it another wonderful vignette.  She is able to tell a story that has been told in parts by previous books, but she is able to synthesize her information in creating an immensely readable account that is very fluid and keeps the reader engaged despite the book’s length.

The first few chapters form a review of Anglo-American relations from the conclusion of the War of 1812 through the election of Abraham Lincoln.  Figures as diverse as Charles Dickens, Fanny Trollope, Harriet Beecher Stowe; and numerous politicians such as Charles Sumner and John Bright make their appearance.  Each provides their opinion of Britain or the United States and the tension that existed between the two countries.  What clearly emerges is that most Americans despised the British who they saw as an empire in decline.  From the British perspective, they looked down upon their former countrymen and what seemed to drive British opinion before the war and during its conduct was its hatred of slavery.  British hypocrisy is fully evident since their importation of cotton fueled the profitability of the south’s “peculiar institution.”

(by Frank Vizetelly)

It is clear throughout the book despite certain episodes that Palmerston’s cabinet was united and felt it was imperative for Britain to stay out of the conflict in America once Lincoln was elected.  The Palmerston government had to fight off intense pressure from southern lobbyists and certain British business men and members of Parliament to retain neutrality during the war.  British shipping interests built a number of ships for the south, including the CSS Alabama that in two years “captured or destroyed a total of sixty five U.S. ships, causing more than $5 million worth of losses to the Northern merchant marine trade.” (624)  Throughout the war the British government had to try and prevent blockade runners and ramming ships that were sold to the south from leaving British ports to be turned over to the Confederate navy.  British shipping and Union blockading of the south formed two issues that frustrated all sides and on occasion almost brought England into the conflict or at the very least recognition of the Confederacy.  The Union seizure of two southern diplomats from a British vessel in the Trent Affair was another episode that breeded great distrust between Washington and London.  Once both sides, as in most cases, realized that a working relationship between the Union and the British was much more conducive to the success of their economies accommodations were reached.

Plots abound in Foreman’s presentation.  Smuggling of ships, weapons, food, and supplies from English ports involved numerous characters ranging from the work of James Bulloch, the Chief Confederate secret service agent in England and the architect of Confederate plans to fulfill the needs of the Confederacy to Jacob Thompson, a Colonel in the Confederate army, and the head of clandestine operations in Canada.  Thompson largest operation came in November, 1864 when he wanted to purchase a steamer and convert it into a warship in Guelph, Ontario.  John Yates Beall who conducted terror raids against the north earlier in the war, would captain the ship, renamed the CSS Georgia and would try and sink the USS Michigan and create havoc along Lake Erie against undefended cities from Buffalo to Detroit. The plot failed when Lord Monck, the British Governor-General of Canada had the ship seized and a number of conspirators arrested.  Not to be considered defeated, Thompson when on with another operation this time to set fire to New York City in retaliation for Union army’s torching of buildings in the south.  The operation did set fire to a few hotels and created some panic, but overall it must be categorized as a failure.  Propaganda played a major role in the conflict and the Confederacy supplied millions of dollars to Henry Hotze, sent to London in 1862 and became the editor of the pro-Southern Index to convince the British people and government to recognize and supply the Confederacy.  He was able to befriend William Gladstone, a member of Palmerston’s cabinet and leader of the British opposition to the Tory government as well as the future Prime Minister, who became the Confederate voice for recognition within the British cabinet.  Foreman has a number of detailed descriptions of the spy operations that existed, particularly from the southern point of view.  This material is interesting and entertaining and reflects a different aspect of the war that most do not think about.

(Southern refugees encamped outside Vicksburg, July 1863, by Frank Vizetelly)

Foreman describes all the major battles and their political implications between the states, as well as how they affected British policy toward the war.  Much of this has been told in other monographs, but Foreman’s use of British citizens and their involvement in these battles presents a new and interesting perspective.  Examples include the battlefield and naval illustrations of Frank Vizetelly of Charleston’s harbor channel as Confederates deployed torpedoes, or his illustration of the fall of Fort Fisher as Wilmington fell to union forces, in addition to the many Punch cartoons that are interspersed in the narrative; as well as the opinions offered by William Howard Russell of The Times as he described the southern mindset as one of delusion and naiveté as they dealt with their prospects of victory.  Dr. Charles Mayo’s descriptions of the injuries sustained at Antietam and Gettysburg provide further insights into the concept of total and technological warfare that did not exist before 1861.  On April 2, 1863, Francis Lawley unburdened himself to in a letter to a British MP concerning the bread riots in Richmond.  “The Confederate capital was a microcosm of the many hardships being endured in the south; hunger, and disease were spreading.  Smallpox had invaded the poorer neighborhoods as more refugees arrived…” (424) Lawley further stated after a brief visit to Charleston after the battle of Wilmington, “that the empty streets reminded him of Boccaccio’s description of Florence after the Black Death.” (726)

Federal troops retreating at the first battle of Bull Run, 1861, by Frank Vizetelly)

Foreman delves into the thought processes and analysis of the major characters in the conflict.  She spends a great deal of time trying to explain the actions of Secretary of State Seward as he seemed to alternate between bellicosity and conciliation on a daily basis in dealing with the British.  Less time is spent on Lincoln than in most studies and there is little that is new here, but her portrayal of Jefferson Davis is intriguing as she delves into his personal life and fears as realized by the Spring of 1864 that his policies that were based on achieving British recognition, the pressure from British labor who were suffering because of lost jobs due to a lack of cotton, and the expectation that Robert E. Lee would deliver military victories that would result in independence had all fallen by the wayside.  Foreman has an excellent chapter dealing with Davis’ support for changing northern opinion by raids from Canada that would also provoke a war between the Union and England.  This did not pan out as Palmerston withstood pressure from Parliament to at least mediate the war that would have allowed the south to maintain slavery.  But, it was the slavery issue that the south could never overcome, though Davis, desperate after Sherman had ravaged Savannah and Wilmington was about to collapse on December 27, 1864 sent an emissary to London to offer to abolish slavery in return for recognition of the South.  In reality, the offer was moot once the U.S. House of representatives ratified the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery on all American soil on January 21, 1865.

Foreman brings her narrative to a successful conclusion by providing an update on the lives her main characters following the Civil War.  Further, she goes on to discuss the outstanding issues that remained between the United States and Great Britain.  The negotiations between the two nations were at times contentious but because of the work of Charles Francis Adams and his cohorts settlements were reached.  First, the Treaty of Washington, signed on February 24, 1871  “established two tribunals, one to arbitrate the claims of private individuals against the United States for actions committed during the Civil War, the other to rule on the Alabama claims.” (802)  On September 14, 1872 the tribunal ruled that Britain owed $15.5 million plus interest for the damage caused by Confederate cruisers built and facilitated by the British.   According to Foreman, A WORLD ON FIRE was an attempt “to balance the vast body of work on Anglo-American history in the 1860s with the equally vast material left behind by witnesses and participants in the war—to depict the world as it was seen by Britons in America, Americans in Britain, during a defining moment not just in U.S. history but in the relations between the two countries,” (806)  it is quite obvious that the author has achieved her goal.

ON HIS OWN TERMS: A LIFE OF NELSON ROCKEFELLER by Richard Norton Smith

szfreiberger American Political History, American Social History, Biography Leave a comment

Original caption: 9/16/1976– Binghamton, NY- Vice President Nelson Rockefeller gives a crowd of young hecklers an upraised middle finger gesture at the Broome County Airport during a brief stop here Sept. 16, while on a campaign trip with Vice Presidential candidate Bob Dole (L, Background, out of focus)

Today the term “Rockefeller Republican” is still considered a negative characterization to most members of the Republican Party.  The term stands for moderate republicanism that calls for fiscal prudence, but also a social conscience.  In the current political environment when a large number of Republicans are calling for the disassembling of major components of the federal government and are trying to limit people’s voting rights the ideas of Nelson Rockefeller fall on deaf ears.  For the former four time governor of New York bipartisanship and an all inclusive party were a major part of his political agenda for most of his time in office.  As most of the Rockefeller platform is unacceptable today, it suffered a similar fate in 1964 as Barry Goldwater became the Republican standard bearer against Lyndon Johnson.  Many would argue that the hatred for “Rockefeller Republicanism” by Goldwater voters was the precursor of today’s Tea Party.  If so a number of important questions must be asked.  First, how did Rockefeller’s brand of moderate Republicanism come to the fore? Second, why was it so successful in New York and rejected nationwide? Lastly, why did it provoke such an extreme reaction in 1964 that continues to this day?  In his new book, IN HIS OWN TERMS, a major new biography of Nelson Rockefeller, Richard North Smith attempts to answer these and other questions as he explores a career that included the governorship of New York, the Vice Presidency, coordinator of Inter-American affairs under Franklin Roosevelt, and one of the most generous and widely renown philanthropists of his era.

(New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller trying to address the 1964 Republican National Convention)

The portrait that Smith presents is a complex one.  Rockefeller comes across as an ideological follower of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal for a major part of his political career.   Later he would adopt a more conservative political agenda as he continued to seek the presidency on at least three separate occasions.  He comes across as a generous individual who uses his wealth to reward and assist others, but at the same time he could be a stubborn vindictive person who set out to get even with those who disagreed with him.  Domestically, Rockefeller pursued a liberal agenda, but in foreign policy he was a cold warrior, fearful of the communist threat he supported the Vietnam War for most of his political career.  On a personal level Smith describes a man who could be a caring father, but at the same time he appears as a serial philanderer.  His first marriage failed after thirty years, and after remarrying, he seemed to dote on the children of his second marriage angering those of his first.  The author explores in detail these aspects of the Rockefeller persona and career, and has written an almost encyclopedic biography of one of the most interesting political figures of the twentieth century.

Smith describes his thirteen year odyssey in writing this biography.  Its coverage is impressive as he conducted numerous interviews and thoroughly mined the attendant secondary and primary sources.  The result is extensive coverage of his subject that brings the reader into the Rockefeller family dating back to its founder John D. Rockefeller.  We witness the wealth that was available to Nelson Rockefeller and how he employed it to satisfy his almost obsessive need to acquire art, design and build numerous residences and public buildings, caring for his many associates and friends when they were in need, and of course, procure his own election as governor on four separate occasions.  Rockefeller was a “serial” believer in forming committees and/or commissions made up of the leading experts on whatever topic was of interest to him.  Each role he was tasked, be it, as coordinator for Latin American affairs under FDR, an emissary for Richard Nixon to Latin America, a study to ascertain the best way to rebuild Albany, NY, develop a way to improve the welfare system in New York as well as well as nationally, along with numerous others, Rockefeller in most cases funded these activities with his own money and many of the solutions that emerged, i.e., revenue sharing and enhancing John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress were adopted by different presidential administrations.

In a book of this length there are many themes and storylines.  One that seems to dominate is the evolution of Nelson Rockefeller from a liberal approach to social policy, whereby he was willing to push through increases in taxes, fees and other sources of revenue to implement them.  Rockefeller supported a myriad of social programs from improvements in Medicaid, purification of water resources, women’s rights, the first state minimum wage law, to the implementation of civil rights legislation.  Rockefeller’s approach to executive leadership and legislative tactics are reviewed as well as his philosophy of government.  What emerges is the type of governor that New York hadn’t seen since FDR.  With the message of taking responsibility for developing problems for the future, he would tackle issues in the present so they would not become problems down the road.  The issue was his overly ambitious approach to executive leadership always risked alienating conservatives west of the Hudson River.  With a strategy that would evolve from a “pay as you go” philosophy that would bring revenues into line with expenditures, “thereby eliminating costly borrowing and setting the stage for renewed economic growth,” Rockefeller evolved into to a governor who blew up the state budget to meet the needs of his massive infrastructure and building expenses in addition to the budget shortfalls of New York City by borrowing and floating different bond proposals.  By the time Rockefeller reached the end of his third term in office and was elected to his fourth term he became increasingly fiscally conservative as he faced opposition from the state legislature and probably realized that the political current of the late sixties and early seventies would not help any presidential ambitions he might have if he did not change.  Another major storyline that dominated Rockefeller his entire life that permeates the book was his life long battle with dyslexia.  The governor was not aware that he suffered from this affliction, but whether he was attending the Lincoln School in New York, Dartmouth College, or just trying to keep up with the massive amount of reading that a state executive engaged in it was always a battle.  With his wealth as a cushion, Rockefeller was able to employ numerous individuals to assist in this process whether in preparation of legislation or developing auditory strategies to overcome his reading difficulties.

There are a number of fascinating aspects to Smith’s approach to his subject as he prepared  expansive footnotes at the bottom of each page providing the reader with ancillary information that was not available in the text.  Rockefeller’s private opinions of the likes of John Lindsay and Richard Nixon emerge in a very “colorful” fashion which made the mining of these footnotes quite entertaining.  Smith’s discussion of deeply personal issues is not blanched over.  The breakup of Rockefeller’s marriage to Mary Todhunter Clark (Tod) was detailed and very fair as was the coverage of his remarriage to Margaretta “Happy” Murphy.  The loss of his son Michael during an expedition to collect primitive art in a remote part of New Guinea shows a father who has to deal emotionally with a loss of a son.  The relationship of the Rockefeller brothers and their children receives a great deal of attention and produces many interesting insights into the dynamic of such a public family.  Importantly, Smith does not mince words or coverage in dealing with Rockefeller’s numerous extracurricular activities with numerous women throughout his marriages.  In fact we witness a scandal at the site of Rockefeller’s death as to how his body was treated by those who were with him and the medical papers that were prepared to spare the family any embarrassment.

Aside from the personal aspects of the Rockefeller story, Smith devotes a great deal of effort in explaining what drove Rockefeller.  He was an avid and meticulous collector of modern and primitive art and he set as a goal the creation of a museum to house modern art that he would proudly help establish with the creation of the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA).  The second area that fascinated Rockefeller was politics and how it could be used to help people and better his country, a career path that would dominate his life for over forty years.  The fact that Rockefeller realized that as a scion of wealth he did not have to worry about “ordinary things,” therefore he was motivated to pursue the extraordinary.  Rockefeller’s battles to create MoMA were his trial by fire, a learning course in the art of political infighting.  This would also be the case in the creative process and building of Rockefeller Center as he would take lessons  learned from these confrontations and apply them in the future in his fights with the legislature, opponents such as New York Mayors John Lindsay and Robert Wagner, as well as national political battles.  In dealing with transit and garbage strikes, prison issues including the riots and death at Attica, infrastructure and other building projects, Rockefeller’s learning curve was applied to many crises.

Rockefeller’s other area of interest was foreign policy, and Latin America in particular.  His approach to western hemispheric issues was ahead of his time.  It began as a strategy to block Nazi Germany’s inroads in Mexico and South America.  He agreed with FDR that hemispheric solidarity was the key to changing the perception that the United States was seen as a colonizer in the region.  In 1942 Rockefeller unveiled his “Basic Economy Program” that called for improvement in the region’s public health problems.  Rockefeller arranged training for hundreds of professional nurses to assist in creating medical clinics in outlying areas.  Further,  he worked to export penicillin to offset disease in the region.  “In four years, Rockefeller agents trained more than ten thousand in-service workers, nurses, doctors, midwives, sanitary engineers, and home demonstration agents.”(164)  Rockefeller engaged in a fierce bureaucratic battle with “Wild” Bill Donavan, the head of the Office of Strategic Services at the end of the war over policy toward Latin America.  After the war facing the fight against communism, Rockefeller was a proponent of foreign aid to the region, but his approach was geared to offset the sensibilities of the countries receiving it to avoid the charactiture of “Yankee Imperialism” that OSS policy seemed to engender.  Rockefeller’s sensitivity toward third world countries should not take away from his fervent anticommunism, particularly in dealing with Vietnam where he was a strong supporter of Lyndon Johnson and was able to develop a close working relationship with the president.

Smith does yeoman’s work in describing Rockefeller’s campaigns for governor and president.  In both areas Rockefeller’s wealth and ability to obtain the necessary support for his candidacies was ever present.  The elective success he experienced in New York could not be replicated on the national stage as the Republican Party shifted to the right throughout the nineteen sixties.  His battle against Goldwater in 1964 made him an enemy to conservative republicans and his indecision in 1968 cost him any hope of wresting the republican nomination away from Richard Nixon, which also destroyed any candidacy for 1972.  His hopes improved after he was chosen vice-president by Gerald Ford following the resignation of Richard Nixon, but any hope of influencing the Ford presidency was offset by major disagreements with Ford’s Chief of Staff, Donald Rumsfeld who would block Rockefeller at every turn over policy and political decisions.  Any hope of higher office was dashed in 1976 as Rockefeller’s support for civil rights and the Voting Rights Act made him a political liability with conservative republicans in the south and resulted in the candidacy of Robert Dole for Vice-President on the 1976 Republican presidential ticket.

Overall, Nelson Rockefeller enjoyed an amazing life.  Art connoisseur, benefactor to countless individuals, a mostly progressive governor, and an influential and sometimes polarizing national figure for decades.  Richard Norton Smith gives attention to all these aspects of Rockefeller’s life and has written an in depth and informative biography that I am certain will be the definitive work on an illustrious career for many years to come.

BLUE-EYED BOY: A MEMOIR by Robert Timberg

szfreiberger American Political History, American Social History, Biography, Cold War, Military History, Vietnam Leave a comment

(Author Robert Timberg during a book presentation)

As most are aware the Vietnam War has left many scars on those who fought the war and the American people in general.  With 58,000 men dead and roughly 270,000 wounded, many like the author, Robert Timberg suffered life changing injuries that affect them psychologically and physically to this day.  Mr. Timberg, a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, and a Marine Corps officer suffered second and third degree burns to his face and parts of his body on January 18, 1967 when his armored vehicle went over a North Vietnamese land mine in the vicinity of Da Dang, just thirteen days before he was to be cycled out of the war theater as his thirteen month tour was drawing to a close.  Mr. Timberg has written a long delayed memoir dealing with his experiences in Vietnam, his recovery, and his career which was a major component in trying to recapture some sort of normality.

(Timberg writing a letter home from Vietnam)

The book, BLUE-EYED BOY: A MEMOIR is written on multiple levels.  It is an emotionally captivating story by an individual who wages a courageous battle to regain some semblance of what he lost on that fateful day when delivering a payroll to another unit his vehicle hit a land mine.  The book is also a personal journey that takes him through numerous hospitals and thirty five operations with the support of two wonderful women, his first wife, Janie, who Timberg credits for his level of recovery and the family and career he is most proud of.  He readily admits that he was responsible for the end of their marriage and how poorly he treated her.  The other woman, his second wife, Kelly, allowed him to continue his recovery and develop a successful journalism career.  Unfortunately for Timberg, they too could not keep their marriage together.  The last major thread is how Timberg repeatedly lashes out against those individuals that did not go to Vietnam and as he states found, “legal and illegal ways” to avoid doing their duties as Americans.  Despite repeated denials that he is past those negative feelings and no matter how much he pushes his bitterness below the surface employing the correct verbiage of an excellent writer, his ill feelings towards a good part of his generation repeatedly bubbles to the surface.

(Timberg being evacuated from Da Nang area after his vehicle hit a land mine, January 18, 1967)

This memoir is very timely in light of the type of injuries that American soldiers have sustained in Iraq and Afghanistan for the last twelve years.  It brings a message of hope for the future based on Timberg’s remarkable recovery and the success he has enjoyed as a reporter and a writer.  Our wounded veterans face a long road to recovery and Timberg’s story could be a wonderful model that they can try to emulate.  The first two-thirds of the book for me were the most interesting.  Timberg lays his life out for all to see.  His emotions which seemed to rise and fall with each sunrise and sunset are heart rendering.  His descriptions of his treatment with multiple skin grafts and surgeries are a testament to his perseverance.  His tenacity and ability to overcome most of the obstacles that were placed in front of him are truly amazing.  We learn a great deal about the Naval Academy and the United States Marine Corps and what they stand for.  Timberg takes the reader through many stages of recovery by interspersing his relationships with those who are most responsible for his making him whole, his first wife, Janie, and Dr. Lynn Ketchum, the surgeon who like a sculptor put Timberg’s facial features back together as best he could.  Despite his recovery, throughout this period his loss of identity constantly tugged at him, even as he earned the satisfaction of a successful career, but the loss of identity seemed to always be under the surface.  Once Timberg reaches the end of his period of recovery, he must leave “the cocoon of the hospital to home cycle” of constantly undergoing surgery and recovery.  For Timberg it was very difficult, but finally with Janie’s assistance he is able to overcome his fears and earn a Master’s Degree in Journalism at Stanford University and begin his career as a reporter in Annapolis.  That career would lead to a Nieman Fellowship, positions at the Baltimore Evening Standard, and the Baltimore Sun.  Timberg became a leading White House correspondent, and the author of three very important books.

The one area of the book I have difficulty accepting is the sections that deal with the germination of the ideas for the book THE NIGHTENGALE’S SONG, and how the book was finally conceived and reached fruition.  It was fascinating how Timberg pulled together such disparate personalities as John McCain, James Webb, John Poindexter, Robert McFarlane, and Oliver North to create narrative dynamic that made sense.  What sparked this dynamic was the Iran-Contra scandal that rocked President Reagan’s second term in office.  Timberg was able to parlay the scandal and the personalities just mentioned into a coherent and interesting monograph.  I remember when the book was published and after reading it I wondered if Timberg had an agenda that called for damning those who were able to avoid serving in Vietnam, and blaming the prosecution of the Iran-Contra scandal on the media and members of Congress who figured out ways to remain out of the military during the war.

Timberg’s judgment is deeply flawed in attacking, what seems to be everyone who did not fight in Vietnam for pursuing the Iran-Contra scandal.  I understand that he suffered unbelievable horrors as a result of his military service and significant emotional issues remain.  However, his inner drive to become the person he was before he was seriously wounded has clouded his judgment to the point where he deeply hurt, Janie, his first wife, the woman who was mostly responsible for making himself whole as he recovered.  His comments dealing with the need to find another woman to have sex with aside from his wife to see if he could find another person who was attracted to him is deeply troublesome.  It was thoughts like this and leaving her alone with three children for a great deal of time reflects poorly on Timberg no matter how courageous he was.  As Timberg researches and writes THE NIGHTENGALE’S SONG, his obsession with those who did not fight in Vietnam comes to the fore completely.  Though there are repeated denials in the book his understandable prejudice against “draft dodgers,” etc. is readily apparent, i.e., his convoluted logic of going after people who believe that Iran-Contra was a major crime and resulted in violation of the constitutional and legislative prerogatives of Congress, aside from the cover-up and outright lying the of the Reagan administration with a vengeance.  By explaining away the scandal by raising the question; “was Iran-Contra the bill for Vietnam finally coming due?” for me, is a bit much and cannot explain away the illegal acts that North, Poindexter, and McFarlane committed no matter how hard Timberg tries.  For the author it seems like everyone who did not go to Vietnam used money and connections to avoid serving.  Further, those who did not serve, “much of the rest of that generation came up with novel ways to leave the fighting and dying to others.”(213)  Timberg quotes from Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Srauss’ excellent analysis of the draft, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE to buttress his arguments, however if he revisits objectively the Pentagon statistics that the authors quote he will find that not all who did not serve in Vietnam committed acts that Timberg finds reprehensible  There are millions who were involved in defense related jobs, duty in the United State Army Reserves and the National Guard, had legitimate medical deferments, or were conscientious objectors.  I agree a significant numbers did avoid service and Baskir and Strauss put the number of draft offenders at about 570,000, accused draft offenders at 209, 517, with about 3250 actually imprisoned.  We must also keep in mind that of the 26,800,000 men of the Vietnam generation, 6,465,000 served but never went to Southeast Asia, and of the 15,980,000 who never served in the military 15,410,000 were deferred, exempted or disqualified -all cannot be painted with the broad brush of being draft dodgers as Timberg seems to strongly intimate.*

Overall, Timberg is correct, Vietnam is still a raw nerve for a generation that witnessed men rallying to the flag, and men who felt the war was wrong.  As history has borne out the American people were lied to by the Johnson administration and the government in general.  I respect Mr. Timberg’s service, the wonderful career he used as a vehicle to become whole again, and I find that he is an exceptional author, who at times goes a bit overboard in his attempt to rationalize why people avoided service in the war.  The book is a superb read, deeply emotional and for my generation dredges up a great deal and provokes deep thought concerning how the experience of the Vietnam War still affects American foreign policy and the conduct of combat to this day.

*See Lawrence M. Baskir & William A. Strauss CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, p. 5 for an excellent chart that is reflected in the figures presented.

LIAR TEMPTRESS SOLDIER SPY: FOUR WOMEN UNDERCOVER DURING THE CIVIL WAR by Karen Abbott

szfreiberger American Civil War, American Political History, American Social History, Biography 2 Comments

 

 

 

(Photo of Belle Boyd, the rabid secessionist and successful Civil War spy)

When I read a title that sounds like a John Le Carre novel, I am always intrigued. Karen Abbott’s new book, LIAR TEMPTRESS SOLDIER SPY: FOUR WOMEN UNDERCOVER IN THE CIVIL WAR has many elements of the espionage master’s work and she weaves a series of wonderful stories into a historical narrative that could pass for fiction.  The book Abbott has written explores the role of women during the Civil War, an area that has not been addressed sufficiently by historians.  Her work is less about the contribution of women in general who performed domestic tasks for confederate and union forces, but mostly about the lives of four women who played prominent roles during the war; Rose O’Neal Greenhow and Belle Boyd who supported secession, and Elizabeth Van Lew and Emma Edmonds who remained loyal to the union.  All four women engaged in espionage during the war, and their lives reflect their own personal dangers in addition to the death and destruction that they witnessed during the “war between the states.”  In telling the stories of these heroines, Abbott integrates important aspects of the political and military history of the war into her narrative very effectively as each statement or document that appears is supported by by her research, though there are a number of places in the narrative when she appears to take some poetic license as she quotes from works of fiction as if they were accurate sources.

For the reader who sets out to read Abbott’s historical monograph they will find that, at times, it reads like an espionage thriller.  As they progress in the book they will meet many important historical characters, including; General Stonewall Jackson, General George McClellan, Detective Alan Pinkerton, Abraham Lincoln, Louis Napoleon III among many others.  The book is organized chronologically with alternating chapters dealing with each of the subject women.  At times this approach can be confusing, and perhaps each woman could have been dealt with separately to create greater cohesion and then a chapter or two discussing how their lives may have interacted.  None the less the book is a quick and interesting read and focuses attention on four unsung heroes who can now be seen in a new light.

(Photo of Sarah Emma Edmonds, Union spy who changed her sex identity during the Civil War)

What separates Abbott’s account of the war is her in depth portrayal of her subjects and how they used their own inner resources to place themselves at risk in promoting the cause they believed in and were willing to die for.  The first, Belle Boyd, a charismatic character, who loved the limelight and had a force of personality that dominated most situations she found herself in.  Raised in Martinsburg, Va. she was a staunch secessionist who abhorred the union.  She engaged in numerous plots to acquire intelligence for the confederacy and employed her saucy, feminine whiles with men to gain whatever she needed.  Her life is fascinating and is worthy of her own biography.  Perhaps her lowest moment in the war, aside from the defeat the south suffered was the secession of western Virginia, including her own home county of Berkley, forming the state of West Virginia.  Second we meet Emma Edmondson, Canadian women who wanted to join the union army.  The strategy she adopted was to assume the identity of a man named Frank Thompson and when she survived her physical exam she joined Company F, 2nd Michigan infantry.  She began as a male nurse and soon became a mail currier and  spy for the union.  She kept her identity secret from everyone but two soldiers she served with that she fell in love with.  She survived a great deal of combat and was very effective.  Throughout the war she feared someone above her in rank would discover her true sex more than she feared death.  Her life is also an amazing story and she did write her own memoir entitled; MEMOIRS OF A SOLDIER, NURSE AND SPY! A WOMAN’S ADVENTURES IN THE UNION ARMY.  Third, is the life of Rose O’Neal Greenhow who lived in Washington, DC and was counted on by the Confederacy to obtain as much intelligence as possible.  She was friends with Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard and headed a spy ring prone to “indiscretions” with men.  She worshiped Southern senator, John C. Calhoun of South Carolina and mirrored his political views.  She had a number of lovers, the most important of which was Henry P. Wilson, an abolitionist Republican who was  the union Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee.  She has been credited with providing the intelligence that allowed the confederacy to defeat the union army at the first Battle of Bull Run (Manassas).  During the course of her career she was arrested a few times and served short prison sentences in Washington at the Capitol Prison.  After being exiled to the south she was sent by Jefferson Davis to England and France to try and gain recognition of the Confederacy by these nations.  On her return to the United States her blockade running ship was intercepted by the Union Navy. Lastly, and probably the most impactful of the four women on the course of the war was Elizabeth Van Lew, a wealthy society woman, and a strong unionist who lived in Richmond.  Her career as a spy was fraught with danger since most of her neighbors and politicians in the confederate capitol knew her wartime sympathies.  There were numerous attempts to try and catch her, by searching her mansion which became a union safe house, constant searches by detectives, and numerous attempts at entrapment.  Despite all of these obstacles she organized and ran the Richmond spy ring and its conduit to the Underground Railroad for escaped slaves and union soldiers to the north, and maintained a “secret room” upstairs in her mansion as a transshipment point for those fleeing the south.  General Grant, grateful for her work sent her a personal note: “you have sent me the most valuable information received from Richmond during  the war.”  Grant awarded her the position of Postmaster General of Richmond during his presidency to try and compensate her for all the  wealth that was poured into the northern cause during the war.

(Photo of Rose Greenhow, a Confederate spy during the Civil War and her daughter and part time currier, “Little Rose”)

It is not my purpose to recapitulate Abbott’s narrative but they are a myriad of interesting and surprising revelation that she brings to the fore.  Since women were not allowed to serve in the union army and there really was no military legal precedent for what to charge them should they be caught, union military officials would kick them out of the army under the charge of prostitution.  There were about 300-400 women in the union army during the Civil War, and Abbott tells a number of stories dealing with their plight.  In addition, the author relates the activities of Detective Alan Pinkerton who was in charge of union espionage for part of the war.  The role of detectives emerges throughout the narrative and how they interacted with Boyd, Greenhow, and Van Lew.  We witness a blend of societal graciousness and hospitality on all sides, but at the same time Abbott is letting the reader know what each character thought.  The chapter that deals with Pinkerton’s arrest of Rose Greenhow is priceless.  Abbott describes in detail the house search and how Greenhow was able to finagle documents into the hands of her eight year old daughter, “Little Rose,” as the conduit to avoid detection by Pinkerton’s agents and getting the intelligence to sources outside her home.  Even under constant surveillance Greenhow continue to spy for the Confederacy employing her daughter as her currier.  Another important vignette that Abbott discusses is how Elizabeth Van Lew, a friend of Confederate President Jefferson Davis’ wife is able to convince her to take on one of her freed slaves as a servant in the Confederate White House.  As the war turns against the Confederacy, Davis, for a time, is at a loss as to how Union spies seem to know military plans soon after he had conferred with General Robert E. Lee,  or other southern generals.  The work of Van Lew’s servant, Mary Jane, was certainly an important contribution to the Union cause.

(Photo of Elizabeth Van Lew, a Richmond socialite who spied for the Union during the Civil War.  A woman who was widely praised by General U.S. Grant)

Karen Abbott has certainly done a service to the memory of four women who were under cover during the Civil War.  It makes for an excellent read and I recommend it to Civil War buffs and those interested in an aspect of women’s history that few are familiar with.  As Elizabeth Van Lew alluded to after the war, women made major contributions to the northern victory but when it came for them to receive military pensions they had to beg men for what was due them, because they did not have the vote.

CHASING SHADOWS: THE NIXON TAPES, THE CHENNAULT AFFAIR, AND THE ORIGINS OF WATERGATE by Ken Hughes

szfreiberger American Political History, Biography Leave a comment

(Richard M. Nixon boarding a helicopter at the White House on August 9, 1974 after he resigned the presidency)

During the summer of 1973, while in graduate school, I found myself transfixed by the Watergate hearings that were broadcast live each day.  For me it became almost a soap opera with the revelations of Nixon administration misdeeds.  Once Nixon resigned, the battle for the Watergate tapes continued. After the 37th president passed away, the federal government gradually released more of the Nixon tapes resulting in a thorough record of what went on in the Nixon White House between February 16, 1971 and July 12, 1973 when over 3432 hours of tapes were produced.  What we learned before Ken Hughes new book CHASING SHADOWS: THE NIXON TAPES, THE CHENNAULT AFFAIR, AND THE ORIGINS OF WATERGATE was disconcerting enough for the American public, but now as Mr. Hughes, a journalist who is a researcher at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center Presidential Program, since 2000 culled these documents reaching the conclusion that is even more damning concerning Nixon’s abuse of power than the original tapes that were released in the 1970s.  In October, 1969, Joseph McGuinnis wrote in his book, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 about the “new” Nixon, and the “old Nixon.”  According to Mr. McGinnis, the “new” Nixon was prepackaged as a candidate to avoid the “out bursts” and other political errors the former Vice-President had made in past elections that represented the “old” Nixon.  What emerges from Hughes detailed study is the reemergence of the “old Nixon on steroids,” as his political paranoia, hatred for those who made him look bad, anti-Semitism, and general nastiness is invariably documented on each page.

At the outset the author asks the question that after 40 years what we could possibly not have been exposed to concerning Watergate.  Hughes concludes “that the origins of Watergate extend deeper than we previously knew to encompass a crime committed to elect Nixon in the first place.” (x)  The first section of the book focuses on the Chennault Affair which by any standard was an act of treason against the American people.  At the time rumors abounded in Washington after the election of 1968 that there were members of the Nixon campaign, and probably Nixon himself who interfered with the Vietnam peace negotiations then in progress in Paris.   President Johnson wrestled with the idea of an unconditional bombing halt since March 31, 1968 when he announced he would not seek reelection.  Negotiations in Paris focused on the details of such a bombing halt and the Nixon campaign feared an “October Surprise,”[i] a few days before the election that would allow Vice-President Hubert Humphrey to defeat Nixon, who had led by 18 points in the polls in September, 1968.  According to Hughes, who produces records of conversations and other damning evidence describing meetings and phone calls between members of the Nixon campaign staff and Bui Diem, the South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States, whereby they promised South Vietnam’s President, Nguyen Van Thieu a better deal if he would muck up the negotiations and wait until Nixon was President.  During the week before the election North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris actually move slightly closer to the Johnson administration position on the bombing pause and it seemed as if a deal was at hand.  Suddenly, Thieu informed Washington that there were aspects of the deal he could not support thus causing the deal to collapse.  Hughes provides proof that the emissary between the Nixon campaign and the South Vietnamese government was Anna Chan Chennault, (the spouse of Lt. General Claire L. Chennault who during World War II was the American leader of a volunteer air group, the Flying Tigers that defended China against Japanese invaders) whose relationship with Nixon went back to the China Lobby of the late 1940s and 1950s when Republicans accused the Truman administration of losing China to the Communists, a charge that the then Congressman Nixon used to vault himself into the Senate in 1948.  Hughes offers an almost daily description of the Paris peace talks with North Vietnam from right after Labor Day until the election.  The reader will learn from the documentary evidence the details of Johnson’s conversations with candidates Humphrey and Nixon.  What emerges is LBJ’s disappointment with the Democratic candidate who he feels is soft concerning a bombing halt and belief that despite Nixon’s duplicitous nature he would be a stronger president concerning Vietnam.  Late in the campaign Johnson learned of Nixon campaign machinations concerning talks in Paris, but he held back releasing it which would have most likely thrown the election to Humphrey.  Johnson warned Nixon very subtly that he knew what was occurring and the Republican candidate feigned surprise and reaffirmed support for the president’s policies.  Throughout the book, Hughes integrates verbatim transcripts to support his points, and there can be no doubt of Nixon and his staff’s culpability in treasonous activities.  The question remains why didn’t LBJ expose the actions of the Nixon campaign.  The answer probably rests with LBJ’s national security concerns, fear of weakening the presidency, and prolonging a war he desperately wanted to end to assure his historical legacy.

(Anna Chennault, the conduit for the Nixon campaign to the South Vietnamese government flanked by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger)

If Hughes description of the Chennault Affair is not disturbing enough then his exploration of other aspects of Nixon administration internal policy certainly is.  When Nixon arrives in the White House he immediately ordered his Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman to get hold of all the documents that LBJ had accumulated during the presidential campaign, i.e.; NSA intercepts from Ambassador Diem to Saigon, wiretaps of Chennault, CIA bugs overseas etc.  Haldeman tasked Tom Charles Huston to obtain the material.  Huston claimed that the Department of Defense Office of Internal Security Affairs had a report of all events leading to the bombing halt and it was located at the Brookings Institution.  Nixon obviously was concerned that should these documents become public his campaign organization and he himself personally would appear to have violated the Logan Act of 1799 that “prohibits as treasonous activity any interference by American citizens with the negotiations of the US government.” (38)  Nixon’s concern is readily apparent as he stated on June 17, 1971 in reference to the Brookings file.  “Now you remember the Huston’s Plan?[ii]  Implement it; I want it implemented on a thievery basis.  Goddamn it, get in and get those files.  Blow the safe and get it.” (68)

As one reads on it becomes surreal as Nixon becomes obsessed with anyone that appears to be his enemy.  His reaction to the leaking of the Pentagon Papers and the actions of Daniel Ellsberg reflect a heightened paranoia on the part of Nixon as he created the Special Investigative Unit (SIU), known as the “Plumbers” to deal with leaks and what he perceived to be domestic terrorism located in the basement of the White House. “The creation of the SIU violated both criminal law and the US Constitution.”  Nixon created a unit to commit crimes-like burglarizing the Brookings Institution, Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office, and later Democratic Party Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel.  Further, it specifically violated the Fourth Amendment that protected “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (130)  

What was most disturbing to me apart from Nixon’s criminal offenses was his rationale for his actions and his virulent anti-Semitism.  “The leading conspiracy theorist in the White House was the President.  Nixon’s theory centered on three groups: Jews, intellectuals, and Ivy Leaguers.” (122)  He feared a “Jewish cabal” was out to get him arguing that Ellsberg, Morton Halperin (a member of Henry Kissinger’s staff who was wiretapped), and Leslie Gelb all who opposed him were Jews.  Hughes concludes that Nixon spoke about Jews in the NSC and the defense and State Departments as if they were security risks simply because of their religious background.  National security policy was not the only area that the Jews in Nixon’s eyes were out to get him.  Harold Goldstein who was an employment analyst at the Bureau of Labor Statistics for over twenty four years and served democratic and republic presidents going back to Truman, in Nixon’s view was publicizing unemployment statistics to make him look bad as he approached reelection.  This for Nixon was part of the “cabal” and he had Goldstein exiled to a regional office in Montana.   In dealing with Arthur Burns, the Head of the Federal Reserve Board, Nixon believed that Burns monetary and fiscal policy did not support his reelection, and  on July 24, 1971, he remarked to Haldeman, “there’s a Jewish cabal, you know, running through this, working with people like Burns and the rest, and they all-they all only talk to Jews.” (143)

(Daniel Elleberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers)

Hughes develops his story that culminates in Watergate and includes some new documents concerning the break-in that had not been previously released.  It really does not change the outcome or the course of history it just reaffirms Nixon’s acute paranoia and as Bruce Mazlish wrote before the 1968 election in his psychological analysis, IN SEARCH OF NIXON, that there was a personality flaw that existed and no matter what success Nixon might have achieved, his self-destructive mechanism would undo it.  When Nixon resigned the presidency on August 8, 1974 and left the White House the next day, Mazlish’s prediction came true.

 

(What would a review of a book on Richard Nixon be without a picture of the Watergate Hotel?)

[i] The title of a book by Gary Sick written after the election of Ronald Reagan accusing the Reagan campaign of interfering with negotiations to obtain the release of American hostages in Iran between the Carter administration and the Iranian government.  The Reagan people were very concerned that Iran would agree to release the hostage’s right before the election, thus swinging the American electorate over to President Carter.

[ii] In June, 1971 the secret Huston Plan was designed to expand government break-ins, wiretaps, and mail openings in the name of fighting domestic terror.

EMPEROR OF LIBERTY: THOMAS JEFFERSON’S FOREIGN POLICY by Francis D. Cogliano

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, American Political History Leave a comment

As a retired educator I enjoyed having students debate whether Thomas Jefferson was a realist or an idealist when discussing his foreign policy.  Many believed he was an ideologue who rarely strayed from his principles that usually pitted him against Alexander Hamilton.  In EMPEROR OF LIBERTY, Francis D. Cogliano revisits this debate and concludes that Jefferson consistently implemented a pragmatic approach to foreign affairs no matter the situation.  The book is a concise recapitulation of Jefferson’s diplomatic decision making tracing his raison d’être from his service as Governor of Virginia during the American Revolution, American Minister to France following the revolution, Secretary of State during George Washington’s first administration, and as President of the United States.  The issues he faced included a number of bouts with the Barbary pirates, Algiers, Tripoli, and Morocco; a series of issues with the British, including impressment and commercial interests among many; policy toward the French Revolution; the purchase of Louisiana; and finally his effort to remain neutral during the Napoleonic War.  In all cases Cogliano employs precise language and command of the relevant secondary and primary source material.  But as a historian I must ask, is there anything that has not been written before?

In each instance Cogliano presents the views of those historians who argue that Jefferson’s actions must be explained from the ideological perspective.  For the author Jefferson’s motivations are clear from the time he was Governor of Virginia that his vision for the United States was an empire of liberty that would be brought about primarily through peaceful expansion.  Jefferson favored an agrarian republic that rested on the ability of Americans to trade freely in the world.  For Jefferson, a threat to commerce was a threat to the republic.  He was not totally against the use of force as many maintain.  Once he perceived that American commercial interests were threatened he would employ the navy as he did against the Barbary pirates to achieve his goals.  He could also use the “veiled fist” as he did with Spain before the United States acquired the Louisiana territory.  That acquisition which married commerce to an avenue to the Atlantic Ocean was Jefferson’s greatest triumph.  Jefferson had always favored westward expansion as a vehicle of spreading republican principles going back to when he was Governor of Virginia when he dispatched George Rogers Clark to explore the territory.  Jefferson’s vision for the American empire was quite simple.  If the republic was to succeed it would have to expand to absorb its growing population.  For liberty to survive the republic would need to be a nation of small farmers.  In order for the United States to flourish they would have to export their produce requiring unfettered access to international markets.  “The United States would be an empire of liberty because liberty could not thrive without expansion.  If liberty were extinguished in the United States, the republican experiment would fail.  In Jefferson’s mind the growth of the ‘empire of liberty’ and the success of the American republic were one and the same thing.  As president, Jefferson sought to realize this vision of an expansionist American republic.” (5)

(map circa 1800, Barbary States)

Throughout his diplomatic career Jefferson made careful note of strategies that were effective and mirrored his beliefs.  As governor of Virginia he felt that the state’s decentralized constitutional arrangement hampered his ability to deal with the constant threat of British encroachment.  From this experience he realized a strong executive was needed to conduct an effective foreign policy even if it meant exceeding constitutional limits as long as he received legislative approval after the policy was implemented.  Employing the case study approach Cogliano does not present a comprehensive study of Jeffersonian foreign policy, but he chooses the most salient examples.  Jefferson had to deal with the issue of the seizure of American ships and imprisoning American sailors on a number of occasions during his career.  Whether it was as Secretary of State or President, Jefferson believed that the Barbary corsairs threatened American trade, therefore liberty.  Jefferson was fully aware that the United States projected weakness to foreign powers, which is why the Barbary States targeted American shipping.  Until a navy could be developed Jefferson employed diplomatic threats, support for overthrown leaders, and the creation of alliances to achieve his goals.  In 1791 the US would wind up paying tribute, but by 1802, the American navy taught Tripoli a lesson.  For Jefferson, diplomacy was the first resort, but force at times was proven necessary.  Jefferson’s greatest diplomatic accomplishment was the purchase of Louisiana from Napoleon.  Some argue this came about due to the defeat of the French in Saint Domingue and her inability to protect Louisiana as the Peace of Amiens in Europe broke down.  Whatever the case the purchase was made by exceeding his constitutional powers and Jefferson obtained the western territory, control of the Mississippi, and New Orleans at the same time.  Following precedent, Jefferson obtained Congressional approval after the fact.  I agree with Cogliano’s premise that Jefferson was a pragmatist when it came to foreign relations as all his examples seem to reflect.

In dealing with England Jefferson was at a disadvantage since commercial interests were his prime concern and his position was weak. Cogliano lays out the different scenarios that Jefferson could employ; war, embargo, or be patient and hope things would calm down.  A great deal of attention is focused on the issue of impressment and British Orders in Council that hindered American commercial interests.  After the Chesapeake-Leopard affair it appeared that the United States would declare war against England, but fearing the repercussions of war Jefferson chose an embargo. In Jefferson’s eyes the embargo was the best option that he had.   According to Cogliano the policy was not defective; it was its implementation as Jefferson did not rally the American people to support the embargo, resulting in smuggling and other strategies to undermine its effectiveness.  The policy was an economic disaster for the US and was the greatest failure of Jefferson’s presidency.

Overall, the book has a great deal of interesting sidelights, i.e., the fact that the British were so desperate in its war against Napoleonic France it bombed Copenhagen when the Danes refused to turn over its navy to them. Also, Cogliano begins the book with a discussion of autocracy and Jefferson’s positive views of the new Russian Tsar, Alexander, a discussion I found interesting and somewhat surprising.  If you are looking for a readable study of Jeffersonian foreign policy then Cogliano’s work fits the bill, however, if you are well versed in the subject the narrative will qualify as an excellent review of information and events.

SEYMOUR HERSH: SCOOP ARTIST by Robert Miraldi

szfreiberger American Political History, Biography, Vietnam Leave a comment

When Robert Miraldi sat down to choose the title of his new book, SEYMOUR HERSH: SCOOP ARTIST, he might have thought about a different title to describe one of the most important investigative reporters of his generation.  Seymour Hersh was more than a scoop artist, to use Theodore Roosevelt’s term to describe the likes of Ida Tarbell, Upton Sinclair and others during the Progressive Era, he was more of a muckraker, a writer who thrives in the muck to locate and develop a story.  This was Seymour Hersh, a reporter whose tactics were unconventional to say the least, which developed his own stories no matter where they took him, and became a thorn in the side of any person with power who he set his sights on.  Hersh was a Pulitzer Prize winner and a recipient of the George S. Polk award for distinguished journalism, and the author of numerous books.  In exploring Hersh’s career, Robert Miraldi has not produced a traditional biography, but an examination of Hersh’s methodology in tracking down stories, and he provides numerous insights into his subject’s character and relationship to the people and topics he is drawn to.  What emerges is a flawed Seymour Hersh, who fights for justice and righteousness, but at times, allows his larger than life ego take hold of him, resulting in great praise from the public, but also denigration, and enemies from the protectors of his targets.

Having read most of Hersh’s books over the years I had little insight into the type of individual that he was on a personal level.  I always believed after reading a book or article written by Hersh that he was a person who let the public peer into the halls of power and was driven to seek justice whether it be the My Lai massacre, the downing of flight 007 by the Soviet Union, the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, or any of the myriad of causes he took up.   Miraldi opens a window into Hersh’s work that is both personal and analytical.  Resting on numerous interviews, documents, and an encyclopedic knowledge of Hersh’s writings, Miraldi has produced a useful narrative that seems to track his subject’s life from book to book, and article to article that he has written.  By adopting this approach the reader is exposed to a history of the United States from 1960 through the present, through the eyes of Seymour Hersh.

If Hersh had you in your cross hairs it meant you were a very powerful individual or a government agency that had overstepped its constitutional limits as seen by Miraldi’s, “scoop artist.”  After an early career at the Chicago City News Bureau and UPI, Hersh latched on to the AP Chicago bureau by 1965 proclaiming that David Habersham, the award winning New York Times reporter as his role model and would soon pursue similar investigative subjects.  Early on Hersh was interested in civil rights and the military and after being transferred to Washington, D.C. Hersh began his first investigation of the military confronting the truth behind General William Westmoreland’s thirty hour bombing freeze in December, 1965.  Hersh’s first major crusade dealt with the inequalities of the draft.  We witness Hersh’s standard writing technique as he refused to name sources as his articles are sprinkled with “unnamed sources,” informants, anonymous citations which led many to question the veracity of his approach.  One of the most important parts of Miraldi’s book is his description of Hersh’s tactics which were very successful, but as he correctly points out, at times, are over bearing and based on falsehoods and bullying.  For Hersh, the investigation meant the ends justified the means.  The My Lai massacre investigation that Hersh turned into a book, MY LAI MASSACRE: A REPORT ON THE MASSACRE AND ITS AFTERMATH made him nationally known figure, and created a reputation as a tenacious investigator who knew how to uncover information better than any of his peers.  If he wanted to talk to you, he had a way to extract what he needed even if you did not want to provide the information.  From the outset the “Hersh treatment” was ever present.  First, Hersh is a voracious reader.  No matter the subject if it dealt with an ongoing investigation he would consume books, articles, and documents so that he was as well versed, or more in the subject matter than the person he wanted to interview.  To get to a source Hersh was extremely disingenuous and outright lied, bullied, or threatened a target until they succumbed to a conversation.  Most of this took place on the phone and at times in person.  Jay Peterzell, a researcher at the Center for National Security Studies, an advocacy group in Washington had a “bird’s eye view of the telephone terrorist” as Hersh conducted over a thousand interviews for his book on Kissinger.  He would “overwhelm you with his verbal barrage” and bait his target into finally granting his wishes, as “they got caught in the enthusiasm, the importance, his energy.” (237)  This approach was evident in all of his research but especially when dealing with Henry Kissinger, who Hersh despised, at one point stating that he would “love to get that son of a bitch.”  The question must be asked is Hersh’s approach too over the top, or did his mantra of “terrible things happen in war, [but] the responsibility of the press…to find, verify, and publish the truth” justifies everything. (32)  Hersh was able to alienate his targets as well as his colleagues who resented his success, but in many cases felt that he was very biased in his approach and he could not “fairly evaluate reality.” (95)

bodies of civilians killed in My Lai massacre

Bodies of Vietnamese villagers killed at My Lai, March 16, 1968

One of the most surprising things that I learned from Miraldi’s book is that Hersh worked for Senator Eugene McCarthy’s campaign in 1968 as its Public Relations director.  This brought two imposing personalities head to head, as McCarthy, who hated publicity that he did not control, and Hersh who was overbearing and controlling, it was obvious that after a short period of time they could not coexist.  After Hersh quit or was fired from the campaign he published CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: THE HIDDEN ARSENAL making him the “Ralph Nader of the bio-chemical industry” and helped to push the Nixon administration to stop building biological weapons.  Nixon had his own reasons apart from what Hersh exposed, but Hersh must get some of the credit for Nixon’s actions.  Hersh followed this success by becoming involved with the POW issue in Vietnam.  He even visited Hanoi and after joining the New York Times he continued to get under Richard Nixon’s skin.  Another surprising aspect of the book is Miraldi’s discussion of Hersh’s view of Bob Woodward and the Watergate investigation.  Woodward and his partner at that time, Carl Bernstein were out front in the investigation from the outset.  Hersh was caught up in the New York Times, Washington Post competition and grew jealous of Woodward’s success and growing reputation.  Throughout the book this competition remains in the background as Hersh wanted to be considered the number one investigative reporter in the American press, and though he praised Woodward’s work, and became his friend, he never truly accepted him as his equal.  Hersh was able to enter the “Watergate competition” late and eventually the Nixon White House became “scared to death of this guy…We don’t know what he can prove or can’t prove,” (158) as stated by an unidentified White House source during the investigation into the illegal bombing of Cambodia.

What was shocking to me was Miraldi’s discussion of how many top governmental figures, be it political or military that spoke with Hersh and leaked important information to him.  For example subjects as diverse as Senate Armed Services Committee head, John Stennis, a conservative Democrat during hearings concerning U.S. bombing of Cambodia; Frank Sturgis, a Watergate co-conspirator, dealing with hush money paid by the Nixon White House; to CIA Director William Colby who became a Hersh “phone mate” during the investigation dealing with the coup against Salvatore Allende in Chile.  Hersh always sought out new sources, particularly in the Pentagon, and according to Miraldi when Hersh called declaring, “Hi I’m Sy Hersh and you probably want to talk with me,” retired generals, in particular liked to hear from him.” (171) The book is also useful for shedding light on the inner workings of the New York Times editorial board and how the “paper of record…did not seek to create or make that record.” (233) The reader also witnesses the competition between staff and board members and the volatile nature of the Hersh-Abe Rosenthal relationship.  The two sides tolerated each other for six years but after Hersh’s articles dealing with Gulf and Western Industries in 1979 they went their separate ways.  Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the book is Miraldi’s description of how Hersh went about writing his work on Kissinger, THE PRICE OF POWER.  Having read the book I agree with the author’s critique that the book is difficult to read and Hersh is probably guilty of overwriting, particularly certain topics, i.e., SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union.  On a more positive note, historian, Stanley Hoffman has written, “this is a book that through its factual density avoids the typically hectoring tone of the investigative reporter or the ideologue with an ax to grind.” (252)  This cannot also be said of THE DARK SIDE OF CAMELOT where Hersh ran up against the myth of JFK and the family that tried to protect the image of Camelot.  As Hersh uncovered some of the more salacious details of Kennedy’s private life he fell for some doctored documents and his reputation suffered and in the end he wound up mentally exhausted.

Hersh would recover and he latched on with the New Yorker, under the influence of its editor David Remnick who supported Hersh’s work and gave him the leeway and resources that reenergized him.  This resulted in Hersh becoming a “war correspondent” after 9/11.  Hersh was truly shaken by the attack and over the next three years “Hersh produced twenty stories and over 110,000 words.” (319)  Hersh concluded that the intelligence community was not prepared to stop the terrorists as government agencies and the military lacked the training and communication to be successful.  Once the United States invaded Iraq, Hersh concluded that President Bush had lost control of his foreign policy to the cabal of neocons inside and outside his administration.  Hersh argued that “the intelligence community had ignored the sacrosanct ‘stove piping’ rule-that only carefully vetted information should go up the chain of command.” (323)  Hersh was once again faced criticism of his sourcing as most of his sources were anonymous, but he felt the neocons were now out of the closet.  This would lead to his book, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB, which took advantage of over thirty years of sources who were at the Pentagon, the CIA, and other places to critique US policy on Afghanistan, Iraq, and terrorism.  Donald Rumsfeld became part of the center piece of Hersh’s narrative in the book and articles written based on his own research dealing with the torture at Abu Ghraib.  Hersh’s presentation has proven very accurate during the last ten years since the book was written. PHOTOGRAPH: ABU GHRAIB PRISONER ABUSE Abu Ghraib prison, site of US torture and demeaning of prisoners in Iraq

Whether Seymour Hersh uses unethical tactics to obtain information, whether he is a bully who extracts the necessary documents he needs, what is important for Miraldi is that Hersh presents the facts and lets others ponder the consequences.  If you are a fan of Hersh’s raison ‘detre, or believe he has gone too far, Miraldi’s book is comprehensive and provides the best portrait of one of the most important journalistic figure of his age.

TIP AND THE GIPPER: WHEN POLITICS WORKED by Chris Matthews

szfreiberger American Political History, Biography Leave a comment

 

As an avid viewer of MSNBC’s Hardball program each evening with Chris Matthews I am very familiar with his views and style, and usually agree with him.  I have read his previous books and looked forward to reading his latest, TIP AND THE GIPPER: WHEN POLITICS WORKED.  After reading the book and digesting his final thoughts as he states that “We need leaders able to balance large purpose with equally large awareness of the electorate, what message the voters have sent.  In a worthy contest this goes for those who’ve won but especially for those who haven’t. The rules of fair play can’t be simply cast aside.” (371) Reading TIP AND THE GIPPER I got the feeling I was having an intimate conversation with the author and his subjects.  Matthews lets the reader in to his inner most thoughts and cannot but admire both men he writes about and the relationship they forged.  Obviously, Matthews wants their relationship to be a model for today’s politicians who have given us a new concept, “partisanship on steroids!”

Matthews is a superb writer and his narrative flows like a literary work.  He is able to subtly integrate his own political education, first as a speech writer for Jimmy Carter and then as Tip O’Neill’s administrative assistant, as he develops the relationship between his two larger than life subjects.  As the historical narrative unfolds the reader would have to be blind not to think about our current state of government by stalemate.  Today, Reagan would probably be labeled a liberal Republican by Tea Party elements and his legislative accomplishments, particularly the 1983 Social Security legislation and the 1986 Tax Reform Law, would have been forcefully opposed by the likes of Cruz, Lee, and Paul.

Matthews is very insightful in a number of areas.  Early on he points out the weakness of the Carter presidency, the aloofness of the man from Plains, Ga.  When Reagan assumes the presidency in 1981 “his plan was to charm rivals and potential allies alike,” and Tip O’ Neill was his first major target.  By pointing out the political problem that aloofness in the Presidency can create, it is obvious who Matthews is pointing to.  From the outset O’Neill rejected an obstructionist strategy in dealing with Reagan’s proposed economic plan as he realized that the American people had spoken at the polls.  He decided that he would assist Reagan in achieving his agenda as much as he could, as it was his duty as an American patriot.  O’Neill’s biggest problem in dealing with Reagan was his “star power,” as the President was the consummate actor in addition to being shrewd and cunning in dealing with the Speaker.  Matthews’ role in the Speaker’s office was to assist O’Neill in adapting to using the media as a tool in dealing with Reagan.  It is from this vantage point that Matthews presents his narrative.

If O’Neill had considered any thoughts of creating roadblocks for Reagan’s legislative agenda they would have been immediately cast aside after the assassination attempt on the President.  Reagan’s handling of the attempt on his life was out of a Hollywood script and after being closer to death than the American people were led to believe he emerged as a “true American hero.”  For O’Neill this meant doing his best to lessen the assault on his liberal self, and in 1981 and 1982 Reagan was able to work with O’Neill and gain congressional approval for his tax cut, increase in military spending, all of which was to lead to a balanced budget by 1984.  It was very clear that what Vice President George H. W. Bush termed “voodoo economics” during the 1980 presidential campaign was not going to work and because of that O’Neill was able to gain Reagan’s cooperation in reforming the Social Security system and putting it on a firm financial footing for the future.

The most interesting aspects of Matthews’ book center around his description of the how the O’Neill-Reagan relationship developed and how they were able to work with each other despite their divergent political philosophies.  Matthews quotes freely from Reagan’s diaries and O’Neill’s memoir, and statements and speeches he was privy to.  In so doing he seems to create a conversation between the two men which reflected anger at times, but always mutual respect for each other.  The mutual respect was the key and they both believed that after 6:00pm politics would be set aside as they met frequently and seemed to enjoy each other’s company.  What is amazing is that despite their ideological differences and their battles over the budget and spending and tax issues they never lost their affection for each other.

The first third of book is a comparative biography of both men where Matthews does not present any new material that has not been gone over by the likes of Lou Cannon in his book on Reagan entitled, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME and John A. Farrell’s excellent biography, TIP O’NEILL ANDTHE DEMOCRATIC CENTURY.  After completing this section of the book, Matthews begins his account of the legislative battles between the two men and their disagreements on foreign policy.

Matthew’s description of O’Neill’s mood swings as he dealt with Reagan is fascinating.  In particular the Speaker’s anger when Reagan characterizes his liberal principles as demagoguery.  As a result he finally realized he had to graduate to the media age against a president who had mastered it for years.  Despite his periodic anger at Reagan, O’Neill always realized that no matter how weak the economy became after the Reagan agenda became law, the president always remained popular.  In addition, O’Neill was always wary of being seen as an obstructionist.  For Matthews, his role was to make O’Neill relevant again despite legislative defeats and not appear as “over the hill” as Republican strategists tried to make him out to be.  His media “remake” of O’Neill was successful and it forced the public to begin to question Reagan’s economic program and resulted in Democratic gains in 1982.  By 1983 Reagan began gearing up for his reelection and did not want Social Security to be an issue for the Democrats.  Hence, Reagan and O’Neill realized there was a political center in American politics that would benefit the entire country.

On foreign policy O’Neill took the position that the President needed Democratic support in dealing with the Soviet Union and events in Lebanon.  But Reagan’s position on the Sandinistas in Nicaragua reminded the Speaker of the slippery slope that led to the Vietnam War.  O’Neill was a major force in limiting the administration’s action in Latin America through the Boland Amendment and greatly resenting being “told” about the invasion of Grenada which he saw as an attempt to turn the focus of the American people away from the terrorist bomb that led to the death of 241 Marines.  Matthews is correct in pointing out that Reagan could not escape the Cold War paradigm that he believed in and accept the idea that there were numerous confessional rivalries in Lebanon as well as ignoring the history of resentment against American imperialism in the Americas. (276)

O’Neill’s final year in office was highlighted by the 1986 Tax Reform Bill as once again he and the President moved to the center in compromising their goals in the name of the American people.  Obviously many of the examples that Matthews presents seemed designed as lessons for today’s politicians many of whom only know how to say no instead of doing what is in the best interests of the nation as a whole.  Every day pundits reinforce the idea that nothing will can accomplished due to the current political environment, but Matthews has provided an honest historical portrait of two men who showed despite their differences what could be accomplished.

THOSE ANGRY DAYS: ROOSEVELT, LINDBERGH AND THE FIGHT OVER WORLD WAR II by Lynne Olson

szfreiberger American Political History, World War II Leave a comment

Recently I visited the World War II tunnels under the White Cliffs of Dover. As a retired historian this fostered further interest on my part in examining the events surrounding Dunkirk and the German aerial blitz over England in 1940. Coincidentally, Lynne Olson, the author of a number of books dealing with the United Kingdom and the war, published her most recent effort, THOSE ANGRY DAYS: ROOSEVELT, LINDBERGH AND THE FIGHT OVER WORLD WAR II, 1939-1941, a survey of American policy toward events in Europe in the 1930s culminating with its entrance into the war following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. Olson as she has done in all her previous books presents a cogent and well written narrative that explores the role of those who sought to prepare for what they perceived to be the coming war with Germany and provide the British with the necessary assistance once war broke out following the German invasion of Poland in September, 1939. Further, Olson examines the role of the isolationist movement during the period, a group that sought to keep the United States out of the war at seemingly all costs. In her narrative Olson incorporates all of the main characters in this, at times, nasty debate ranging from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Charles Lindbergh. Other than a few minute details there is not much that is new here, but the book is an excellent synthesis of available primary and secondary materials and the author has prepared a smooth narrative that captivates the reader.

A number of important subjects and themes are explored. The discussion of the evolution of American public opinion toward the war in Europe is interesting, particularly how the British under the leadership of William Stephenson and his network sought to influence decision making in Washington. The role of Charles Lindbergh as he evolves from a national hero to a political partisan involved with isolationists at home and manipulated by Hitler’s government abroad is fascinating. The election of 1940 is accurately described and the fear felt by FDR for the candidacy of Wendell Willkie takes the reader inside both presidential campaigns. Wilkie is treated as a principled man. Despite his feelings about the New Deal, he supported the interventionist movement and he was an essential component politically as the Roosevelt administration sought to gain the passage of important legislation, i.e., the Destroyer Base Deal, Lend-Lease, and conscription in Congress.

Olson correctly points to Roosevelt’s attempt to alter the make-up of the Supreme Court in 1937 as his worst domestic political error that heavily impacted his ability to prepare the United States for the approaching conflict and provide assistance to the British after 1939. This defeat lessened FDR’s confidence in his own decision-making, reduced his influence on Congress, and saw his own popularity with the American people decline. This hamstrung attempts to alter the Neutrality legislation of the mid to late 1930s and was a boon to the political opposition led by the likes of Senators Burton K. Wheeler and William Borah, Robert Woods, the head of Sears Roebuck, Henry Ford, and Charles Lindbergh.

The passage of HR 1776, better known as Lend Lease is vividly presented in exacting detail. Olson’s description of the vituperative politics of the period through the eyes of the main characters is enlightening. The actions taken by Wendell Willkie and Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador to the United States, who died shortly after the bill was passed is detailed and reflects an author in total control of their material. Olson observes correctly that the passage of the bill was FDR’s most important prewar political victory and her choice of quotes is wonderful, i.e., Eric Sevareid, the CBS correspondent’s description of opponents of Lend Lease as “tobacco-chewing, gravy stained, overstuffed gila monsters, who nestled in their bed of chins, would doze through other speeches, then haul up their torpid bodies and mouth the old, evil shibboleths about King George III, the war debts, Uncle Sap, and decadent France (were) very dangerous men,” is also illustrative of the negativity, nastiness, and partisanship of the period.

Over the years some have argued that FDR sought to involve the United States in a war against Germany well before December, 1941. Olson’s argument to the contrary is right on as she states that FDR plodded along and took baby steps toward preparing the United States for what he was convinced would be a war to defeat Nazi Germany. FDR read the polls assiduously and was always afraid no matter what the political polls may have reflected that he was too far out in front of what the American people would support. Olson’s examination of the politics behind expanding the undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic highlighted by decisions of how much area the United States would defend in convoying merchant shipping is illustrative of FDR’s fears, as was his approach to the conversion of the US economy from domestic to military production.

There are numerous other areas that Olson explores ranging from the role of Hollywood in the propaganda war against Germany, the influence of anti-Semitism on American politics, the infighting within the American military establishment, and intimate portraits of the most important historical characters. Olson’s examination of events and the attendant research contribute to a well thought out and deeply interesting portrait of the United States and England as both faced the coming war and its final outbreak in 1939 and 1941. As a side note if anyone is interested in reading a counter factual historical novel dealing with this topic they should read THE PLOT AGAINST AMERICA by Philip Roth who conjectures of what might have happened if Lindbergh had sought the presidency in 1940 and defeated Roosevelt, just food for thought.

THE SECRETARY: A JOURNAL WITH HILLARY CLINTON FROM BEIRUT TO THE HEART OF AMERICAN POWER by Kim Ghattas

szfreiberger American Diplomatic History, American Political History, Biography Leave a comment

At a time when the rumors surrounding the candidacy of Hillary Clinton for president in 2016 seems to permeate every news cycle Kim Ghattas presents the public with a marvelous book that describes not only her personal journey from the civil war in Lebanon in the 1980s to the present, but allows the reader to enter the decision making process of the State Department. THE SECRETARY: A JOURNAL WITH HILLARY CLINTON FROM BEIRUT TO THE HEART OF AMERICAN POWER provides a unique perspective as the author, the BBC State Department correspondent shares with the reader her world- wide travels over hundreds of thousands of miles with Secretary of State Clinton. What emerges is an understanding of the motivations and the limitations of American power. Entering office the Obama administration set as one of its major goals a corrective foreign policy designed to repair the damage caused to America’s reputation abroad that resulted from Bush administration policies. In the book Ghattas described Clinton’s strategy, which at times differed from President Obama, in trying to restore trust in the United States among allies, and improve relations with those countries that were skeptical about working with Washington. Interwoven in this journey are the author’s memories and emotions related to her upbringing in war torn BeIRUT and how she relates her personal observations and emotions to American actions be they in Libya, Syria, dealing with China, or a myriad of other topics. The conclusion that Ghattas has reached is that Clinton has been successful in laying the foundation for the reorientation of American policy where “working with the United States is once again desirable” (333) It is no longer “you are with us or against us,” the mantra of the previous administration. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the intricacies of the development of American “smart power,” and the implementation of Hillary Clinton’s style of personal diplomacy.