(Explosions from Israeli air strikes over Gaza City this past summer during the Hamas-Israel War of 2014)

Last week newly reelected Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu backtracked from his election eve statement that he opposed a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Though he seems to have walked back that statement because of American pressure the issue still remains, will there be any movement toward a dialogue for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians in the near future?  At this juncture the answer appears to be a resounding no.  In the absence of a clear diplomatic path it is useful to explore a major component to any future deal.  In 2005, then Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon disappointed his right wing Likud Party partners and set forth a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.  Tired of the cycle of violence with terrorist attacks and counter-terrorist reprisals, Sharon decided it was not worth the cost of maintaining an area that is 139 square miles (the same as Detroit) with a population of about 1.8 million Palestinians.

As Palestinian politics have evolved over the last ten years Hamas, seen as a Moslem extremist party and terrorists by both the United States and Israel, assumed power over Gaza, and the “more moderate” Palestinian Authority is in charge of administering the West Bank.  This situation came about through a bloody civil war between the two parties and the electoral process.   On January 25, 2006 the Hamas Party won the Palestinian legislative election resulting in the nomination of Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh as Prime Minister within a Palestinian National unity government with Fatah, the largest Palestinian political party.  This unity dissipated quickly when Hamas and Fatah effectively engaged in a civil war, the results of which have left two separate ruling bodies in the Palestinian territories.  In recent years, of the two territories, the Palestinians in Gaza have suffered the most.  Last summer, in what seems to be a bi-annual war between Israel and Hamas resulted in the death of over 2100 Palestinians and 73 Israelis.  The causes of the war center on Hamas’ frustration at its lack of progress in achieving a Palestinian state, and the belief that they had nothing to lose by launching missiles into Israel to provoke an invasion.  The background for these events are explored in Jean-Pierre Filiu’s new book GAZA: A HISTORY, a comprehensive study of Gaza from roughly 18^th century BC to the end of 2011.  The book is important because it fills a gap on the literature pertaining to Gaza since most Middle East scholarship tends to focus on the endless attempts to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  In addition, the book provides a useful guide to events that led to the carnage of last summer.

The author summarizes the early history of Gaza and what becomes clear from at least the12^th century BC is that the region is repeatedly conquered by external forces.  Be it the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Crusaders, Mongols, Mamelukes, Ottomans, French, British, and eventually Israelis, Gazans were rarely in charge of their own destiny.  They would be forced to believe in paganism, Christianity and finally Islam.  Important historical figures are presented from Alexander the Great, Salah ad-Din, Gamal Nasser, to present day politicians all of which possess their own agendas that did not necessarily bode well for Gaza.  According to Filiu Theodore Herzl and his early 20th century Zionist movement did not consider Gaza as part of the land of Israel as Gaza’s land owners refused to provide the Jews land purchases the way the Arabs had in central Palestine, thereby limiting any Jewish incursion into Gaza.  From that point on Filiu reviews the history of the region exploring the diplomacy of World War I, the 1929 Arab riots, the Arab rebellion of 1936, and the effect of World War II on the area.  In addition he does a good job discussing the dynastic rivalries that existed among Palestinians throughout the period and their impact on Gaza.  In doing so Filiu forgets to explore the 1939 British White Paper, I believe in part because it doesn’t necessarily support his Palestinian bias that is present in many of the areas that he explores. Once the narrative approaches the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 Filiu zeros in on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which makes up over three-quarters of the narrative.

(The Israeli Iron Dome Missile Shield developed by Israel.  It was employed last summer to protect Israel from the thousands of Hamas rocket launches.)

Filiu spends an inordinate amount of time describing what seems to be each and every act of terror and counter-terror committed by both sides in the conflict.  I understand the importance of many of these actions and counter-actions but at times it becomes tedious and can overwhelm the reader with detail.  Of course, many of these attacks lead to changes in policy or military action, particularly by the Israelis but it would benefit the reader if this could be condensed and the author could concentrate more on analysis of events rather than direct reporting of who died, how many died, and who survived.  The horror of the plight of the Palestinian refugees cannot be denied, and Filiu does a superb job providing the reader with an understanding of their plight.  Discussions of the life and politics in the Kan Younes, Jabaliya, Rafah, Nuseirat, Bureji, and Deir al-Balah camps are important because from these camps the varying leadership and shock troops of the militant Palestinian groups emerge.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the book is Filiu’s description of the rise of Yassir Arafat to leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Fatah, its political wing in 1964.  The author follows the evolution of Arafat as a “freedom fighter/terrorist” who is faced with increasing opposition from other Palestinian elements as the history of the region evolves from Israeli “punishment” of Gaza for attacks on its settlements to outright war.  We witness an Arafat who must balance himself between the many Palestinian factions that emerge over the years and by 1990 he begins to engage in the diplomatic process with Israel and the United States leading to the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the failure of the Camp David talks in 2000.  Next to Arafat, the man who receives the most attention from the author is Sheik Ahmed Yassin who became the leader of the Moslem Brotherhood in Gaza in 1966.  Later, in 1973 he would set up an organization called the Mujamma designed to meet the social service and educational needs of the Palestinians in Gaza.  In response to the 1987 Intifada of the younger generation of Palestinians against Israel he founded Hamas (the Movement of Islamic Resistance).  It is here that Filiu does his best work as he describes the ideological differences between the various groups that vie to represent the Palestinians.  He explores the ideologies and strategies that Fatah, the Muslim Brotherhood (that eventually evolves into Hamas), Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in detail, and how they hope to achieve Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and explains the reasons Hamas emerged as the dominant force in Gaza today.

(Destruction in Gaza caused by the Israeli invasion)

The importance of Filiu’s work lies in his discussion of the escalation of violence that took place in 2001 as Hamas and its allies expanded their attacks from targeting Israeli settlements inside Gaza to the territory of Israel itself.  This would lead to Israel’s application of an “iron fist” in response and a cycle of violence that would continue until Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2006.  Hamas would launch its first home made Qassam rockets, employ its first female suicide bombers, and reject all calls to demilitarize the second Intifada.  Throughout the period not a day went by when there wasn’t an assassination, air strikes, suicide bombings, or destruction of Gaza’s homes and infrastructure.  By 2006, Hamas’ strategy concerning elections would change by first running in municipal elections, then parliamentary contests which in the end brought them to political power. However, instead of using their victory as a positive force they engaged in a fratricidal war with Fatah.  But as Donald Macintyre suggests in the The Independent it would have been interesting if Filiu provided greater analysis of these events and the actions of the Bush administration, as well as the lack of action by the European Union as they sabotaged any chance of an international agreement with Hamas by the policies they pursued. (The Independent, September 11, 2014)  What is even more troubling than missing an opportunity after the election of 2006 to pursue some sort of diplomatic demarche, is the author’s description of the fighting between Hamas and Fatah between 2006 and 2011 that can only be characterized as savage.  Further this brutality was taking place at the same time as Israel pursued “Operation Cast Lead,” its punishment of Gaza for the militant’s seizure of Gilad Shalit, a nineteen year old Israeli soldier on June 25, 2006.

Earlier I mentioned that Filiu at times is not totally objective in his presentation.  A few cases in point; in discussing casualties in various attacks and counter attacks, the author provides minute details of Palestinians and then glosses over Israeli casualties.  The reader is presented with the Grand Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husani as a leader of the Palestinian people, but Filiu skirts over his alliance with Nazi Germany during the war, and his work to help Nazis accused in the Holocaust to escape to the Middle East.*  In discussing the outbreak of the Suez War, Filiu makes it appear that Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in response to the Israeli assassination of his intelligence chief.  In point of fact, Nasser’s anger was due to the withdrawal of the Aswan loan guarantee by the United States, their refusal to sell him weapons to counter Israeli attacks, and their policy of trying to create a Middle East Defense Organization geared against the Soviet Union.  In 1967, the author suggests that Nasser ordered the UN forces out of Sharm el-Sheik to take Arab pressure off of him for restraining Fedayeen attacks against Israel.  In fact the Russians kept feeding Egypt information about the coming Israeli attack and that he should take action.  Perhaps as Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez suggest in FOXBATS OVER DIMONA, the Soviets wanted to provoke a war in order for them to interfere in support of the Arabs and destroy the Israeli nuclear reactor in the Negev Desert.  In discussing the Yom Kippur War he emphasizes the “air bridge that brought in supplies provided by the United States” to Israel, but makes no mention of the “air bridge” that the Soviets provided the Arabs.  Perhaps Professor Filiu should have explored Nasser’s true feelings about the Palestinians, who behind closed doors was repeatedly heard to make derogatory remarks describing them.  In his discussion of the outbreak of the 1987 Intifada, the author should explain the demographic and financial inequalities in the Arab world that in part led to the outbreak of violence, and perhaps mention that though Arafat took credit for the revolt, it caught him by surprise just as it had the Israelis.  I find the documentation that Filiu uses rather selective at times, concentrating on United Nations Documents and mostly pro-Arab secondary sources.  I am not suggesting these sources are wrong, however one should employ a myriad of sources to assure objectivity.

(Hamas tunnel complex used to smuggle materials into Gaza and fight against Israel)

(Israeli soldier discovers Hamas tunnel opening during the fighting last summer)

Despite these flaws Filiu has prepared a remarkable book that fills the historiographical gap that is apparent with the paucity of historical monographs that examine Gaza.  I would hope that the author would prepare an updated edition of the book that carries his story through the events that led to the Hamas-Israel war of last summer, and the horrifying result for the people of Gaza, as opposed to Hamas’ leadership, that appears to have emerged unscathed.

• See Rubin, Barry; Schwanitz, Wolfgang G. Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014.

(Future Israeli Prime Minister Menachem as leader of the Irgun.  According to the British during and after World War II, Begin led this terrorist organization)

This past week’s news cycle has been dominated by the Iran nuclear talks and the reelection of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israeli Prime Minister, two stories that are interrelated due to the politics of the Middle East.  Both situations have been parlayed by politicians to reinforce their own ideological agendas.  The results have been extremely negative with Republicans in Congress grand standing about a deal that has not been concluded, and PM Netanyahu’s somewhat racist comments about Arab voting, and his diplomatic dance surrounding his support or non-support of a two state solution in negotiations with the Palestinians.  The relationship between President Obama and Netanyahu have never been strong, and now have become even more dysfunctional.  The consequences of these events for the region are extremely important since the Arab-Israeli Conflict has produced four major wars, and a series of lesser wars since 1948.  It would be useful to revisit the history of the pre-1948 War and try to understand the background of the conflict that may never be settled.  All one has to do is think about the situation in Gaza last summer as Israel and Hamas exchanged missile strikes resulting in the destruction of a major part of the infrastructure of the Gaza Strip.  In addition, the Palestinian community is split between the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank and Hamas that governs the Gaza Strip.  Currently, the diplomatic game is at a standstill so Bruce Hoffman’s THE STRUGGLE FOR ISRAEL, 1917-1947 is both timely and important.

Mr. Hoffman, the Director of Security Studies at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the United States Military Academy’s Combating Center raises the important question, “does terrorism work?  According to Hoffman “campaigns of terrorism depend on rational choice.”  It results from a group’s decision to oppose a government and is seen “as a logical means to advance desired ends.”(x)  Today in the Middle East there are a number of groups whose choice of terror fits this description; Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, ISIS, and al-Qaeda’s many derivations.  Hoffman has chosen to concentrate on three groups that have been credited with convincing the British government to relinquish its League of Nations mandate over Palestine in 1947 that led to the creation of the state of Israel.  The book explores these three groups; the Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi and determines that it was the Irgun that should be given most of the credit for forcing the British withdrawal.  If this is an accurate assumption, then according to Hoffman, terror, in this particular instance worked.

The title of the book is derived from a poem written by Abraham Stern, a messianic Zionist who implored Jews to fight for the creation of their own state; “We are the anonymous soldiers without uniform, Surrounded by fear and the shadow of death.  We have all been conscripted for life; from these ranks, only death will free us.” (96) The strategy embodied in the concept of anonymous soldiers was extended by the Irgun leader following World War II, and future Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.  Begin believed that Israeli freedom fighters (as opposed to terrorists) could blend into the general population and hide in its battle against the British.  He believed that all Jews who lived in the Yishuv were fighters for the creation of the Jewish state, a concept that the British accepted and as explained by the author based their counter-terrorism policy arguing that since the Jewish terrorists hid among and were assisted by the general population, they were just as culpable for terrorist attacks as the actual perpetrators.

Hoffman’s premise, whether terrorism works, is an important one, but at times it becomes lost in the minutiae of each terrorist attack that he presents.  The book is a comprehensive recounting of the role of terror played in Palestine from World War I through the declaration of Israeli statehood on May 15, 1948. It encompasses major decision making by the British as they tried to carry out their mandate over Palestine, the reactions of the Arab community, particularly before World War II, and the Jewish responses throughout the period.  All the major and lesser personalities involved are examined, including Winston Churchill, Ernest Bevin, Clement Atlee, General Bernard Montgomery and High Commissioner Alan Cunningham on the British side to, David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, and Abraham Stern representing the Jews, and Hajj Amin-al Husseini, and Izz al-Din Abd al-Qadir al Qassam, who embodied the Arab cause.  Along with the personalities involved the author described in detail what seems to be every important terror attack that took place within the scope of his topic.  The book appears to be broken down into three parts.  The first major delineation occurs in 1929 as Arab riots against Jewish immigration and land purchases led to British quotas regulating Jewish immigration to Palestine.  As the riots led to a pogrom in Hebron, the Yishuv leadership realized it could not rely on the British for protection.  The reorganization and centralization of the underground Jewish army, the Haganah resulted, and Jewish revisionists like Vladimir Jabotinsky set up their own autonomous group that would fight Arab terror with Jewish terror.  The next turning point would be the Arab rebellion that lasted from 1936 to 1939 that eventually would produce the 1939 British White Paper that limited Jewish immigration to Palestine to 1500 per month for five years and declined to partition Palestine into a Jewish and Arab state.  Issued as Jews were trying to escape Nazi Germany it would have a profound impact on the plight of the Jews and British policy that did not want to aggravate its relations with the Arabs as the war approached.   Obviously the end of the war is another watershed as Jewish terror increased against the British evolving into a situation of all-out war that only ended with British withdrawal from Palestine.

(The King David Hotel, Jerusalm that was bombed by the Irgun on July 22, 1946)

The most important part of the book is Hoffman’s description and analysis of what appears to be each terrorist attack that took place particularly after World War II.  It seems that the author did not find an attack that he didn’t feel the need to describe in minute detail.  For the student of the period it is valuable, but the general reader will become bogged down in what seems at times to be a daily description of the terrorist and counter-terrorist activity that takes place.  The author reports on all major attacks, describing their explosive power, and casualties from what seems to be every angle.  The reader learns the details of the bombing of the King David Hotel that housed Britain’s governmental agencies for Palestine by the Irgun, assassinations of major figures, i.e.; Lord Moyne, kidnappings, hangings, as well as the overall terrorist dance that the Irgun and its allies engaged in with the British military and the Palestine Police Force (PPF).  What is most interesting is Hoffman’s analysis of Britain’s counter-terrorism strategy.  His observation that the British applied tactics that worked between 1936 and 1939 dealing with a rural insurrection, to an urban terrorist strategy employed by the Irgun between 1945 and 1948 reinforced the objectives sought by Begin and his cohorts in Lehi.  Further, once the British decided to employ 100,000 troops in Palestine after the PPF was not able to bring the terrorist threat under control, Palestine became a garrison state.  The actions of the police and military became confused and this segmented the police away from any source of actionable intelligence, the people themselves.  The British intelligence structure in Palestine was severely criticized as the political leadership in London could not make up its mind, and to make matters worse the intelligence agency (CID) in Palestine was poorly trained, under manned, and underfunded.  The result was that American intelligence (OSS) was much more reliable than that of the British and in many cases the British played right into the hands of Ben-Gurion and Begin.  The Irgun leader’s strategy was designed to counter British tactics.  His goal was to undermine the British government’s prestige and control of Palestine by striking at symbols of British rule.  The Irgun and its junior partner, Lehi targeted immigration, land registry, tax and finance offices, and made the price the British would have to pay to remain in Palestine much too high in light of England’s overall economic condition during the winter of 1947.

(The Arab Revolt in Palestine designed to stop Jewish immigration)

Apart from events Hoffman does a superb job explaining the ideological development of the major characters and the strategies they hoped to employ.  Though long winded at times the reader will emerge with a firm understanding of the beliefs of Begin, Ben-Gurion, al-Husseini, Qassam and many others.  The political machinations and battles that contributed to Britain’s inability to accomplish their goals is always present.  A discussion of the hatred between English Generals Bernard Montgomery and Evelyn Barker, and Montgomery and High Commissioner Alan Cunningham disrupted British decision-making repeatedly as did disagreement within the English cabinet in London.  The growing rift between the Atlee government and the Truman administration over a solution to the Palestine problem is present for all to see.  The divisive conflict within the Jewish leadership is detailed and is extremely important as Ben-Gurion and Begin did not enjoy the best relationship as they agreed and disagreed over the use of terror throughout their war against the British.  What was shocking to me was the degree of overt anti-Semitism that was evident on the part of many of the major British players.  As more and more British soldiers and civilians were victims of the violence perpetrated by the Irgun and Lehi, British frustration and anger manifested itself with a virulent type of anti-Jewish behavior.  One must ask, did British anti-Semitism inhibit their ability to solve the Palestinian problem?

Hoffman is a very skillful writer, and though he is somewhat repetitious, his integration of so much detail at times is very engrossing, but at other times it can be overwhelming.  He raises the issue that one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter and the partisan debate over such issues will find supportive evidence for each position throughout the book.  In addition, some might argue that there is no difference between the Irgun approach to statehood and that of Hamas and others today.  Hoffman argues that the Irgun and Lehi focused on British military and governmental targets.  Civilians were killed, but not targeted.  For Hoffman, Palestinian terrorists have often been indiscriminate and at times targeted civilians directly.  No matter the reader’s point of view, there is a great deal of history presented that could be debated, in addition to contemporary strategies that can be argued.  Overall, Hoffman has written a very important book that provides many insights as to why the problem remains so intractable.

(the old city of Jerusalem in winter, 1942…notice the snow!)

As Israel approaches new elections in March, the Palestinian Authority calls for further recognition in the United Nations, and Hamas still struts their weapons in Gaza, we find ourselves asking what is next for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  According to Amos Oz, the Israeli novelist, “there is a growing sense that Israel is becoming an isolated ghetto, which is exactly what the founding fathers and mothers hoped to leave behind them forever when they created the state of Israel…Unless there are two states—Israel next door to Palestine—and soon, there will be one state.  If there will be one state, it will be an Arab state.  The other option is an Israeli dictatorship, probably a religious nationalist dictatorship, suppressing the Palestinians and suppressing its Jewish opponents.”* Is this the vision that Israel’s founders saw in 1948?  If we examine the ideological splits in Zionism at the time there were groups that favored the concept of some sort of Israeli government excluding Palestinians in Palestine.  This ideology was part of the belief system of Abraham Stern, a Jewish freedom fighter and/or terrorist depending if you were Jewish refugee escaping the Nazis, or a member of the British mandate government in Palestine.  In his new book, THE RECKONING: DEATH AND INTRIGUE IN THE PROMISED LAND, Patrick Bishop examines the death of Stern by British police in 1942 and its impact on those individuals and groups who were bent on the creation of an Israeli state following the Holocaust.

(Israeli commemorative stamp of Abraham Stern)

The core of Bishop’s narrative centers on the personal conflict between Abraham Stern and Geoffrey Morton, the British Assistant Superintendent of the Palestine Police Force.   For Morton, Stern was a terrorist who was responsible for political assassinations of British officials, the murder of innocent Arabs, as well as Jews who became collateral damage.  The issue for Morton became personal, when Stern’s group killed his close friend and second in command, Wally Medler.  From Stern’s perspective, Morton represented a government that blocked the immigration of Jewish refugees in Europe who were trying to flee Nazi persecution, and stood in the way of the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.   Stern had evolved from a career as a promising poet in Poland, to an aspiring Zionist theorist, to an underground fighter.  By 1942 he saw himself as a warrior prophet who believed that England was the main enemy of the Jews and the chief obstacle to a Jewish state in Palestine.  For Morton, Stern and his followers were causing major difficulties for his government at a time when things in Europe were not going well, the Battle of Britain was in full swing, and Rommel’s Afrika Corps were approaching Palestine.  When Stern reached out to Italy as a source of weapons, it became clear to Morton that Stern could be a conduit for a “fifth column” for Nazis in the region.

(British wanted poster, 1942 for Stern Gang members)

Bishop provides biographical information for all of his characters and takes the reader through the politics on both sides.  The rupture between the Yishuv (the Jewish Agency that governed Palestine for the Jews, who at the outset felt working with the British would be beneficial in the long run), its military wing the Haganah, the Irgun (the revisionist group under the leadership of Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who rejected gradualism in dealing with the British), and the Stern group (that eventually broke with the Irgun and pursued a policy of violence) is examined in detail.  Bishop also explores the different factions within the British government, some who favored greater leniency toward the Jews because of their plight, and those like Morton who wanted to enforce the law as it was written and did not want to compromise.  The reader is taken behind the scenes reflecting solid research for each group and witnesses how decisions were reached and operations were planned.  Bishop keeps the reader aware of events in Europe and how they impacted the region to promote further understanding of all sides.  We meet all the major characters, those who hunted Stern and his cohorts, and those who carried out Stern’s plans and hid him from British authorities.

Bishop discusses the major actions taken by the Stern Group as it became known and its results.  He details the British response to the violence and how it finally was able to kill Stern in February, 1942.  It is the killing of Stern that forms a major focus of the book and the controversy that ensued.  Was Stern killed while escaping a friend’s apartment, or was he murdered as he was unarmed and trying to flee through a window in an area that was sealed off by British police.  Both points of view are given and to this day the controversy remains as to how Stern died.  The problem for British authorities was that the controversy over Stern’s death made him a martyr to the Zionist cause and was used to rally Jews against the British.  Following his death, Stern’s remaining followers worked out a Modus Vivendi with the Irgun, and the Haganah to continue the fight against the British mandate government in Palestine.

Bishop tries to present his narrative as a detective story designed to capture the reader’s interest and keep them on the edge of their seats.  A sub title of the book states, “a true detective story.”  Here I think the book fails.  In trying to take a historical monograph that describes so many different characters, ideologies, and government edicts it is very difficult to try and fit it into the parameters of detective non-fiction.  From the outset of the book, Bishop drops numerous hints as to his plot line and the coming death of Stern.  His repeated clues about Stern’s demise are better left out, and what Bishop should have done is let the story, an interesting an important one in light of current events, play out.  There are a number of important findings that Bishop emphasizes, particularly Stern’s attempts to come to agreement with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany for weapons and support as an ally against the British.  This component of the book reflects Stern’s obsession for the ultimate goal of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and his tunnel vision in that he would work with anyone to achieve it.  This did cause opposition in his “gang,” but ultimately they remained together.  Further findings dealing with Morton’s motivations in dealing with Stern and the Jewish problem and his rationalizations are important as well as his removal by British authorities who felt he had gone too far.

The book is very timely and it points out the influence Stern had on two future Prime Ministers of Israel, Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir.  Some might also argue that elements of Stern’s beliefs still exist in Israeli politics, particularly among right-wingers as we approach the Israeli elections in two months.  The book is a useful addition to the vast bibliography that deals with the creation of Israel, but it does itself a disservice by trying to create a historical mystery.

*”What Will Israel Become?” by Roger Cohen, New York Times, December 20, 2014.