THE GOOD SPY: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF ROBERT AMES, by Kai Bird

 

 

 

 

(The US Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon after the bombing, April, 1983)

As I write, rockets continue to be launched from the Gaza Strip by the militant group, Hamas, and Israel continues to retaliate with massive bombing and ground forces.  As this tragedy continues to unfold, Kai Bird’s latest work that deals with the Arab-Israeli conflict, THE GOOD SPY: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF ROBERT AMES is extremely timely.  When one thinks of the CIA operatives who have impacted the Middle East, the names of Miles Copeland, Kermit Roosevelt, and William Eveland come to mind, but usually not Robert Ames.  However, when one calculates the impact of these operatives on events in the region, Ames’ name should emerge near the top of the list.    Bird, who during his teenage years was a neighbor of Ames, recounts his private and shadow life as a CIA operative in great detail, but what he has written is more than a general biography.  He places Ames’ career that encompassed the years 1962 through 1983 in the context of events throughout the Middle East concentrating on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict and the Lebanese Civil War that raged between 1975 and 1983.  What separates Ames’ work from others who have attempted to facilitate peace in the region is that he was the individual who “brought the Palestinians in from the cold” through his relationship with Yasir Arafat’s intelligence chief, Ali Hassan Salameh. (15)  The book opens at the White House with a smiling President Clinton cajoling Yitzchak Rabin and Arafat into signing the 1993 accord granting the Palestinians a degree of self-government in Gaza and the West Bank.  Bird argues throughout that this agreement would not have been possible without Ames, and that his death during the American embassy bombing in Beirut in 1983 was a blow to the peace process because of Ames’ ability to empathize with Palestinians, gain their trust, and behind the scenes work to establish a relationship between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the US government in order to foster negotiations with Israel for a permanent peace.

During his first posting in 1962 in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia Ames became the protégé of Richard Helms who later would become the Director of the CIA.  Like Helms, Ames came to believe in human intelligence, not splashy technical operations or the application of force which tends to bring too much attention to CIA operations.  Ames wanted to remain in the “shadows” gathering intelligence from his contacts in making recommendations for policy.  For Ames “violence was usually impractical, ineffective, and costly.” (37)  In the early 1960s the CIA came to place a high value on officers who could develop human resources.  To do so they recruited agents who could remain anonymous, apply discretion and ironclad secrecy in cultivating sources.  These qualities were difficult to find, but along with “commonsensical powers of observation,” Robert Ames was the perfect operative.  Employing these skills for over two decades from postings in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Yemen, Lebanon, and Langley, Va., Ames developed numerous sources that allowed him to alter American Middle East policy and work to find a solution to the many conflicts in the region.

Bird does an excellent job explaining the background history of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict as well as the Lebanese Civil War through the lives of the most important historical characters.  He focuses on many individuals but zeroes in on those who interacted with Ames the most.  The two most important people are Ali Hassan Salameh, who followed in his father’s footsteps by fighting for Palestinian statehood and eventually he was recognized as one of the top two Palestinian military commanders and the eventual successor to Yasir Arafat.  The second was Mustafa Zein, educated in the US and was a very successful business consultant in Beirut.  Zein had many contacts in the Arab world and believed he could help bridge the political and cultural divide between America and the Arabs.  Ames would develop genuine friendships with these individuals and would work behind the scenes using Zein’s contacts to foster a strong relationship with Salameh.  Bird details how Ames was able to ingratiate himself with a man so close to Arafat and once he is able to do so, what the implications of that relationship were.  Though Salameh was seen as a terrorist by the US and Israeli governments, Ames were able to convince CIA and other national security officials in Washington of the benefits of establishing some sort of tie to the PLO.   At the time the PLO was labeled a terrorist group by the US and officials were banned from having any contact with them. In the early 1970s Ames relationship with Salameh established a back channel for PLO-US communication that President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were aware of, and Arafat approved.  With the Jordanian Civil War and the formation of Black September resulting in the Munich Olympic massacre in 1972 Ames worked through Zein to establish further links with Salameh who grew distant at times when elements other than Ames within the CIA tried to officially recruit him.  Ames realized that would make Salemeh a candidate for elimination by radical elements and just wanted to maintain his “friendship” with him.  The book at times is a dual biography of Ames and Salameh and stresses how their lives interacted as each tried to use each other for the benefit of the causes they believed in.

(Robert Ames)

Bird does a superb job explaining the intricacies of the political rivalries within the Arab world and how the US could take advantage of it.  He explores the relationship between the CIA and the Israeli Mossad and the conflict that usually remained dormant between these two intelligence groups.    The Mossad resented Ames’ work with Salameh who they blamed for the Munich massacre.  On a number of occasions Ames warned his source about assassination attempts against him, in part because of his friendship, and in part because he was so integral to what Ames was trying to achieve.  As their relationship progresses it becomes clear that Ames is not objective when it came to the Palestinians.  He developed an emotional attachment to them and in a number of ways reminded me of an American version of T.E. Lawrence.  As Bird writes, “to say that Bob Ames was sympathetic to the Palestinian cause would be an understatement.  He empathized with them deeply and admired Ali Hassan to a degree that is hard to explain.  He knew that Salameh had done some terrible things” and he wrote his wife Yvonne, “It is hard to believe our friend was what he was.”  But, being that Ames was the CIA’s only conduit to the PLO he was given great latitude and to his credit usually his subjectivity was not an impediment to his work.

The most important parts of the book aside from development of the Ames-Salameh partnership was Bird’s description of the Lebanese Civil War from 1975-1983.  Bird explains the different Lebanese factions and how they came to be and how they impacted events.  Bird also explores in detail the connection between events in Lebanon and the development of a plan in the early Reagan years to use Arafat as a vehicle for peace.  Ames was directly involved in negotiating an Arafat-US rapprochement, especially after he and his fighters were forced out of southern Lebanon and were given safe haven in Tunisia.  Bird’s description of the harrowing bombing of the US embassy in Beirut in 1983 that killed Ames and the bombing of the US Marine barracks shortly thereafter are very accurate.  As he does throughout the narrative Bird relies on his firm grasp of history and numerous sources within each government and movement.

The last section of the book focuses on who might have been responsible for the various acts of terror that occurred in Lebanon and an exploration of the role of Iran and its allies in the bombings.  Bird’s conclusion is that the perpetrator of these acts is currently living comfortably in the US under CIA protection is very disturbing.  Bird also reiterates his thesis that Ames laid the ground work for the 1993 accords and conjunctures as to what might have been accomplished had Ames not perished in the 1983 embassy bombing.  Bird’s writing is crisp and his conclusions reflect a great deal of thought and are usually very accurate.  The book is an important addition to the literature of its subject, and if one would like another perspective in trying to understand what is currently presented on the news each hour, then Bird’s book is for you.

THE TWILIGHT WAR by David Crist

I have followed US-Iranian relations for over forty years and David Crist’s work is the best that I have come across. It is a maticuously researched book that explores most diplomatic and military aspects of the American-Iranian relationship since the decline of the Shah and his overthrow in 1979. Crist explores the role of all the major players during the period and he raises important questions as to whether the deterioration of Washington’s relationship with Teheran could have been avoided are at least lessened significantly. The importance of this book can not be measured as Christ provides insight as to why Teheran has been the real victor resulting from the American invasion of Iraq. the twilight war may someday evolve into a “hot” war and policy makers and the general public should read this book very carefully. It is written in such a manner that the general public and the academic can benefit from. Based on current events Crist lays out some scary possibilities whether it pertains to the past or the future.

THE BERLIN-BAGHDAD RAILWAY by Sean McMeekin

Sean McMeekin is a historian who specializes in the diplomacy of World War I and has written an interesting survey of Turkish-German relations leading up to and during the “Great War.” The author concentrates on the role and construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway project that was designed to allow Germany to penetrate the Middle East and present the British with a diplomatic and economic defeat in the region. The railway was to counter the importance of the Suez Canal and was to be an integral part of Germany’s strategy to upset the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East. The book is well researched and documented and provides useful insights into German and Ottoman policies apart from the railyway itself, ie; Armenian massacre, Gallipoli. The important characters of the period, ie; Mustafa Kamal, Winston Churchill are discussed in detail resulting in a very satisfying read.

MY PROMISED LAND by Ari Shavit

Ari Shavit’s MY PROMISED LAND is the most important book dealing with the Arab-Israeli Conflict to be published since Thomas Friedman’s FROM BERUIT TO JERUSALEM.  After digesting Shavit’s work I am confused in trying to categorize it.  It is in part a personal memoir, it also contains the historical background of the region, it discusses the political strategies and military actions that have taken place in Palestine since the turn of the twentieth century, but more importantly it seems to be the philosophical and moral ruminations of one of Israel’s most important commentators analyzing contemporary issues and what the future may hold.  Shavit’s journey begins with his great grandfather Herbert Bentwich’s decision to forgo his comfortable family life in England and immigrate to Palestine in 1897.  From that point on Shavit takes the reader on a wondrous journey that encompasses the early history of Zionism, the uprooting of Jews as they try to escape anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, the survival of the Holocaust, and the creation Jewish state, with its many economic, social, and political problems.

Shavit’s approach is a masterful blending of interviews with the actors in this drama, including perceptive historical analysis.  At the outset Shavit has what appears to be a dialogue with himself as he wonders what his life would have been if his great grandfather had not gone to Palestine.  He correctly points out that his great grandfather, like other Jews before and after him do not see the Palestinian villages as he is motivated not to see them.  “He does not see because if he does see, he will have to turn back” because the wonderful possibilities that exist in the valley he witnesses are already spoken for.  But the plight of the Jews in Eastern Europe are such that a safe haven is needed where the Jews can develop their Zionist dream and establish a new Jewish identity based on cultivating the land.  According to Shavit, “as the plow begins to do their work, the Jews return to history and regain their masculinity: as they take on the physical labor of tilling the earth, they transform themselves from object to subject, from passive to active, from victims to sovereigns.” (35)  But in doing so they do not see or solve the problem that the Palestinian Arab presents.

Through Shavit’s interviews and vast knowledge the reader is presented with intimate details of kibbutzniks working the desolate valley that makes up Ein Harod, and the settlement of Rehovot which by 1935 reflect throughout Palestine that the Zionist dream is taking root.  The author  tells the story of the orange growers in Rehovot as a microcosm of the brewing conflict between Jews and Palestinians that will boil over in 1936.  Interweaving events in Nazi Germany and the development of Palestinian nationalism in the north the reader is presented a narrative and analysis of why the Palestinians will revolt in 1936 without the traditional political and ideological arguments that most historians present.  The Zionist argument is presented in a local weekly published in Rehovot; “we are returning to our homeland that has awaited for us as wasteland, and we are entering a new country that is not ours….all these riches we bring with us as a gift to our ancient land, and to the people who have settled it while we were away….” (62) But again no reference to the Palestinian.  Shavit’s argument throughout is that for the Zionist to be successful he had to be a colonialist and occupy the land that belonged to others and eventually force them out.  1936 is the first watershed year that Shavit speaks about as we witness the onslaught of Arab rage against the Jews in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Tel Aviv.  The violence and a general strike are different than past Arab protests as this is a “collective uprising of a national Arab-Palestinian movement that results in 80 dead and 400 wounded Jews that transforms their collective psyche as “the Jewish national liberation movement had to acknowledge that it was facing an Arab liberation movement that wished to disgorge the Jews from the shores they settled on.” (74)  The Arabs could no longer be ignored and the response led to further violence and brutality through 1939 as for the first time the Jews retaliated in kind.

In a wonderful chapter dealing with Masada, Shavit describes his interview with  Shmaryahu Gutman who realizes that as 1942 dawned the future of world Jewry rested in the hands of the Soviet army as it tried to stem the Nazi tide on the Eastern Front.  At the same time General Erwin Rommel is threatening Cairo and if successful the Jews of Palestine would be decimated.  At this point Gutman leads a group of 46 teenagers to climb Masada as part of their leadership training which the author describes in detail.  Gutman wants Masada to become the poignant symbol that will substitute for the theology and mythology that Zionism lacks.  He wants to create a Jewish ethos of resistance that will override the reputation of Jews who do not fight back.  It is an interesting concept that was explored in an earlier book by Jay Gonen, A PSYCHOHISTORY OF ZIONISM which offers the idea that Israel as a nation suffers from a Masada Complex, a type of Adlerian inferiority complex based on Jewish history.  Gonen argues that to overcome ones perceived inferiority, one adopts a superiority complex as compensation.  If so this offers a useful explanation of Israeli domestic and foreign policy from 1948 onward.  The Soviets blunt the Nazi advance and Rommel is stopped at El Alamein and “the Zionist enterprise is not that of drained or of orange groves bearing fruit but that of a lonely desert fortress casting the shadow of awe on an arid land.” (97)

For Shavit the lessons Jews learned concerning lethal historical circumstances are the key to Jewish survival.  The author uses the Arab village of Lydda as an example of Israel’s demographic policies during the 1948 War of Independence.  Because of its location it must be controlled by Israeli Jews if the new state is to survive.  In addition, the area of the eastern Galilee must be Arab free to provide land for survivors of the Holocaust.  The new Israeli government under David Ben-Gurion sees the War of Independence as a one time opportunity to solve the Arab problem.  Ilan Pappe, another Israeli historian describes in minute detail Operation Dalet in his book THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF PALESTINE, a plan to clear out Arab villages from areas that the new Israeli government wanted for its development.  Shavit agrees with Pappe and ruminates on the issue of Israeli occupation and what it has meant for Israel and how it has become an albatross around its neck from 1948 until today.  Once these lands were seized in 1948 the issue of the right of Palestinians to return has become one of the major stumbling blocks for any future peace.

Shavit tells the stories of Holocaust survivors and Jews who were able to leave Arab countries to come to Palestine and later Israel.  Shavit also tells the stories of displaced Arab families who have lived as refugees since 1948.  In so doing the reader is presented with a picture that is far from equitable.  Between 1945-1951 685,000 people were absorbed by a society of 655,000.  This was facilitated in part by reparations paid by the German government.  When interviewing Palestinian Arabs, Shavit hears that they would like resettlement and reparations, this time from the Israeli government to a Palestinian one.

The state of Israeli society is a major concern for Shavit and we see it through the eyes of many Israelis.  The economic miracle of the 1950s is based upon the denial of Palestinian rights as it “expunged Palestine from its memory and soul.” (160)  But this denial Shavit argues from a very personal perspective “was a life-or-death imperative for the nine-year-old nation into which I was born.” (162)  Shavit describes the common thread that all immigrants that are highlighted in his interviews.  First, travel by ship from a European port to Israel, followed by time in a refugee camp living in a tent for months on end, and finally a small apartment consisting of one and a half room in a town or joining an agricultural kibbutz.  The author is sensitive to the difficulties of societal integration, and the ability of families to adapt to their new surroundings.

In developing the narrative Shavit has chosen a number of important dates of which 1948, 1957, and 1967 stand out.  The War of Independence and the resettlement of Arabs is obvious, but 1957 is not so.  It was during that year that Israel and the France began colluding to develop a nuclear reactor in the Negev Desert.  French feelings of guilt because of the events of World War II made it possible for Israel to develop the Dimona Reactor which allowed Israel to develop a nuclear stockpile.  From the Israeli perspective Shavit argues that the reactor was a necessity because the expulsion of 1948 meant that the Palestinians would never rest until they recovered what they believed had been stolen from them.  He further argues that following the 1956 Suez War, Israel found itself surrounded by Arab armies that would never accept her and though Israel never acknowledged the facility the Arab states believed it existed.  The 1967 War brings forth a new concept for Israel, one of preemption, which allowed the success of the Six Day War.  That success however created a climate of preemption that will be carried out repeatedly in the future, i.e.; attacking the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, invading Lebanon in 1982, and destroying the Syrian reactor in 2007.  The policy of preemption has had mixed results for Israel and as we hear the same rumblings concerning the Iranian nuclear reactor today, we can just hope.

Israel’s actions after 1967 solidified her as an occupier of Arab territory and for a few years Shavit argues that Israel felt secure.  However, the early stages of the 1973 War proved a disaster for Israel.  Shavit correctly points out that Israel was victorious militarily, but psychologically it was a defeat.  The end result was the weakening of the Labour government that had led Israel since 1948 and for the first time Israelis felt doubt about the future.  With the weakened government the ultra-orthodox saw it as an opportunity to built settlements in the West Bank which Shavit describes through the eyes of the leadership of Gush Emunim and the resulting splintering of Israeli society.  This on top of the already emerging schism between the Oriental Jewish underclass and the Ashkenazi elite reflects a country that Israel was not unified and has not really come together to this day.

Shavit points out what he perceives to be the mistakes that Israel has made since independence.  The greatest one being one of occupation as he describes during one of his own army reserve tours in a Gaza prison.  But he also reflects as to the choices that Israel has as it is surrounded in a sea of Islamic countries who want to destroy her.  Shavit argues that each time Israel gives up territory as in Gaza and Lebanon it winds up with Hezbollah and Hamas.  He does not see a war breaking out in the near future but how viable will Israel be in fifty years when their own Arab population is a majority and orthodox Jews will outnumber secular Jews.  As far as the peace process is concerned Shavit correctly states that  “ what is needed to make peace between the two peoples of this land is probably more than humans can summon.  They will not give up their demand for what they see as justice.” (266)

There is much more to this book than I have discussed as Shavit ruminates on the conundrum that is Israel;  “if Israel does not retreat from the West Bank, it will be politically and morally doomed, but if she does retreat, it might face an Iranian-backed and Islamic Brotherhood-inspired West Bank regime whose missiles could endanger Israel’s security.  The need to end occupation is greater than ever, but so are the risks.” (401)  The picture Shavit paints is not a very optimistic one.  Whether he writes about the fractures in Israeli society, the weakness of its government, the inability to control the settlement movement, or the hope that its economic strength can continue, the geo-political world it lives in leads him to conclude his analysis by comparing Israel to a film; “we are a ragtag cast in an epic motion picture whose plot we do not understand and cannot grasp.  The script writer went mad.  The director went away.  The producer went bankrupt.  But we are still here, on this biblical set.  The camera is still rolling.  And as the camera pans out and pulls up, it sees us converging on this shore and clinging to this shore and living on this shore.  Come what may.” (419)

MY PROMISED LAND by Ari Shavit

Ari Shavit’s MY PROMISED LAND is the most important book dealing with the Arab-Israeli Conflict to be published since Thomas Friedman’s FROM BERIUT TO JERUSALEM.  After digesting Shavit’s work I am confused in trying to categorize it.  It is in part a personal memoir, it also contains the historical background of the region, it discusses the political strategies and military actions that have taken place in Palestine since the turn of the twentieth century, but more importantly it seems to be the philosophical and moral ruminations of one of Israel’s most important commentators analyzing contemporary issues and what the future may hold.  Shavit’s journey begins with his great grandfather Herbert Bentwich’s decision to forgo his comfortable family life in England and immigrate to Palestine in 1897.  From that point on Shavit takes the reader on a wondrous journey that encompasses the early history of Zionism, the uprooting of Jews as they try to escape anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, the survival of the Holocaust, and the creation Jewish state, with its many economic, social, and political problems.

Shavit’s approach is a masterful blending of interviews with the actors in this drama, including perceptive historical analysis.  At the outset Shavit has what appears to be a dialogue with himself as he wonders what his life would have been if his great grandfather had not gone to Palestine.  He correctly points out that his great grandfather, like other Jews before and after him do not see the Palestinian villages as he is motivated not to see them.  “He does not see because if he does see, he will have to turn back” because the wonderful possibilities that exist in the valley he witnesses are already spoken for.  But the plight of the Jews in Eastern Europe are such that a safe haven is needed where the Jews can develop their Zionist dream and establish a new Jewish identity based on cultivating the land.  According to Shavit, “as the plow begins to do their work, the Jews return to history and regain their masculinity: as they take on the physical labor of tilling the earth, they transform themselves from object to subject, from passive to active, from victims to sovereigns.” (35)  But in doing so they do not see or solve the problem that the Palestinian Arab presents.

Through Shavit’s interviews and vast knowledge the reader is presented with intimate details of kibbutzniks working the desolate valley that makes up Ein Harod, and the settlement of Rehovot which by 1935 reflect throughout Palestine that the Zionist dream is taking root.  The author  tells the story of the orange growers in Rehovot as a microcosm of the brewing conflict between Jews and Palestinians that will boil over in 1936.  Interweaving events in Nazi Germany and the development of Palestinian nationalism in the north the reader is presented a narrative and analysis of why the Palestinians will revolt in 1936 without the traditional political and ideological arguments that most historians present.  The Zionist argument is presented in a local weekly published in Rehovot; “we are returning to our homeland that has awaited for us as wasteland, and we are entering a new country that is not ours….all these riches we bring with us as a gift to our ancient land, and to the people who have settled it while we were away….” (62) But again no reference to the Palestinian.  Shavit’s argument throughout is that for the Zionist to be successful he had to be a colonialist and occupy the land that belonged to others and eventually force them out.  1936 is the first watershed year that Shavit speaks about as we witness the onslaught of Arab rage against the Jews in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Tel Aviv.  The violence and a general strike are different than past Arab protests as this is a “collective uprising of a national Arab-Palestinian movement that results in 80 dead and 400 wounded Jews that transforms their collective psyche as “the Jewish national liberation movement had to acknowledge that it was facing an Arab liberation movement that wished to disgorge the Jews from the shores they settled on.” (74)  The Arabs could no longer be ignored and the response led to further violence and brutality through 1939 as for the first time the Jews retaliated in kind.

In a wonderful chapter dealing with Masada, Shavit describes his interview with  Shmaryahu Gutman who realizes that as 1942 dawned the future of world Jewry rested in the hands of the Soviet army as it tried to stem the Nazi tide on the Eastern Front.  At the same time General Erwin Rommel is threatening Cairo and if successful the Jews of Palestine would be decimated.  At this point Gutman leads a group of 46 teenagers to climb Masada as part of their leadership training which the author describes in detail.  Gutman wants Masada to become the poignant symbol that will substitute for the theology and mythology that Zionism lacks.  He wants to create a Jewish ethos of resistance that will override the reputation of Jews who do not fight back.  It is an interesting concept that was explored in an earlier book by Jay Gonen, A PSYCHOHISTORY OF ZIONISM which offers the idea that Israel as a nation suffers from a Masada Complex, a type of Adlerian inferiority complex based on Jewish history.  Gonen argues that to overcome ones perceived inferiority, one adopts a superiority complex as compensation.  If so this offers a useful explanation of Israeli domestic and foreign policy from 1948 onward.  The Soviets blunt the Nazi advance and Rommel is stopped at El Alamein and “the Zionist enterprise is not that of drained or of orange groves bearing fruit but that of a lonely desert fortress casting the shadow of awe on an arid land.” (97)

For Shavit the lessons Jews learned concerning lethal historical circumstances are the key to Jewish survival.  The author uses the Arab village of Lydda as an example of Israel’s demographic policies during the 1948 War of Independence.  Because of its location it must be controlled by Israeli Jews if the new state is to survive.  In addition, the area of the eastern Galilee must be Arab free to provide land for survivors of the Holocaust.  The new Israeli government under David Ben-Gurion sees the War of Independence as a one time opportunity to solve the Arab problem.  Ilan Pappe, another Israeli historian describes in minute detail Operation Dalet in his book THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF PALESTINE, a plan to clear out Arab villages from areas that the new Israeli government wanted for its development.  Shavit agrees with Pappe and ruminates on the issue of Israeli occupation and what it has meant for Israel and how it has become an albatross around its neck from 1948 until today.  Once these lands were seized in 1948 the issue of the right of Palestinians to return has become one of the major stumbling blocks for any future peace.

Shavit tells the stories of Holocaust survivors and Jews who were able to leave Arab countries to come to Palestine and later Israel.  Shavit also tells the stories of displaced Arab families who have lived as refugees since 1948.  In so doing the reader is presented with a picture that is far from equitable.  Between 1945-1951 685,000 people were absorbed by a society of 655,000.  This was facilitated in part by reparations paid by the German government.  When interviewing Palestinian Arabs, Shavit hears that they would like resettlement and reparations, this time from the Israeli government to a Palestinian one.

The state of Israeli society is a major concern for Shavit and we see it through the eyes of many Israelis.  The economic miracle of the 1950s is based upon the denial of Palestinian rights as it “expunged Palestine from its memory and soul.” (160)  But this denial Shavit argues from a very personal perspective “was a life-or-death imperative for the nine-year-old nation into which I was born.” (162)  Shavit describes the common thread that all immigrants that are highlighted in his interviews.  First, travel by ship from a European port to Israel, followed by time in a refugee camp living in a tent for months on end, and finally a small apartment consisting of one and a half room in a town or joining an agricultural kibbutz.  The author is sensitive to the difficulties of societal integration, and the ability of families to adapt to their new surroundings.

In developing the narrative Shavit has chosen a number of important dates of which 1948, 1957, and 1967 stand out.  The War of Independence and the resettlement of Arabs is obvious, but 1957 is not so.  It was during that year that Israel and the France began colluding to develop a nuclear reactor in the Negev Desert.  French feelings of guilt because of the events of World War II made it possible for Israel to develop the Dimona Reactor which allowed Israel to develop a nuclear stockpile.  From the Israeli perspective Shavit argues that the reactor was a necessity because the expulsion of 1948 meant that the Palestinians would never rest until they recovered what they believed had been stolen from them.  He further argues that following the 1956 Suez War, Israel found itself surrounded by Arab armies that would never accept her and though Israel never acknowledged the facility the Arab states believed it existed.  The 1967 War brings forth a new concept for Israel, one of preemption, which allowed the success of the Six Day War.  That success however created a climate of preemption that will be carried out repeatedly in the future, i.e.; attacking the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, invading Lebanon in 1982, and destroying the Syrian reactor in 2007.  The policy of preemption has had mixed results for Israel and as we hear the same rumblings concerning the Iranian nuclear reactor today, we can just hope.

Israel’s actions after 1967 solidified her as an occupier of Arab territory and for a few years Shavit argues that Israel felt secure.  However, the early stages of the 1973 War proved a disaster for Israel.  Shavit correctly points out that Israel was victorious militarily, but psychologically it was a defeat.  The end result was the weakening of the Labour government that had led Israel since 1948 and for the first time Israelis felt doubt about the future.  With the weakened government the ultra-orthodox saw it as an opportunity to built settlements in the West Bank which Shavit describes through the eyes of the leadership of Gush Emunim and the resulting splintering of Israeli society.  This on top of the already emerging schism between the Oriental Jewish underclass and the Ashkenazi elite reflects a country that Israel was not unified and has not really come together to this day.

Shavit points out what he perceives to be the mistakes that Israel has made since independence.  The greatest one being one of occupation as he describes during one of his own army reserve tours in a Gaza prison.  But he also reflects as to the choices that Israel has as it is surrounded in a sea of Islamic countries who want to destroy her.  Shavit argues that each time Israel gives up territory as in Gaza and Lebanon it winds up with Hezbollah and Hamas.  He does not see a war breaking out in the near future but how viable will Israel be in fifty years when their own Arab population is a majority and orthodox Jews will outnumber secular Jews.  As far as the peace process is concerned Shavit correctly states that  “ what is needed to make peace between the two peoples of this land is probably more than humans can summon.  They will not give up their demand for what they see as justice.” (266)

There is much more to this book than I have discussed as Shavit ruminates on the conundrum that is Israel;  “if Israel does not retreat from the West Bank, it will be politically and morally doomed, but if she does retreat, it might face an Iranian-backed and Islamic Brotherhood-inspired West Bank regime whose missiles could endanger Israel’s security.  The need to end occupation is greater than ever, but so are the risks.” (401)  The picture Shavit paints is not a very optimistic one.  Whether he writes about the fractures in Israeli society, the weakness of its government, the inability to control the settlement movement, or the hope that its economic strength can continue, the geo-political world it lives in leads him to conclude his analysis by comparing Israel to a film; “we are a ragtag cast in an epic motion picture whose plot we do not understand and cannot grasp.  The script writer went mad.  The director went away.  The producer went bankrupt.  But we are still here, on this biblical set.  The camera is still rolling.  And as the camera pans out and pulls up, it sees us converging on this shore and clinging to this shore and living on this shore.  Come what may.” (419)